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Abstract
The 1991 reforms to Britain’s health service established a quasi-market where the 
purchasing function was performed by health authorities and those general practices that 
joined the fund-holding scheme. Whilst the literature lacked any direct comparison of 
the performance of these agencies as purchasers, there was much controversy about the 
equity implications of the system. Most notably this focused upon alleged differences in 
the waiting times for hospital services of patients registered with fund-holding and non 
fund-holding practices. However, such allegations were based on anecdotal evidence 
and open to contradiction.
The thesis moves this debate beyond a reliance on anecdotal evidence and for one 
service, elective surgery, redresses the lack of evaluation in the relative merits of fund­
holders and health authorities as purchasers. The waiting times of fund-holding and non 
fund-holding patients for operations covered by the fund-holding scheme were compared 
at four public providers over a four-year period. Fund-holding patients from the elective 
waiting list generally had significantly shorter waits than their non fund-holding 
counterparts. Because such trends became evident after practices joined the scheme, 
shorter waits were linked to fund-holding status.
Another important aim was to ascertain why this tendency occurred. A series of 
hypotheses were tested, including the generosity of fund-holders’ budgets, contrasts in 
the surgical case mix of each population, plus differences in the way fund-holders and 
health authorities perform their purchasing roles. An aspect of this last hypothesis was 
confirmed. Hospitals admitted fund-holding patients sooner to dissuade fund-holding 
practices from referring elsewhere. This connects to the income hospitals receive from 
fund-holders being more closely attributable to actual patient throughput than was the 
case with their income from health authorities.
In discussing the policy implications of the study, the thesis then addresses how public 
sector quasi-markets can work in the contexts of both equity and efficiency.
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Preface
The introduction in 1991 of a quasi-market into Britain’s health service was commonly 
perceived as the most radical change to the service since it began. Yet while the reform 
clearly changed the organisational structure of the service (the purchaser provider split), 
its impact on the services received by patients was less clear. A reason for undertaking 
this research was to try and resolve this problem in the context of one service, elective 
surgery (though the study compared the performance of the purchasers within the quasi­
market, not the new system and its forerunner).
The performance of health authorities and general practice fund-holders were tested by 
comparing the waiting times of patients who had their elective surgery commissioned by 
each purchaser type. Indeed, the respective waits of these patient groupings had aroused 
much controversy, with viewpoints previously based on anecdotal evidence. This study 
was intended to provide hard evidence for that debate.
For this comparison, a substantial database giving the waiting times of non fund-holding 
and fund-holding patients was required (information held by all health authorities), and it 
was here that the author’s employment history may well have had a telling effect. I was 
told that my request for the database was undoubtedly looked upon more sympathetically 
than would otherwise have been the case because I am a former employee of one the 
health authorities in the county where the research was based. Another advantage was 
staying in the health service since leaving the health authority. For the entire duration of 
this research project, I was employed by a fund-holding practice from the same county.
Rather than this creating bias, I am convinced that the opposite was true. It was possible 
to see things from both the health authority and fund-holding angles. I am equally sure 
that my employment history caused no bias on the part of the interviewees seen for the 
research. Some were aware of my background, others were not, and there were no 
trends in either group’s answers to suggest that biases existed. Whilst keeping myself 
aware of the potential for bias, I am completely satisfied that it did not occur.
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C hapter 1
The 1991 reforms: questions, background and rationale
The reforms to the National Health Service (NHS), introduced by the government of the 
United Kingdom (UK) in April 1991, were widely judged as inaugurating the most 
radical changes to the service since its inception in 1948. Even so, they were still 
representative of an international trend during the last decade or more when health care 
reform was commonplace (Wagstaff et a/., 1993). For whilst the Thatcher regime was 
perhaps one of the most noted advocates of market mechanisms in welfare provision, 
their reforms to the NHS reflected a pattern of change that can be seen to various 
degrees almost everywhere in Europe (Baldock, 1993; Brommels, 1995; Saltman and 
von Otter, 1995). Indeed, there is room for states to learn from each other’s experiences 
(Ham, 1996a; 1997a), even though the precise pattern of the changes in different 
countries have been specific to each individual nation (Kane, 1995).
The central characteristic of the UK reforms was a division of the organisational 
structure of the service, or at least the part relating to the procurement and provision of 
secondary care for patients, into separate purchaser and provider functions to create a 
more competitive climate. In brief, the treatments received by patients from service 
providers were to be purchased on their behalf by health authorities and those family 
doctor general practices which elected, and were eligible, to participate in the fund- 
holding scheme.^
1. A reason, alongside concerns about cost containment and the tradition of centralisation in the NHS, 
why patients have the purchasing function performed for them derives from the economics of health 
care that stresses poor consumer knowledge. They are not generally considered to be knowledgeable 
enough to make appropriate clinical decisions themselves (see Strong and Robinson, 1990).
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The refomis, and in particular this dual-purchasing configuration for the services covered 
by the fimd-holding scheme, generated a mass of literature in which a number of issues 
have been discussed in an almost confirontational manner. Perhaps the most contentious 
debate concerned the implications of the system for equity between patients represented 
by health authorities and fimd-holding practices. Most notably this focused on disputed 
assertions that fimd-holding patients benefited fi-om shorter waiting times for the hospital 
services covered by the fimd-holding scheme than did non fimd-holders. It is this issue 
that provides the principal focus of this thesis.
QUESTIONS
The thesis has two primary fimctions. First, to fill the gap in knowledge regarding the 
question of whether fimd-holding patients were given quicker access to hospital services, 
specifically for elective surgery. Second, to establish the reasons why any such contrasts 
exist. After all, health authorities are far larger purchasers than fimd-holders, even when 
such practices are taken as a block.^ It might thus be expected that hospitals would be 
more reliant on the custom of the local health authority for their financial viability than 
on their business with fimd-holding general practitioners (GPs). This could presumably 
give health authorities a stronger negotiating position with providers than that enjoyed by 
the practices.
Indeed, this understanding led Glennerster et al. (1994a) to declare that the earlier 
admission of fimd-holding patients was an implausible strategy for hospitals because it 
would mean them discriminating against the largest purchaser. Proposals that fimd- 
holders were more able than health authorities to gain shorter waiting times for patients 
therefore seems to represent something of a paradox. As well as demonstrating whether 
and why providers pursued such a strategy, the dilemma will also be addressed by
2. In 1995/96 fimd-holders in England and Wales purchased just 7 per cent of the value of all NHS 
hospital and community services. Even in tiie area most densely covered by such practices the 
health authority still retained 71 per cent of the available resources (Audit Commission, 1996a).
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explaining the nature of purchasing leverage and examining hospital behaviour in the 
post-1991 NHS.
TERMINOLOGY
In the literature the system introduced in 1991 tends to be referred to as either an internal 
market or quasi-market. Pietroni (1993) inferred that the market is said to be internal 
because it operates within the public health care system of the UK. However, purchasers 
can buy services from both public and private providers, and the reforms may thus have 
increased competition for the private sector as well (see Propper and Maynard, 1990). 
This engagement of the public and private sector in a competitive relationship led Butler
(1992) to question the appropriateness of the phrase ‘internal market’.
Le Grand (1991a), using what might thus be a more suitable term, distinguished a quasi­
market from a conventional market because it differs in one or more of three ways. First, 
many of the organisations competing in the market may not be seeking to maximise their 
profits. Second, payment for services could be centralised away from the purchaser or 
otherwise made in the form of vouchers rather than cash. Third, agents might act on 
behalf of the consumers of the service, patients in the case of the NHS.
But for any talk of the post-1991 NHS, the 1997 general election result has made the use 
of words like ‘markets’ and ‘purchasing’ less fashionable now, at least with the new 
government, than under the former administration. Yet the actual purchaser provider 
split, or should one say the separation between commissioners and suppliers, looks here 
to stay for the foreseeable future. Moreover, since the thesis concerns events prior to the 
1997 election, the use of the traditional language of the quasi-market period is continued 
in this thesis. Therefore, while doubts have been raised about the technical correctness 
of calling the system an ‘internal market’, because of its widespread use it is utilised 
interchangeably here with the phrase ‘quasi-market’. Similarly the term ‘purchase’ is
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sometimes substituted by the word ‘commission’, and such expressions are also used 
without distinction.
Another small matter to briefly explain at this juncture is the use o f a hyphen when the 
term ‘fimd-holding’ and its derivative phrases are used in the thesis. The only exceptions 
are the times when direct quotations are cited fix)m other works and the authors had not 
used a hyphen in this way. Such use of the hyphen is very rare in the academic literature 
and in lower status official publications like the ‘executive letters’ and ‘health service 
guidance’ documents produced by the NHS Executive. However, in the higher status 
governmental literature, including ‘statutory instruments’ and ‘acts ofparliament’, a 
hyphen has been used. As such, the use o f a hyphen when referring to the fund-holding 
scheme can be seen as technically correct^ despite its infirequent usage.
EQUITY: PAST AND PRESENT
Although equity has been such a contentious issue since the 1991 NHS reforms, there is 
nothing new about attention being devoted to this topic. It has long held a prominent 
place in the literature about the health service. This is not surprising, as the creation of 
the NHS under Attlee’s administration can be seen as an attempt to secure greater equity 
in health care (see Bevan et al., 1980; Mays and Bevan, 1987). Indeed, despite Pereara’s
(1993) claim that precise specifications of equity objectives were oficn disregarded, 
Whitehead (1994) saw such aims as inspiring the original design of the NHS. Moreover, 
the accent given to equity in governmental publications before the last election (see NHS 
Executive, 1995a; Department of Health, 1995a) shows it has continued as a seductive 
goal across the broad range of the political spectrum. In short, equity is closely related 
to concepts like justice and feimess (see Le Grand, 1991b; Donaldson and Gerard, 1993; 
Le Grand et<û., 1992), making an equitable service synonymous with a just or fah one.
This of course raises the question as to what a feir or just health service would actually 
look hke. Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer (1993a) felt the essence of an equitable service
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was for payments to be progressive and primarily related to the ability to pay rather than 
the amount of care received, with access to services being available to those requiring 
them in quantities relative to their need. Similarly, others saw equity as implying things 
like the same treatment for those in equal need, with the extent of people’s treatment 
correlating with their degree of need (for example, see Evandrou et al., 1992; Harrison 
and Hunter, 1994). Such interpretations also encompass two other definitions of equity. 
Horizontal equity occurs when persons with a matching capacity to pay make identical 
contributions and those in equal need receive the same level of treatments. Vertical 
equity transpires if people in differing need obtain appropriately dissimilar treatments and 
those of unequal ability to pay make suitably disparate payments (see Appleby, 1992).
Yet in truth, the measurement of need and treatment is a complicated process (see Illsley 
and Le Grand, 1987) and the extent to which the NHS has matched the two concepts is 
uncertain (Le Grand, 1993). Still, the achievement of equity has traditionally been 
approached from a couple of angles. First, by trying to equalise the distribution of health 
care by social class. Second, by attempting to balance the geographical spread of 
resources through budgetary allocation and financial incentives to doctors (Le Grand et 
a l, 1990; Barr, 1993).
Equity by social class
Despite doubts as to whether it is the best tool for gauging inequality, differences in 
health across the population are commonly measured by comparing the mortality rates of 
different social classes (see Illsley and Le Grand, 1987). That was the health indicator 
used when the high correlation between material deprivation and ill health was most 
famously identified in the Black Report (Black, 1980). This comprehensive review 
concluded that disparities in health between social classes at that point had not declined 
since the early 1950s. Regardless of any criticisms concerning the methodology used for 
the report, the broad argument that deprivation and poor health are linked has not been 
seriously challenged, and was reiterated more recently by Subner and Bruce (1993).
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The perceived links between deprivation and poor health led to calls that health policies 
should be widened to include measures which counteract poverty (Townsend, 1987) and 
reduce inequalities in income and housing (Rutten, 1993). Such ideas also reinforce the 
claim of Culyer (1993a) that the health of individuals is unlikely to be determined just by 
the distribution of health care alone. However, Arblaster et al. (1996) made the point 
that some interventions can be made by health care agencies to lessen inequalities in 
health.
Also relevant to social class and the definition of vertical equity is the burden falling on 
different segments of the population for funding the NHS. Judgements that the UK tax 
system is only mildly progressive in terms of financing health care (for example, see 
O’Donnell et a/., 1993; Van Doorslaer and Wagstaff, 1993) comply with Wagstaff and 
Van Doorslaer’s (1993b) claim that pro-rich inequity has almost certainly existed in 
Britain. Indeed, it seems that this tendency may be representative of the position in some 
developing countries as well, even where the state has shown a concern for promulgating 
equity (see Baker and van der Gaag, 1993). Moreover, an earlier study pronounced that 
the more affluent sections of society have better utilised the health care available through 
the NHS, even though it is the deprived classes who may be in most need of its services 
(see Le Grand, 1982).^
Equity by geographic spread
The second traditional approach in the attempts to achieve equity in health, the nature of 
the geographic spread of resources, can be linked to the claim of Maynard (1993a) that 
the equal distribution of health care resources does not ensure a reduction in health 
inequalities. This also mirrors the verdict of Culyer and Wagstaff (1992) that achieving 
greater equality of health in the community requires an unequal distribution of medical
3. This hypothesis was later challenged (see O’Donnell and Propper, 1991; Powell, 1995), both 
articles prompting replies (see Le Grand, 1991c; 1995).
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care. However, the precise arrangements required for the equitable location of health 
care suppliers has remained open to question, and Mohan (1987) argued that more effort 
was still needed to amend any geographical and spatial inequalities in the level of health 
care provision in different areas.
New and Le Grand (1996) saw the allocation of NHS resources on a geographical basis 
as addressed by the introduction in 1977 of a methodology known as RAWP (Resource 
Allocation Working Party). The fundamental aim was to identify the health care needs of 
the population in each of the geographic regions of the NHS. Decisions were then made 
annually as to how much actual allocations should be adjusted to move such areas 
towards their target share, as indicated by the RAWP formula (Department of Health, 
1989a). These targets were based upon a calculation of what was required to provide 
the national average service to patients in each of the regions (West, 1988).
Although this venture moved regions closer to their RAWP targets, that success was 
qualified by criticisms that the system gave too much weight to planned service 
developments, like opening a new hospital, and historic patterns of service use that took 
little regard of efficiency. The Thatcher government felt this caused a weak relationship 
between the allocations to health districts and the number of patients in those areas (see 
Department of Health, 1989a), and thus abandoned RAWP in favour of setting health 
authority cash limits on a weighted capitation basis. This was founded on a 'needs’ 
based formula using rather elaborate population statistics. Subsequent work has taken 
place to try and make it more robust (see Carr-Hill et a/., 1994; Smith et a l, 1994).
In sum, the conventional past interest in equity pertaining to the NHS has mainly tended 
to concentrate on social class and geography. But however meaningful these factors are, 
the quasi-market reforms have significantly, if not completely, altered the nature of the 
equity debate. It has largely been diverted towards another two issues, cream skimming 
and the two-tier service. And even though more than seven years have now passed since 
the changes were implemented, it still seems fair to say that many of the questions raised
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in the literature about these subjects, particularly concerning the latter, have remained 
unanswered. Both topics will now be discussed.
Cream skimming
Anxieties were evoked that the new system might induce what is commonly known as 
‘cream skimming’, the act of discriminating against expensive users of the service (see 
Matsaganis and Glennerster, 1994a). Such conduct has also been called ‘risk selection’ 
(see Ham, 1996b) and ‘adverse selection’ (see Scheffler, 1989). The contention has 
largely been based upon conjecture built on a couple of linked grounds. That GPs 
participating in the fund-holding scheme might block the entry of people on to their 
practice list who they either perceive as likely to be expensive, or remove those existing 
patients who actually are costly. Such suspicions have partly arisen due to experiences 
with health maintenance organisations in America (see Scheffler, 1989), from where 
much of the literature on this subject comes (for example, see Wilensky, 1988). They 
could also have gained validity from the suggestion of Crump et a/. (1991) that random 
variation in patients’ needs may put individual fund-holding practices at financial risk.
Fortunately, there is no evidence to date that ‘cream skimming’ happens in the NHS 
internal market (see Glennerster et a/., 1994a; Ham, 1996b) due either to the financial 
mechanics of the fund-holding scheme, medical ethics, or a mix of both. Two examples 
may explain how the financial mechanics of the scheme can nullify the prospect that 
fimd-holders will ‘cream skim’. Firstly, they currently only pay the initial £6,000 of an 
individual patient’s treatment in a single year (see NHS Executive, 1994a), with costs 
above this figure met by health authorities. This form of insurance should theoretically 
remove much of the incentive to turn away high cost patients. Secondly, fimd-holders 
have customarily had much of their hospital services budgets set on the basis of past 
activity levels. If the period used for recording this activity was typical, high cost
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practices should get larger budgets that are adequate for the care needed by expensive 
patients/
Yet concentrating on the monetary rationale that fund-holding might give to such actions 
could have distracted attention away from a more likely reason why GPs, and not just 
those in the scheme, may carry out risk selection. This is to avoid heavy workloads by 
rejecting high demand patients from their practice lists, like those who regularly request 
night visits or surgery appointments for marginal reasons. Moreover, such patients need 
not necessarily be expensive in the context of receiving services from community and 
hospital providers. Hence if finance is not the only or even the strongest motivation to 
avoid certain patients, perhaps the fund-holding scheme was a ‘red herring’ for the 
research into such behaviour by GPs. Consequently, studies into discrimination against 
patients, in so fer as the analysis currently stands, may not yet be complete.
A two-tier health service
The other recent development over the equity debate concerns the possibility that a two- 
tier service evolved where patients of GP fimd-holders received preferential services at 
NHS hospitals to those who were registered with practices remaining outside the 
scheme. While past disclosures about this were based on anecdotal evidence (see Dixon,
1994), they have been quite plentiful (for example, see Samuel, 1992; Dobson, 1993; 
Fisher, A. 1993; Fisher, P. 1993; Luxton, 1993; McAvoy, 1993; McCullough, 1993; 
Wright, 1993). Most commonly the controversy centred upon the speed of access to 
services and suspicions that the waiting times for hospital admissions of non fund-holding 
and fund-holding patients are inequitable can be seen as a root cause of the Labour
4. Matsaganis and Glennerster (1994a; 1994b) argued that this fimding methodology might not 
provide sufficient motivation fcH* fimd-holders to enhance hospital efficiency in the longer-term. 
They suggested a capitation formula, weighted fw chronic health 6ctors, would give enough 
resources for expensive patients without undermining incentives to drive provider efficiency. 
Although framing a robust formula may be technically difficult (see Sheldon et al., 1994; Majeed, 
1998), a move tO)^ds widening the use of capitation funding has lately been given strong official 
policy emphasis (see NHS Executive, 1996a; 1997a). It appears that such funding methodologies 
will be used to set budgets for all purchasers of public healfri care services in the future.
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Party’s antagonism towards the scheme (see Bevan, 1998). It also explains why the new 
government ruled that NHS hospitals should admit patients solely on the basis of medical 
need from April 1998 (see Murray, 1997; NHS Executive, 1997b).
With regards to this issue, at the heart of the debate lie contrasting ideas about the 
effects of markets. Le Grand (1991a) wrote that a common criticism of conventional 
markets is based upon their potential to compromise social justice by fostering and 
maintaining inequalities, and intimated that suspicions could exist about quasi-markets 
having similar effects. Alternatively, Glennerster et al. (1994a) proposed that market 
systems tend to resist arbitrary behaviour, which complies with Barry’s (1987) assertion 
that they have egalitarian repercussions because competition is a persistent equalising 
force.
As to whether a degree of inequity does exist between fund-holding and non fund- 
holding patients, arguments have been made which support both angles of the debate. 
Such contradictory disclosures have even been made in pieces published around the same 
time. For example. Ham (1996b) claimed fund-holding has reduced the waiting times for 
hospital appointments of patients registered with general practices participating in the 
scheme. But another work published that same year took a different line. The Audit 
Commission (1996a, p. 21) suggested that waiting times for fund-holder and health 
authority patients, the latter being those of non fund-holding GPs, ‘are usually similar 
overall, although their seasonal patterns may differ’.
In truth, there has been a conspicuous lack of demonstrable evidence to corroborate 
either argument. This verdict is compatible with an earlier observation, cited previously, 
that allegations concerning the existence of a two-tier service have largely been based 
upon anecdotal evidence (Dixon, 1994). It is this controversy, where judgements have 
previously had closer ties with conjecture than certainty (Robinson, 1996), that provides 
a key theme for this study.
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As such, this thesis concerns one aspect of the changes to the NHS introduced in 1991, 
the parity of hospital waits. However, it is necessary to fill in the broader rationale 
behind the reforms to place the more detailed study that follows into its proper context 
and illustrate why an investigation into waiting times is both relevant and important. For 
this reason, detailed below is a sketch of the background to and expectations of the 
quasi-market reforms.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In the UK a period of almost continuous growth in state welfare following the second 
world war was halted in the mid-1970s (Le Grand, 1990) as the inflation fuelling oil 
crisis of that decade stimulated attempts to control public expenditure (Ham, 1992). For 
a decade or more the consequence of this for the NHS was a phase o f‘belt-tightening’ 
rather than particularly radical reform (Glennerster et a l, 1994a). Nevertheless, certain 
steps had been taken that can be seen as opening the way for the more significant 
changes which occurred later.
For example, the government experimented with ideas like the resource management 
initiative to try and influence clinicians to control costs (see Ham and Hunter, 1988; 
Packwood et a l, 1991). Attempts were also made through the introduction of general 
management to instil features of private sector management into the service (Allsop, 
1995), which may have meant that some managers more committed to the traditional 
format of the NHS were less likely to be retained (Thompson, 1993). Overall, the move 
towards general management has been considered by some commentators to be an 
important step in laying the foundations for the later quasi-market reforms (see Saltman 
and von Otter, 1992; Butler, 1993; 1994).
Yet the previously mentioned ‘belt-tightening’ may concur with the fact identified by 
Barr et a l  (1988) that Britain was spending less on medical care as a proportion of gross 
domestic product than most other OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
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Development) countries. But despite this, they also made the point that it did not seem 
to cause a genuine crisis in public health. This was because nothing indicated that the 
health of the population was suffering because of the relatively low spending (they also 
claimed that there is no obvious relationship between a state’s expenditure on medical 
care and the health of its population). Moreover, Britain continued to appear at least as 
healthy as most other developed countries. Indeed, with regard to the achievements of 
health service agencies, Loveridge (1992, p. 216) described the performance of NHS 
providers before the reforms were implemented as ‘world class’.
Nevertheless, despite such commentaries the health service was not an arena in which the 
government escaped condenmation. A burden was generated as the decreased growth in 
NHS funding coincided with a continuing acceleration in the demand for its services. In 
part this reflected the additional services required by an ageing population, plus the rise 
in people’s expectations of the health service as medical technology has advanced (Ham, 
1992). During the mid-1980s this tension was magnified by a number of factors which 
attracted extensive media coverage and criticism of government health policy. These 
included such things as ward closures (Butler, 1994), scandals about the failure to treat 
particular patients (Maynard, 1993a), severe shortages in nursing staff (Ham et al.,
1990), plus a lack of medical equipment (Butler, 1992). Another commonly cited source 
of criticism was an increasing public discontent with the length of NHS waiting lists (for 
example, see Bartlett, 1991a; Butler, 1992; Glennerster and Matsaganis, 1994).
The initial response of the government was to announce in December 1987 an addition 
of around £100 million for the NHS to ease the problems. Yet this had little immediate 
effect in relieving pressure on the Conservative administration (Ham et al., 1990). In 
short, they were embarrassed to be faced with a widespread perception that under their 
control the health service was in a state of financial crisis. Margaret Thatcher reacted to 
the predicament by announcing a formal review of the NHS (Klein, 1995). The decision 
was revealed during an interview on a BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) current 
affairs television programme. Panorama, in January 1988 (Ham et al., 1990; Maynard, 
1993a), and allegedly came as a surprise to some of her ministerial colleagues in the
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cabinet (Maynard, 1993b). This course of events led to claims that the review was ‘an 
explicitly political response to the intense concern that had arisen about the supposedly 
low level at which the NHS was funded’ (Butler, 1993, p. 59).
The NHS review
The initial priority in the review was to find alternative ways to finance the health service 
(Ham et a l, 1990). However, ideas related to the financing question such as a social 
insurance scheme that would include the right for people with private insurance to opt 
out of the national scheme were, although considered, subsequently rejected. Despite 
the evidence that the Thatcher administrations were committed to a critique of state 
institutions (see Silverman, 1990), this was perhaps due to the government’s realisation 
that the existing tax funded service with cash limits might be a rather better way of 
controlling overall expenditure (Butler, 1992; 1993; Klein, 1995). Financing issues thus 
gave way to a debate about methods for achieving a more efficient use of NHS resources 
(Butler, 1993; 1994; Hunter, 1993).
It is noteworthy that the timing of the review followed a visit to Britain by the American 
economist Alain Enthoven, who had written a paper suggesting the introduction of an 
internal market could have important benefits for the NHS (Enthoven, 1985). This work 
is seen as having much influence in driving the reform process (WagstafiFet a l, 1993), 
and the idea that hospitals should compete against each other for income in a quasi­
market gained particular favour as the review developed (Ham, 1992). Following the 
review, the government outlined its plans for the health service in the White Paper 
entitled Working for Patients (see Department of Health, 1989a). A separation of the 
purchaser and provider functions in the organisational structure of the service was the 
major proposal in this document.
Enthoven’s (1985) proposition was to favour health authorities as having a purchasing 
role in an internal market. This was intended to address various criticisms he had made
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of the NHS which he saw as caught in a grip of forces that made change exceedingly 
difficult to bring about, a scenario he called a gridlock. Problems he identified included 
the difficulty in closing unwanted hospitals, the lack of incentives to run services more 
efficiently, and because resources did not follow patients, the consultants who treated 
more would not enjoy any extra reward or means to do the job. He saw an over­
centralisation in pay settlements as making it harder to attract staff in some areas, and a 
shortage of local responsibility in paying for buildings which increased the chances that 
space would be wasted. He also perceived a lack of financial accountability in terms of 
knowing the costs of running services and in performance against budgets. Moreover, he 
felt patients were not considered as a central enough priority to be taken seriously.
Yet there was an alternative proposal as to who might undertake the purchasing 
function. Maynard (1986) had argued GPs were sensible candidates for such a role, and 
put forward the thought that all GPs could purchase all services for their patients. The 
notion that GPs should have a purchasing task was a late arrival as a serious option in the 
review discussions when Kenneth Clarke became the Secretary of State for Health, and 
he became the chief advocate for the initiative (Glennerster et al., 1994a; Timmins,
1995).
As such, there were two competing ideas for purchasing the hospital and community 
health care services. One has been called top-down funding through health authorities, 
the other bottom-up through GPs (Glennerster, 1997), and the government ‘went for 
both at once’ (Glennerster, 1992, p. 181).’ However, restrictions on the range of 
services coming within the purchasing remit of GPs and minimum patient list size
5. This dual-purchasing configuration can also be linked in some ways to the idea of Mullen (1990; 
1993) that there are two main types of internal market. One is purchaser led, the other patient led. 
Mullen (1993) felt the NHS was in reality closer to the purchaser led model, though it had attributes 
of the patient led type as well. Nevertheless, patients are more likely to have greater influence on 
the purchasing decisions of fimd-holders than health authorities (Glennerster et al., 1998) and some 
referrals may even be made due to pressure applied on GPs by patients (Coulter, 1992a). When 
such points are considered alongside Bryden’s (1992) claim fiiat fimd-holders could have greater 
freedom fix)m the constraints on making extra contractual referrals that health authorities may place 
upon other GPs, it is plausible that fund-holding is somewhat more akin to a patient led system than 
health authority purchasing.
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requirements for the practices volunteering to take on the role did make the scheme 
outlined in the White Paper less radical than Maynard’s (1986) initial idea.
A cautious start
The quasi-market was formally launched in April 1991 following the passage through 
parliament of the NHS and Community Care Act 1990. Hence there was a relatively 
brief interval of not too much longer than a couple of years from the finish of the review 
at around the end of 1988 to the start date. This was the case even though the service 
has not been considered by some as notably responsive to attempts to change it in the 
past (see Dennis, 1993a; Spurgeon, 1993a). The speed of the implementation might thus 
be an example of March and Olsen’s (1989) model whereby major structural change can 
be made to large organisations resistant to transformation through a process of radical 
shock (see Ferlie et a l, 1993; Tilley, 1993). It also complies with the suggestion of 
Williams (1990) that the medical establishment in the UK had resisted change for too 
long under the banners of ethics and clinical freedom, and the connotation that the more 
conservative elements of the profession needed to be shaken out of their complacency.
Nevertheless, the reform proposals had aroused intense debate and controversy on a 
number of fronts. An example that illustrates this was the row over the extent to which 
public providers acquiring trust status would sit outside the mainstream NHS, and 
whether this was a step on an agenda leading towards an enlarged private provision of 
health care (see Peck and Spurgeon, 1993a). By April 1991, and for the initial period 
afrer this date, such accusations were making the government play down the market 
element of the reforms (Baggott, 1994). This would appear to correlate with William 
Waldegrave replacing the rather more abrasive Kenneth Clarke as Secretary of State for 
Health in November 1990 (see Hunter, 1993).
With the government thus exhibiting an apparent desire to preserve its standing in the 
popularity stakes, or at least avoid its position becoming irreparably damaged, the quasi-
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market in its early days generated very little competition. The first year was even 
characterised by an approach that prohibited purchasers fi*om making major changes to 
providers’ established activity levels (Appleby et al., 1993; 1994). This interval 
corresponds with what Ferlie et al. (1993) called a pseudo market, in which the changes 
are a symbolic reform bringing little substantive variation to the inherited pattern of 
relationships. In such a situation the reorganisation is primarily a re-labelling exercise. 
Such caution may have connections with Bartlett and Le Grand’s (1993) point that the 
success of the reforms was more likely if uncertainties in the system were limited so as 
not to undermine long-term planning. However, March and Simon (1958; 1993) claimed 
that even conventional markets can ofl;en exhibit considerable stability and predictability.
Yet the formulation of this ‘steady state’, seen by Caines (1993) as the first cloud on the 
horizon for the idea of survival through performance, was probably driven by the 
impending 1992 general election. Its continuation was thus not a guaranteed feature for 
the longer-term, which relates to the way in which the Audit Commission (1993) thought 
the system should mature. Whilst agreeing that the immediate relationship between 
purchasers and providers at the start of the reforms should be collaborative, they felt that 
health authorities required the fi*eedom to alter their purchasing patterns if they were to 
be fuUy effective. Moreover, once the election was over, and won by the Conservative 
Party despite the hostile political conflict over its health care strategy, market structures 
containing the capacity for fiercely competitive behaviour were still in place and signs 
began to appear that they would be used (Butler, 1993).
Nonetheless, this point is not supposed to exaggerate the fi*ee nature of the quasi-market 
introduced through the 1991 reforms. Although the fundamental principles of market 
theory are explained below in order to convey the key ideas that inspired the changes, the 
internal market has always been regulated. And whilst Arvidsson (1995) claimed more 
information needs to be acquired about the topic of regulation, different types of quasi­
market produce diverse regulatory regimes (Challis et al., 1994). Ferlie et al. (1993) 
identified two types of regime as being likely in a managed health care market: control by 
government or self-regulation by professionals. There are likely to be elements of both
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in the post-reform NHS, maybe the former in particular. It is thus probably appropriate 
to think of the system as a form of ‘managed con^etition’, a phrase used by Klein et al. 
(1996). Indeed, this term also seems to correspond with other commentators use of the 
term ‘planned markets’ (see Saltman and von Otter, 1995; Saltman, 1996).
PURPOSES OF THE REFORMS
In line with the change in the priorities of the NHS review (away from finding fresh 
means of fimding the service), none of the traits of the quasi-market appear to contradict 
a crucial feature of the established system. The state still retained control of financing 
the NHS. But regardless of this continuity, the notion that any reform to a public service 
must surely be undertaken because the government involved wants to accomplish 
something through the change has an obvious and extremely con^elling logic. The 
organisational split between purchasers and providers was clearly meant to change the 
behaviour of these key agents in some way (Drummond, 1993). But that remark is not a 
precise observation. The introduction of a quasi-market into the NHS therefore raises 
the query as to what it was actually supposed to achieve. In addressing that question, 
this section will also examine what the former Conservative Government of the time may 
have found so attractive in the idea of public sector market systems.
The theoretical nature of markets
A market is a network where buyers (purchasers) and sellers (providers) interact to 
exchange payment for goods and services. Certain constraints will exist to the exchange 
relationship. For instance, this can include the effect of income and price in terms of the 
resources that are available to buyers for paying the price at which an item is being sold, 
and the access of purchasers to a market for the produce they might wish to buy. Prices 
can also be seen as a communicator of information (for example, see Steele, 1993), and 
in textbook economics prices play a central role in bringing supply and demand into
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balance. If supply exceeds demand the price would fall, and if demand exceeds supply 
the price should rise. Prices can therefore give signals to suppliers as to whether they 
should expand or contract supply (for example, see Williams, 1987) and indicate the 
measurement of value to purchasers plus the extent of costs to providers (see Maynard, 
1987).
A market can be competitive if purchasers have a choice between alternative providers 
competing for their business. Perfect competition requires numerous purchasers and 
providers interacting in the market attempting to win orders or buy at the best possible 
price. Hence providers would have an incentive to increase efficiency in order to reduce 
the costs of production so that they can lower their prices and become the preferred 
supplier chosen by a purchaser. In reality price may not be the only consideration for 
purchasers and other factors could be the quality of the produce or service plus the speed 
of its delivery, although this should not be taken as an exhaustive list. The notion that 
greater efficiency comes from a multitude of sellers competing for the business of a large 
number of buyers equates with the principles of the neo-classical market (see Ferlie et 
al, 1993).
Although this is a very brief interpretation of the nature of markets, and possibly rather a 
one-dimensional view as well, it seems to highlight quite successfully the prevailing view 
of the Thatcher regime as to how markets were perceived to work and also the basic 
principles behind the NHS reforms. The crux of these was surely the proposition that 
competitive pressures induced by markets provide a spur to efficiency (Taylor-Gooby 
and Lawson, 1993; Flynn and Williams, 1997). A further temptation might conceivably 
have related to the potential for prices to communicate information, even though Culyer 
et a l  (1990) had reservations about instinctively accepting prices as effective signals to 
health care purchasers. Hence the basis for the reforms appear rather different to Gray's 
(1992) ethical support for market systems as a way of enabling personal well being 
through individual autonomy.
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Public choice, government failure and market failure
In many ways the reforms have their origins in public choice theory. This places the 
market in a central position to enable rational agents operating within it to supposedly 
advance prosperity for society in general (Self, 1993), whilst also adopting a theme that 
promotes small as responsive in the context of institutional design (Bobrow and Dryzek, 
1987). Indeed, this latter point connects to Mintzberg’s (1979) work on organisation 
theory. He argued that benefits from the decentralisation of hierarchical structures 
include a greater stimulus for motivation, quicker responsiveness to local conditions, and 
decisions made from a better understanding of local conditions. Moreover, Cox (1992) 
saw the changes as symbolic of the Conservative Government’s distaste for the kind of 
communal action incorporated in the original design of the NHS. Quite recently, Bloor 
and Maynard (1997) described the 1991 reforms as an ideological experiment.
In short, the reform proposals might have been indicative of an ideological commitment 
that monopolies should be broken up and systems deregulated to allow competition. 
Limits exist to the effectiveness of bureaucracy (Starkey and Hodges, 1993) and quasi­
markets were pictured as the means to enhance the efiBciency of the public sector (Gray 
and Jenkins, 1993; Taylor-Gooby and Lawson, 1993). The validity of this understanding 
of that government’s doctrinal sympathies appears to be emphasised by the introduction 
of quasi-market reforms into other areas of the public sector. For example. Ball et al. 
(1994), Glatter and Woods (1994), Johnes and Cave (1994), plus Levacic (1994) have 
all discussed such policies in the field of education. Meanwhile, Knapp et at. (1994), 
Means et al. (1994), Taylor and Hoggett (1994), Mannion and Smith (1995), plus Means 
and Langan (1996) addressed the use of quasi-markets in community care.
The expectation that introducing a quasi-market would enhance efficiency in the NHS 
may well have been driven on a theoretical level by some of the problems identified by Le 
Grand (199 Id) in his discussion of the theory of government failure. Namely, that 
government provision could be inefficient because public providers are usually, though 
not always, monopolies that are protected to a large extent against actual and even
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threatened competition from profit maximising organisations, as well as bankruptcy and 
take-over. This reduces the incentives to keep costs to a minimum and will induce what 
is known as X-inefficiency, the production of a commodity at more than the minimum 
possible cost. The pressures applied on public sector managers by their political masters 
to improve the efi&ciency of their organisations are routinely seen by market protagonists 
as less effective than market competition and contestability.
Furthermore, government failure suggests the state cannot gather all the information it 
requires to manage the economy effectively, and that there are too many limits to a 
government’s ability to set objectives centrally (Thonq)son, 1990). Such a perspective 
also figured in the arguments of Osborne and Gaebler (1992). They put forward their 
case for extending the use of markets and entrepreneurial spirit in the public sector by 
arguing that hierarchical and centralised bureaucracies designed in a past era do not 
function well in modem societies. This sentiment also conforms with the view of 
Leibenstein (1987) that the nature of hierarchies can be a source of inefdciency. Paton 
(1992) referred to the market or hierarchy debate as representing competitive efficiency 
versus the planned meeting of needs, although Pitelis (1991) proposed that aspects of 
market relationships are themselves hierarchical and so the choice is really between 
market hierarchies and non-market hierarchies.
Yet if markets can motivate organisations to at least make an attempt to produce a 
commodity at the minimum possible cost, a circumstance known as Y-efficiency, this and 
allocative inefficiency  ^are not mutually exclusive concepts (see Le Grand, 199Id). They 
can coexist alongside each other. For instance, the UK public health system may in the 
pre-reform period have delivered a better outcome in terms of life expectancy and other 
health indicators such as infant mortality at a lower cost than the US private system. 
Even if the US system was more Y-efficient through the effect of markets, and that has 
yet to be firmly established, it could still be highly inefficient in an allocative sense. This
6. Outside the concept known as X-efficiency, Glennerster (1992) discussed two other types of 
efficiency. Allocative efficiency is to distribute resources in such a way that produces the closest 
possible match between wiiat can be produced and vdiat consumCTS want. Productive efficiency is 
associated with goods and services being produced in the most efficient manner.
36
is because health care may not be distributed in a way that coincides with the needs for 
services of different sections of the population (see Le Grand, 199 Id).
Spurgeon (1993b) pursued the tension between markets and allocative efficiency by 
claiming that it is only in conditions of virtually perfect competition where the market 
will be efficient in an allocative sense. Barr (1993) also argued that unrestricted markets 
are highly inefficient, though the NHS quasi-market should not be seen as an unrestricted 
market (see Dennis, 1993b). That competitive markets can result in an allocation of a 
commodity that is socially inefficient is the principal rationale for the theory of market 
failure, and is paradoxical to the theory of government failure that pron^ted the NHS 
reforms. Along with the pursuit of greater social equality (see Le Grand, 1982), the 
prospect of market feilure is likely to have been one of the most important historical 
arguments for state intervention (Cowen, 1988). Indeed, Eckel and Steinberg (1993) 
saw market M ure as a M tor behind the existence of many non-profit organisations.
Yet aside fi*om any dispute over the merits or drawbacks of government intervention and 
markets, the belief of the Thatcher regime in the virtues of markets (see Appleby et al.,
1994) made their views accord more with the theory of government Mure. Moreover, 
the introduction of a quasi-market into the NHS probably embodied a dual belief (or 
hope). Whilst conventional markets can M  on the basis of allocative efficiency and 
public monopolies might not Militate AT-efficiency, quasi-markets could achieve both. 
Equal access may be preserved by keeping services financed by the state while also 
introducing an element of conq)etition (see Glennerster, 1998).
Choice, responsiveness and efficiency
A basic principle of the quasi-market was that money should follow the patient (Ebralum, 
1993). Hence the former Conservative Government doubtless anticipated that a system 
where NHS service providers competed with each other, and with those fi*om the private 
sector, for revenue fi*om purchasers would have the potential to overcome many of the
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perceived defects of the bureaucratic model of the welfere state. This observation is 
upheld by a remark made in official governmental literature. It was stated that providers 
would ‘produce a better quality service and encourage other hospitals to do even better 
in order to compete’ (Department of Health, 1989b, p. 3). The importance attached to 
inq)roving ‘quality’ in the service was en^hasised by Gregory and Walsh (1993) as well
It has also commonly been asserted that the new system was expected to give providers 
incentives to expand efficiency, choice and responsiveness (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993; 
Propper et al., 1994; Le Grand, 1994a; Bartlett, 1995; NHS Executive, 1995a). Such 
propositions appear to comply closely with the passage in Working fo r Patients that 
reads:
NHS Hospital Trusts will earn revenue fix>m the services they provide. They will 
therefore have an incentive to attract patients, so they will make sure that ffie 
service they offer is what their patients want. And in turn they will stimulate 
other NHS hospitals to respond to what people want locally. (Department of 
Health, 1989a, p. 4)
The theory was that in order to sustain long-term viability, providers wouM need to 
respond to and satisfy the demands of well informed purchasers who act in the interests 
of their client population (see Harrison and Nutley, 1993; Haycox, 1993; Kind et al.,
1993). This should enhance the efiBciency of the system. The question is what type o f 
efficiency was the dominant aim? It has been alleged that the Conservative Governments 
since 1979 gave priority to controlling public expenditure by granting a higher status to 
economic objectives than social policy goals (see Allsop, 1989; 1995; Hart, 1994), and 
Brazier et al. (1990) defined cost-efifectiveness as an aim of the reforms. Hence JT- 
efficiency could have been an intended objective of the quasi-market, at least to some 
extent.
Yet if the government had been seeking to reduce public expenditure by introducing a 
quasi-market they would have been disappointed by the outcomes (Glennerster and Le
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Grand, 1995). This does not necessarily contradict the possibility that more productivity 
could be obtained from the resources than might otherwise have been the case. But to 
change from a hierarchical to a market system may often raise the administrative costs of 
the structure (see Williamson, 1975; 1986; Bevan et a i, 1989). For instance the expense 
of separate purchasers and providers negotiating contracts with each other, known as ex 
ante costs, plus what are called the ex post costs of monitoring the outcomes of the 
exchange, are likely to increase the transaction costs of the system.
Further, it is often accepted that this has happened in the NHS (for example, see Bartlett 
and Harrison, 1993; Cook, 1993; Wall, 1993; Robinson and Le Grand, 1995), even if 
some health service staff may disagree with such a conclusion (see Walsh, 1995). Even 
so, there need not necessarily be just a negative side to any such increase. For instance, a 
prime justification for transaction costs is the attainment of information (Holstrom and 
Tirole, 1989). If raised transaction costs has made the NHS more rich in information, in 
theory this could easily have positive spin-offs for patient care (Glennerster et al.,
1994a).
From this, although it is hard to imagine the former government could have been totally 
oblivious to the prospect that the quasi-market might be administratively expensive, they 
still went ahead with their plans. Consequently, in view of the apparent willingness to 
tolerate or at least risk the danger of higher transaction costs, it does not appear either 
sensible or adequate to accept an extension of X-efficiency as the sole or even major 
objective of the reforms. Doubts must thus exist over the extent to which the Thatcher 
administration was concerned with ^ -efficiency when trying to raise efficiency, choice 
and responsiveness. Any hope that some degree of cost reduction would be achieved 
through competition may well have been just one goal that initially existed alongside 
other perhaps even more important priorities. It therefore seems a broader definition of 
efficiency should be adopted to identify the goals that drove the government’s plans for 
the NHS, beyond a simplistic reduction in public expenditure.
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Hospital efTiciency: shorter waits via competition
Sources have already been cited which have proposed that an area where there was a 
great deal of political and consumer concern about the performance of the NHS was 
hospital waiting lists. It also seems logical to assume that the length of waiting lists 
would normally correlate directly with the length of the waiting times, a point that was 
strongly emphasised by Yates (1987). He asserted that there is a clear and indisputable 
association between the length of waiting lists and the waiting times for surgical 
procedures. Long waiting times will lead to long waiting lists, while shorter waiting 
times will mean there are shorter waiting lists.
Moreover, waiting times may also have a large impact on the day to day experiences of 
many consumers of health services, the patients. Long waits for operations could mean 
they suffer some sort of inconvenience like, for example, pain, continuing illness, or time 
off work. In assessing the impact of the reforms on patients, waiting times thus look a 
legitimate comparator for measuring the relative merits of GPs and health authorities as 
commissioners.
From this, it seems reasonable to suggest that one aspect of the efficiency goals of the 
reforms was to lower waiting times and encourage higher patient throughput at hospitals 
by making them responsive to purchasers. This idea also falls into place with the concept 
of choice, as a competitive market may give opportunities to customers to express their 
interests in ways not often available in a monopolistic public service (Glennerster, 1992). 
By discussing of the concepts of exit, voice and loyalty, Hirschman (1970) explained why 
this might be so. Purchasers should have more potential to influence a provider through 
discussion or negotiation if they hold an opportunity to move their custom elsewhere.
To extend the responsiveness of suppliers, the influence of voice is increased when the 
option of exit is available to the buyer, and the option of exit derives from a choice 
between alternative providers.
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A further bridge between the efficiency goals of the reforms and a reduction in waiting 
times is provided by an observation of Frankel (1993). He argued that while health care 
rationing had been orchestrated by making patients wait for elective surgery, this was 
consistent with the NHS selecting for relative neglect those conditions where treatments 
are unequivocally effective and markedly desired by the population. This interpretation 
is linked to the reforms by the claim of radical economists that the extension of market 
forces is the only way to forge a strong link between that demanded and that produced 
(see Loveridge and Schofield, 1993). Moreover, this falls into place with the view of 
Spurgeon (1993b) that the quasi-market was expected to enable purchasers to target 
specific categories of patients on waiting lists.
As such, the publicity given to the waiting list problem for elective surgery by the media, 
making it a political crisis for the government, looks a significant factor in provoking the 
most radical restructuring of the NHS to date. Hence a better control over waiting times 
can be implied as a serious aim of the reforms, with the changes * intended to redirect 
activity towards those areas which may better reflect health needs, as these are perceived 
by the population’ (Frankel, 1993, pp. 1-2). To an extent the reorganisation may thus 
have had its origins in a fairly limited part of the service, elective surgery. This view is 
supported by the continuing weight attached to the reduction of waiting times by the last 
government, as shown by the production of guidelines for health service professionals, 
managers and clinicians, on how to meet this aim (see NHS Executive, 1996b).
On balance, it seems that the extension of hospital efBciency through making them more 
responsive to the choices open to purchasers must lie very near the heart of the reforms. 
The increased throughput of patients at hospitals, as implied by shorter waiting times, is 
thus the form of productive efficiency used here as the basic measure of the effectiveness 
of the alternative purchasers within the internal market. To apply, or perhaps adapt, 
Glennerster’s (1992) definition of productive efficiency (cited earlier), shorter waits are 
taken as indicative of hospital services being produced in a more efficient manner.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has relevance to policy. The early indications after the 1997 general election 
was that the new Labour Government looked to be assessing its options regarding the 
structural format of the NHS, which appeared to involve exploring different models for 
the commissioning of services (see Fletcher, 1997; NHS Executive, 1997c). Attitudes 
which can fittingly be recounted as resembling open hostility to fund-holding in the early 
years of the scheme (see Labour Party, 1993) had been reported as softening a little over 
time (Barrowcliffe, 1996).
Reports in the GP press even stated there were no immediate plans to abolish fund- 
holding in the first two years of the new government’s term of office (Brown, 1997).
That impression seemed to be upheld by the tone of governmental publications (see NHS 
Executive, 1997b), and complied with the view of Gosden et al. (1997) that not enough 
was known about fund-holding to make a firm decision about its future. Yet such a life 
expectancy was unlikely to be seen as adequate by Bosanquet (1996), who felt the 
weightiest gains from the scheme could take at least ten years to accrue.
But the new Labour Government’s White Paper on the fiiture of the NHS (Department 
of Health, 1997), whilst described as marking evolutionary rather than revolutionary 
change (Dixon and Mays, 1997), clearly signalled the direction in which the service 
would move. The internal market is formally to be abolished even though its central 
characteristic, a separation between the commissioning and provision of services, is to 
remain. It appears that fund-holding, and indeed health authority purchasing, will be 
succeeded by Primary Care Groups incorporating all GPs fi’om April 1999. While this 
may reflect Coulter’s (1995a) view that other models of GP involvement in purchasing 
might be as effective as fund-holding, it could also be that Primary Care Groups might be 
more of an extension to the fund-holding scheme than its replacement.
Yet either way it seems that both health authority and single practice purchasing will 
eventually be abolished. However, the intricacies of the reform proposals could mean
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there will still be room in the foreseeable future for many uncertainties to develop. For 
example, there are to be four different levels of Primary Care Groups. The first level 
may actually resemble current health authority commissioning, with some GPs possibly 
having the chance to give them advice. At the other extreme, the fourth level, groups of 
GPs should have much independence from the health authority to make their own 
purchasing decisions. Although the White Paper states that such groups will be expected 
to move towards the higher levels, it is difficult to estimate how long such a process 
might take, especially if a health authority is obstructive to groups wishing to do this.
As such, the true nature of the development of Primary Care Groups may well be in 
some doubt, making it necessary to use lessons from the fund-holding era to assess 
whether Primary Care Groups will be more effectively run by GPs or health authorities. 
Moreover, Ham (1997b) stated that any one purchasing configuration is unlikely to be 
appropriate in all circumstances. This brings a continuing need to evaluate the 
commissioning process and although Maynard (1996) suggested there is often a lag 
between research and the use of what it discovers, the thesis advances the attainment of 
evidence concerning the purchasing function. While focusing upon one type of outcome, 
the speed of access to elective surgery, it indicates which of the internal market’s two 
main commissioners achieved more or less than the other for that particular service.
This leads directly on to a second and connected theme in the discussion of waiting 
times, which is equity. If it were clear at the outset which of the two main purchasing 
options, health authorities or GPs, was to be the better commissioner, there would be 
little case for experiment. However, if one purchaser achieved shorter waits for their 
population than the other, was this fair? If waiting times are not equal, is this because 
practices within the fund-holding scheme were over funded, or might they simply be 
better purchasers of elective surgery than health authorities? This thesis will address 
these queries.
In doing this, the thesis breaks new ground in the existing literature. For instance, the 
Audit Commission (1996a) claimed some studies of fimd-holding (namely, Glennerster et
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al., 1994a; National Audit Office, 1994)^ have tended to consider the achievements or 
not of the scheme on the basis of fimd-holders' own views. Nevertheless, it still became 
the most studied aspect of the 1991 reforms (Dixon and Glennerster, 1995). Yet the 
same cannot be said about health authorities, despite the fact that they were the internal 
market’s largest purchasers. Little work has been performed, let alone completed, that 
evaluates their effectiveness as commissioners. Both of these points, an alleged over­
reliance on fimd-holders’ opinions of themselves and the relative neglect of health 
authorities by the research community, has made it difficult to get firm evidence about 
the comparative effectiveness of each purchaser type.
There is also a further endorsement for that suggestion. The lop-sided nature of the 
research whereby health authorities have been relatively neglected may have removed the 
use of tangible control comparators from some studies of fimd-holding. This could 
arguably have led to any results of the scheme being compared against what might either 
be an unrealistic image of perfection, or an overoptimistic vision of what should have 
been accomplished. For example. What the Doctor Ordered (Audit Commission, 1996a) 
was probably greeted by many critics of fimd-holding as a faultfinding piece of research 
into the scheme. Yet a framework used in this study for testing success was whether 
practices were ‘turning the world upside down’ (Audit Commission, 1996a, p. 89). As 
this seems such a very formidable yardstick can the conclusion reached, that not enough 
were doing this, really be too much of a surprise?
In line with that reservation, might it not be more useful to look at whether fimd-holders 
were bringing greater benefits and doing better than health authorities, or vice versa? 
Perhaps a chief weakness of the Audit Commission’s (1996a) study was that it left the 
impression fimd-holders were generally underachieving, but quite simply the judgement 
may not be either fair or balanced. Against such a challenging standard as turning the 
world upside down how many health authorities have managed to fulfil this target? After
7. Readers intending to search for these two works from details provided by the Audit Commission 
(1996a) should guard against being misled by their referencing. Glennerster was misspelled 
‘Glennester’ whenever this author was cited in the paper, and the National Audit OfBce document 
was mistakenly dated 1995, rather than 1994.
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all, whilst the project had not dealt with the proficiency of such bodies as commissioners, 
an ofiF-the-cufF remark was made that ‘in some areas, the new health authorities will have 
their work cut out to establish their own credibility as purchasers vis-a-vis the GPs’ 
(Audit Commission, 1996a, p. 98).
As such, measuring the success or otherwise of fimd-holders against some image of what 
would be ‘nice’ if they achieved it, whilst ignoring the performance of health authorities 
in the same field of care, says little about the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
internal market’s predominant purchaser types. Idealistic expectations might not always 
be the best mechanism for comparing the effectiveness of separate agencies. Hence it is 
feasible that whilst fund-holding may not have been perfect, it could be an improvement 
on the alternatives, with the reverse also being plausible. But with little comparative 
work having been performed, the style of the research to date fails to show which of 
these possibilities is true. Overcoming that deficiency in the existing literature is an 
important objective of this thesis.
Plan of the thesis
Having discussed the background plus goals of the reforms and identified the questions 
to be addressed in this chapter, the remainder of the thesis is arranged as follows. The 
primary objective of chapter two is to discuss the reasons why the waiting times of fund- 
holding and non fund-holding patients might differ. These are the hypotheses that were 
investigated during this study. The third chapter will explain the format of the NHS in 
the area where the research was conducted, and clarify the methodologies used for the 
investigation. Chapter four provides a comparison of the waiting times of fund-holding 
and other patients for the elective surgery covered by the fund-holding scheme. This is 
therefore a central part of the thesis that demonstrates whether there were differences in 
the waits of these groups, and goes on to consider if any contrasts can be attributed to 
fund-holding practices participating in the scheme.
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The next three chapters all address the hypotheses that might explain contrasts in waiting 
times. Chapter five considers whether fund-holding practices were systematically over 
funded in the area where the research took place. The sixth chapter compares the 
surgical case mix of fimd-holding and non fimd-holding practices. The seventh chapter 
deals with the impact of contracts on waiting times, the effect of the information and 
incentives applicable to each purchaser, the relationships between providers and different 
commissioners, and the impact of purchasers moving work away fi*om a hospital. The 
final chapter addresses the policy implications of the study in the context of the present 
government’s intentions. This discussion will cover the concepts of purchasing leverage, 
hospital behaviour, equity and efficiency.
C hapter!
The quasi-market and waiting times: the hypotheses
The format of the NHS internal market has been described elsewhere in varying detail by 
numerous authors (for example, see Culyer, 1993b; Paton, 1994), and was briefly 
outlined near the beginning of the previous chapter. The first purpose of this chapter is 
to cover the structure of the quasi-market and explain the main characteristics of the key 
actors within its constitution. This leads to a discussion of the factors that potentially 
could offer realistic explanations why the waiting times of fund-holding and other 
patients may differ. In essence, that part of the chapter identifies the hypotheses that 
were investigated during the course of this study.
PROVIDERS
Some publicly financed health services are actually supplied to patients by private 
providers. This happens when either a GP fund-holder or health authority commissions 
care for NHS patients from non-public hospitals or a wide range of independent private 
contractors that can include, for example, mental health counsellors and physiotherapists. 
This option has been used more fi-equently by fund-holders than health authorities 
(Bartlett, 1995), albeit probably to quite a limited extent as it is likely that NHS patients 
will mostly receive care through public institutions.
Prior to achieving trust status, public providers came under the organisational umbrella 
of what is often called their responsible or host health authority. They were the agencies
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known as ‘directly managed units’, a term referring to the hierarchical command that 
health authorities held over them. So that these providers could be both organisationally 
distinct and managerially independent from the direct control of the health authorities 
that were likely to be their main customers, they were given an opportunity to attain 
‘trust’ status. This meant gaining formal autonomy from the health authority by breaking 
away from it, although there is some debate about how far the severance was actually 
achieved and what the nature of the split should be.
For instance, Graham (1993) stressed the need for trusts to build on the pre-existing 
continuity of their relationships with health authorities in order to avoid instability, while 
Hargadon (1993) argued that for the quasi-market to be allowed to work, trusts which 
fail should not be bailed out.* Either way, directly managed units have been encouraged 
to acquire trust status. Moreover, in line with Hill’s (1993, p. 138) comment a few years 
ago that the growth in their number was becoming a ‘stampede’, it seems reasonable to 
assume that just about all of them would have done this by now.
Types of NHS trusts
Although what follows represents a guide rather than a definitive list and it may well be 
possible to find exceptions, there are four main sorts of trusts. One is the type providing 
ambulance services. The commissioning of ambulance services, which generally relates 
to the response to emergency call-outs and the time it takes to get such patients to 
hospital, does not fall within the standard fund-holding scheme. It is thus commonplace 
for ambulance services to be purchased for patients by health authorities. The exceptions 
to this rule occur when a ‘total purchasing project’ has taken on the task. These are 
either a single or more usually a group of general practices that act as a sub-committee of
8. On the basis of interviews with health authority staff, Glennerster et al. (1994a) implied that such 
organisations had in some areas (outside London) bailed out public providers for long periods. The 
contractual deals between these bodies had initially represented a concern to stabilise the market 
and protect NHS hospitals.
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their health authority to commission services outside the standard fund-holding scheme 
(see NHS Executive, 1996c).
Another form of trust is the hospitals providing a range of acute services. Many have 
accident and emergency departments, admissions to which can be made via concerned 
GPs, acquaintances of patients, or by self-referrals. Such services are excluded from the 
standard fund-holding scheme and, again with the exception of any total purchasing 
projects, are purchased by health authorities. Hospitals also perform diagnostic services 
like pathology and x-rays, as well as other procedures for patients referred by GPs such 
as physiotherapy plus outpatient and maternity services, with the latter also being outside 
the fund-holding scheme. Outpatient investigations can lead to a wide range of other 
treatments at the same or different provider, embracing such things as oncology services 
and elective surgery, the latter being operations performed on patients who have been 
called in from a waiting list. This covers clinically urgent cases as they are also placed on 
a waiting list, usually just for a shorter period of time than are routine status patients.
Another form of trust are those which provide a range of what are called community 
services, rather than the kind of acute episodes summarised above. Such trusts usually 
employ the district nurses and health visitors attached to GP surgeries, whose services 
are purchased by fund-holders, as well as having responsibility for supplying more 
specialised nursing care in the community. Generally they also provide treatments 
required by people with learning disabilities, plus a range of outpatient and inpatient 
mental health services, the latter involving sites used for institutional care which are not 
covered by standard fund-holding. Such trusts may also supply some other services, 
chiropody for example, in a community setting like a health clinic rather than an acute 
hospital. Indeed, some could even rent a site in an acute hospital for this sort of activity.
The final type of trust includes those where the task of supplying acute and community 
services has not been divided between separate bodies, but one organisation provides 
them both. When acute and community providers were severed from the direct control 
of health authorities to become trusts, the decision as to whether they would split into
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distinct or combined organisations was based upon local circumstances. For example, 
the acute and community provider arm of a health authority could have been ready to 
acquire trust status in different years, and if each took the earliest opportunity to do this 
they will obviously have been separated.
Does competition between providers exist?
If a major objective behind the 1991 reforms was an improvement in the efficiency of 
providers, the performance of trusts, which Peck and Spurgeon (1993b) saw as tending 
to lead the quasi-market, is surely one of the crucial bench-marks against which the 
success of the changes should be measured. Smee (1995) felt their establishment offered 
two distinct advantages over the hierarchical command and control system: that of 
operational independence for health care providers and market type incentives. The 
ways in which trusts responded to the demands of competition are thus most relevant to 
the success or otherwise of the quasi-market experiment. However, concerning this 
point, certain conditions may have to be met. Purchasers would need a degree of choice 
between different service providers (Culyer and Posnett, 1990; Bartlett and Le Grand, 
1993), and be willing and able to exploit the alternatives (see Glennerster et al., 1994a).
Regarding the question of whether commissioners really have enough choice between 
alternative providers, the balance of opinion in the literature seems to give a degree of 
weight to the premise that they do. Despite the early doubts of some observers that 
enough genuine options existed to make the system adequately competitive (see Bartlett 
and Harrison, 1993; Freudenstein, 1993), a number of other commentators came to a 
rather different conclusion (see Appleby et a l, 1994; Bartlett and Le Grand, 1994a; 
Glennerster et a l, 1994a). The view that effective competition may exist, at least to an 
extent at the margins, seems backed in part by the evidence of Mahon et a l  (1994) that 
some people are willing to travel to hospitals other than their local one, especially to 
where there are shorter waiting times. Nevertheless, this tendency was by no means 
reported as being uniform amongst all patients.
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As such, perhaps the quasi-market should not be seen as ultra-competitive? After all, the 
substantial size of most trusts makes the provider side of the ^stem  quite concentrated 
(ChaHis et al., 1994), and competition would f)e increased by afti^er number of smaller 
hospitals (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1994b; Le Grand, 1994b). The sheer size of NHS 
providers could thus give the system a monopolistic character, leading to speculation that 
part of its competitiveness may be reliant on hospitals being motivated to increase their 
efficiency to ward off the threat of new units entering the market. Yet in reality the high 
set-up costs for new providers appear very problematic in making the internal madcet 
contestable in this way (see Robinson and Le Grand, 1995; Ferlie et al., 1993). In view 
of this, the cong)etitiveness of the system might be more dependent on1x)th the capacity 
and the willingness of commissioners to move some patients between providers. I t  is 
therefore necessary to consider the characteristics of the purchasers.
PURCHASERS
The range of purchasers operating within the internal market has to some extent alt^ed 
over time. For example, various forms of commissioning groups have evolved around 
the country in which GPs are meant to acquire greater input into and links with the 
purchasing policies of local health authorities (for example, see Black er al., 1994; G ra ^  
and Williams, 1994; Balogh, 1996; Ham, 1997c). Hie genuine progress made by these 
sorts of group is not absolutely clear, although Glennerster et al. (1998) concluded that 
those achieving the greatest success were the ones most closely resembling fimd-holding.
Another kind of commissioning agency are the aforementioned GP total purchasers who 
are delegated a budget to buy a wider range of services than those covered by the 
standard ftmd-holding scheme. In reality, there were often some treatments not taken on 
board by these groups, so arrangements may fell short of genuinely making them ‘total’ 
purchasers (Mays et al., 1997). But despite such developments, health authorities and 
fund-holders have dominated the history of purchasing in the NHS quasi-market. Hiis
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dual-purchasing configuration over the last few years means the commissioning of health 
care services on behalf of patients has been undertaken by agencies with very different 
attributes, characteristics and even incentives. The major features of health authorities 
and GPs as purchasers are discussed below.
Health authorities
Since the 1991 reforms there has been a noticeable process of amalgamation between 
health authorities (Robinson, 1994). At first this occurred through some district health 
authorities combining, but the trend continued when district health authorities and family 
health services authorities were merged in April 1996 following the Health Authorities 
Act 1995. These events halved the number of health authorities in England and Wales to 
about 100 (Willis, 1996). Although family health services authorities did not have a true 
commissioning role, the general amalgamation process has tended to concentrate health 
authority purchasing power into a decreasing number of such organisations.
This trend could well have signalled an attempt to curtail the chances for providers to 
manipulate small purchasers (see Paton, 1992), although the potential for reducing 
administrative costs by combining smaller districts was possibly an even greater motive 
behind the changes. As more providers became trusts, the loss of direct managerial 
control by districts over the hospitals they were coincidental with had probably removed 
the need for so many smaller scale health authorities.
A primary function of health authorities is to assess, interpret and analyse the health care 
needs of its resident population (Williams et a/., 1993) and set contracts with providers 
to satisfy those needs to the maximum possible extent that is consistent with its cash limit 
(Tennison, 1992). It was anticipated that this process, by which health authorities should 
successfully secure measurable improvements in the health of their resident populations, 
could become more sophisticated over time (Akehurst and Ferguson, 1993). The role of 
health authorities as the internal market’s main commissioner is evident by the range of
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their responsibilities. In short, they purchase all hospital and community services for 
patients of non fund-holding GPs, plus those services not covered by the fund-holding 
scheme at any point in time for patients registered with GP fiind-holders.
Research on the performance of health authorities as commissioners has been quite 
sparse (Le Grand et a l, 1997), although Opit (1993) did claim that their job was made 
more difficult because they can have their purchasing strategies subverted by fund­
holders.^ This idea may connect with the claim of Challis et a l  (1994) that purchasing 
power was diluted by the growth in the number of practices joining the fimd-holding 
scheme (even though health authorities have always remained the major commissioner in 
the internal market). Beyond this. Le Grand et a l (1997) reviewed the evidence that 
does exist on health authority purchasing, and their survey suggests that the true impact 
of such organisations remains unclear. For example (although there are others), the 
contribution of health authorities in driving an increase in NHS activity since 1991 is 
unknown, as is their impact on switching expenditure between providers. On balance, 
the research on health authority commissioning looks inadequate.
Moreover, the structure of the purchasing configuration in the internal market appears to 
reflect two competing theories. First, the perceived efficacy of health authorities is 
coincidental with a need for the power of large providers (NHS trusts) to be countered 
by substantially sized commissioners. The second focuses on the strength of small 
purchasers that might be less inhibited and more flexible because of their limited size. It 
is this notion that provides a rationale for the fund-holding scheme, which is discussed in 
the following section.
9. Opit (1993) endorsed this claim by using an OPCS (Office of Population (Censuses and Surveys) 
publication from 1989, a couple of years prior to the start of the 1991 reforms, to allege that many 
health authorities had restricted funding termination of pregnancies. The point was also made that 
where this had happened fimd-holding practices 'in the same district can decide to finance all or 
none’ of these abortions in their own client population (Opit, 1993, p. 84). However, termination of 
pregnancy operations were not even covered by the standard fund-holding scheme until April 1996 
(see NHS Executive, 1995b), some three years after Opit’s (1993) paper was published.
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Fund-holders
During the initial period of the quasi-market fund-holders purchased a limited range of 
acute hospital services, although they also had budgets for practice staff and prescribing 
drugs. But in 1993 their purchasing remit was extended when a range of community 
based services were also brought into the scheme (see Glennerster et al., 1994a). In feet 
prior to the new government postponing the eighth wave of the scheme, practices with a 
list size of only 3,000 patients could take on the purchasing function for the community 
services, including district nursing and health visiting, plus diagnostic tests (see NHS 
Executive, 1994b). Beyond this, over the years the scope of the acute services covered 
by fimd-holding has grown. For elective surgery, the standard scheme was extended 
significantly in April 1996 (see NHS Executive, 1995b). From that date it has generally 
been the major or very costly procedures, including such things as organ transplants and 
brain surgery, which are still excluded (see NHS Executive, 1995c).
Participation in the fimd-holding scheme has always been voluntary (Audit Commission, 
1996a). For practices wishing to enter it on an individual basis there have been list size 
requirements that were relaxed over the years. The original proposal in Working for 
Patients (Department of Health, 1989a) had been for practices to have at least 11,000 
patients, although this was reduced to 9,000 by the time fimd-holding actually started. 
The minimum in England eventually fell to 5,000 (Audit Commission, 1996a) for the 
standard scheme, although smaller practices can group together to satisfy this condition. 
Some fimd-holding practices pool a proportion of their managerial resources to become 
what are known as multi-funds, though wide variations in the take-up of this option in 
different areas have been reported (see Audit Commission, 1996a).
A number of objectives have been identified for the fund-holding scheme. One was to 
give GPs the opportunity to enhance the quality of services on offer to patients, another 
to improve the balance of care between the primary, community plus hospital settings 
and reduce duplication between these sectors (National Audit Office, 1994). Other goals 
were to stimulate providers to be more responsive to GPs and patients by improving the
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quality of the services they offer (Department of Health, 1989c). Fund-holding was also 
seen as a way of increasing the sensitivity of purchasing to local needs (Willis, 1993), 
promoting value for money, and improving consumer choice (Dixon and Glennerster,
1995). Lemer and Claxton (1994) described such targets as ambitious.
In enabling purchasing decisions to be taken at a level nearer the patient, a rationale for 
fund-holding seems to be an expectation that by enabling consumer preferences to inform 
and determine priorities in secondary care services, efiBciency should be advanced. This 
accords with reports of some fund-holders extending the services provided at their own 
surgeries, thus altering the site of service provision (see Dixon and Glennerster, 1995). 
This trend was often represented by the development o f ‘outreach clinics’ (Bailey et a/., 
1994; Lapsley et a/., 1997), when outpatient clinics were held at practice premises. Yet 
any benefits fi*om this restricting the ‘did not attend’ syndrome by extending convenience 
for patients might also be balanced by some disadvantages. Harris (1994) argued that 
outreach clinics could involve consultants too much in direct services to patients rather 
than training and professional development. Moreover, Coulter (1996) proposed that 
there was little evidence to support a shift of care to general practice anyway.
Various authors have seen GPs as having a gate-keeping role in which, through their 
referrals, they filter patients into the more specialist sector of health care provision (for 
example, see Coulter, 1992b; 1998; Oswald, 1992; Fleming, 1992; Harvey, 1993; Dixon 
et al., 1998). They therefore possess at least a theoretical ability to determine the 
adequacy of the provision of expensive hospital services. This links to the economy 
objectives of the scheme as it may thus be a recognition of the importance of this gate- 
keeping function of general practice, and conceivably be an attempt to make GPs more 
responsible for their own control of it (Bryden, 1992). Davis (1993), however, saw the 
attempts to do this as contradicting the opportunities for user-choice.
Alongside the intention to make GPs more responsible for their referral habits, the same 
pressure was placed on prescribing (Hoey, 1995). By having a budget for drugs, against 
which savings could be retained by practices, an incentive was placed in the system to
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control prescribing costs. However, Petchey (1995) was sceptical over the efficiency of 
fund-holders in prescribing, and there were suggestions that mechanisms other than fund- 
holding can be used to restrain drug expenditure (see Paris et al., 1994). Nevertheless, 
there is evidence that the scheme curtailed the growth in drug costs in two ways, despite 
the contrary claims of Keeley (1994; 1997a). This was by increasing the rate of generic 
prescribing and cutting the average cost per item (Bradlow and Coulter, 1993; Maxwell 
et at., 1993; Dowell etal., 1995; Edwards, 1995; Harris and Scrivener, 1996).
Suggestions were made that the early containment of prescribing costs by fund-holders 
was not sustained (for example, see Stewart-Brown et a l, 1995). That finding coincides 
with a study in Northern Ireland where disincentives in the budget setting system, with 
savings being deducted j&om the following year’s allocation for drugs, made the curbing 
of costs a temporary trend (Rafferty et a l, 1997). This would appear to complement the 
judgement of Goodwin (1994) who, although not referring specifically to drugs, stressed 
the importance of incentives within the internal market.
On reflection, Dixon and Glennerster (1995) have already admirably reviewed research 
into the fund-holding scheme, and there seems little point in rewriting that article here. 
However, what is most important for the purposes of this research was that they noted 
the absence of any evidence from systematic study (at that point) to demonstrate whether 
or not a two-tier service was actually occurring. Not surprisingly, therefore, so is proof 
concerning the relative influence of factors that may possibly be making it happen. These 
issues are addressed in the following sections.
DEBATES AND HYPOTHESES: AN OVERVIEW
At a general level this thesis examines two contesting theories about commissioning in a 
public sector quasi-market: the financial power of large purchasers against the potential 
flexibility of smaller commissioners. Waiting times are a good test for the strength of 
each theory. There are various reasons why waits might differ, which can be categorised
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into two general groupings. Contrasts could be caused by one commissioner being a 
more effective purchaser than is the other. At a more detailed level, factors that can 
contribute to purchasing effectiveness cover contractual matters, incentives, information, 
relationships, and market flexibility. Yet even if differences in waits were established, 
they might not be related to purchasing effectiveness. Perhaps the surgical case mix of 
each population was radically different (this could be caused by chance or purchasers’ 
decisions), or financial resources were not distributed fairly between the commissioners.
These possibilities will all be discussed. In effect, each of the sections that follow relates 
to the hypotheses that were investigated for this study. The first main hypothesis, and 
the sub-hypotheses that comprise it, deals with the generosity of fund-holders’ budgets.
ARE FUND-HOLDERS BUDGETED OVER GENEROUSLY?
Numerous reports exist about the benefits of fund-holding (for example, see Bain, 1992; 
1994; Coulter, 1992c; Glennerster et a l, 1992; Leese and Drummond, 1993; Newton et 
a l, 1993; Wisely, 1993; Glennerster et a l, 1994a; Smee, 1995). Yet claims have been 
made that achievements are tempered by unfair advantages given to practices in the 
scheme. For example, Dixon (1994, p. 775) remarked that positive accounts of fund­
holders’ successes are marred by accusations of overgenerous funding, and health 
authorities use their alleged under funding as a * convenient smokescreen to hide local 
inefficiencies’. In brief, critics of the scheme suggest that a systematic over funding of 
the practices in it lie at the root of benefits enjoyed by their patients, including alleged 
shorter waiting times. Because fund-holders’ budgets are subtracted fi'om health 
authorities’ cash limits, this would have consequences for non fund-holding patients:
Overgenerous funding of fundholders means fewer resources available for the 
patients of non-fundholders, the consequences of which are likely to be most 
acute in areas with high numbers of fundholders... elective surgery is the area 
where inequities are most apparent. (Dixon, 1994, p. 772)
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However, popular usage of this hypothesis does not guarantee its accuracy, and the 
comment of Robinson et al. (1993) that there was little empirical evidence to support 
such views still holds true. Indeed, in a more recent piece Dixon and Glennerster (1995) 
made the point that while mounting anecdotal evidence suggests a two-tier service may 
have developed, this could be for a number of possible reasons. Although one of these 
was the over fimding of practices in the scheme, the true impact of this is unknown. This 
is not a major surprise considering the relative scantiness of research in this field.
Frostick and Wallace (1993) gave some attention to this issue and suggested that alleged 
variations between the treatment levels of fund-holding and other patients imply GPs in 
the scheme do receive an overgenerous level of funding. However, any such variations 
could be caused by a number of other factors, including differences in referral rates or 
contrasts in the genuine health care needs of each population. Alternatively, Opit (1993) 
claimed a simple test of the fairness of fund-holders’ budgets can be made by assuming 
every practice is in the scheme, grossing up the allotment for the services they purchase 
and seeing what remains of the health authority allocation. Without giving any indication 
of where or if this had been performed, the approach was taken as indicating that fund­
holders’ budgets were excessive. This non-evidence based assertion was supposedly 
validated by citing an anonymous report in an edition of The Health Service Journal (24 
October 1991) about the under spends of some practices in the scheme.
Dixon et al. (1994) performed a more evidence-based study in the North West Thames 
region, and claimed that fund-holding patients were budgeted more generously than non 
Amd-holders were. They reached this judgement by estimating the totals spent on 
specific hospital treatments by health authorities in 1993/94 and the amounts allocated to 
fund-holding practices for the same services. There were, however, problems with this 
study. Bowie and Spurgeon (1994) expressed reservations about it because some 
important assumptions were only based upon rudimentary data.
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A different line was taken by Glennerster et al. (1994b) who maintained there was more 
to suggest that first wave fund-holders were generally under rather than over funded.
This was carried forward by Glennerster et al. (1994a) claiming that there was little to 
support accusations that fund-holders were consistently budgeted over generously. 
National average costs showed fiind-holders on an aggregate basis were getting 15 per 
cent less in their budgets than would have been expected, with a more detailed study in 
the Oxford region indicating a 9 per cent shortfall for such practices. This view received 
earlier support from Brogan (1993), yet it contrasted with another study that suggested 
fiind-holders were over funded by about 15 per cent (see Glennerster et al., 1994a).
Similar to contrary assertions concerning waiting time differences, the literature thus 
incorporates opposing viewpoints regarding the budgetary position of fimd-holding 
practices. This could imply that budget setting for fiind-holders was something of a 
lottery, with both gainers and losers at practice level. Substantial variations in the size of 
budgets received by fiind-holders to purchase hospital services (see Day and Klein, 1991) 
may support this view.
Consequently, in any waiting time comparison it is crucial to test the fairness of the level 
of resources apportioned to fiind-holders in the relevant area. If their patients do benefit 
fi-om shorter waits than non fiind-holders, was this because they received inequitable 
budgets? The investigation into the funding hypothesis therefore represents an important 
element of this study, and the possible ways in which inequitable funding may come 
about is discussed next.
Different funding methodologies: an overview
Dixon (1994) argued that financial inequity between health authorities and GP fund­
holders has been inevitable because of the different methodologies used to fund them. 
Whilst the cash limits of health authorities were set on a weighted capitation basis (see 
NHS Executive, 1994c), fund-holders have traditionally received most of the hospital
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services element of their budgets according to past activity levels (see NHS Management 
Executive, 1991). Practices’ allocations have routinely been set according to the value 
of their activity in part of their final year outside the scheme. This was not the original 
intention of the government (Glennerster et a l, 1994a), but the delay in fi-aming a robust 
method of formula funding for general practices led to the immediate plans for setting 
fund-holding budgets through a capitation methodology being abandoned.
With the different methodologies used to fund health authorities and practices, there are 
various factors that could feasibly result in inconsistencies between their budgets, and 
each will be discussed in some detail. But it is worth mentioning one area in which this 
problem should not arise. Mohan (1995) claimed fund-holders with substantial numbers 
of patients with private health care insurance might be over funded because such patients 
are less likely to be a call on the practices’ budgets for NHS services. Yet practices with 
a ‘well-off list of patients might make less use of public services in the period used for 
measuring their historic NHS activity. So they would not receive funds for the private 
services received by their patients. It also seems unlikely that practices would be able to 
persuade such patients to use the NHS in a relevant year. People have private insurance 
in part to buy shorter waits (Calnan et a l, 1993), and such patients of non fund-holding 
GPs may be unwilling to endure longer waits for the sake of the practices’ future budget.
The effect of provider price changes
Perhaps a more likely reason why different funding methodologies could result in 
inequitable budgets is the possible existence of a policy stipulating that the resources of 
fund-holding practices should be increased in line with their local NHS provider’s price 
changes. The suspicion is that this would give incentives to providers to hike the prices 
they charge for services to fimd-holding patients beyond the percentage increase the 
health authority receives to its cash limit for inflation. If they did and the budgets of such 
practices were raised by an equivalent percentage, because the value of fund-holders’ 
budgets are subtracted fi'om their health authority’s cash limit, the funds retained by the
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health authority for its own purchasing function would be reduced. For services covered 
by the fund-holding scheme, this would disadvantage non fund-holding patients.^®
Dixon et al. (1994) investigated this issue and found no evidence that fund-holders were 
consistently charged higher prices than health authorities in the North West Thames 
region. Their limited analysis indicated that eight out of twelve hospitals actually 
charged fund-holders lower average prices than the health authorities. Therefore, if such 
practices were over funded (and it was reported earlier that they had claimed this was the 
case), it seems providers charging them higher prices than the health authority was not 
the reason. But this fails to guarantee that the same thing happened in other areas. The 
prices charged to different purchasers thus deserve consideration in this study.
Recording activity
A further concern over the historic data budget setting methodology is an aspect which 
lies at the very heart of the system, the recording of the activity of practices preparing for 
fund-holding status. Dixon (1994) raised the prospect that when surgeries and hospitals 
each monitored the activity of practices over a period of their last year outside the 
scheme, the two sets of data were often difficult to match. It was claimed that the level 
of activity recorded by practices was consistently higher than providers’ records.
Reasons given for this were that the discharge information produced by hospitals might 
be poor, episodes of care could mistakenly be recorded more than once, and treatments 
outside the fund-holding scheme, including emergency services, may be counted towards 
the budget. The argument was reinforced by an accusation that if a practice records 
more activity, it secured a higher budget and as more enter the scheme, non ffind- 
holders’ resources ‘will be squeezed further’ (Dixon, 1994, p. 775).
10. The prospect that the prices charged to one purchaser will affect the amount left over for the other 
might undermine Dawson’s (1994) view that both NHS policy makers and academics overestimated 
the importance of open information on prices. When markets are characterised by contestability, 
she felt that open information on prices (which tend to be unique and secret to each purchaser) is 
not a requirement for a dynamic and competitive system.
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Such arguments reflect a widespread belief among critics of the fund-holding experiment. 
To genuinely be the case, however, a number of conditions have to hold. First, the 
records of practices would have to be an overestimate of their true activity pertinent to 
the fimd-holding scheme. Yet this might not be as likely an occurrence as implied by 
Dixon (1994). It was in the interests of health authorities to check and challenge the 
data, and the accuracy of the capture of information inq)roved rapidly since the internal 
market began. And where a hospital’s discharge information was poor, this could result 
in practices being under fimded. For instance, notification that an episode of care had 
taken place may not be sent to the GP surgery and because practices mostly rely on 
hospitals for the specifics of their patients’ treatments, they would have no formal record 
of the activity. Hence relevant activity that should have been recorded towards the 
budgets of practices could easily be missed, rather than counted twice.
Second, the errors in distinguishing between fund-holding and non fund-holding episodes 
(such as taking emergency as elective cases) would have to be skewed in one direction. 
Yet elective treatments might just as easily be confused as emergency admissions and 
thus not counted when they should have been? But either way, the point made earlier 
about the rapid improvements in the accuracy of NHS data is important. It is inqwrtant 
not to exaggerate the likelihood of errors in the data collection process. Third, Dixon’s 
(1994) argument appears dependent on the records of practices, not providers, always 
being accepted in the final analysis as the true count used for the calculation of budgets. 
But in any district where the records of hospitals were finally used when there were 
discrepancies between the two sources of data, the point seems to lose its relevance.
From this, although the arguments of Dixon (1994) may well be usefiil in highlighting 
potential problems with the data collection exercise, some of the assumptions on which 
they are based appear rather one-sided. It seems quite feasible that the true activity of 
future fund-holders in the relevant period had as much chance of being understated as 
overstated. Considering this, the inaccurate recording of data might have a rather limited
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scope for making a material difference to the size of their budgets. Both sides of this 
argument, and the consequences, were summarised by the Audit Commission (1996a):
If through errors in budget setting fundholders were given a larger proportion of 
a district’s healthcare allocation than is justified on past patterns of referral, then 
less would be left to spend on the healthcare of non-fundholders’ patients.. .But 
the opposite would be the case should fundholders’ budgets be underestimated. 
(Audit Commission, 1996a, p. 106)
However, outside the accuracy of the data collection, there are other concerns over the 
historic data budget setting methodology. This relates to the standard period in which 
the historic activity of future fund-holding practices was used for budget calculation 
purposes (the first six months of their last year outside the scheme). For this might not 
be a feir indicator of each practice’s normal level of activity pertinent to the scheme.
Such suspicions are aroused due to two potential scenarios. One is that significantly 
more activity could have occurred in the first six months than in the second. If so, this 
would mean that new fund-holders could receive a greater share of health authority 
resources than might actually be fair. This prospect is discussed next. The other worry 
over the data collection period concerns the possibility that prospective fund-holders may 
tiy to inflate their patients’ usage of NHS services (this will be discussed later).
Non fund-holding work: the six-month balance
Of the two possible grounds why the data collection period could be untypical of the 
normal activity of practices preparing for fund-holding status, one would not be their 
feult, or would have no links to the conscious actions o f the GPs concerned. The other 
could indicate almost deceitful behaviour by the practices. It is the first that is dealt with 
in this section. It relates to a point made by Glennerster et al. (1994a) in order to e3q)Iain 
why health authorities may tend to run out of money more quickly than fund-holders, 
rather than automatically putting it down to such practices being over funded:
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Hospitals had an incentive to get through as much work for their district as their 
capacity permitted them to do as fast as they could. When they finished their 
contracted total of procedures they would then hope to persuade the district to 
give them some more money to continue to treat patients. (Glennerster et al.^  
1994a, p. 173)
The inference was that by contrast, fund-holders running out of money early was not 
likely to attract the same publicity and political pressure to find additional resources for 
the provider, but was more prone to give the impression locally that the practice could 
not manage its affairs properly. This point can be taken further by hypothesising that in 
such circumstances the health authority would probably not have the funds in reserve to 
afford precisely the same level of activity at the hospital as occurred in the early part of 
the year. Rather, it would perhaps maintain a steady admission of patients, albeit at a 
slower rate than the one at which the provider started the year for non fund-holders.
The idea that more non fund-holding activity might take place earlier rather than later in 
the year may be reinforced for another reason. It seems feasible that even if a district did 
not find extra funds for a provider later in the year, there might still be advantages for 
hospitals in meeting its health authority contract prematurely. For this would probably 
enable the provider to cover most of its fixed operating costs early. That might relieve 
its managers and clinicians of later pressure while offering an opportunity to maximise 
income by fast-tracking fimd-holding work fi-ee from any demands to meet the health 
authority’s targets. Such manoeuvring may also uphold the assertions of the Audit 
Commission (1996a) about the existence of seasonal variations in the waits of fund- 
holding and other patients, even though it was not stated which group had longer or 
shorter waits in what period of the year.
If the scenario that providers try to meet their main obligations under the health authority 
contract as quickly as possible is correct, the following proposition can be made. With 
new fund-holders ordinarily having their budgets calculated in line with the value of their
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activity in the first six months of their last year outside the scheme, they will be funded 
on the basis of the half year in which most of their activity took place. Whether this 
happens because providers attempt to get more money from health authorities or so that 
they can then concentrate on maximising their income from fund-holders is immaterial, 
the outcome will be the same. If so, a compelling argument can be made that enjoining 
the scheme, new fund-holders’ budgets will be overgenerous. Further, if that first year 
budget is carried forward in an ongoing process as the nucleus of practices’ allocations in 
future years, allegations that the resources left over for the care of non fund-holding 
patients would be unfairly diminished begin to look quite persuasive.
Practices inflating activity
There are suspicions that practices in their last year outside the scheme may accelerate 
the usage of hospital services during that period to surreptitiously increase their budget 
(see Keeley, 1994). This idea was also promoted by Bartlett (1995, p. 18) who wrote 
that such practices ‘boost their rates of patient referral in the year prior to becoming 
fund-holders’. Yet this is far from being a straightforward matter, which is shown by the 
apparent complexity of the rate of GP referrals as a topic of study.
For example, although Riis (1982) claimed the intricacy of medical practice can be 
exaggerated, various factors affect the decisions made by clinicians (Gambrill, 1990) and 
their referral patterns (Wilkin and Roland, 1993). That may conform to the lack of a 
consensus on what a desirable rate of referral may be (see Coulter, 1992d; Russell and 
Grimshaw, 1992). This seems reflected by reports of wide variations in the referral rates 
of different GPs (see Coulter e ta l, 1990; Haines and Armstrong, 1992; Jones, 1992; 
Wilkin, 1992), the reasons for which remain obscure (Roland, 1992a). Nevertheless, the 
contrasts are not adequately explained by conventional measures of need (Sanders et al., 
1989; Wilkin and Smith, 1987). Indeed, there is not even a known relationship between 
high and low referral rates and quality of care (Roland et al., 1990; Roland, 1992b;
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1992c) although in gross terms, large fluctuations in the numbers of referrals have not 
generally been observed (Farrow and Jewell, 1993).
At first glance, the subject therefore looks something of a ‘minefield’, and could perhaps 
offer some camouflage fi'om audit to any GPs who hike referrals to try and increase their 
budget offer. Yet new fund-holders are customarily budgeted according to the actual 
treatments and episodes of care given to their patients, not the number of referrals they 
make and raising referral rates is, on its own, unlikely to have a parallel effect on activity 
levels. Hence if a practice referred twice the number of patients as usual, this would not 
necessarily double their activity. For instance, extra referrals by GPs in a preparatory 
year could well clog hospital services up by increasing demand without a corresponding 
expansion in the capacity of providers. This could result in extended waiting lists for all 
patients using a hospital. That may slow any growth in the treatments given to those 
fi’om practices in their final year outside the fimd-holding scheme to a level much less 
than the increase in such GPs’ referral rates.
Moreover, most referrals are made for outpatient appointments, though episodes of care 
like pathology, physiotherapy, and x-rays can also be provided as a direct consequence 
of an action by a GP Yet elective surgery, by far the most expensive service covered by 
the standard fimd-holding scheme, is not supplied until a hospital doctor has seen and 
investigated the patient through an outpatient clinic and decided surgery is justified. As 
such, GPs cannot just send people off for an operation to increase their activity in the 
data collection period. A patient actually has to need one in the opinion of a hospital 
clinician.
Nonetheless, if GPs preparing for fimd-holding status were going to try and increase 
activity, as elective surgery is so much more expensive than the other services in the 
fund-holding scheme, this may well be the area they would concentrate on in order to 
make a material difference to their budget. There could be borderline, clinically non­
urgent cases where a GP can choose whether, and at what point in time, to refer or not. 
In such circumstances it seems reasonable to presume GPs might have a degree of choice
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over the timing of a referral for a patient who may need an operation. They may have an 
opportunity to decide whether to do this immediately or to wait and see how a condition 
develops so as to ascertain if it improves without surgery. A tangible chance to inflate 
surgical activity could thus exist.
But for services that are received by patients as a direct consequence of referral by a GP, 
which therefore look the most direct way in which a practice can manipulate its activity 
levels, there are difficulties in doing the same. For example, these episodes of care are 
amongst the least expensive that are covered by the standard fund-holding scheme. Also, 
for services like pathology, physiotherapy and x-rays, in some areas the budgets of fund­
holders have not even been set on the basis of the past activity levels of individual 
practices (see Glennerster et al., 1994a). If a simple capitation system had been utilised 
instead, the financial advantages for individual future fund-holding practices in, for 
example, requesting many more blood tests, is significantly diluted as the costs of their 
additional activity is spread out among many practices.
In addition, rational behaviour need not just be concerned with maximising budget size. 
For example, increasing activity for pathology means GPs will need to explain to more 
patients why they are having their blood, or whatever else, tested. Such a burdensome 
task may undermine any financial temptation for doing this, particularly if practices have 
to pay overtime to practice nurses for working extra sessions to accommodate a large 
increase in the samples they have to take. Similarly, raising outpatient activity will mean 
GPs writing many more referral letters, which not only becomes a repetitive and time 
consuming job for them but may feasibly incur additional costs within the surgery if 
typists have to work more hours. Such events may reduce practice profits and avoiding 
that could be far more important to GPs than increasing their fund-holding budget.
In view of this, the finding of Coulter and Bradlow (1993) that fund-holders had not 
altered their referral patterns since joining the scheme might not be too surprising, which 
strengthens the idea that practices preparing for fund-holding status may not have acted 
surreptitiously. Also, if practices had artificially increased their referrals in the year prior
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to attaining fund-holding status, they might be expected to lower them again after joining 
the scheme in order to create savings. Coulter and Bradlow (1993) found no evidence of 
this happening in the Oxford region. Yet work in the same area detected a growth in the 
referral rates of some control practices outside the scheme who were preparing for fund- 
holding status, though the rise continued after they had joined the scheme (see Surender 
et a/., 1995). However, Howie et al. (1994) suggested referral rates did drop after entry 
into the scheme, but this was accompanied by an increased use of direct access services.
From this, the question of whether fund-holders accelerated activity prior to their entry 
into the scheme seems to warrant a revisit for at least two concrete reasons. One is the 
apparent contradiction between the work of Coulter and Bradlow (1993), Howie et al. 
(1994), and Surender et al. (1995). The other is the fact that most of the studies were 
conducted in the earlier days of the quasi-market.
Further, it seems likely that if practices were trying to expand their surgical activity to 
enhance their budget, there are uncertain time gaps that occur between the GP sending a 
referral letter and the admission of patients for an operation. This suggests their activity 
would increase over the whole of the year in question. For even if GPs were skilful 
enough to increase referrals in such a way that the number of patients joining the surgical 
waiting hst is increased, it is most unlikely that the rise in activity would conveniently be 
concentrated into one half-year window. Common sense suggests many such patients 
would be admitted during the second half of a year. It just does not ring true that GPs 
could manage to condense any such rise in their patients’ surgery into a single six month 
period, as the sense of timing required would be nothing short of miraculous.
The distribution of movements in funding
Another factor that could feasibly cause an imbalance in funding between fund-holders 
and health authorities is the distribution of additional monies coming to the NHS in a 
district, or indeed the division of reduced allocations. Most obviously this relates to the
68
funds that health authorities receive for inflation, though the move from setting their cash 
limits through the RAWP methodology to a weighted capitation system has also resulted 
in changes to the cash limits of some districts. For example, if a health authority was 
shown by the capitation formula to be under funded through RAWP, it probably received 
growth to its cash limit to move it closer to the capitation allocation. Alternatively, if a 
district’s allocation under the RAWP system exceeded the amount that was implied as 
appropriate under capitation, it could lose funds from its cash limit.
If this latter possibility had been the case and a health authority lost funds in this way, it 
would seem unfair if longer-term fund-holding practices were able to keep their existing 
budgets in full. For these allocations would have been set at a time when there was more 
funding for the NHS in the district. Alternatively, if a health authority gained money 
through the move from RAWP to capitation, it would seem inequitable if fund-holders 
received an excessive (or insufiQcient) proportion of the extra funding, pro rata to the 
sum acquired by the district. The same point can be made about an increase for inflation. 
In principle, whatever amount was received by a health authority, the total passed on to 
fund-holders should correlate fairly with the district’s addition.
Summary
There are a number of factors that might conceivably result in an imbalance in funding 
between GP fund-holders and health authorities. However, there is no guarantee that 
any of them will ensure fund-holders have been budgeted over generously. In short, the 
important point that needs to be made here is that there is no clear evidence about fund­
holders either being over or under funded. Though Dixon et al. (1994) made a valuable 
bid to investigate this issue on a scientific basis, they were faced with inherent difficulties 
due to the limited data available to them. There is consequently a need to examine the 
funding issue and the matters just discussed will be addressed later (see chapter five).
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CASE MIX
It has been claimed that differences in the waiting times of fund-holding and other 
patients might result from what is probably a more obscure (but no less tangible) factor 
than inequitable funding or purchasing effectiveness: differences in the surgical case mix 
of each population (see Black, 1998). Case mix has been defined by the National Case 
Mix Office of the NHS Executive as ‘the mix of cases, types of patients and types of 
treatments’ (see NHS Executive, 1997d, p. 1). In terms of surgery, the case mix is thus 
the assortment of operations performed on patients.
For the hypothesis to be valid that fund-holding patients’ shorter waits result from case 
mix variations, there would have to be very different average waiting times for particular 
types of operations. To give a simple and fictitious example, perhaps the average wait 
for cataract surgery at a hospital might be far longer than for joint replacements. If this 
was the case, the validity of the hypothesis rests on the notion that proportionately more 
non fund-holding patients required cataract surgery than those of fund-holding GPs, 
whilst the incidence of joint replacements was far more common amongst fund-holders.
In reality, it is likely that this type of split between the operations given to each group of 
patients would have to be repeated amongst more than one sort of procedure to make a 
material difference to average waiting times. As such, there would have to be significant 
contrasts in the case mix of each population. The activity of fund-holding patients would 
generally be skewed towards those operations with shorter waits, with the reverse being 
the case for non fund-holders, and the effect of this on average waits would need to be 
significant. To investigate this hypothesis, comparisons will therefore need to be made 
of the case mix of surgical procedures received by fund-holding and non fund-holding 
patients, taking into account the waiting times for specific groups of operations. The 
case mix hypothesis was tested on this basis and a full discussion concerning the nature 
of the investigation, plus the results of it, are reported later (see chapter six).
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THE EFFECT OF CONTRACTS
The review of the potential reasons why waiting time contrasts might occur have so fer 
centred on factors outside the theories concerning the relative effectiveness of GP fimd- 
holders and health authorities as purchasers -  inequitable funding and differences in case 
mix (the latter may be down to chance). It is also necessary to consider how contrasts in 
waits could be explained by the ways in which commissioners perform the purchasing 
role. It is from this point that the discussion focuses more heavily on hypotheses dealing 
with the relative merits of each commissioner in controlling waits, rather than unfair 
advantages or even accidental outcomes.
The contracting process was one of the key characteristics of the internal market. The 
intention had been for purchasers and providers to be linked by contracts rather than 
management hierarchy (Robinson and Le Grand, 1995). Although Checkland (1997) 
claimed that the rhetoric of contracting had turned out to be stronger than the reality, it 
seems fair to suggest that on balance the true impact of the contracting process on many 
aspects of NHS services remains uncertain. For this reason the effect of contracts on the 
respective waiting times of patients registered with practices inside and outside the ftind- 
holding scheme requires investigation.
Three types of agreements have been used in the quasi-market: block contracts, cost-per- 
case contracts, plus cost and volume contracts (Figueras et al., 1993). Health authorities 
had sometimes used straightforward non-attributable block arrangements that can install 
rather obscure links between activity and payments, to sin^lify the management of their 
large deals with local NHS trusts (Paton et al., 1998). The purchaser agrees to pay the 
provider a pre-set annual fee, normally in twelve monthly instalments, for its services. A 
benefit may be that they are administratively simple to run, although this advantage might 
be balanced by a danger that the links between the income and activity of providers can 
be weakened (Ellwood, 1993). Fund-holders using block contracts have commonly 
utilised a more sophisticated form of this arrangement (see NHS Executive Trent, 1995).
71
Fund-holders have often applied ‘floors and ceilings’ to their block contracts for many 
services (although less so for pathology and community nursing). These can work if the 
twelve monthly payments are taken as the baseline value of the activity that will ideally 
be performed. Say the actual level performed falls between 98 per cent and 102 per cent 
of this figure, no rebates or additional payments may be due from either side. If the 
value of the actual activity rises above the 102 per cent figure, the purchaser could be 
liable for extra payments to the provider, usually at marginal rates (meaning the extra 
activity is paid for at less than the full price of the treatments). There might be a ceiling, 
say the 105 per cent figure, and any activity beyond that level is free to the purchaser. 
Otherwise, the provider may be liable to reimburse any shortfall in the activity performed 
below the 98 per cent total to the commissioner. This type of arrangement should 
motivate the provider to perform about the right level of activity.
Cost-per-case contracts have been used more by GP fund-holders than health authorities 
(Gleimerster et a l, 1994a; Robinson and Le Grand, 1995; Spurgeon et a l, 1997) and 
involve a payment for each relevant episode of treatment given to individual patients at a 
price that should reflect the complexity of the procedure. Whilst probably the most 
information-rich form of NHS agreement, they are also likely to be more expensive to 
implement and use (Bartlett, 1991b). This suggests transaction costs for providers that 
contract with a large number of fund-holders may be high (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993).
Cost and volume contracts are in effect a combination of the other two and whilst having 
different titles, conceptually they are very similar to block agreements with floors and 
ceilings. A pre-set annual fee is agreed for a certain quantity of activity, with additional 
cost-per-case payments made to a defined limit if it is exceeded by an agreed extent, or 
indeed reimbursed if less than the pre-set level of work is performed.
Glennerster et a l  (1994a) developed a theory of contracting that linked cost-per-case 
contracts with flexibility for the purchaser. The prediction was that health authorities 
would run block contracts with local NHS providers, whilst fund-holders would be more 
willing to use, and tolerate the costs, of cost-per-case arrangements in order to force
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change from hospitals. However, in doing this it is not just the practices that would have 
to endure higher administrative costs. The transaction costs sustained by the hospitals 
would also be likely to increase (Bartlett, 1991b).
This theory also links to the notion that GPs would have greater capacity to move work 
away from hospitals as the flexibility offered by their choice of contracts makes them less 
tied to a single provider. This in turn connects to the idea that they will be able to exact 
shorter waiting times for their patients than health authorities could do for people 
registered with non fund-holding practices. Beyond this, the question can also be raised 
as to whether fund-holders had specified shorter waiting times in their arrangements with 
providers than the health authority did, or perhaps practices with cost-per-case contracts 
had been able to warn hospitals by threatening to refer patients elsewhere.
In sum, for differences in waits to be driven by contracts, one of two possible conditions 
is required. Either fund-holders stipulate shorter waiting time targets in contracts, and 
these are met by hospitals. Or different forms of contract could provoke dissimilar 
responses from providers. Hospitals might admit patients of fund-holders utilising cost- 
per-case agreements more promptly than those called in under a health authority block 
contract. If so, patients admitted under cost and volume contracts may have shorter 
waits than those called in through a block contract, but have longer waits than patients 
treated on a cost-per-case basis. This reasoning can be taken a stage further. If the sort 
of contract linking purchasers and providers did drive contrasts in waits, it would surely 
be expected that patients registered with GP fund-holders using block agreements would 
endure longer waits than their counterparts from other such practices admitted under 
cost-per-case arrangements. These queries will all be addressed in chapter seven.
EXIT THEORY
A related explanation for waiting time differences has more to do with the power and 
willingness of commissioners to move patients than the precise form or content of the
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contracts between purchasers and providers. It relates intimately to the work of 
Hirschman (1970), cited in the first chapter. The basic set of premises behind this 
hypothesis is as follows. Fund-holders have the budgets to pay for the care received by 
their patients, or at least for those services covered by the scheme, and can refer them to 
specific providers. They have the option to move work and thus income away fi'om a 
hospital. Hence they may no longer have to rely as much on a single provider that 
previously could have held a virtual monopoly over the provision of various services to 
their patients.
At first glance this hypothesis has links with the one concerning contract types. Both 
deal with fimd-holders having the flexibility to move work away fi'om providers. Yet 
there is a subtle and important difiference. The contract hypothesis relies on hospitals 
reacting differently to contract types by admitting patients covered by cost-per-case 
agreements more promptly than those under block contracts. Yet exit theory focuses on 
providers responding in dissimilar ways to the purchaser type, not the form of contract. 
As such, the idea rests on the principle that fimd-holders using block agreements could 
exert as much leverage over hospitals as those utilising cost-per-case contracts by being 
able to reduce the scale of their commitment (or for the following year, even shift it in its 
entirety). In theory, practices that use block contracts should exact the same benefits for 
patients as those using cost-per-case contracts because providers will wish to safeguard 
income under ‘floors and ceilings’, and also their prospective earnings in fiiture years.
From this, whatever type of contract practices use, in an environment where resources 
are scarce, the exit option may pressure hospitals to do everything they can to safeguard 
their workload, and consequently income, by satisfying the demands of all fimd-holder 
customers. Yet this proposition on its own does not explain the hypothesis fiiUy. Whilst 
it complies with the inference of Frostick and Wallace (1993, p. 241) that many hospitals 
are forced to favour fimd-holding patients because their GPs hold a ‘small but significant 
percentage of the fimds’, why should this group be the main or only beneficiaries? After 
all, health authorities control a larger and more significant proportion of the resources 
used to commission services. Providers could therefore be even more reliant on health
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authority business than on fund-holding work. For services covered by the fund-holding 
scheme, should this not work to the advantage of non fund-holding patients and if not, 
why not?
Monopsony versus a multitude of purchasers
The answer to this question may well lie in the gap that exists between the purchaser and 
patient in health authority commissioning. Every UK resident has a right to be registered 
with a GP and it seems highly probable that the huge majority will be. As such, for every 
service commissioned by a health authority, which constitutes the entire range of care 
obtainable through the NHS, GPs come between it and the population it represents. In 
the case of the elective surgery covered by the fund-holding scheme, these are the non 
fund-holding practices.
This may well complicate the purchasing function for health authorities. By quoting a 
comment made by a hospital finance director, Glennerster et al. (1994a) publicised the 
view that it is GPs, not health authorities, who send patients to providers. It is therefore 
GPs who drive the business of hospitals, not health authorities. The latter are perhaps 
relegated to the role of having to second-guess the demand of practices and their patients 
for various aspects of care by imposing their own arbitrary limits to a range of services. 
Consequently, health authority commissioning must surely be further removed fi'om the 
eventual consumers of the service, the patients, than GP purchasing. Moreover, if this 
makes it difGcult for populations to be genuinely absorbed into the decision making of 
health authorities beyond a symbolic level of involvement, the assertion of Stewart and 
Walsh (1992) that the internal market is not really patient-led looks to have a convincing 
logic.
The remoteness of health authorities fi*om their client population also counters Schofield 
and Hatcher’s (1993) desire to see local communities controlling and planning health 
care services to meet their own needs. For citizens seem tied to the strategies of their
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local health authority as it is hard to imagine any would leave the area they live in singly 
to have their services purchased by an alternative health authority. This led Glennerster 
et al. (1998) to call them monopoly purchasers, giving the system a monopsonistic 
character. Of course, the quasi-market is not a monopsony. The existence o f GP fund­
holders in any health authority area means that there will be more than one purchaser. 
However, each part of the dual-purchasing configuration represents a tendency towards 
two conq)eting systems: the principles of monopsony against a less concentrated order 
where a number of fund-holders, closer to patients, may function.
The closeness of GPs to their patients, alongside their referral role, means that they have 
much greater control than health authorities over when, % and to whom a patient is sent 
for more specialised care at a hospital This is an advantage that looks hard to transfer to 
health authorities, regardless of the range of contracts they might hold with providers. If 
health authorities are to hold some sway on activity levels themselves, they may have to 
persuade or coerce GPs to abide by set guidelines. These could be mq)opidar and incite 
uncooperative behaviour by some GPs, while others might have chosen to become fund­
holders. Indeed, preserving referral fireedom was reported by the Audit Commission 
(1996a) as the third most prevalent motive for practices to join the sdieme.
Consequently, health authorities may well be restricted in the degree to whfch they can 
influence the GPs of the patients they purchase for, and enticing them to alter their 
referral patterns could be very difficult indeed. They might thus have only a negligible 
opportunity, dependent on delicate negotiations, to persuade non fund-holding GPs of 
the virtue in changing their referral habits in order to find shorter waiting times, better 
quality services for patients, or cheaper prices. Hence it is feasible that trusts may see 
health authorities as ‘captive’ purchasers, a notion in^lied by Propper et al. (1998).
A sensible conclusion to reach fi*om these \dewpoints may be that health authorities are 
trying to commission something on behalf of a population with which it has little close 
contact, and over which they have little control. GPs would appear to hold a strong 
advantage in both these respects. They are the gatekeepers to most health care services
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delivered outside the general practice setting. Without pressure from a health authority, 
it is they who make the final decision as to where a patient is referred. Providers may be 
sensitive to the exit option if they need to retain business in order to maintain or even 
increase their workload and income. From this, it seems that the advantages derived 
from the exit option in the context of increasing the responsiveness of providers are 
likely to rest with fund-holders more than with health authorities.
Summary
Fund-holding practices may well be able to agree at partnership level whether they will 
move referrals for a particular specialty from the local provider to a competitor. Exit 
theory suggests this closeness to patients could give GP fund-holders greater bargaining 
power over hospitals than is available to health authorities. This leverage could enable 
such practices to acquire benefits for their own patients which are not open to people 
represented by a health authority. Devolving budgets to the level of general practice 
might thus give GPs who are motivated to try and acquire shorter waiting times for their 
patients the opportunity to do just that. As money follows the fund-holding patient, if 
fund-holders make hospitals aware they are willing to move clients elsewhere, they could 
find their negotiating position, with an analogy being Hirschman’s (1970) concept of 
voice, strengthened. The exit hypothesis will also be addressed in chapter seven.
The idea that GP fund-holders have more control over the referral process and thus a 
greater capacity to move work between providers, which in turn enhances their leverage, 
connects to another possible reason why the waiting times of patients represented by 
health authorities and fund-holding practices could vary. Namely, the information each 
purchaser has to act as an effective commissioner plus the motivation they have to use it 
for the benefit of patients. The next section discusses the possible effect of these issues 
on the waiting times of patients.
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INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES
If the outcomes of a quasi-market are measurable to some extent by its effect on the 
standards of services being provided, success is likely to be dependent at least in part on 
how well purchasers advocate the interests of their clients in negotiations with providers. 
This idea was surely the basis of Loveridge and Starkey’s (1992) claim that fund-holding 
was making GPs the patient’s champion once more. However, the Department of Health 
(1990) plus Ham and Spurgeon (1993) both suggested that the internal market gave 
health authorities the opportunity to fulfil the ‘champions of the people’ role. From this, 
the types of information and incentives possessed by the two main purchaser types in the 
NHS could easily be an important factor in the priority they give to shortening the 
waiting times of patients.
There are different kinds of information and incentives, and the level at which each is 
applicable to health authorities and GPs varies. This idea compliments the notion put 
forward by Glennerster et al. (1998) that the effective commissioning of different sorts of 
health care services may require dissimilar types of information and incentives. For 
instance, the types needed to be proficient in purchasing one kind of care, say elective 
surgery, might well be very different to those required, for example, to competently 
commission accident and emergency services. However, while it is possible that this 
could mean health authorities would be good, relatively speaking, at purchasing some 
things and GPs others, this is not necessarily the case. Either could have greater access 
to the kinds of incentives and information that facilitates better performance at 
commissioning most, or perhaps even all services.
However, the precise answer to what the most important types of information and 
incentives might be for commissioning what kinds of services is so far unresolved, being 
an area of study still in its infancy. Nevertheless, there now follows a discussion of the 
classes of information that may be available to health care purchasers.
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Information
The form of information which is available to anyone is undoubtedly a crucial factor in 
enabling rational decisions, and is thus likely to have a strong influence in determining 
the effectiveness of health care purchasers in their role (see Bartlett and Le Grand,
1993). After all, contract monitoring requires a supply of good information (Spurgeon, 
1993c). Glennerster et al. (1998) saw four types of information as likely to be necessary 
for purchasing health care services competently. One was the data on area wide health 
needs and disease trends, which is connected to epidemiological research and study. 
Considering the relatively small numbers of patients registered with individual general 
practices, this kind of information is obviously going to be more accessible at health 
authority rather than GP level. This was surely the rationale behind Roland’s (1996) 
opinion that GPs may not be the best people to plan the health care of wide populations.
Another type of information derives fi'om what Glennerster et al. (1998) called health 
technology assessment. This relates to things like researching the cost effectiveness of 
therapies to elicit evidence for the success of various treatment options. The evolution 
of this type of data is not well developed. In reality, work towards the attainment of 
such data seems more likely to be performed at a level above that of general practice, 
and quite probably higher than local health authorities. Whatever level this enterprise is 
progressed at, the eventual provision of such information should be valuable to and 
usable by any type of purchaser.
A fiirther kind of information identified by Glennerster et al. (1998) as relevant to 
purchasing in the NHS is that on the organisational and clinical efficacy of providers. 
This has links with an appraisal of quality which, although not impossible to define in the 
context of health care (Koch, 1993), may often be difficult to measure (Kerrison,
1993).“ Concerning this variety of information, when their roles are separated the
11. With regard to quality in health care, Koeck and Neugaard (1995) wrote of an experiment in 
Vienna where competition between hospitals was based upon the quality of services rather than the 
price of them. It was, however, too early to ascertain the success or otherwise of the project.
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purchaser is likely to have Jess information about the quahty and outcomes of the service 
than is the provider (Pro%q)er, 1993a; 1993b). Yet such an asymmetry o f  information 
may be a less severe problem for fund-holders than health authorities because GPs do 
have a direct and daily contact with patients through their surgeries (Le Grand, 1994a).
From this, GPs may ‘get a feel’ for service quality as it affects specific people. Patients 
personally telling their GPs how they got on at hospital could well be a cheap way of 
giving an important, albeit anecdotal and smaU scale ingression about the quality of 
various services and the attitudes of clinicians at a provider. While such opinions could 
also be unrepresentative, it might be better than having nothing. If a health authority \yas 
going to acquire such data, perhaps either through questionnaires to patients or by 
interviews with GPs, the task could be time consuming and e?q)ensive.
While it is important not to overestimate the likely level of data that could pass to GPs in 
this way, to whatever extent it does happen, personal contact with patients is a source of 
data fiom which health authorities are distanced. Information to health authorities on a 
provider’s services could have more to do with impersonal quantities obtained firomthe 
hospital, albeit useful ones like bed occupancy statistics and the volume o f treatment 
episodes. Such data can of course be supplied to GPs as welL Moreover, fiieir closeness 
to patients may also give GPs a good source of data about waiting times -  an impression 
of the waits at local hospitals. Patients may conq>lain to GPs about the length o f  their 
wait, or perhaps attend for consultations in pain or discomfort because of i t  This could 
even lead to the use of the exit option, with referral patterns being changed and patients 
sent elsewhere.
GPs are also likely to have greater access to afjurth  sort of information -  the views, 
preferences and concerns of patients (Glenn^ster ^ 1 al., 1998). This data also has very 
strong links to the closeness of the relationship between GPs and their patients. Some 
practices have formal participation groups in which a  number ofregiMered patients, 
although not necessarily a representative sample, have meetings with GPs and manners 
about a range of matters. Yet more than this the most obvious source of such feedback
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is probably again the ‘day to day’ consultations at surgeries. As mentioned previously, it 
is feasible that through this mechanism GPs could get strong impressions about the 
waiting times for particular types of surgery at local hospitals.
In sum, there are different sorts of information, some of which manifest more at the level 
of general practices than health authorities, with the reverse being true for others. As a 
general rule, information on smaller groups of people and indeed individual patients is 
likely to be more robust at practice level, whilst for larger populations health authorities 
seem to have a major advantage. Of course, there are channels through which data can 
pass between the two purchaser types. The GP contract introduced in 1990 required 
general practices to provide various data to health authorities in annual reports (see 
Department of Health and Welsh OflBce, 1989; Health Departments of Great Britain, 
1989) that, when aggregated, contributes to knowledge on area wide health needs. 
Conversely, it is hard to think of a good reason why health authorities could not share 
public health data with GP purchasers. Perhaps the dilemma has more to do with the 
prediction of Glennerster et a i  (1994a) that GPs might have only limited interest in it.
Incentives
Glennerster et al. (1998) cited four types of incentives that health care purchasers could 
possess. One was a desire to procure a sense of professional satisfaction that can result 
from doing a good job. This connects with Dunleavy’s (1991) idea that self-interest may 
not be the only motivation for professional staff. Things like saving lives and improving 
the lot of patients brings its own reward (Glennerster et al., 1994a). Their responsibility 
for the everyday care of patients makes it easy to picture the presence of this kind of 
motivation in GPs. For health authority staff, such incentives constitute what Le Grand 
(1997) called knightly behaviour and according to the public choice literature it might be 
naive, or at least over optimistic, to accept its existence to a particularly large degree (for 
example, see Niskanen, 1971; 1973). Nevertheless, to avoid cynicism it might be feasible
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that health authority staff could be motivated to some extent, even if less than GPs, by 
factors such as helping patients.
Yet some may not see this account of GP motivation as a very balanced view, and 
perhaps this doubt might have some validity. Does the possession of a medical degree 
automatically guarantee that doctors will be selfless servants to their patients’ interests? 
The former politician Enoch Powell -  quoted in Klein (1995), observed that one of the 
first things all health ministers discover at or near the outset of their term of office is that 
the only subject they are destined to discuss with the medical profession is money. This 
does not sound too compatible with knightly behaviour, though there might be some 
difference in their individual (more knightly) and collective (less knightly) behaviour.
This is not to say that doctors will be unconcerned about the well being of patients. But 
in the context of rationality any motivation derived fi*om inq)roving the fete of patients, 
and despite Enoch Powell’s comments it seems reasonable to accept that this probably 
happens to some extent, might be strengthened if other rewards arise as well.
This proposition fells conveniently into place with another form of incentive identified by 
Glennerster et al. (1998), that of minimising time costs and job complexity. For this can 
also be seen as being stronger the closer a commissioner is to patients. The logic of this 
conclusion is chiefly based upon the premise that if GPs can, for example, shorten their 
patients’ waiting times, this may well reduce their workload as patients treated pronq)tly 
at hospital could require less care in general practice. It is also possible that GPs will be 
inconvenienced less by patients asking them to expedite their admission date (linking to 
the previous discussion of their information on waiting times). Such benefits will not be 
accrued by health authority staff if they shorten the waits of patients. It is hard to 
imagine many people would badger such personnel to try and obtain an earlier admission. 
GPs are much nearer to patients and would surely spring to their minds before an 
anonymous bureaucrat at a health authority office.
A further sort of incentive discussed by Glennerster et al. (1998) was organisational 
survival, job security and promotion prospects. For health authority staff this might be
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reinforced by fund-holding producing competition in purchasing, though there are other 
reasons why it could exist. In a climate where year on year efficiency savings must be 
found in administration costs and mergers between health authorities have been common, 
the tenure of NHS executives may not be as long-lived or safe as it once was (Flannery, 
1996). This can put staff under pressure to discharge duties to high standards, and if 
good performance is measured against governmental directives like keeping waiting 
times down, sufficient incentives might exist in respect of organisational survival and job 
security regardless of fund-holding. Promotion prospects may also be enhanced by high 
performance, and these incentives could be more explicit and powerful for health 
authority staff than for self-employed GPs in secure partnerships.
The other kind of incentive considered by Glennerster et al. (1998) was the maximising 
of personal monetary gain. Though it links to promotion prospects for higher paid jobs, 
this incentive could possibly offer motives to health authority employees to try and profit 
via illegitimate means, or through performance-related pay. Yet the modest impact of 
the latter as an incentive to NHS managers (see Dowling and Richardson, 1997) suggests 
this might have only a limited effect. Glennerster et al. (1998) also made the point that 
GPs could have a monetary incentive in attracting patients to keep their practice list 
buoyant. The remuneration of GPs is partly dependent on the list size of their practice, 
most notably through the capitation fees payable for all patients registered with their 
practice. From this, economic theory suggests GPs could try to compete for patients by 
performing well as purchasers. The validity of the theory thus relies upon the existence 
of competition for patients between GPs.
The notion that competition for patients could be an incentive may be endorsed by some 
fund-holders giving the protection of their list size as a reason for joining the scheme (see 
Audit Commission, 1996a). Nevertheless, the possibility remains that patients might be 
too apathetic, loyal to their existing GPs, or unaware of the performance of alternative 
commissioners, to switch practices and so make this a wholly convincing or credible 
theory. Moreover, such doubts appear supported by Thomas et al. (1995) failing to find 
evidence that patients move between practices in large numbers for any other reason than
83
changing their address. This could suggest that the theory might have a weakness and if 
this scepticism were warranted, it would be unlikely to disappoint Crump and Griffiths 
(1993) who opposed the idea of purchasers competing against each other.
In summary, similar to the forms of information which may, or might not, be available to 
distinct commissioners, there are also various types of incentives. It is feasible that 
alternative kinds of incentives could be more, or less, applicable to different purchasers. 
It is possible that any professional pride in improving the fortunes of patients, and the 
greater convenience this brings to daily work routines, could motivate GPs more than 
health authority staff. It may also be that the enhanced job security and promotion 
prospects that could derive from being recognised as an effective commissioner may be a 
stronger incentive for health authority staff than GPs in relatively secure partnerships. 
The promotion prospects of NHS managers are linked to their earnings potential, and it 
is thus possible to see how this might work as an incentive for good performance as a 
purchaser of health care services.
Who should purchase what?
With the mix of different types of both information and incentives that are applicable to 
purchasers in the NHS internal market, it seems that each may have contrasting relevance 
to the performance of health authority staff and GPs in their commissioning function. If 
information and the incentives to use it has consequences on the efficacy of a purchaser, 
that has an outcome on the kinds of services received by patients. In turn, disparities in 
the weightings given to the factors by alternative commissioners reduce the confidence 
that can be attached to any prediction. Good forecasts about the relative performance of 
different purchasers are thus difficult.
12. Support for policies that sustain collaboration between purchasers was also emphasised by Moore 
and Dalziel (1993).
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Nevertheless, Glennerster et al. (1998) did attempt to shed some theoretical light on the 
possible impact on each purchaser type of the different forms of information and 
incentives. The suggestion made was that health authorities might be most effective at 
roles which relate to the broad community, which falls into place with their wider needs 
assessment for quite large populations and their public health function. Meanwhile, 
fund-holders may be best at purchasing services where the gains are more private to the 
GP. Taking this notion forward, it seems to coincide with the idea that there are distinct 
advantages for fiind-holders in, for example, lowering waiting times for elective surgery 
because this may stop patients moaning during consultations that occur in the meantime.
However, if this theoretical position is realistic, it provokes another line of thought. Are 
the majority of NHS services currently being commissioned by the wrong purchaser, 
meaning the one that is least likely to do the best job? Every item of service received by 
patients has a potential impact on the workload and convenience of GPs. Say a practice 
nurse does not bother to give a patient with below par immunity their recommended flu 
jab and the individual subsequently develops influenza as a result, that person is likely to 
need an appointment with their GP to obtain treatment for their symptoms. The same 
principle holds for hospital services both inside and outside the standard fund-holding 
scheme. A sub-standard physiotherapy department could mean that more patients might 
go and see their GPs because of aches and pains than would otherwise be the case. A 
poor oncology service implies more terminally ill patients requiring intensive care at the 
level of general practice.
A similar argument can be made for just about everything in the context of health care 
services. People not admitted quickly enough to hospitals, or being discharged from 
them in a poorer condition than need be the case, affects general practice in a negative 
way. When patients undergo health care, at the point at which a treatment is received it 
is an individual episode of care on a single person. If that service is shoddy, patients are 
more likely to turn to GPs for assistance. GPs thus have an incentive to shape hospital 
services for the benefit of patients, which does not exist at the health authority. If a 
patient requests a night visit following the receipt of second-rate care at a hospital, it is
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not an employee of the health authority who gets a telephone call in the middle of the 
night.
Therefore, might GPs be better purchasers of most health care services, including many 
of those outside the standard fund-holding scheme? So what does that thought say 
about the purchasing configuration in the quasi-market? Could the most profitable role 
for health authorities be to aggregate area wide public health and epidemiological data 
for use by GP commissioners to purchase a range of services far beyond what was in the 
standard fund-holding scheme? Or was the prediction of Glennerster et al. (1994a) that 
GPs may have little interest in such matters right? It is uncertain what the correct answer 
to this question is, even though the forthcoming reforms to the NHS make it a crucial 
debate. But there is another hypothesis that may offer a practicable explanation why the 
waiting times of fund-holding and other patients could differ -  the relationships of key 
actors operating within the system. This possibility is discussed in the following section.
RELATIONSHIPS
The foundation for this hypothesis is that patients’ waiting times could be determined by 
the relationships between individuals representing the purchasers and providers. As a 
starting point for a discussion of this idea, Ferlie (1994) considered the relationship issue 
on a general basis in three contexts. One was that the system could have what was called 
a relational nature because of the continuing relationship between the chief ofBcers of 
trusts and health authorities. Another was that a high degree of continuity for senior 
staff at these bodies might make the system socially embedded. The other was that the 
internal market could be institutionally embedded if managers were conscious of the need 
to meet the regulatory targets imposed by higher tiers.
It is noticeable that the slant of these ideas rests heavily on the alliance between health 
authority and trust managers, with an apparent assumption that the appointed chief 
officers at both may have a long-term relationship since a time before the provider
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achieved trust status. While an association between established suppliers and customers 
in conventional markets can often after over time (see Langlois and Robertson, 1995), 
the ingression is aroused that this might be a rather cosy relationship. However, the role 
of GPs as commissioners may well have made the connection between providers and at 
least some of the purchasers rather less comft)rtable, if suspicions that there is a degree 
of rivalry between the elements of the medical profession are correct. After all, Harrison 
et al. (1990) plus Strong and Robinson (1990) predicted fund-holding could cause 
cleavage between consultants and GPs. It would thus appear sensible to not restrict the 
inquiry into relationships to just those between non-clinical managers.
There is a history behind such forecasts o f the intact o f the fund-holding scheme on the 
relationships between hospital consultants and GPs. This is the clear division in the NHS 
between primary and secondary care (see Roland, 1992d), alongside the firm and long­
standing detachment of these two sections of the medical profession (see Honigsbaum, 
1979). TraditionaUy, consultants have held the highest and most prestigious position in 
the profession’s hierarchy (Levitt and Wall, 1984; Pollitt, 1984; Handysides, 1994a; 
1994b). Correspondingly, decisions concerning which patients are called in firom a 
waiting list, and in what order, has long been under the control o f hôpital consultants 
(Frankel, 1993). This could mean that if consultants have retained their authority in this 
respect, and Chinegwundoh (1997) inq)lied that to an extent they had, for any purchaser 
wishing to curb wafts they would appear to be the people worth influencmg.
This proposition conq)lies with both the claim of Light (1997) that surgeons control the 
waiting lists, plus Hamilton’s (1997) argument that the onus to reduce waiting times lies 
with purchasers. From this, who influences sudi hospital clinicians the most, GP ftind- 
holders or health authority staff and out of the two purchasers which wants to influence 
them the most? In sum, does a relationship between two sets o f clinicians, consultants 
and GPs, have a different effect to the involvement of health authority staff in the 
commissioning process?
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Relationships inspired by the fund-holding scheme
One cornerstone of the engagement of GPs in purchasing is the idea that fund-holding 
could have halted a trend in which they lost power and status in their relationship with 
consultants (see Roland, 1991; Wisely, 1991; Comey, 1994; Glennerster a/., 1994a; 
Glennerster, 1995; Mant and Towse, 1996). If money follows fund-holding patients to 
the providers where they are referred, exit theory suggests this will increase the weight 
of GPs’ voice. This may give them greater influence over providers than that enjoyed by 
health authorities, whose purchasing might perhaps be more akin to patients following 
the contract or second-guessing the demand of GPs. In line with this, Baeza et a l  
(1993) claimed the reforms had much to do with enhancing the power of GPs to sway 
hospital policy, a judgement that ties in with Stott (1993), a hospital doctor, having 
considerable doubts that GPs should be commissioners. Yet despite such judgements 
there is another prospect concerning the relationships of consultants and GPs.
Rather than having a relationship based on antagonism, could consultants and GPs find 
dealing with each other preferable to negotiating with non-clinical managers? Of course, 
such doctors do work alongside managerial staff at both hospitals and general practices. 
But the contracting process between fund-holders and hospitals is more likely to bring 
together clinicians than the relationship between providers and health authorities. After 
all, a health authority may have a director of public health plus a medical advisor dealing 
with prescribing issues, but as far as the employment of doctors is concerned, that could 
be it. Moreover, directors of public health are unlikely to negotiate contracts with 
hospital doctors. However, whilst consultants may not personally settle agreements with 
practices in the scheme, their on-going contact with GPs through the referral process 
could make clinical interaction in the commissioning procedure more common when 
fund-holders deal with providers than when the health authority does.
So far the theory concerning relationships is that fund-holders could have more influence 
in persuading hospital doctors to admit patients promptly than health authority staff for 
the following reasons. To adopt Hirschman’s (1970) terminology, holding budgets may
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expand the weight of GP’s voice to give them a greater opportunity to negotiate shorter 
waits for their patients. This outcome might flow fi*om either a relationship based upon 
animosity or otherwise a spirit of tolerance if consultants feel trading with professional 
colleagues is favourable to dealing with managers. Perhaps the association could even be 
symbolised by goodwill. However, things might not be that straightforward.
The complication is founded on the question of whether the admission of patients is still 
down to the decision of consultants? After all, there is a prospect that hospital clinicians 
might over recent times have been incorporated more into the financial, and indeed other 
priorities of their providers (see Harrison and Pollitt, 1994). Could this mean they have 
adopted new criteria for choosing whom to admit when? Or have decisions pertaining to 
the admission of patients been passed to non-clinical management? Such areas require 
investigation and in-depth interviews were thus conducted with both consultants and 
trust managers to explore their views over relationships with purchasers.
The other form of social relationship that may arise (as a result of fund-holding) is that 
membership of the scheme could make the GPs concerned more visible to hospital 
consultants. It is feasible that trusts have held open days for fund-holding GPs where 
they are shown around clinical departments at the hospital, and host meetings whereby 
fund-holders as a group or individually can meet consultants and managers to discuss 
service issues? If such events happen, and if they exclude non fund-holders, could the 
greater exposure for GPs within the scheme make a difference to the speed of admission 
for their patients? Moreover, if it did the effect could again go two ways. The hospital 
clinician and fund-holders might develop warm relationships, or they could antagonise 
each other. Such questions shall be addressed in chapter seven.
Relationships not inspired by the fund-holding scheme
Another reason why fund-holding patients might have shorter waiting times is that their 
GPs could generally have a different form of social relationship with hospital consultants
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than those outside the scheme, but this is not caused by fund-holding status. Perhaps 
fund-holding may tend to attract GPs who differ from those who choose not to enter the 
scheme, a viewpoint that has been advanced by the Audit Commission (1996a).
From this, could fimd-holding GPs have the types of personalities that enable them to 
influence consultants to admit their own patients more quickly than patients of a similar 
clinical urgency registered with other practices? If this was the case, then it is not the 
scheme per se that would enable fund-holding patients to enjoy shorter waits but the 
personalities of their GPs and the relationship they have with hospital doctors because of 
it. If so, it would surely be the case that patients of these GPs would be admitted sooner 
whether or not the practice was fimd-holding. However, the prospect that this is a real 
cause of disparities in waits may have lessened as large numbers of GPs with presumably 
many different character types and working habits have joined the scheme.
It may also be fair to note the possibility that some GPs could obtain shorter waits for 
their own patients for reasons that go beyond the relationship hypothesis. Perhaps it 
could have something to do with the way they practice, instead of their relationship with 
consultants. Or their patients might be of a social class or have such attitudes that they 
take it upon themselves to pressurise hospital doctors to admit them quickly for their 
operations, rather than the GP doing this.
Whatever the case, the point still remains that prior to acquiring fund-holding status, 
patients of such practices would be expected to have shorter waits than people registered 
with other practices. If this happened, it would not be fimd-holding that shortens waits. 
Shorter waits after a practice joined the scheme would be a continuation of a trend for 
patients that existed prior to fund-holding status. Therefore, whether shorter waits were 
due to the relationships between GPs and consultants or something else is less important 
than actually showing whether or not this trend was evident prior to fimd-holding status. 
This query will be addressed in the fourth chapter.
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Summary
The potential impact of relationships on waiting times has a number of traits. Who 
chooses which patients are admitted when, and if it is consultants do they take such 
decisions in line with policy set down by non-clinical staff? Does any recent equalisation 
in the status of GPs and consultants enable the fund-holders to persuade or even coerce 
hospitals to hasten the admission of their patients? Or might the waits of fund-holding 
patients be reduced by a harmonious professional link between GPs and consultants? If 
so, is such a clinical interface more beneficial to patients in the purchasing process than a 
doctor to non-clinical manager association? Moreover, has fund-holding increased the 
prominence of GPs in the scheme beyond the level enjoyed by other family doctors and if 
it has, does this have any relevance?
Otherwise, do GPs within the fund-holding scheme tend to have different characteristics 
to those outside it by always having tried, and succeeded, to persuade consultants to 
admit their patients promptly? If this were the case, fund-holding would not be making 
any difference. Such GPs would surely be shortening the waits of their patients whether 
or not the practice participates in the scheme. After all, GPs do retire and resign but the 
fairly infi-equent incidence of this means that partnerships are very largely made up of the 
same people prior to and during fund-holding status. Neither does it seem likely that the 
essence of GPs’ personalities will change when they become fimd-holders. Because of 
this it looks safe to accept that if waiting times are cut after practices join the scheme, it 
will have something to do with fimd-holding status, not the personalities of GPs.
CONCLUSION
The hypotheses that could feasibly explain why the waiting times of fimd-holding patients 
might be shorter than those endured by other patients have been covered in some depth. 
The framework for a study into this issue must necessarily cover a number of theoretical 
positions. These range jfrom questioning if fimd-holders have been budgeted over
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generously, or whether differences in the case mix of fund-holding and non fund-holding 
activity provide the answer. If the first of these was true the system has given fund­
holders an unfair advantage, while the second could indicate that if their patients do 
enjoy shorter waits, this has more to do with chance (or luck) than the effectiveness of 
GPs in a commissioning role.
Other possible reasons relate to variations in the way purchasers operate. This includes 
the impact of contracts, the information and incentives relevant to each commissioner, 
the effect of the exit option, and the relationships between key agents within the system. 
If any of these factors explain why fimd-holding patients have shorter waits, if they do, 
then this could well suggest that elective surgery might be best commissioned at the level 
of general practice, rather than by health authorities. Unless, of course, any relationships 
between hospital consultants and fund-holders that facilitate shorter waits for patients are 
not driven by GPs’ membership of the scheme. In sum, all of the areas discussed in this 
chapter need to be addressed. An explanation of the ways in which they were examined 
is a fundamental objective of the next chapter.
C hapters
The study: geography and methodology
This chapter has two primary functions. The first is to identify the location of the 
research project and outline the configuration of the NHS in the area. Much of the data 
for this section is taken from a health authority document named West Sussex Health: 
Reference Atlas 1994/95, although some use has also been made of other material, most 
notably the business plans of local NHS trusts. The second purpose is to clarify the 
research methodology.
WEST SUSSEX: GEOGRAPHY, DEMOGRAPHY AND DESIGN OF THE NHS
The research represents a case study that centres on a large county in the south of 
England, West Sussex, which covers just over 1,988 square kilometres. The county is 
divided into 155 wards, as defined by the 1991 census data, and there are approximately 
116 postcode sectors. It also comprises 7 local district councils, those of Adur, Arun, 
Chichester, Crawley, Horsham, Mid Sussex and Worthing.
According to the OPCS statistics that are used to calculate health authority cash limits. 
West Sussex has a population approaching 750,000. Compared to some areas of major 
conurbation, it is relatively stable with far less movement between the lists of general 
practices than is often the case. As is usual, the population registered with general 
practices in the county is a little higher than the OPCS figure, in October 1996 totalling 
760,484. However, the OPCS total has not been attributed to the level of individual
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general practices. This has prompted the health authority to base its analyses at practice 
level, including its current moves toward capitation fimding for GP hmd-holders and 
Primary Care Groups, upon patient numbers according to its own population register. 
Hence whenever population numbers are discussed in the thesis, such as the percentages 
given in table 3.1, the totals will relate to the slightly inflated figures recorded by the 
health authority as registered with GPs.
This creates no inconsistency with the health authority receiving its cash limit on a 
capitation basis according to its OPCS population. For there is no reason to imagine that 
the patient numbers on the health authority register for one set of practices, fimd-holding 
or not, would be any more or less inflated compared to the OPCS population than the 
other. Also, it is considered that the number of people living within West Sussex but 
registered with practices outside it are evenly balanced by those who reside in other 
health authority areas but are on the lists of GPs inside the county.
West Sussex itself has quite diverse characteristics. Much of the county is rural, but 
there are also a number of heavily populated urban neighbourhoods. Within this 
environment there are various sites which can only be described as extremely afQuent, 
although it does have some very deprived localities as well. Jarman scores are measures 
of deprivation that were developed to connect GP remuneration with the socio-economic 
indicators of the practice list. The indicators are weighted against eight variables to 
assess whether a practice is eligible to receive deprivation payments, as an atten^t to 
match pay to workload. On the basis o f Jarman scores calculated for the 1991 census, 
much of West Sussex is quite prosperous, while the most deprived wards are found in 
Crawley, which also has the most people fi’om ethnic minority groups. Worthing, Bognor 
Regis, Littlehan^ton, and Lancing. There is also a single deprived ward in Chichester.
The population density is highest in Crawley and Worthing, the characteristics of which 
are very dissimilar in the context of age bands. While the county altogether has a lower 
proportion of young children than the average for England and Wales, Crawley is the
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main exception to this and has a considerably higher level. In contrast, the proportion of 
elderly people in Worthing far exceeds the national average.
Health authority configuration
Prior to the 1991 reforms, and indeed for a time after the changes, the county of West 
Sussex was split into three separate district health authority areas, each named after the 
general vicinities they covered, Chichester, Mid Downs and Worthing. The trend 
towards health authority amalgamation has already been described. These three districts 
became an example of that tendency when they merged to become the West Sussex 
Health Authority in April 1995, although in reality they had been acting as a unitary body 
for at least a year before that. The West Sussex Family Health Services Authority also 
formally combined with the main health authority in April 1996.
Public providers
All of the public providers in the county have become self-governing trusts. There is an 
assortment of hospital, community, or combined hospital and community NHS trusts as 
well as the local ambulance service. The last of these became a trust in April 1995 when 
it merged with the parallel service in East Sussex to form the Sussex Ambulance Service 
NHS Trust. Hence there are examples of each of the four types of trust highlighted in 
the previous chapter. The public acute and community service providers in West Sussex 
are arranged as follows.
The Crawley Horsham Health Services NHS Trust used to be part of the provider unit of 
the Mid Downs District Health Authority before it gained trust status in April 1993. It 
was a combined hospital and community provider, with the acute services predominantly 
centred at Crawley Hospital although some occurred at Horsham Hospital As the name 
suggests, the towns of Crawley and Horsham were the main centres of population in its
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catchment area. In April 1998, some two years after the time span of this research, the 
trust merged with the nearby (though external to West Sussex) East Surrey Healthcare 
NHS Trust in RedhHl to become the Surrey and Sussex Heabbcare NHS Trust.
The Mid Sussex NHS Trust is another combined acute and community provider. Acute 
services are provided fi’om the Princess Royal Hospital in Haywards Heath. Before trust 
status in April 1994 it was the other arm of the Mid Downs District Health Authority’s 
provider fimction. The main towns in its locality are Haywards Heath and Burgess HilL
The Royal West Sussex NHS Trust is an acute provider, the St Richard’s Hospital in 
Chichester. Before becoming a trust in April 1994 it was the acute provider arm of the 
Chichester District Health Authority. The NHS community services provider in the 
locality is the Chichester Priority Care Services NHS Trust, which also achieved trust 
status in April 1994. The largest centres of population served by them are in the city of 
Chichester and the town of Bognor Regis.
The Worthing and Southlands Hospitals NHS Trust is, as the name suggests, an acute 
provider comprising two hospitals. Worthing Hospital and Southlands Hospital in 
Shoreham-by-Sea. It became a trust in April 1994 and the hospitals were previously the 
acute provider arm of the Worthing District Health Authority. The principal community 
service provider in the locality is the Worthing Priority Care NHS Trust, which achieved 
trust status in April 1993. The chief towns served by the providers are Worthing, 
Shoreham-by-Sea and Littlehampton.
The other public provider in West Sussex is the Queen Victoria Hospital NHS Trust in 
East Grinstead, in the &r north east of the county. However, there is something of an 
anomaly over this provider. Although the hospital is just within the boundaries of West 
Sussex, prior to becoming a trust in April 1994 it was part of the acute provider arm of 
the Tunbridge Wells District Health Authority. With the merging of districts, Tunbridge 
Wells now comes under the West Kent Health Authority and a manager fi’om the Queen 
Victoria Hospital confirmed that West Kent remains the host health authority for the
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trust, rather than West Sussex. The geographic location of the acute NHS providers is 
shown in figure 3.1, which also gives the boundaries of the old district health authorities. 
The southern boundary of the county is part of the coastline of the English Channel.
FIGURE 3.1 - Map o f West Sussex showing the boundaries o f the former district health authorities and 
the position o f the acute hospitals which comprise NHS trusts
SURREY
QUEEN VICTORIA
CRAWLEY
HORSHAM
EAST SUSSEX
HAMPSHIRE
THE ROYAL WEST SUSSEX (St R id tsd s)
Each distinct NHS provider in West Sussex that supplies acute services offers the same 
range of operations covered by the fund-holding scheme to all patients, regardless of the 
status of their practice. This does not mean they all provide the same services. For 
example, one might not have an ophthalmology department while another does. But the 
one that does will offer the same range of eye operations to all patients, whether fund- 
holding or not. Also, when individual providers are named throughout the thesis, to 
achieve consistency they will be called by the basic name of the trust, whatever their 
status at that point in time. For instance, if something to do with St Richard’s Hospital 
in 1993 were to be discussed, it would still be called the Royal West Sussex provider, 
even though the trust of this name was not formally conceived until April 1994.
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The growth of fund-holding
In the context of the number of practices participating in the scheme and the proportion 
of patients covered, fimd-holding has grown considerably in West Sussex since 1991, 
reflecting a wider national picture identified by the Audit Commission (1995). In fact the 
ratio of the population covered by fund-holding GPs in the county during the first five 
years of the scheme exceeded the quota given by the NHS Executive (1995d) for the 
whole of England. Four first wave practices had almost 8 per cent of the population on 
their lists. The next year close to 17 per cent of patients were registered with fund- 
holding GPs, rising to nearly 29 per cent in the 1993/94 financial year. This increased to 
over 41 per cent fi*om April 1994 and more than 47 per cent for the 1995/96 financial 
year.
Although this study covers the four years to March 1996, the scheme continued to grow 
after this date. The population coverage was nearly 63 per cent in 1996/97. The 
following year, four existing fimd-holding practices in East Grinstead went live with a 
‘total purchasing’ project to commission a range of the services outside the standard 
scheme, as well as continuing to purchase those inside it. When five practices became 
seventh wave standard fund-holders at the same time, the standard scheme and GP total 
purchasers covered nearly 69 per cent of patients. This figure would have increased still 
further fi’om April 1998 if the eighth wave had been allowed to go ahead.
Another three practices, covering a little more than 1 per cent of patients, have been 
acting as community fund-holders since April 1996 (an option mentioned in the previous 
chapter). As such, over 70 per cent of the people registered with West Sussex practices 
are now covered by GP purchasers in some way, with the very large majority under the 
standard fund-holding scheme. After joining a variant of the fund-holding scheme, no 
West Sussex practice has ever chosen, or been made, to leave it.
The development of GP purchasing in the county, giving more precise percentages of the 
patients covered, is provided in table 3.1. The number of practices involved in directly
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commissioning health care services can be compared to a total in the county that hovers 
around the century mark, although the precise figure does not remain constant. Patients 
of retiring single-handed GPs have occasionally been subsumed within the lists of other 
existing practices, and though rare it is not unknown for some partnerships to split. 
Between 1994 and 1996 the number of practices fell fi-om 101 to 97.
TABLE 3.1 - Growth in the cumulative number o f practices and the percentage o f patients covered by 
the standardfund-holding scheme, GP total purchasers and community fund-holding in West Sussex 
over a seven year period
Standard fund-holding GP total purchasing Community fund-holding All forms GP purchasing
No. of % of No. of % of No. of % of No. of % of
Wâve aod year practices patients practices patients practices patients practices patients
1. 1991-92 4 7.9 0 0 4 7.9
2. 1992-93 10 16J 0 - 0 - 10 16.5
3. 1993-94 18 28.9 0 - 0 - 18 28.9
4. 1994-95 29 41.1 0 - 0 - 29 41.1
5. 1995-96 34 47.4 0 - 0 - 34 47.4
6. 1996-97 52 62.8 0 - 3 1.3 55 64.1
7. 1997-98 53 63.6 4 5.3 3 1.3 60 70.3
For the period covered by this research project, 1992/93 to 1995/96, standard fimd- 
holders and health authorities were the only two types of purchaser that fimctioned in the 
West Sussex internal market. Neither the East Grinstead total purchasers nor the 
community fimd-holders, which along with standard fimd-holders are planned to be 
formally superseded by Primary Care Groups, were enacting such a role during the 
relevant four years. There were no operative commissioning groups at the time, either.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: AN OVERVIEW
The research had two main goals. First, to demonstrate whether patients registered with 
GP fimd-holders had shorter waiting times for elective surgery, relative to the patients 
fi"om non fimd-holding practices. Quantitative research techniques were used to address 
this aim. Second, to establish the reasons for any such différences. Qualitative research 
methods were utilised to test many of the hypotheses covered in the last chapter which
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may explain any contrasts in the waits of the two groups of patients, although some 
inquiries required the fiirther use of quantitative techniques.
The database
The West Sussex Health Authority, via its patient information database (PID), supplied 
data for every patient admitted from the waiting list who underwent an elective surgical 
procedure covered by the fund-holding scheme during the 1992/93,1993/94,1994/95 
and 1995/96 financial years. The operations occurred at the four public providers of 
acute services for which it acts as the host health authority, the Crawley Horsham, Mid 
Sussex, Royal West Sussex, phis Worthing and Southlands providers. As was previously 
mentioned, two of them supply a range of community services as well Although details 
were also given for the private patients that had operations at the hospitals covered by 
these providers, the research obviously concentrated on those whose treatments were 
financed by NHS purchasers. The database contained no information about NHS funded 
patients, financed either by a health authority or more probably a fund-holding practice, 
who received treatments at private hospitals.
The initial twelve months of the quasi-market from April 1991 to March 1992 was not 
included in the database for a number of reasons. Firstly, there were only four first wave 
fund-holding practices in the county that financial year, and two of those came from East 
Grinstead and thus primarily used the Queen Victoria provider. Secondly, the PID data 
was considered by the health authority to be more reliable from the second year onwards. 
The third justification was that the ‘steady state’ in 1991/92 might well have made it an 
untypical period.
For each provider in every year the database gave the date patients were placed on the 
waiting list following the outpatient attendance plus associated clinical investigations, the 
date of their admission for an operation, and the number of days between these events 
(net of any period of deferral). The latter represents the length of stay for each patient
100
on the waiting list, although for a relatively small number this was not recorded. The 
database also gave each patient’s GP practice, the health authority or fimd-holder that 
purchased the operation, and for people on the list of GPs outside the scheme who later 
joined it, the future fund-holding identity code for that particular practice. Other details 
included were the consultant responsible for the care, the clinical specialty, the procedure 
date, the discharge date, the operation performed, the half year in which the episode 
occurred, each patient’s waiting list classification plus diagnosis, and whether the 
admission was made as an ir^atient or day case.
Limited personal details, namely the patient’s gender and date of birth, were also given. 
These details enabled a random check of the accuracy of the PID data, initially against 
the contents of the medical records for patients at a large fourth wave fimd-holding 
practice. The data firom these two sources were compared for forty patients who had 
operations relevant to different specialties both before and after this practice entered the 
scheme. Following a comment by Black (1998), this checking procedure was later 
repeated at another three practices, this time auditing a dozen patients at each who were 
still alive and registered with them, and whose episodes were spread over the four years. 
Each one of these practices came fi-om the catchment areas of different hospitals, and not 
the same locality as the original practice participating in this process. This was the only 
check on randomness in choosing these three fiirther practices. In this way, data relating 
to all the providers that are central to this research were covered.
In no cases did serious discrepancies come to light, suggesting much confidence can be 
attached to the accuracy of the database. Although in some instances the information on 
dates was not too precise it was still possible, at the very least, to establish fi*om the 
medical records that a particular patient did undergo a certain operation and had been 
placed on the waiting list at an approximate point in time. This backs the forceful claim 
of a health authority manager that their own tests show that for operations after the first 
year of the internal market, the PID data is very accurate.
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QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH
The waiting times of fund-holding and non fimd-holding patients were compared on a 
year on year basis at each provider separately. This was because different providers 
could have distinct priorities and characteristics that might become hidden if they were 
all compared as an amalgam Circumstances at a single provider may also change as 
years pass by, and if so this should also become more visible with separate comparisons 
per provider for each year. Such benefits seem to outweigh any disadvantage resulting 
from a relatively small number of operations being performed on fund-holding patients, 
perhaps because few practices from a provider’s catchment area was in the scheme at a 
specific point in time. In frict the only time this looks to have conceivably undermined 
the comparison was for the Royal West Sussex in 1992/93 when only a single fimd- 
holding practice used the provider.
Measuring waiting time differences: are they fact or fiction?
Differences in the waiting times of fund-holding and non fund-holding patients were 
measured at the 95 per cent confidence level through single factor (one-way) analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) computations.^^ This hypothesis test uses the specific waiting time 
of every patient relevant to each population, and both the mean and median waits are 
shown in the tables to give a more comprehensive picture of their relative positions. For 
instance, the mean could feasibly be skewed (much increased) by a relatively few patients 
having very long waits. Exhibiting the median should indicate if this was likely to have 
been the case. If the distributions are not greatly skewed the mean and median will be 
similar. Also the use of ANOVA (a parametric test) for comparing the large populations 
relevant to this study is validated by the central limit theorem. For this shows parametric
13. As well as ANOVA, the stud«it’s Mest would also have been applicable for comparing the waiting 
times of two populations (non fimd-holding and fimd-holding patients). But the final results of the 
analysis would not be changed whichever was used (see Kirkwood, 1988). Compariscms performed 
through ANOVA and the r-test produced the same P-value (although only the ANOVA statistics are 
shown in the thesis).
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tests (reliant on normal distribution assumptions) as suitable even for groups with very 
skewed distributions if the sample size is comfortably over 100 (Jordan et a/., 1998).
Comparisons were made on an overall basis and at an individual major department level. 
The definition of major in this context was applied if a specialty had been responsible for 
some 10 per cent of all the operations on elective waiting list patients, on an aggregate 
basis at all the providers over the four years (see table 3.2). As such, general surgery, 
gynaecology, orthopaedics, urology, ear nose and throat, plus ophthalmology were all 
considered major. Although ophthalmology fell just short of the 10 per cent mark, nearly 
all the activity for this specialty occurs at the Worthing and Southlands provider, where it 
is a very substantial department.
TABLE 3.2 -  Aggregate totals o f operations per specialty covered by the fund-holding scheme given to 
NHS patients from the elective waiting list at the Crawley Horsham, Mid Sussex, Royal West Sussex and 
Worthing and Southlands providers in four financial years
Specialty
1992-93
No.
1993-94
No.
1994-95
No.
1995-96
No, Total % of total
General surgery 3831 3988 3862 3575 15256 25.5
Gynaecology 2977 2611 2734 2414 10736 17.9
Orthopaedics 2102 2277 2896 3391 10666 17.8
Urology 1070 1416 2002 2182 6670 111
Ear nose and throat 1644 1514 1627 1675 6460 10.8
Ophthalmology 1599 1511 1468 1332 5910 9.9
General medicine 692 34 727 1294 3447 5.8
Geriatric medicine 1 43 141 148 333 0.6
Neurosurgery 46 35 44 83 208 0.3
Oral surgery 91 13 17 21 142 0.2
Paediatrics 0 0 43 0 43 0.1
Pain relief 0 0 7 33 40 0.1
TOTAL 14053 14142 15568 16148 59911 100.0
However, even if patients of GP fimd-holders do have shorter waits than their non fund- 
holding counterparts, the doubts as to \^ether it was membership of the scheme that 
brought this about were highlighted in the previous chapter. For example, certain GPs 
may singly be more persistent in trying to obtain shorter waits for their patients fi*om 
consultants, whether or not they are in the scheme, and perhaps it is these types who 
have eventually become fund-holders. If the shorter waits for such patients were not a 
consequence of their GPs acquiring fimd-holding status, they would surely be admitted
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sooner whether or not the practice was fund-holding, and therefore prior to entering the 
scheme. This was tested by performing a "before and after’ fund-holding status exercise 
in the following way.
The database enabled any changes that occurred to the waits of practices’ patients as 
they joined the fimd-holding scheme to be observed. For practices which became fimd- 
holders in April 1993,1994 or 1995, the waiting times of their patients during the last 
year outside the scheme was compared, again through single Actor ANOVA, to those of 
the other non fund-holding practices using the same provider. Like all the significance 
tests throughout the thesis, differences were taken as significant at the 5 per cent level or 
less (95 per cent confidence level). It will then be apparent whether prospective fimd- 
holders had managed to get their patients admitted sooner than other non fimd-holding 
practices, Wiilst they themselves were still non fimd-holders.
A similar exercise was repeated for the same practices in the following year, once they 
had joined the scheme. The waits of patients firom first year fimd-holders were conq)ared 
with the waiting times of those registered with the continuing non fund-holding practices 
in that year. From this, it will be possible to detect whether the waiting times for patients 
of new fimd-holders change once they join the scheme, relative to those firom practices 
which have remained outside it.
The funding balance
An important hypothesis that might offer a valid explanation as to why fund-holding 
patients may enjoy shorter waits is the conjecture that practices in the scheme have been 
systematically over funded. This is a difficult issue to address, simply because of the 
doubts over what a Air division of fimds between a health authority and practices would 
actually look like. The methodology that was used revolves around three main lines of 
inquiry (discussed below), though other matters that re Ate to the way in which additional
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fimds were distributed plus the impact of provider price changes are also considered, 
some of these on a more theoretical level.
First, what has been the actual effect of GP fimd-holders receiving their budgets for 
elective surgery on the basis of historic activity? The database shows what the outcome 
is of practices being fimded according to their activity in the first half of their last year 
outside the scheme. This entails con^aring the activity of such practices in each of the 
two halves of what is called their preparatory year, the final twelve months outside the 
scheme. Second, monitoring the activity of future fimd-holders in their last two years 
outside the scheme will show whether preparatory year practices have a higher level of 
activity than would be expected fi-om the previous year, relative to the continuing non 
fimd-holding practices. This will indicate if there is anything to suggest that practices 
inflated their activity in their final year outside the scheme.
Third, what do comparisons between the resources received by fimd-holders and the 
level that would be appropriate according to a capitation formula tend to suggest? The 
West Sussex Health Authority claims to have been involved in the development of a 
formula for use at a general practice level They were therefore able to conpare the 
allocations for practices in and outside the scheme using the methodology explained in 
NHS Executive (1997a) prior to its publication. This part of the thesis will draw heavily 
on their work. In essence it is the evidence fi-om all of the considered fectors that will be 
used to judge if fimd-holders are budgeted over generously and whether this hypothesis 
can thus be accepted as an explanation why their patients may have shorter waits.
The case mix effect
Another hypothesis identified in the last chapter relates to the idea that differences in the 
waiting times between fimd-holder and health authority patients could be a consequence 
of large variations in the case mix of surgery provided to the two groups. The logic 
behind this idea rests on the princq)le that non fund-holding patients could have received
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fer more operations for which there is typically a very long wait, whereas fimd-holding 
activity might be skewed towards those procedures which usually have much shorter 
waits. The database details the code and name of every surgical procedure given to each 
patient, Wiich enables this hypothesis to be either confirmed or disproved.
The grouped case mix of fund-holding and health authority activity can be listed in a 
bivariate table, for which the significance of any differences between the expected and 
actual activity of the two groups can be calculated by way of chi square confutations. 
Where statistically significant variations are found, the investigation will be taken further 
to ascertain if the following circumstances occurred. Was health authority activity 
skewed towards a preponderance of those procedures for which patients routinely have 
very long waiting times, with the reverse being the case for fund-holding patients? If so, 
did this have a material effect on average waiting times?
The relevance of contract types
A further possible explanation why the waiting times of fimd-holder and health authority 
patients may vary is the different forms of contract each purchaser commonly uses. It is 
expected that health authorities would have predominantly utilised block contracts with 
local providers, with fimd-holders mainly using cost-per-case agreements. If the various 
kinds of contract generate different behaviour patterns fi’om providers, and overall fimd- 
holder patients do enjoy shorter waits, this might lend support to the hypothesis that it is 
something to do with cost-per-case contracts that shortens waiting times.
However, the use of cost-per-case contracts by GP fimd-holders is unlikely to be a 
universal phenomenon. Moreover, if waiting time variances between fimd-holding and 
health authority patients were genuinely caused by the common application of different 
sorts of agreement by the purchaser types, the following could be expected. Patients 
fi-om fimd-holding practices using block contracts would have significantly longer waits 
than fimd-holders admitted under cost-per-case arrangements.
106
The potential of contract types in causing waiting time differences between health 
authority and fimd-holder patients is therefore approached by comparing the waits of 
fimd-holders covered by different forms of contract, once again through single 6ctor 
ANOVA. If differences between fimd-holding patients covered by block, cost-per-case, 
plus cost and volume agreements are not shown to be significant, it is hard to see how 
alternative contract types can be accepted as an adequate e^lanation for any contrasts 
between the waits of fimd-holder and health authority patients. In short, the hypothesis 
would no longer appear sustainable.
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH
Interviews were conducted with representatives firom the providers, health authority and 
fimd-holding general practices. The choice of what sorts of personnel were seen at these 
organisation types was based on the desire to make contact with the most key decision­
makers at each, at least in the context of the topic being researched. Regarding the 
providers, this led to the primary interviews being held with a mix of senior clinicians and 
managers, namely consultants and the chief executives, though some managers of clinical 
departments and contract managers were also seen. Obtaining such a cross-section of 
views was inqmrtant due to both the claim of Smith (1973) that single organisations are 
for the most part made up by groups of sta% plus PoUitt’s (1993) suggestion that any 
complex body displays a number of contrasting and sometimes even competing sub­
cultures.
Restricting the primary interviews to these groups also complies with judgements over 
the potential influence of other people at hospitals who could be considered relevant, 
most noticeably the non-executive membership of trust boards. Indeed, Ashbumer 
(1993) claimed a couple of years after the quasi-market began that the true role of NHS 
trust boards had not even been established. The choice to interview the provider chief 
executives is backed fiirther by their alleged heavy influence in determining the non-
107
executive membership of trust boards (see Peck, 1993a). This may endorse a claim by 
the same author in another work that such board members are likely to experience major 
problems in having a significant impact on trusts (see Peck, 1993b). There is little hard 
evidence of these judgements being incorrect, or that the situation has since altered. It 
thus seems credible that consultants and chief executives would be fan more relevant 
interviewees than would the non-executive board members of NHS trusts.
Moreover, the interviews with consultants also relate to the issue of how much their 
decisions conform to non-clinical policies. On this topic, Tremblay (1993) welcomed an 
extended role of doctors in management due to their purported ability to bridge a gulf 
between public understanding and the setting of priorities in an environment of scarce 
resources. Yet Harrison (1995) claimed the autonomy of clinicians has been reduced by 
the managerial drive towards tighter financial control over expenditure on services. This 
complies with Hutton’s (1993) assertion that the desire of hospital doctors to provide the 
best quality service is ten:q)ered by a need to check costs in order to win business in a 
competitive environment. Additionally, Starkey (1992) wrote of the stronger managerial 
imperatives of financial stringency and control being placed on the medical profession. 
The interviews should thus widen knowledge regarding the extent to which consultants 
are incorporated or acquiesce with managerial priorities.
The surgical specialties that fimction at all of the four providers are general surgery, 
gynaecology and orthopaedics. A single consultant fi*om each of these three departments 
was seen at all four providers. The individuals concerned were given assurances that 
their identities would not be publicised in the thesis. The interviews occurred from mid- 
January to late-April 1997. Of the dozen consultants, half were the clinical directors for 
their departments and the other six were not. For the sake of clarity, the division 
between clinical directors and other consultants is given in table 3.3. Because it is quite 
easy to trace the identity of a clinical director in a hospital’s surgical specialty at a 
particular point in time, the providers’ names have been withheld to protect the 
anonymity of those seen.
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The mix shown in table 3.3 was applied to try and obtain a decent cross-section of 
consultant opinioiL For example, although clinical directors might be more aware of 
hospital-wide issues and thus represent a hnitful source of information, their holding of 
the post might result from particular characteristics or attitudes that may be reasonably 
common to them all. It was intended that the three interviewed at each single provider 
would not all be either clinical directors or other consultants, so ensuring a combination 
at every trust. The aim of interviewing a cross-section of subjects was also advanced by 
seeing two clinical directors and a couple of other consultants from each specialty.
There were no other constraints on randomness in choosing the consultants to be seen.
TABLE 33 -  Division between clinical directors and other consultants interviewed from the general 
surgery, gynaecology and orthopaedic departments at four providers in early 1997
Unit General Surgery Gynaecology Orthopaedics
Provider 1 Other consultant Clinical dircctw Other consultant
Provider 2 Clinical director Other consultant Other consultant
Provider 3 Clinical director Other consultant Clinical director
Provider 4 Other consultant Clinical director Clinical director
Regarding the hospital managers, the selection process for the chief executives was 
obviously more straightforward because there is just one at each. All four of them were 
interviewed in May 1997. Six managers of the same three clinical departments as the 
consultant interviewees were also seen during November 1996. These sessions were 
primarily used to leam at an early stage who it is that tends to have responsibility at the 
hospitals for deciding which patients are called in when. The limited goals for the 
interviews somewhat lessened the importance of them, and hence only half of the twelve 
departments were covered.
For the interviews with GP fimd-holders, those from East Grinstead were excluded 
because their local hospital was not a feature of the research. Apart from this exception, 
all other practices from waves one to five were divided into four geographical groups 
according to which of the featured acute providers’ catchment areas they come within. 
Emphasis was given to practices from the first five waves because they participated in
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the scheme during the time-span of the research, up to the end of the 1995/96 jGnancial 
year. Three practices were chosen from each group with no other consideration taken 
into account. The individual GPs seen were those named by each practice as having the 
lead responsibility for its involvement in the scheme during the research period. These 
doctors represented two first wave fimd-holders, four practices from the second wave, 
one practice that joined in the third wave, three fourth wave fimd-holders, and two fifth 
wave practices. The interviews took place during April and May 1997.
In addition to seeing GPs, informal discussions also took place with the fimd-holding 
manager at four of the practices. These individuals were selected conq)letely at random. 
The conversations cannot be described as formal interviews, but were largely used to 
ascertain their retrospective opinions on how they felt the budget setting process was 
conducted and its likely effects.
The primary interviews with representatives of the health authority were held with the 
chief executive and the director of public health. The purpose of this selection was to 
ascertain the health authority viewpoint from both a senior managerial and clinical 
perspective, similar to that of the providers. Of the two interviews, one was carried out 
in June 1997, the other in July 1997. Also held were some less formal discussions with 
various senior managers from the finance and contracting departments. A couple of 
these were to confirm the historic methodology that had been utilised to set the hospital 
services budgets of GP fimd-holders. Each of these conversations covered the 
arrangements for different services.
For each group of subjects the interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner. 
Pilot interviews were arranged for the sessions with consultants and GP fimd-holders 
because there was a sufficient number of them to enable this. To do the same for other 
categories of interviewee, like the chief executives of trusts and the health authority plus 
the director of public health, was far more problematic because of the solitary nature of 
their positions within the organisations. When the offices of some such post-holders in
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other areas were contacted, there was a certain reluctance to devote time for what was 
seen as only being a rehearsal for research elsewhere.
In short, the interviews were used to investigate a number of the hypotheses outlined in 
the previous chapter, although other topics were also covered. Amongst the subjects 
investigated were the impact of contractual demands, the effect of relationships between 
purchasers and providers, the incentives applicable to purchasers, plus the relevance of 
any threat or danger to hospitals in losing work. A guiding principle of the interviews 
was to word questions about the same issues to representatives from either purchasers or 
providers in the same way. Questions to fimd-holders and health authority managers 
covering the same topic were thus identical, as were those to consultants and the chief 
executives of trusts. This does not mean exactly the same set o f questions were asked 
of, for exan^le, both sets of purchasers. Some of the questions to health authority 
managers may not have been appropriate for the GPs. But for the issues covered with 
both, the questions put to each group of interviewee were worded identically.
RELEVANCE TO THE WIDER PICTURE
In order to establish whether there were significant differences in the waiting times of 
patients who had their operations commissioned by either a fimd-holding practice or 
health authority, the research process used a unique database covering four financial 
years, put together from the data held by a co-operative health authority. This offered an 
opportunity to demonstrate whether or not it is legitimate to deem that a two-tier service 
for elective surgery existed at four NHS providers operating within the internal market in 
West Sussex. It also provided a springboard to verify why the system worked in the way 
it did.
The extensiveness of the case study, covering four providers over four years, means its 
findings should be valuable in a wider context. None of the featured providers are major 
teaching institutions, they all seem to encompass relatively standard district general
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hospitals, and although two of them as trusts are responsible for the provision of both 
acute and community services, this in itself is reasonably common.
Likewise, there is little reason to suspect GP fund-holders in West Sussex are out of the 
ordinary compared to those in many other areas, as well as being subjected to a 
frequently used budget setting methodology. The same can be said about the health 
authority. It went through the same structural convergence of smaller district health 
authorities and subsequently the local frmily health services authority as similar bodies 
elsewhere. As such, there is very little reason to presume West Sussex might not be 
representative of a wider picture of the NHS quasi-market.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most inq)ortant gain from the methodology adopted for this study is that it 
actually enables a comparison of the performance of the two main purchaser types, albeit 
in just one inqx)rtant context, that of waiting times for elective surgery. The Audit 
Commission (1996a) warned that direct contrasts may be unsafe because frmd-holders 
and health authorities operate under different rules, plus dissimilarities between practices 
inside and outside the scheme might not be due to their status (ftmd-holding or not). 
However, it seems feeble to hide behind these obstacles and do nothing. Both purchaser 
types commission the elective surgery covered by the fund-holding scheme, and after the 
steady state in 1991/92, it is difficult to see how they perform this frmction under formal 
rules which gives one an advantage over the other.
For example, there is not a regulation that stops one purchaser from being allowed to 
move work between hospitals while another can, even if there could be circumstances 
that can have this effect. Similarly, distinct purchasers may work or do various things in 
alternative ways, such as the types of contract they run, and indeed have contrasting 
relationships with other agents. But this is not the same as operating under different 
rules. In addition, it is possible to demonstrate if contrasts in waiting times between
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fund-holding and other patients are a continuation of an existing trend, or whether they 
originate when practices join the scheme. As such, a satisfectory comparison between 
health authorities and fund-holders is possible. What is more, while the fimd-holding 
scheme has been the subject of much attention by the research community (see Dixon 
and Glennerster, 1995), the lack of research into the effectiveness of health authorities as 
commissioners makes such a comparison of the purchasers important.
To close, various commentators discussed how research into the 1991 reforms and fimd- 
holding could have been progressed (for example, see Iliffe and Freudenstein, 1994; 
Coulter, 1995b; Dixon and Glennerster, 1995; Ham et al., 1995). Regarding this matter, 
the logic of comparing the performance of the different purchaser types together looks 
compelling, particularly in the context of such a sensitive issue as waiting times. This 
may also address the perspective offered by Ham (1994) that important questions about 
the balance of health authority and fund-holding commissioning remain unanswered, a 
remark that still holds true. In short, the methodology adopted for this study used the 
waiting times for elective surgery to redress the lack of comparative studies into the 
relative effectiveness of health authorities and GP fimd-holders as purchasers.
C hapter 4
Differences in waiting times: myth or reality?
Whilst commencing with a review of the central issues that are both germane to and 
prevalent in the literature about waiting for treatment in the NHS, this chapter has two 
chief concerns. First, to demonstrate whether patients registered with ûind-holding GPs 
had shorter waiting times, relative to non fimd-holders. Second, to establish whether any 
such benefits for fund-holding patients can legitimately be attributed to the participation 
of their practices in the fimd-holding scheme. Preliminary findings relating to these 
questions were presented in the British Medical Journal (see Dowling, 1997). In the 
light of correspondence and comments provoked by this paper (see Black, 1998), the 
analysis was refined and possible objections to the findings explored.*  ^ It is the revised 
results that are presented here (with further matters also considered in other chapters).
WATTING IN THE NHS
Just about everybody requires health services at some point in their lives. Indeed, if 
someone actually avoided the receipt of any form of such care and was not neglected by 
service providers, their eventual death would presumably be a sudden and unforeseen 
event without a preceding period of illness. Whilst a few people may receive services 
solely fi*om private suppliers, the limited scope of private health insurance -  especially for 
the elderly, suggests the overwhelming majority of the UK population use the NHS at
14. A response to Black’s (1998) comments has recently been published (see Dowling, 1998).
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some time. Moreover, all NHS patients requiring elective care will inevitably experience 
a wait for their treatment because only those admitted for events like childbirth plus 
accident and emergency services do not endure any formal waiting period.
There are different events that mark the beginning of the waiting period for alternative 
services. Some, such as outpatient appointments, start with the referral by a GP and 
finish when the patient is seen at the hospital. In fact this is the case for all services 
provided as a direct result of a patient being referred by a family doctor. For elective 
surgery, the waiting time is the period between a patient’s placement on the waiting list 
by a hospital doctor following an outpatient consultation and associated investigations to 
the point of their admission for the operation. The wait may occasionally be deferred or 
suspended for part of this time, for various possible reasons. For example, they could 
have an ill relative that necessarily delays the surgery, they might first need to lose weight 
before they undergo an operation, they may decline offers of admission, they could need 
other prior treatment, or be pregnant (see NHS Executive, 1996b).
The debate over waiting times for NHS services has traditionally focused heavily on 
elective surgery, even though the waits for other non-emergency services can sometimes 
be very long indeed. Moreover, Frankel and Robbins (1993) made particular reference 
to outpatient consultations in this respect. But historically it is only the waiting lists for 
elective surgery -  the numbers of people awaiting an elective surgical procedure at a 
hospital at a given point in time, that have even been counted in the NHS (Yates, 1987). 
And the provision of elective surgery in the NHS has often been characterised by long 
waiting times for the service. A variety of reasons have been put forward to explain this, 
and over the years a number of solutions to the problem have been advanced.
Causes of long waiting lists
Various reasons might explain the persistence of long waiting lists in the NHS. One put 
forward some years ago was that over time the increased supply of beds could itself raise
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demand (see Culyer and CuUis, 1976). Harvey (1993) also offered several potential 
causes, such as the inclusion of people in the list who should not be on it. For instance, 
patients who died whilst on the list might in the past have remained on it for quite some 
time after their death, although the priority given to upgrading information systems since 
the reforms (see Malek et a/., 1993) should have made this type of incident far less likely. 
Another possibility suggested by Harvey (1993) was the deliberate maintenance of long 
NHS waiting lists by surgeons in order to oblige patients to have their operation on a 
private basis. Indeed, when the fund-holding GPs interviewed for this research were 
asked what they thought had been the causes of long waits in the NHS, one-third (four 
out of twelve) felt such manipulative behaviour by consultants was an important factor.
Harvey (1993) also mentioned the effect of hospital doctors giving priority to treating 
life-threatening conditions that hold only a small chance of a successful outcome. In 
theory it may be more rational to devote greater resources to less clinically interesting 
but curable ailments, which are the conditions most commonly found in waiting list 
patients. Nevertheless, if implemented this could feasibly compromise the advancement 
of medical knowledge. Some conditions might be curable now because resources were 
formerly devoted to treatments for them before there was much chance of a successful 
therapeutic outcome for the patients concerned. The other potential explanation for long 
waits that Harvey (1993) cited was an inadequate funding of the service, though little or 
no firm evidence exists to substantiate this (or any of the other possible reasons). For 
example, variations in the spending levels of the NHS in discrete areas of the country do 
not correlate with differences in the sizes of waiting lists in those districts (Yates, 1987).
Furthermore, the debate over inadequate resources relates to Smith’s (1998) point that 
waiting lists are a mechanism for rationing non-urgent health care services in the NHS. 
While Frankel and West (1993) claim waiting lists will be misunderstood if they are seen 
in just this context, they made a number of almost positive points about them. First, 
leaving some patients on a waiting list was a way of rationing the responses to trivial 
conditions. It formally offered treatment even when there was little chance of it being 
performed. Second, waiting lists can be used as a political weapon to demonstrate a
116
need for additional resources. Third, they minimise the time when staff may be idle by 
allowing a consistent throughput of patients. This also complements a point made by 
Yates (1987) that if waiting lists do enable a rational scheduling of patients through 
operating theatres, they may help to avoid the costs of excess hospital capacity.
Yet despite such points the existence of waiting lists is a long-term politically sensitive 
issue that has exacerbated public criticism for various governments, and the Thatcher 
administration was not exempt from these difficulties. Moreover, it seems that alarm 
over waiting times contribute to some people taking out private insurance (see Calnan et 
al., 1993; Besley et a l, 1996). Despite the point that this could slow the growth in NHS 
costs, over the years such concerns have induced a range of initiatives aimed at reducing 
waiting times (see Edwards and Barlow, 1994). These were often short-term campaigns 
marked by temporary additional funding to increase surgical activity (Paton and Bach, 
1990). Yet the problem has never permanently disappeared and assorted approaches 
have been put forward as to how the waiting list dilemma should be addressed.
Ideas to combat long waits
There have been various proposals for reducing the length of waiting lists. Examples 
include raising the amount of short stay and day case surgery to increase throughput, 
plus booking patients with an admittance date at the time of the outpatient assessment 
(see Frankel and West, 1993). To an extent both of these approaches are already applied 
in the NHS. Policy emphasis has been given to setting targets to increase the level of 
elective surgery performed on a day case basis (see NHS Executive, 1992), and some 
patients are given an admission date for the procedure at the time the decision to operate 
was made (see NHS Executive, 1994d). Other ideas include restricting the degree to 
which the private practice of consultants is allowed to limit their NHS commitments, plus 
publicising information on waiting lists with ‘bottlenecks’ or ‘black-spots’ identified and 
investigated (see Yates, 1987; Frankel and West, 1993).
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Yates (1987) also promoted the idea that patients who have had long waits could receive 
compensation, as well as suggesting that the study of good practice in the management 
of waiting lists should be encouraged and when found disseminated to other hospitals.
Yet despite the abundance of such options, the Thatcher government still chose to 
introduce a quasi-market in an attempt to resolve its problems over the NHS, including 
the public discontent with long waiting lists. Indeed, it seems that the fund-holding 
element of the 1991 reforms was particularly focused upon that part of the service. The 
initial list of procedures covered by the scheme included those where the problems of 
long waiting lists were most acute. Hence the Thatcher government’s favourable view of 
the ways in which markets function seemed to coincide with the belief that at one level of 
economic analysis the continuation of waiting lists demonstrate the inefficiency of non- 
market forms of resource allocation (see Cullis, 1993).
THE FORMAT OF NHS WATTING LISTS
NHS hospitals operate what West (1993) has called a multi-degree scale of urgency for 
running waiting lists. Patients awaiting elective surgery should generally be admitted for 
the procedure in a time-span that accords with their clinical urgency and in particular the 
necessity that they receive quick treatment in order to maximise the likelihood of a 
successful therapeutic outcome. For instance, patients requiring surgery for an operable 
form of cancer are likely to be admitted far more promptly relative to men on the waiting 
list for vasectomy procedures. That hypothetical example is not meant to minimise the 
importance of sterilisation services, just to indicate the differences that normally exist 
between the waits of the seriously ill and patients whose condition is not life threatening.
Even so, waiting times for people with similar conditions are not the same countrywide. 
They can differ considerably, even at different hospitals in the same area, especially for 
patients with a non-urgent clinical status. Moreover, because the seriously ill tend to 
receive relatively swift treatment, it is the long waiting lists and times for non-urgent 
patients that has been the focus of the political pressure applied on governments. But
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even when a patient’s medical condition is not clinically life threatening, the duration of 
their wait is still important. Long waits for treatment can severely reduce people’s 
energy, quality and enjoyment of life, a capacity to care for children or elderly relatives, 
plus prospects for work. In this context elective surgery is desired by the population, 
unequivocally effective, and deliverable at a comparatively low cost (Frankel, 1993).
Yet beyond these points, what is much less appreciated is the fact that there are three 
separate categories of the waiting list. These are the elective waiting, elective planned, 
and elective booked lists (see NHS Executive, 1994d; 1996b). Patients are placed into 
them according to their medical condition, although it will be shown that the policies of 
alternative providers in this context are not entirely uniform. Table 4.1 gives the precise 
breakdown of NHS patients from each category who received operations covered by the 
fimd-holding scheme at the four providers featured in this study.
The elective waiting, planned and booked lists
Elective waiting list patients, about 61 per cent of the NHS patients who received fimd- 
holding operations at the four providers over the four years, are placed on the list by a 
hospital doctor without having their admission planned or booked for a specific time in 
the future. These are predominantly the patients given a routine clinical urgency.
Elective planned patients, over 9 per cent of the total, are given a date or at least an 
approximate time of admission for an investigative procedure as a planned sequence of 
clinical care. They may be called in at regular intervals, perhaps every six months, for a 
diagnostic examination on some part of the body. For example, people with a family 
history of rectal or colon cancer might be admitted for a colonoscopy to check that area 
of their anatomy. Another common operation for such patients is a cystoscopy, an 
examination of the bladder. This procedure is often performed on a cyclical basis for 
patients who are in a period of remission or recovering from a malignant disorder of that 
organ in order to try and detect at an early stage any recurrence of the disease.
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TABLE 4.1 - Number o f operations covered by the fund-holding scheme performed at four providers 
over four financial years on NHS patients from different categories o f the waiting list
Provider and year
Elective waiting list 
Walt Walt not 
recorded recorded
Elective
Walt
recorded
booked list 
Walt not 
recorded
Elective planned list 
Walt Walt not 
recorded recorded
Overall waiting Hst 
Walt Walt not 
recorded recorded
Crawley Horaham 
1992-93 No. 3207 31 167 6 1 1127 3375 1164
% 70.7 0.7 3.7 0.1 0.0 24.8 74.4 25.6
1993-94 No. 3094 6 124 11 14 1100 3232 1117
% 71.1 0.1 2.9 0.3 0.3 25.3 74.3 25.7
1994-95 No. 3412 13 541 119 1 1000 3954 1132
% 67.1 0.3 10.6 2.3 0.0 21.6 77.7 22.3
1995-96 No. 3278 110 1613 233 43 433 4934 776
% 57.4 1.9 28.2 4.1 0.8 7.6 86.4 13.6
TOTAL 12991 160 2445 369 59 3660 15495 4189
•/• 66.0 0.8 12.4 1.9 0.3 18.6 78.7 21.3
Mid Sussex 
1992-93 No. 2383 3 645 31 178 0 3206 34
% 73.5 0.1 19.9 1.0 5.5 - 99.0 1.0
1993-94 No. 2088 1 495 25 128 0 2711 26
% 76.3 <0.1 18.1 0.9 4.7 - 99.1 0.9
1994-95 No. 2779 1 419 18 146 0 3344 19
•/• 82.6 <0.1 12.5 0.5 4.3 - 99.4 0.6
1995-96 No. 2838 2 589 16 168 0 3595 18
% 78.5 0.1 16.3 0.4 4.6 . 99.5 0.5
TOTAL 10088 7 2148 90 620 0 12856 97
% 77.9 0.1 16.6 0.7 4.8 - 99.3 0.7
Royal West Sussex 
1992-93 No. 1247 40 2632 546 174 18 4053 604
% 26.8 0.9 56.5 11.7 3.7 0.4 87.0 13.0
1993-94 No. 1384 169 3539 892 127 30 5050 1091
% 22.5 2.8 57.6 14.5 2.1 0.5 82.2 17.8
1994-95 No. 1839 30 5010 206 124 98 6973 334
% 25.2 0.4 68.6 2.8 1.7 1.3 95.4 4.6
1995-96 No. 3096 11 4209 150 570 178 7875 339
% 37.7 0.1 51.2 1.8 6.9 2.2 95.9 4.1
TOTAL 7566 250 15390 1794 995 324 23951 2368
% 28.7 0.9 58.5 6.8 3.8 1.2 91.0 9.0
Worthing and Southlands 
1992-93 No. 7216 125 1440 40 475 109 9131 274
% 76.7 1.3 15.3 0.4 5.1 1.2 97.1 2.9
1993-94 No. 7576 327 1570 60 672 141 9818 528
•/• 73.2 3.2 15.2 0.6 6.5 1.4 94.9 5.1
1994-95 No. 7538 329 1852 127 1089 94 10479 550
•/• 68.3 3.0 16.8 1.2 9.9 0.9 95.0 5.0
1995-96 No. 6936 165 2228 260 1174 126 10338 551
% 63.7 1.5 20.5 2.4 10.8 1.2 94.9 5.1
TOTAL 29266 946 7090 487 3410 470 39766 1903
% 70.2 2.3 17.0 1.2 8.2 1.1 95.4 4.6
AGGREGATE 59911 1363 27073 2740 5084 4454 92068 8557
% 59.5 1.4 26.9 2.7 5.1 4.4 91.5 8.5
Elective booked patients, close to 30 per cent, are given an admission date for the 
procedure at the time the decision to admit was made. These are commonly the patients 
given an urgent clinical status and have relatively short waiting times, for which the
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reason is often confirmed by the diagnoses. The striking observation, particularly at 
three of the providers, is how commonly one or more of the words malignant, carcinoma 
or neoplasm appear in the description, even though the category is by no means solely 
devoted to cancer patients and various other types of diagnoses are found as well.
Table 4.1 shows nearly 98 per cent of the elective waiting list, almost 91 per cent of 
booked patients, and close to 47 per cent of the planned list at the four providers over 
the four years had their waits recorded. The lower percentage for the planned list is 
explained by the apparent policy of the Crawley Horsham provider not to record the 
waiting times for this category, although there are a few exceptions.
Table 4.1 also implies that whatever policies or behaviour governs the placement of 
patients into certain categories of the waiting list, such decisions are not absolutely 
consistent over all four providers. The Royal West Sussex provider places an unusually 
high proportion of their patients in the elective booked category with, over the four 
years, more than 65 per cent of waiting list patients given such a classification. This can 
be compared to just over 14 per cent at Crawley Horsham, and a little less than 19 per 
cent at both the Mid Sussex plus the Worthing and Southlands providers. Indeed, whilst 
cancer patients are routinely placed in the elective booked category at the Royal West 
Sussex provider, more without such a diagnosis are also placed in this list than at the 
others. As such, it appears people are classified as elective booked patients at the Royal 
West Sussex who would not have been at the others.
This tendency is shown even more clearly in figure 4.1. It is unmistakably the Royal 
West Sussex that stands out as unusual in the context of placing patients into the various 
categories of the waiting list. It can also be seen that the Mid Sussex plus Worthing and 
Southlands providers behave almost identically in this respect. The Crawley Horsham 
provider is not too dissimilar either, although they use the elective planned list more than 
the others did, even though the waiting times of patients in this category are rarely 
recorded. Additionally, it can be seen from table 4.1 that Crawley Horsham appeared to 
alter their policy for 1995/96 regarding the mix of patients they place in both the booked
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and planned lists. Overall, hospitals seem to reserve a reasonable degree of freedom in 
deciding which categories of the list to use for certain patients, although the principles 
outlined earlier certainly do still hold in general. In brief, whilst the elective waiting list 
primarily contains clinically routine patients, some may be more routine than other cases.
FIGURE 4.1 - The percentages relevant to each category of the waiting list for the aggregate number of 
operations covered by the fund-holding scheme performed on NHS patients at four providers over four 
financial years from April 1992 to March 1996
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In view of this, a comparison of the waiting times for separate patient groupings may be 
more valid if it concentrated on those whose waits are most likely to be affected by the 
type of purchaser representing them. Policy directives state that admissions for urgent 
cases must be made on the basis of medical priority alone (see NHS Executive, 1994e; 
1996d). The identity of the purchaser should thus have no relevance in the admission of 
patients to hospital who are either clinically urgent or require regular investigations. As 
such, waits for people on the planned and booked lists will not be driven by whether the 
surgery is commissioned by a fund-bolder or health authority, perhaps unlike the elective 
waiting list patients. This would still be the general rule regardless of any inconsistencies 
in the way hospitals divide patients between the three categories. Therefore, a study into 
the capabilities of alternative purchaser types to shorten waiting times could well be 
more fruitful when the analysis focuses on patients from the elective waiting list.
For even if there are some differences in the way separate providers categorise patients, 
patients with a routine clinical status are still liable to be mostly placed in the elective
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waiting list. In fact it seems logical to conclude that because the Royal West Sussex 
positions a greater proportion of its patients in the booked list, out of those who are 
placed in the elective list there are likely to be proportionally more ultra-routine cases 
than at the other providers. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to investigate whether it is 
correct that the waits of routine status patients are most likely to be dependent on which 
purchaser represents them. The forthcoming analysis thus covers not only the waiting 
times of patients from the elective waiting list, but also those on the other categories 
(plus the overall list).
From this, however, there is a further issue to be addressed regarding the division of 
patients between the waiting list categories. Black (1998) inferred that waiting time 
contrasts between fimd-holding and other patients could arise if the proportion of each 
population placed in the elective waiting list differed. In response to this, table 4.2 gives 
the numbers and percentages of all fund-holding and non frmd-holding patients from each 
category of the waiting list who received operations covered by the scheme at the four 
providers from 1992/93 to 1995/96. The aggregate percentages placed in the elective 
waiting list from each population were very similar, 61 per cent of non frmd-holders and 
60.5 per cent of frmd-holders. On an individual basis, a larger proportion of non frmd- 
holders than fund-holding patients tended to be placed in this category at Crawley 
Horsham, and to a lesser extent at Worthing and Southlands. The opposite trend is 
evident at both the Royal West Sussex provider and to a smaller degree at Mid Sussex.
There are different ways of looking at the possible outcome of placing more patients 
from one group of practices, frmd-holding or not, in the elective waiting list. Firstly, 
because more routine status patients are placed in it, this might suggest one population 
might have a higher proportion of non-urgent cases. This could skew their waits 
upwards. The second alternative is that if any randomness between the ratio of urgent 
and routine cases was not a material fector, more patients of greater clinical urgency 
from one of the populations could be deliberately placed in the elective waiting list? If 
so, with the directive that standard waiting times should operate at distinct hospitals for 
urgent patients (see NHS Executive, 1994e; 1996d), as long as this obligation was met
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the average waits for the group with more of its number on the elective waiting list could 
feasibly be lowered. To an extent these suppositions are the antithesis of each other.
TABLE 4.2 - Number and percentage o f operations covered by the fund-holding scheme on non fund- 
holding (health authority) and fund-holding patients from each category o f the NHS waiting list at four 
providers over four financial years
Waiting
Health authority patients
Booked Planned Waiting
Fund holding patients
Booked Planned
Provider and year No. % No. % No. No. No. % No.
Crauiey Horsham 
1992-93 2677 73.1 120 3.3 866 23.6 561 64.0 53 6.1 262 29.9
1993-94 2071 71.7 82 2.8 735 25.5 1029 70.4 53 3.6 379 25.9
1994-95 1873 68.5 346 12.7 515 18.8 1552 66.0 314 12.4 486 19.2
1995-96 1953 61.7 937 29.6 277 8.7 1435 56.4 909 35.7 199 7.8
TOTAL 8574 68.9 1485 11.9 2393 19.2 4577 63.3 1329 18.4 1326 18.3
Mid Sussex
1992-93 1791 72.9 537 21.9 129 5.3 595 76.0 139 17.8 49 6.3
1993-94 1474 78.7 319 17.0 81 4.3 615 71.3 201 23.3 47 5.4
1994-95 1667 81.2 305 14.9 80 3.9 1113 84.9 132 10.1 66 5.0
1995-96 1739 78.7 375 17.0 97 4.4 1101 78.5 230 16.4 71 5.1
TOTAL 6671 77.6 1536 17.9 387 4.5 3424 78.6 702 16.1 233 5.3
Royal West Sussex 
1992-93 1215 27.6 3005 68.2 184 4.2 72 28.5 173 68.4 8 3.2
1993-94 1184 24.3 3567 73.1 129 2.6 369 29.3 864 68.5 28 2.2
1994-95 1295 24.9 3747 71.9 166 3.2 574 27.3 1469 70.0 56 2.7
1995-96 1759 38.8 2366 52.2 405 8.9 1348 36.6 1993 54.1 343 9.3
TOTAL 5453 28.7 12685 66.7 884 4.6 2363 32.4 4499 61.7 435 6.0
Worthing and Southlands 
1992-93 6675 78.1 1347 15.8 524 6.1 666 77.5 133 15.5 60 7.0
1993-94 6485 76.5 1333 15.7 660 7.8 1418 75.9 297 15.9 153 8.2
1994-95 5173 71.7 1276 17.7 765 10.6 2694 70.6 703 18.4 418 11.0
1995-96 4337 64.3 1570 23.3 835 12.4 2764 66.7 918 22.1 465 11.2
TOTAL 22670 73.2 5526 17.8 2784 9.0 7542 70.6 2051 19.2 1096 10.3
AGGREGATE 43368 61.0 21232 29.9 6448 9.1 17906 60.5 8581 29.0 3090 10.4
Although table 4.2 does not compare the waiting times of fund-holders and non fund­
holders, it shall be used later to test the potential impact of differences in the proportion 
of each population placed in the elective waiting list on the waits of each group.
The changing status of some patients
There is another unavoidable complication to the impending comparison. As the number 
of practices joining the fimd-holding scheme has grown over the years, some people will
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have started their wait as a patient of a non fund-holding practice but actually have the 
operation after it has joined the scheme. Therefore, a comparison based on the status of 
patients’ practices at the time of the operation may lead to those people on the waiting 
list for a very long period before their GP practice joined the scheme having their entire 
wait counted towards the average for hind-holding patients. A couple of authentic 
examples from the database, where the patients’ waiting times far exceeded the averages 
for the providers (and for one the patient’s charter target), are now given to show the 
potential effect of this and why the avoidance of such pitfalls looks important.
A patient from a non fund-holding practice joined the elective waiting list of one of the 
providers on 3 October 1991. The practice entered the scheme on 1 April 1993, and the 
patient was admitted for the operation on 2 April 1993, performed on a day case basis 
the same day. Out of a recorded waiting time of 547 days, this patient was on the list as 
a non fund-holding patient for 545 days and as a flmd-holder for 2 days. Another patient 
of a non fimd-holding practice joined the elective waiting list on 18 October 1990. This 
practice joined the fund-holding scheme on 1 April 1993 and the patient was eventually 
admitted for the procedure on 13 August 1993. Hence for a wait totalling 1,030 days, 
895 were spent as a non fimd-holding patient and only 135 as a fiind-holder. Some 87 
per cent of the waiting time thus elapsed whilst a non fimd-holding patient and 13 per 
cent as a fimd-holder.
Obviously for the first example where the patient was called in on the practice’s second 
day in the scheme and the admission would have been arranged prior to 1 April 1993, it 
could be that this was too quick for a new fimd-holder to influence it themselves. It may 
equally be possible that because the practice was soon to join the scheme and would no 
longer be reliant on the health authority contract, they made the provider aware of their 
intention to move the patient elsewhere in order to encourage the hospital to act rapidly. 
Or perhaps the practice had not been in contact about the patient, but as the provider 
knew they were joining the scheme they effected the admission to avoid the patient being 
moved to a competitor without warning. Whatever happened in this or the other case, 
there are many other examples that would have similar effects. The study might thus be
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enhanced by concentrating on those patients registered with practices that did not change 
their status, fund-holding or not, during the course of the wait.
Table 4.3 provides data for NHS patients from the elective waiting list whose practice 
did change their status during the wait. It gives the number of days spent on the list as a 
non fund-holding patient (the period prior to their practice joining the scheme), and as a 
fund-holding patient (the time after the entry of their practices into the scheme). It can 
be seen that for nearly 2,500 such patients, close to 59 per cent of their total waiting time 
occurred before their practices became fund-holders and a little over 41 per cent after 
this event. The total for each provider over the four years is also represented by figure 
4.2. Every bar in the chart below represents the percentages detailed in the rows labelled 
‘total’ for each provider in table 4.3.
TABLE 4.3 - Time spent on elective waiting list as a non fund-holder (the period before practices’ entry 
into the fimd-holding scheme) andfund-holder (the period after practices ’ entry into the fund-holding 
scheme) by NHS patients at four providers over four financial years whose general practices joined the 
scheme during the course o f the wait
Provider and year Number
Wait as a non flmd-hoider 
Days %
Wait as a fimd-holder 
Days % Total days
Craniey Horsham
1992-93 16 2337 29.0 5719 71.0 8056
1993-94 172 28038 65.2 14993 34.8 43031
1994-95 231 42752 56.9 32429 43.1 75181
1995-96 56 7543 33.1 15260 66.9 22803
TOTAL 475 80670 54.1 68401 45.9 149071
Mid Sussex
1992-93 123 15439 65.2 8243 34.8 23682
1993-94 41 5489 69.8 2378 30.2 7867
1994-95 133 20413 70.1 8723 29.9 29136
1995-96 26 3442 41.1 4930 58.9 8372
TOTAL 323 44783 64.8 24274 35.2 69057
Royal West Sussex
1992-93 44 11587 62.8 6863 37.2 18450
1993-94 154 36650 70.4 15439 29.6 52089
1994-95 94 16089 49.0 16768 51.0 32857
1995-96 296 62028 65.1 33212 34.9 95240
TOTAL 588 126354 63.6 72282 36.4 198636
Worthing and Souflilands
1992-93 205 28807 64.0 16219 36.0 45026
1993-94 324 44102 55.9 34848 44.1 78950
1994-95 433 55742 57.8 40699 42.2 96441
1995-96 121 9803 34.4 18674 65.6 28477
TOTAL 1083 138454 55.6 110440 44.4 248894
AGGREGATE 2469 390261 58.6 275397 41.4 665658
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FIGURE 4.2 - For NHS elective waiting list patients at four providers from  April 1992 to March 1996 
whose general practice acquired fund-holding status during the course o f  their wait, the percentages o f  
waits spent both before it entered the scheme (wait as non fund-holder) and after jo in in g  (wait as fund­
holder)
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Both table 4.3 and figure 4.2 clearly indicate that patients generally spent more time on 
the elective waiting list before their practice acquired fund-holding status than after it. 
This statistic alone suggests fund-holding patients may well tend to have shorter waits 
than non fund-holders do. It also means that any comparison between fund-holding and 
non fund-holding patients which is calculated according to the status o f their general 
practices at the time o f the operation could distort the analysis by falsely inflating the 
waiting times o f fund-holders. So in the first instance, for the waiting time comparison 
that follows, patients whose practice changed their status (joined the fund-holding 
scheme) during the course o f their wait are excluded from the analyses.
WAITING TIME COMPARISON
Table 4.4 shows the results of a comparison between the waiting times of patients on the 
elective waiting list from fund-holding and other practices after confining the analysis to 
those registered with GPs who did not alter their status during the wait. The ANC VA 
tests show fund-holders had significantly shorter waits in all sixteen cases. As mentioned 
in chapter three, the table gives the mean and median waits of each population. Even 
though the distribution of waiting times tended to be skewed within the populations, the
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only case where the shorter mean of fund-holders did not match the relationship between 
the medians was for Worthing and Southlands in 1995/96. Here the mean wait of fund­
holders was shorter than for the non fimd-holders, hut they had the same median (though 
it should still be noted that ANOVA tests use the waits of each individual patient).
TABLE 4,4 - Comparison o f waiting times (in days) at four providers overfourfinancial years for the 
operations covered by the fund-holding scheme on non fund-holding (health authority) andfund-holding 
patients from the elective waiting list whose practices ’ status (fimd-holding or not) did not alter during 
the course o f the wait
Health authority patients Fand-holdiag patients ANOVA
Provider and year Median Mean No. Median Mean No. F eiitlcai F obtained P-value
Cranky Horsham
1992-93 69.0 148.4 2655 62.0 111.8 536 3.84 23.11 <0.0001
1993-94 167.0 214.2 2067 65.0 129.2 855 3.84 137.68 <0.0001
1994-95 132.0 193.9 1865 58.0 119.1 1316 3.84 161.18 <0.0001
1995-96 168.0 194.6 1897 115.0 162.9 1325 3.84 35.94 <0.0001
Movement In mean +46Jdays(+31.1%) +51.4 days (+46.0%)
Mid Sussex
1992-93 54.0 94.6 1788 44.0 61.5 472 3.85 41.19 <0.0001
1993-94 62.0 112.9 1473 43.0 68.9 574 3.85 61.06 <0.0001
1994-95 62.0 118.3 1666 44.5 80.3 980 3.84 64.34 <0.0001
1995-96 59.0 125.8 1737 47.0 83.4 1075 3.84 81.85 <0.0001
Movement In mean +312 days (+33.0%) +21.9 days (+35.6%)
Royal West Sussex
1992-93 176.0 262.8 1179 61.0 92.9 24 3.85 13.74 0.0002
1993-94 245.0 270.4 1037 105.0 153.3 193 3.85 61.30 <0.0001
1994-95 284.0 282.0 1279 126.0 170.7 466 3.85 148.93 <0.0001
1995-96 153.0 205.8 1751 65.0 108.7 1049 3.84 277.41 <0.0001
Movement In mean -57.0 days (-21.7%) +15.8 days (+17.0%)
Worthing and Southlands
1992-93 74.0 129.1 6555 48.0 70.0 456 3.84 7759 <0.0001
1993-94 83.0 134.4 6221 59.0 96.6 1031 3.84 79.91 <0.0001
1994-95 80.0 129.6 4942 62.0 103.7 2163 3.84 74.40 <0.0001
1995-96 83.0 136.1 4228 83.0 127.7 2587 3.84 7.16 0.0075
Movement In mean +7.0 days (+5.4%) +57.7 days (+82.4%)
It is also necessary to address Black’s (1998) idea that the proportion of each population 
placed in the elective waiting list could determine any differences in their waits. For this 
to be the case (meaning either of the two options outlined earlier is feasible -  that the 
preponderance of one population in the elective waiting list either lengthens or shortens 
their waiting times), one or other of the following circumstances would be expected. In 
cases where a greater proportion of non fimd-holders had been placed in the elective 
waiting list than fimd-holders, their waits relative to the fimd-holders should consistently 
either be increased or decreased. If non fimd-holders consistently had longer waits
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regardless of whether there was proportionately more or less of them in the elective 
waiting list than fund-holding patients, Black’s (1998) hypothesis would no longer 
appear sustainable.
When the results from tables 4.2 and 4.4 are considered together, a trend substantiating 
either of the two possibilities just outlined is not revealed. In cases where a greater share 
of fimd-holders or non fimd-holders was placed in the elective waiting list, either way it 
was the latter group that had the longer waits. For example, proportionately more non 
fund-holding patients than fimd-holders were in the elective waiting list at Crawley 
Horsham in 1992/93. Non fund-holding patients at this provider that year had longer 
waits relative to the fund-holders. At the Royal West Sussex provider in 1993/94, a 
higher percentage of fimd-holders were admitted from the elective waiting list than was 
the case with non fimd-holding patients. Yet the fimd-holders again enjoyed shorter 
average waiting times.
Although just two contradictory cases have been itemised here, there are others that 
could have been used. This might indicate, beyond the basic understanding that more 
routine status patients are placed in the elective waiting list, the division of patients at the 
margins into separate categories has at most a somewhat peripheral impact on average 
waits. There may consequently be far more important factors that determine the waits of 
fimd-holders and non fimd-holders. In sum, the lack of any consistent link between the 
relative length of waiting times with the proportion of a population placed in the elective 
waiting list suggests that Black’s (1998) suspicion was something of a ‘red herring’.
Table 4.4 also shows that relatively nearby hospitals can have dissimilar waiting times. 
For example, waits are shorter at Mid Sussex than at the Royal West Sussex, although if 
patients in the elective waiting list at the latter are generally more routine than usual this 
may explain the discrepancy. Also, where non fimd-holders’ waits increased over the 
four years this was not associated with falling waits for fimd-holders during the period. 
This may say something about another issue, the impact of the scheme on services for 
patients of non fund-holding practices. The search for evidence with regards to the fund-
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holding scheme having either a negative or positive effect on the waiting times of non 
fund-holding patients is discussed in the next section.
The zero-sum effect: trends in waiting times
Suggestions have been made that improvements in services to fund-holding patients act 
as a catalyst for enhancing those received by non fimd-holders in the same locality (see 
Leese and Drummond, 1993; NHS Executive, 1995e). Such commentators would see 
the shorter waiting times of fund-holding patients as a general efiGciency improvement 
forced on hospitals by competitive pressures, and this is likely to ‘drag down’ the waits 
of non fimd-holders also. With improvements filtering through to non fimd-holders, this 
could represent a ‘no loser’ situation as efficiency gains would be shared.
The opposing claim is that fimd-holders may be securing better access to services at a 
direct cost to people registered with practices outside the scheme (see Fisher, A., 1993). 
The suspicion here is that non fimd-holders would have to wait longer than they might 
otherwise have done to accommodate the shorter waits of fimd-holders. Also, there is a 
third possibility. The shorter waiting times of fund-holders could have no influence on 
the waits of non fimd-holders, either way. Perhaps it is excess hospital capacity being 
used. Whatever option is true, hard evidence on this question has not been available 
(Dixon and Glennerster, 1995). For that reason, this issue deserves consideration here.
Regarding the point of Fisher, A  (1993), cited above, that quicker access to services for 
fund-holders could be at the expense of non fimd-holding patients, what would be 
expected if fimd-holders’ shorter waits were directly linked to longer waiting times for 
other patients? Imagine the scenario where a fictitious hospital before the introduction 
of fimd-holding operated on exactly 5,000 patients a year, a number representing its full 
capacity, each patient had the same clinical urgency, and these characteristics remained 
unchanged with the passing of time. During this twelve months consultants made no 
differentiation between clients for any other reason. Every single patient had a waiting
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time of 150 days. Together, patients receiving an operation that year therefore waited
750.000 days in total.
The next year another 5,000 patients had surgery but 500 of them, 10 per cent, were 
now registered with a fimd-holding GP. Such practices managed to reduce the waiting 
times of their patients to 90 days, quite realistic considering some of the contrasts in 
table 4.4. Because the hospital has a constant capacity, the aggregate 750,000 days 
became spread unevenly between the two groups. The fund-holders waited a total of
45.000 days, but to accommodate this the 4,500 non fund-holders had their waiting times 
extended to nearly 157 days to make up the other 705,000 days. The next year practices 
covering a further 500 patients joined the scheme, and with the same number of first 
wavers they too had their waits lowered to 90 days. This led to the remaining 4,000 non 
fund-holders having their waits raised to 165 days, bringing the gross total to 750,000 
days.
Precisely the same trend occurred in the following two years when a further 500 patients 
of the hospital’s caseload were registered with fund-holders in each, and they also all had 
their waits reduced to 90 days. In year three, this meant the remaining 3,500 non fimd- 
holders having their waiting times raised to almost 176 days to accommodate the fall for 
the additional fund-holders. In year four the continuing 3,000 non fimd-holders had their 
waits increased to 190 days to oblige 2,000 fimd-holders all having waits of 90 days. In 
every year for this hypothetical case, the 5,000 patients together waited 750,000 days.
This example produces the graph shown in figure 4.3. As each year goes by the waiting 
times of the remaining non fund-holding patients, whose number falls by 500 per year, 
rises to serve the increasing number (also 500 per year) of fimd-holders enjoying shorter 
waits of 90 days each. Hence if shorter waits for fimd-holders was part of a zero-sum 
effect where the waiting times of non fimd-holders had to rise to accommodate this, 
graphs would show a widening gap between the lines representing the waits of the two 
populations as more practices enter the scheme. This gap would be even more obvious if 
fund-holders’ waits fell as more practices join the scheme, rather than remain constant.
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FIGURE 4.3 - Trend over four years in mean waits o f non fund-holding patients at a fictitious provider 
performing 5000 operations per year with an aggregate waiting time o f 750000 days in each, i f  the 
fund-holders receiving surgery grew by 500per year and all had a wait o f 90 days
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Figures 4.4 to 4.7, showing the genuine trends in waiting times at the four providers, 
indicate that reality bears little resemblance to the hypothetical example in figure 4.3.
For instance, figure 4.4 shows that at Crawley Horsham the initial difference in the waits 
of the two populations widened then shrank. At Worthing and Southlands there was a 
gradual movement towards equality (figure 4.7). Moreover, figures 4.5 and 4.6 do not 
suggest the waits of the populations widened at Mid Sussex and the Royal West Sussex. 
In fact the trends for both sets of patients at each of these providers look fairly similar. 
Indeed, at the Royal West Sussex the gap representing the waits of each group does 
grow narrower and shift: downwards in 1995/96, perhaps backing the idea that efficiency 
improvements can filter through to non fimd-holders.
Moreover, the correlation coefficient (Pearson’s r) for the actual trends in waiting times 
for non fund-holding and fimd-holding patients is also given in figures 4.4 to 4.7, and is 
calculated in line with the normal practice for this analysis (see Healey, 1996). The point 
to be taken into account for this computation is that if the waits for the two populations 
were negatively correlated in such a way that non fimd-holders’ waiting times increased 
as the waits of fimd-holding patients fell, the Pearson’s r statistic would be a negative 
number. If the Pearson’s r statistic is a positive number, the waits of the two groups are 
positively correlated (to some extent), and the trends in their waiting times move in a 
broadly similar direction.
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Further, the nearer Pearson’s r is to ±1.00, the more extreme is the correlation (either 
negative or positive) in the relationship between the two groups’ waits (a value of 0.00 
for Pearson’s r would indicate that no linear relationship exists in their waiting times). 
From this, the fact that the actual Pearson’s r statistic for all cases is a positive number 
(see figures 4.4 to 4.7) strongly indicates that the waits of both groups were positively, 
not negatively, correlated at each provider, and extremely so at Mid Sussex.
FIGURE 4.4 - Movement in mean waiting times over four financial years at the Crawley Horsham 
provider for fund-holding and non fund-holding patients on the elective waiting list whose practices ' 
status (fund-holding or not) did not alter during the course o f the wait
DAYS
250 1
200 •
150
100 -
50-
1994-951992-93 1995-961993-94
• * Fund-holders 
— Non fund4iolders
YEAR
Pearson’s r = +0.45
FIGURE 4.5 - Movement in mean waiting times over four financial years at the Mid Sussex provider for 
fund-holding and non fund-holding patients on the elective waiting list whose practices ’ status (fund- 
holding or not) did not alter during the course o f the wait
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FIGURE 4.6 - Movement in mean waiting times over four financial years at the Royal West Sussex 
provider for fund-holding and non fund-holding patients on the elective waiting list whose practices’ 
status (fund-holding or not) did not alter during the course o f the wait
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FIGURE 4.7 - Movement in mean waiting times over four financial years at the Worthing and 
Southlands provider for fund-holding and non fund-holding patients on the elective waiting list whose 
practices ’ status (fund-holding or not) did not alter during the course o f the wait
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In sum, the trends in waiting times for each population, as shown in tables 4.4 to 4.7, do 
little to suggest that the shorter waits of fund-holders were achieved at the expense of 
other patients. The waiting times of non fund-holders do not seem to rise as those for 
fund-holders fall, or indeed vice versa. Nevertheless, it could still be over ambitious to 
claim the above evidence provides firm proof about the zero-sum effect. Any judgement 
that the apparent gradual narrowing of the gap in waits of each population at Crawley 
Horsham plus Worthing and Southlands shows efiSciency improvements may be filtering 
through to non fund-holders should not be accepted without caution. But even with this
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qualification, the point that the trends do not match what would be expected if the waits 
of the two groups were negatively correlated does remain intact. In short, there is no 
clear evidence of a zero-sum effect.
Comparisons by specialty
However, to date the comparisons between the waits of fimd-holders and other patients 
in table 4.4 have taken the elective waiting list as a single entity, thus failing to reveal the 
position at the level of individual major departments. Tables 4.5 to 4.8 now rectify this 
omission. Although a comparison is not made for the specific minor specialties, the data 
for those departments are included in the analyses for the overall elective waiting list at a 
provider for a year.
Table 4.5 shows that at Crawley Horsham there were significant differences between the 
waiting times of fund-holding and health authority patients for all four years in the 
general surgery department. Likewise, in three out of four years for gynaecology, and 
two out of four in the orthopaedic plus ear nose and throat departments. In fact for the 
1993/94 financial year there was a significant difference within all four specialties. Yet 
the overall variance in 1993/94 was less than for the following year, even though the 
difference for orthopaedics in 1994/95 was not significant. It is also noticeable that for 
the minor specialties of general and geriatric medicine, waiting times were far shorter 
than in the bigger departments.
Table 4.6 confirms that at Mid Sussex the differences were significant for all four years 
in the general surgery, orthopaedic and gynaecology departments, in two out of four 
cases for urology, but only once in the ear nose and throat specialty. Similar to Crawley 
Horsham, at Mid Sussex there were consistently shorter waiting times for procedures 
within the general medicine department, relative to the major specialties. It is noticeable 
that Mid Sussex is the only provider in West Sussex that performs a service in the clinical
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field of neurosurgery. With the exception of 1995/96, waiting times in that department 
were also lower than for the major specialties.
TABLE 4.5 - Comparison o f the waiting times over four financial years at the Crawley Horsham provider 
for operations covered by the fund-holding scheme performed on non fund-holding (health authority) and 
fund-holding patients from the elective waiting list who spent the entire duration o f the wait in one o f 
these populations
Health authority patients Fund holding patients ANOVA
Year and specialty Median Mean Number Median Mean Number F critical F obtained P value
1992-93
General surgery 61.0 149.1 830 41.0 100.9 181 3.85 12.52 0.0004
Orthopaedics 238.5 264.1 356 104.0 158.2 50 3.86 12.01 0.0006
Ear nose and throat 101.0 158.1 735 96.0 137.2 190 3.85 2.93 0.0873
Oral surgery 84.0 81.1 15 97.0 97.7 3 - - -
General medicine 45.0 51.5 12 44.5 44.5 2 - - -
Geriatric medicine 4.0 4.0 1 - - 0 - - -
Gynaecoiogy 44.0 82.6 706 51.5 66.6 110 3.85 2.27 0.1323
TOTAL 69.0 148.4 2655 62.0 111.8 536 3.84 23.11 <0.0001
1993-94
General surgery 149.5 210.3 706 62.0 118.3 320 3.85 57.03 <0.0001
Orthopaedics 403.0 333.6 287 169.5 197.9 68 3.87 24.40 <0.0001
Ear nose and throat 229.0 240.6 503 107.5 172.6 252 3.85 27.56 <0.0001
Oral surgery 175.0 175.0 1 - - 0 - - -
General medicine 13.5 14.7 18 8.0 9.7 4 - - -
Geriatric medicine 8.0 18.4 28 8.0 11.9 14 - - -
Gynaecology 76.0 146.3 524 51.0 78.6 197 3.85 35.98 <0.0001
TOTAL 167.0 214.2 2067 65.0 129.2 855 3.84 137.68 <0.0001
1994-95
General surgery 148.0 198.3 554 64.0 130.6 420 3.85 40.78 <0.0001
Orthopaedics 248.0 267.1 370 236.0 246.5 141 3.86 1.19 0.2756
Ear nose and throat 154.5 214.6 482 89.0 132.8 367 3.85 54.74 <0.0001
General medicine 15.0 17.1 51 15.0 20.3 46 - - -
Geriatric medicine 21.0 20.6 61 21.0 19.9 80 - - -
Gynaecoiogy 72.0 136.7 347 43.0 60.6 262 3.86 68.90 <0.0001
TOTAL 132.0 193.9 1865 58.0 119.1 1316 3.84 161.18 <0.0001
1995-96
General surgery 186.0 202.0 497 131.0 170.9 387 3.85 10.81 0.0010
Orthopaedics 229.5 223.0 400 190.0 217.8 225 3.86 0.18 0.6700
Ear nose and throat 160.0 192.1 530 142.0 187.6 453 3.85 0.26 0.6104
Oral surgery 119.0 119.0 2 - - 0 - - -
General medicine 14.5 22.1 84 14.0 17.7 61 - - -
Geriatric medicine 15.0 17.9 83 22.0 21.8 65 - - -
Gynaecology 245.0 246.5 301 68.0 99.1 134 3.86 88.32 <0.0001
TOTAL 168.0 194.6 1897 115.0 162.9 1325 3.84 35.94 <0.0001
Table 4.7 shows differences were significant at the Royal West Sussex in three of four 
cases for general surgery, orthopaedics plus gynaecology, and in two for urology. Apart 
fi"om a single patient who may have been categorised incorrectly in 1992/93, cases for 
general medicine were only covered by the elective waiting list in 1995/96. At this
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provider also, general medicine patients had shorter waits than did those in the major 
specialties.
TABLE 4.6 - Comparison o f the waiting times over four financial years at the Mid Sussex provider for 
operations covered by the fund-holding scheme performed on non fund-holding (health authority) and 
fund-holding patients from the elective waiting list who spent the entire duration o f the wait in one o f 
these populations
Health authority patients Fund-holding patients ANOVA
Year and specialty Median Mean Number Median Mean Number F critical F obtained P-value
1992-93
General surgery 47.0 94.2 552 35.0 51.5 126 3.86 16.20 <0.0001
Urology 60.5 91.3 186 54.5 63.8 58 3.88 6.27 0.0129
Orthopaedics 104.5 178.0 214 76.5 103.4 48 3.88 8.52 0.0038
Ear nose and throat 171.0 154.6 124 146.0 142.6 25 3.91 0.47 0.4929
Oral surgery 56.0 56.0 1 - - 0 - - -
Neurosurgery 18.0 29.3 41 21.0 24.4 5 - - -
General medicine 37.0 55.8 290 36.0 48.2 121 - - -
Gynaecology 49.0 67.0 380 39.0 48.8 89 3.86 8.53 0.0037
TOTAL 54.0 94.6 1788 44.0 61.5 472 3.85 41.19 <0.0001
1993-94
General surgery 56.0 108.5 432 44.5 73.2 126 3.86 8.60 0.0035
Urology 42.0 71.9 85 49.0 61.6 39 3.92 0.65 0.4244
Orthopaedics 209.0 242.4 225 93.0 110.7 88 3.87 51.94 <0.0001
Ear nose and tiiroat 224.0 226.6 78 169.0 173.2 33 3.93 4.04 0.0468
Neurosurgery 37.5 50.3 22 24.0 33.0 13 - - -
General medicine 29.0 44.0 347 24.5 34.3 148 - - -
Gynaecology 69.5 86.8 284 43.0 54.9 127 3.86 26.62 <0.0001
TOTAL 62.0 112.9 1473 43.0 68.9 574 3.85 61.06 <0.0001
1994-95
General surgery 75.0 142.6 413 54.0 109.3 195 3.86 6.92 0.0087
Urology 55.0 90.3 160 32.0 55.6 97 3.88 10.12 0.0017
Orthopaedics 147.0 175.7 275 118.0 126.5 171 3.86 18.39 <0.0001
Ear nose and throat 110.5 179.4 90 90.0 157.4 39 3.92 0.50 0.4805
Oral surgery 140.0 140.0 2 - - 0 - - -
Neurosurgery 52.5 88.9 28 72.5 71.6 16 - - -
Paediatric surgery 220.5 237.4 36 325.5 312.5 4 - - -
Pain relief 1.0 1.0 1 - - 0 - - -
General medicine 30.5 40.0 358 25.5 30.2 258 - - -
Gynaecology 74.5 111.0 303 53.5 70.5 200 3.86 22.08 <0.0001
TOTAL 62.0 118.3 1666 44.5 80.3 980 3.84 64.34 <0.0001
1995-96
General surgery 60.0 117.5 408 49.0 86.5 246 3.86 10.82 0.0011
Urology 39.0 69.5 137 38.0 64.6 86 3.88 0.17 0.6774
Orthopaedics 186.0 205.3 385 99.5 137.5 206 3.86 35.22 <0.0001
Ear nose and throat 196.0 226.2 137 112.5 187.4 50 3.89 2.16 0.1432
Oral surgery 56.0 56.0 1 - - 0 - - -
Neurosurgery 109.0 168.6 41 66.0 118.2 30 - - -
Paediatric surgery 19.5 94.4 10 110.5 110.5 2 - - -
Pain relief 6.0 6.0 1 6.0 6.0 2 - - -
General medicine 24.0 33.4 346 24.0 31.9 267 - - -
Gynaecology 80.0 116.4 271 50.0 69.1 186 3.86 26.96 <0.0001
TOTAL 59.0 125.8 1737 47.0 83.4 1075 3.84 81.85 <0.0001
At Worthing and Southlands, table 4.8 shows that differences were significant in all four 
years for the orthopaedic department, in three out of four for general surgery, in two out
137
of four years for ophthalmology, gynaecology, plus ear nose and throat, then in only one 
for urology. Apart from a few cases in the last two of the four years, patients for general 
medicine were only categorised in the elective waiting list during 1992/93 and 1993/94.
TABLE 4.7 -  Comparison o f  the waiting times fm days) over four financial years at the Royal West Sussex 
provider for operations covered by the fund-holding scheme performed on non fund-holding (health 
authority) andfund-holding patients from the elective waiting list who spent the entire duration o f the 
wait in one o f these populations
Year and specialty
Health authority patients 
Median Mean Number
Fund holding patients 
Median Mean Number F critical
ANOVA 
F obtained P-value
1992-93
General surgery 199.0 270.5 324 140.0 152.6 5 3.87 1.62 0.2036
Urology 33.0 41.1 66 36.0 43.3 7 3.86 1.53 0.2160
Orthopaedics 291.0 337.3 456 53.5 70.8 4 3.87 0.20 0.6563
Ophthalmology 174.0 189.0 19 - - 0 - - -
Oral surgery 78.0 142.8 6 - - 0 - - -
Pain relief 70.0 113.4 7 - - 0 - - -
General medicine 425.0 425.0 1 - - 0 - - -
Gynaecology 118.0 200.1 300 85.0 110.1 8 3.87 1.84 0.1764
TOTAL 176.0 262.8 1179 61.0 92.9 24 3.84 13.74 0.0002
1993-94
General surgery 306.0 291.5 301 108.0 162.2 44 3.87 19.54 <0.0001
Urology 53.0 85.6 181 63.0 68.4 51 3.88 1.62 0.2042
Orthopaedics 391.0 342.7 438 182.5 218.8 70 3.86 26.25 <0.0001
Oral surgery 111.0 146.8 5 - - 0 - - -
Pain relief 125.0 125.0 1 - - 0 - - -
Gynaecology 163.0 235.7 111 79.0 130.4 28 3.91 8.05 0.0052
TOTAL 245.0 270.4 1037 121.0 153.3 193 3.85 61.30 <0.0001
1994-95
General surgery 306.0 287.2 364 164.0 211.9 92 3.86 14.52 0.0002
Urology 112.0 161.1 249 71.0 89.1 105 3.87 25.31 <0.0001
Orthopaedics 412.0 362.5 433 179.0 204.7 169 3.86 117.40 <0.0001
Oral surgery 297.0 273.1 8 132.5 192.0 4 - - -
Pain relief 139.0 119.0 5 132.5 132.5 2 - - -
Gynaecology 239.5 255.9 220 122.0 160.4 94 3.87 25.34 <0.0001
TOTAL 284.0 282.0 1279 126.0 170.7 466 3.85 148.93 <0.0001
1995-96
General surgery 236.0 227.9 367 80.0 110.8 222 3.86 93.90 <0.0001
Urology 67.0 115.5 258 62.5 81.7 156 3.86 11.64 0.0007
Orthopaedics 335.0 307.8 569 153.0 195.4 242 3.85 80.04 <0.0001
Oral surgery 88.5 109.6 14 108.0 104.5 4 . - •
Pain relief 105.5 112.4 22 85.0 126.1 10 • - •
General medicine 44.5 58.6 278 35.0 39.7 247 - . -
Gynaecology 208.0 212.2 243 81.0 106.6 168 3.86 69.32 <0.0001
TOTAL 153.0 205.8 1751 65.0 108.7 1049 3.84 277.41 <0.0001
As a general rule (although there were exceptions), the waiting times of patients in the 
urology departments at three of the four units (the Mid Sussex, Royal West Sussex, plus 
Worthing and Southlands providers) were lower than in the other major specialties. The
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reason why Crawley Horsham is excluded from this observation is the fact that they have 
no separate urology department.
TABLE 4.8 - Comparison o f the waiting times (in days) over four financial years at the Worthing and 
Southlands provider for operations covered by the fund-holding scheme performed on non fund-holding 
(health authority) and fund-holding patients from the elective waiting list who spent the entire duration o f 
the wait in one o f these populations
Healdi authority patients Fund-holding patients ANOVA
Year and specialty Median Mean Number Median Mean Number F critical F obtained P value
1992-93
General surgeiy 47.0 72.5 1601 31.5 52.0 130 3.85 8.44 0.0037
Urology 48.0 78.1 663 48.0 52.9 62 3.85 3.14 0.0767
Orthopaedics 161.0 235.4 849 63.0 76.4 37 3.85 17.73 <0.0001
Ear nose and throat 147.0 165.9 503 90.0 123.4 25 3.86 3.02 0.0827
Ophthalmology 126.0 148.1 1445 79.5 98.8 86 3.85 14.68 0.0001
Oral surgery 50.0 78.3 58 48.0 58.4 7 - - -
General medicine 17.0 20.8 212 20.0 20.9 30 - - -
Gynaecology 107.0 140.6 1224 52.0 81.7 79 3.85 15.69 <0.0001
TOTAL 74.0 129.1 6555 48.0 70.0 456 3.84 77.59 <0.0001
1993-94
General surgery 76.0 119.8 1620 50.0 89.7 255 3.85 14.90 0.0001
Urology 56.0 107.7 846 49.0 74.4 175 3.85 10.55 0.0012
Orthopaedics 159.0 214.3 808 105.0 124.5 114 3.85 24.68 <0.0001
Ear nose and throat 220.0 213.8 509 101.0 153.7 48 3.86 7.42 0.0066
Ophthalmology 122.0 131.0 1193 91.5 111.1 238 3.85 10.77 0.0011
Oral surgery 59.0 80.0 5 78.0 78.0 1 - - -
General medicine 23.0 32.1 175 22.0 32.9 39 - - -
Gynaecology 73.0 100.2 1065 59.0 89.0 161 3.85 2.65 0.1036
TOTAL 83.0 134.4 6221 59.0 96.6 1031 3.84 79.91 <0.0001
1994-95
General surgery 74.0 107.8 1117 58.0 89.2 477 3.85 13.36 0.0003
Urology 41.0 67.1 870 41.0 59.4 467 3.85 3.01 0.0832
Orfliopaedics 146.0 202.3 802 103.5 147.0 284 3.85 23.59 <0.0001
Ear nose and throat 151.0 170.3 360 120.5 125.6 150 3.86 15.00 0.0001
Ophthalmology 141.0 159.0 984 116.0 147.5 402 3.85 3.24 0.0720
Oral surgery 94.5 94.5 2 - - 0 - - -
General medicine 72.5 72.5 2 - - 0 - - -
Gynaecology 70.0 100.9 805 61.0 89.2 383 3.85 4.83 0.0282
TOTAL 80.0 129.6 4942 62.0 103.7 2163 3.84 74.40 <0.0001
1995-96
General surgery 84.0 130.6 846 87.0 127.7 487 3.85 0.18 0.6683
Urology 48.0 84.6 937 50.0 85.4 576 3.85 0.02 0.8797
Orthopaedics 173.0 222.6 747 149.0 189.8 415 3.85 10.27 0.0014
Ear nose and throat 135.5 184.6 296 129.0 175.4 179 3.86 0.45 0.5020
Ophthalmology 120.5 132.3 770 122.0 132.3 503 3.85 <0.01 0.9935
Pain relief 7.0 7.0 1 - - 0 - - -
General medicine 302.0 309.0 2 - - 0 - - -
Gynaecology 79.0 99.2 629 74.0 99.2 427 3.85 <0.01 0.9968
TOTAL 83.0 136.1 4228 83.0 127.7 2587 3.84 7.16 0.0075
It seems clear from the above tables that NHS patients at the four providers had the 
length of their waiting times determined to a significant extent by the type of purchaser 
commissioning the surgery on their behalf In short, patients of fund-holding practices
139
had significantly shorter average waiting times than those registered with other GPs. In 
fact some of the differences are so large they would have remained statistically significant 
even if an alpha level had been used that produced a higher confidence level than 95 per 
cent. Nevertheless, this in itself is the most commonly used confidence level in social 
research (see Healey, 1996) and cannot reasonably be called over-cautious.
Links to other research
The finding of clear disparities in the waiting times of fund-holding and non fund-holding 
patients differ fi^ om judgements expressed by the Audit Commission (1996a). In a short 
passage on waiting times the point was made that although seasonal variations could 
exist, these became evened out over the whole year and the waits of fund-holder and 
health authority patients are usually similar on an overall basis. However, information 
elicited via personal communication with an author of this report explained how this 
verdict was reached, and doubts concerning the validity of the conclusion are provoked 
for three reasons.
First, the data used related to just one hospital over a single year, hardly an exceptionally 
comprehensive investigation. Second, the analysis included all NHS patients who had 
fund-holding operations at the hospital that year, so combined all three categories of the 
waiting list. As discussed earlier, if waiting times for planned and booked patients are 
not dependent on the purchaser representing them then this could tend to equalise 
differences between patients on the elective waiting list (despite the larger population). 
Third, the average waits of fund-holding and non fund-holding patients were calculated 
in accordance with the status of their practice, fund-holding or not, at the time of the 
operation. If that leads to counting the waits of patients who spent a long period on the 
list before their practice entered the scheme towards the average waiting times of fund­
holders, this could corrupt the analysis (also highlighted previously).
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To clarify the possible impact of these factors, tables 4.9 to 4.12 compare the waits of 
fund-holder and health authority patients using precisely the same methodology as that 
adopted by the Audit Commission (1996a). Instead of there being significantly shorter 
waiting times for fund-holding patients at each provider in all years, the null hypothesis 
was not rejected in six out of sixteen computations. It therefore seems feasible that the 
Audit Commission’s (1996a) approach might have hidden significant differences in the 
waiting times of patients on the elective waiting list. However, it must also be noted that 
in ten cases out of sixteen, fund-holding patients still had significantly shorter waits.
Tables 4.9 to 4.12 also seem to confirm that NHS hospitals do admit clinically urgent 
patients, defined as those on the elective booked list, within fairly short time-scales 
regardless of whether the procedure is commissioned by a GP fimd-holder or health 
authority. According to the mean, such patients were usually admitted within two or 
three weeks at Worthing and Southlands, then after about one month at Mid Sussex plus 
Crawley Horsham (although at the latter non fimd-holders did have to wait some three 
months in 1993/94). Booked patients generally had a wait of something around the two- 
month mark at the Royal West Sussex. This slightly longer average conforms to the 
idea, discussed earlier, that rather more patients with a less serious clinical urgency are 
placed in the booked list here than at the others.
Moreover, there is only one significant difference in waiting times between booked fimd- 
holding and non fimd-holding patients out of the sixteen cases. This was at the Crawley 
Horsham provider in 1995/96, where non fimd-holders had the shorter waits. As such, 
the hypothesis that there is less variation between urgent patients than there is between 
routine patients is correct, and the directive that common waiting lists should exist for 
urgent cases (see NHS Executive 1994e; 1996d) appears satisfied.
Tables 4.9 to 4.12 also indicate that patients requiring regular investigations, namely 
those on the elective planned list, do not appear to have the length of their waiting times 
determined by the purchaser type commissioning their services either. Again there was 
only one statistically significant difference, this time out of fourteen cases as comparisons
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were not possible for the Crawley Horsham provider in a couple of the years since no 
patients in one of the two populations had their waits recorded. Moreover, the numbers 
where waiting times were available for this provider in the other two years were also 
very low. The significant difference for the planned category occurred at the Mid Sussex 
provider in 1993/94 where fund-holding patients benefited fi’om the shorter waits. In 
sum, the general evenness between the waits of patients on the planned and booked lists, 
whichever agency acts as the purchaser, could feasibly tend to equalise the dififerences 
between fund-holding and non fund-holding patients on the elective waiting list.
TABLE 4.9 - Comparison o f waiting times fin days) for operations covered by the fund-holding scheme 
on non fund-holding (health authority) andfund-holding patients defined according to the status o f their 
practice at the time o f the procedure at the Crawley Horsham provider in four financial years
Health authority patients Fund holding patients ANOVA
Year and category Median Mean No. Median Mean No. F critical F obtained P value
1992-93
Elective waiting Hst 69.5 148.4 2655 64.0 123.2 552 3.84 10.87 0.0010
Elective booked Ust 20.0 31.8 117 18.5 30.0 50 3.90 0.06 0.8045
Elective planned Hst 23.0 23.0 1 - - 0 - - -
ENTUŒ WATTING LIST 64.0 143.5 2773 56.0 115.5 602 3.84 14.86 0.0001
1993-94
Elective waiting Ust 167.0 214.2 2067 85.0 149.5 1027 3.84 90.10 <0.0001
Elective booked Hst 35.5 97.7 76 13.5 63.7 48 3.92 1.82 0.1802
Elective planned Hst 29.0 46.0 9 50.0 37.4 5 4.75 0.13 0.7207
ENTIRE WAITING LIST 154.5 209.4 2152 78.0 145.2 1080 3.84 93.40 <0.0001
1994-95
Elective waiting Hst 132.0 193.9 1865 74.0 149.9 1547 3.84 54.83 <0.0001
Elective booked Hst 13.0 35.0 277 13.0 44.1 264 3.86 0.88 0.3493
Elective planned Hst - - 0 16.0 16.0 1 - - -
ENTIRE WAITING LIST 86.5 173.4 2142 58.0 134.4 1812 3.84 49.04 <0.0001
1995-96
Elective waiting Hst 168.0 194.6 1897 121.0 172.8 1381 3.84 16.24 <0.0001
Elective booked Hst 21.0 43.3 801 26.0 51.6 812 3.85 4.69 0.0306
Elective planned Hst 199.0 256.7 24 189.0 237.4 19 4.07 0.14 0.7106
ENTIRE WAITING LIST 89.0 150.6 2722 65.5 128.9 2212 3.84 26.34 <0.0001
Moving on to the individual providers, table 4.9 indicates how wide the waiting time 
differences were between fund-holding and other patients on the elective waiting list at 
the Crawley Horsham provider. This is because the variances remained statistically 
significant even when the other waiting list categories and patients who joined the list 
before their practice entered the fund-holding scheme are included in the analysis.
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At the Mid Sussex provider, even when the whole waiting list is analysed together and 
the patients whose practice changed their status during the course of the wait are not 
excluded from the comparison, fund-holders still had significantly shorter waits in three 
out of the four years (table 4.10). 1992/93 was the only exception. For two of the three 
years in which the differences were significant at Mid Sussex, 1993/94 plus 1995/96, it is 
noticeable that the variances between fund-holding and non fund-holding patients were 
very wide indeed.
TABLE 4.10 - Comparison o f waiting times (in days) for operations covered by the fund-holding scheme 
on non fund-holding (health authority) andfund-holding patients defined according to the status o f their 
practice at the time o f the procedure at the Mid Sussex provider in four financial years
Health authority patients Fund-holding patients ANOVA
Year and category Median Mean No. Median Mean No. F critical F obtained P-value
1992-93
Elective waiting Hat 54.0 94.6 1788 53.0 88.6 595 3.84 1.43 0.2320
Elective booked list 23.0 33.3 507 21.0 30.3 138 3.86 0.32 0.5702
Elective planned Hst 209.0 239.5 129 196.0 232.6 49 3.89 0.07 0.7975
ENTIRE WAITING LIST 48.0 89.5 2424 47.0 87.3 782 3.84 0.22 0.6330
1993-94
Elective waiting list 62.0 112.9 1473 47.0 77.1 615 3.85 40.18 <0.0001
Elective booked Ust 15.0 29.2 301 13.5 22.3 194 3.86 2.29 0.1310
Elective planned Hst 186.0 237.5 81 112.0 164.0 47 3.92 4.51 0.0357
ENTIRE WAITING LIST 52.0 104.7 1855 38.5 69.5 856 3.84 51.11 <0.0001
1994-95
Elective waiting Hst 62.0 118.3 1666 50.0 96.9 1113 3.84 19.90 <0.0001
Elective booked Hst 11.0 28.8 289 13.5 23.6 130 3.86 0.47 0.4942
Elective planned Hst 170.0 265.9 80 112.0 243.5 66 3.91 0.34 0.5589
ENTIRE WAITING LIST 51.0 111.4 2035 38.5 97.0 1309 3.84 9.40 0.0022
1995-96
Elective waiting Hst 59.0 125.8 1737 48.0 89.1 1101 3.84 59.62 <0.0001
Elective booked Hst 12.0 39.2 365 13.0 30.5 224 3.86 2.54 0.1112
Elective planned Hst 164.0 215.1 97 154.0 239.5 71 3.90 0.47 0.4961
ENTIRE WAITING LIST 49.0 115.4 2199 45.0 87.3 1396 3.84 40.24 <0.0001
For the Royal West Sussex provider, table 4.11 shows that adopting the same methods 
for the comparison as that used by the Audit Commission (1996a) reveals significantly 
shorter waiting times in two out of the four years, 1994/95 and 1995/96. With regards 
to the elective waiting list in 1993/94, there was still a statistically significant shorter 
waiting time for fund-holding patients, even when their average is increased by including 
those who spent part of their wait registered with a non fund-holding practice. This 
comment is verified by table 4.3 showing at this provider that year, over 70 per cent of
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the waiting times for patients whose practices became fund-holding during the course of 
their wait passed while the practices concerned where outside the scheme. But when the 
other two categories of the overall hst are included in the analysis for that year, this 
difference is equalised to the point where the variation is no longer significant.
TABLE 4.11 - Comparison o f waiting times (in days) for operations covered by the fund-holding scheme 
on non fund-holding (health authority) andfund-holding patients defined according to the status o f their 
practice at the time o f the procedure at the Royal West Sussex provider in four financial years
Health authority patients Fund-holding patients ANOVA
Year and category Median Mean No. Median Mean No. F critical F obtained P-value
1992-93
Elective waiting list 176.0 262.8 1179 278.5 304.1 68 3.85 2.17 0.1401
Elective booked Ust 26.0 57.7 2482 19.5 63.2 150 3.85 0.41 0.5216
Elective planned Ust 154.0 184.9 165 224.0 211.1 7 3.90 0.27 0.6066
ENTIRE WAITING LIST 48.0 126.4 3826 46.0 140.6 225 3.84 1.34 0.2476
1993-94
Elective waiting list 245.0 270.4 1037 95.0 235.4 347 3.85 8.42 0.0038
Elective booked list 23.0 61.4 2851 26.0 61.5 688 3.84 <0.01 0.9965
Hective planned Ust 157.0 162.4 102 166.0 170.5 25 3.92 0.10 0.7472
ENTIRE WAITING LIST 38.0 118.3 3990 48.0 121.0 1060 3.84 0.22 0.6404
1994-95
Elective waiting Ust 284.0 282.0 1279 156.0 200.7 560 3.85 87.00 <0.0001
Elective booked Ust 26.0 53.1 3594 26.0 57.1 1416 3.84 1.86 0.1725
Elective planned Ust 136.0 183.6 97 172.0 202.8 27 3.91 0.33 0.5694
ENTIRE WAITING LIST 37.0 114.5 4970 38.0 99.2 2003 3.84 14.54 0.0001
1995-96
Elective waiting Ust 153.0 205.8 1751 89.0 155.6 1345 3.84 73.27 <0.0001
Elective booked list 25.0 51.4 2267 27.0 48.7 1942 3.84 1.16 0.2811
Elective planned Ust 34.5 68.9 298 31.0 64.1 272 3.86 0.49 0.4860
ENTIRE WAITING LIST 44.0 115.3 4316 40.0 90.3 3559 3.84 66.08 <0.0001
For Worthing and Southlands, table 4.12 indicates that the Audit Commission’s (1996a) 
methodology has reduced the number of years in which the overall differences among 
fund-holding and non fimd-holding patients were significant to just one out of four, 
1994/95. Nevertheless, the differences were significant for the elective waiting hst alone 
in both 1992/93 and 1994/95. This is the case even though table 4.3 indicates that by 
including in the population those who spent part of their wait registered with a non fimd- 
holding practice, the average waits for fimd-holders were substantiaUy increased.
Also, managers from the Worthing and Southlands provider have said that the only 
reason significant differences in 1995/96 did not emerge is because the health authority
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slowed its activity in the last quarter of that year, pushing many non fimd-holders with 
very long waits into the next year. If an analysis were conducted for 1996/97, much 
shorter waits for fund-holders would probably be evident. However, it does seem fair to 
remark that in general the variances between fimd-holders and other patients were 
somewhat narrower at this provider than at the other three.
TABLE 4.12 - Comparison o f waiting times (in days) for operations covered by the fund-holding scheme 
on non fund-holding (health authority) andfund-holding patients defined according to the status o f their 
practice at the time o f the procedure at the Worthing and Southlands provider in four financial years
Health anflioiity patients Fund holding patients ANOVA
Year and category Median Mean No. Median Mean No. F critical F obtained P value
1992-93
Elective waiting Hst 74.0 129.1 6555 64.0 116.4 661 3.84 4.84 0.0279
Elective booked Ust 5.0 16.4 1311 5.0 15.1 129 3.84 0.11 0.7393
Elective planned Ust 175.5 177.3 424 181.0 196.2 51 3.86 1.07 0.2996
ENTraE WATTING LIST 59.0 113.7 8290 53.0 105.7 841 3.84 2.62 0.1058
1993-94
Elective waiting Ust 83.0 134.4 6221 83.0 131.6 1355 3.84 0.46 0.4967
Elective booked Ust 5.0 18.2 1282 5.0 18.7 287 3.85 0.02 0.8752
Elective planned Hst 147.0 173.8 547 147.0 162.2 125 3.86 0.75 0.3882
ENTIRE WAITING LIST 64.0 118.6 8050 63.0 115.5 1767 3.84 0.83 0.3622
1994-95
Elective waiting Ust 80.0 129.6 4942 75.5 123.6 2596 3.84 4.07 0.0436
Elective booked Ust 4.0 15.5 1186 4.0 13.2 666 3.85 0.93 0.3356
Elective planned Ust 92.0 126.3 690 90.0 124.6 399 3.85 0.06 0.8126
ENTIRE WAITING LIST 60.0 109.4 6818 55.0 103.6 3661 3.84 5.50 0.0190
1995-96
Elective waiting Ust 83.0 136.1 4228 87.0 132.6 2708 3.84 1.30 0.2544
Eiective booked Ust 6.0 19.3 1410 6.0 21.7 818 3.85 1.00 0.3168
Elective planned Ust 103.0 141.0 748 98.0 145.2 426 3.85 0.25 0.6155
ENTIRE WAITING LIST 60.0 110.9 6386 63.0 111.0 3952 3.84 <0.01 0.9810
In summary, for patients on the elective waiting list, those from fimd-holding practices 
tended to have significantly shorter waiting times for the elective surgery covered by the 
fimd-holding scheme at the four providers featured in the research project. When the 
analysis is narrowed to patients whose GP practice did not change their status regarding 
membership of the scheme, fimd-holders had shorter waits at all the providers in each of 
the four years. Even when the comparison was made according to the status of practices 
at the time of their patients’ operations, in twelve cases out of sixteen the shorter waiting 
times of fimd-holding patients were still significant. Indeed there is not a single example
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where non fund-holding patients have significantly shorter waiting times than their fund- 
holding counterparts.
Do shorter waits for fund-holders continue?
Nevertheless, there is still one final step that can be taken to eliminate any lingering 
doubts concerning the impact of keeping or removing fi'om the analysis those patients 
whose general practice changed their status (fimd-holding or not) during the course of 
their wait. That is to exclude the patients of fund-holding practices in their first year 
within the scheme from each comparison. Hence, for a computation pertaining to the 
1992/93 financial year only patients from first wave fimd-holders would have their waits 
compared to those of non fimd-holders. For 1993/94 the fimd-holding population would 
be those from first and second wave practices, from the first three waves for 1994/95, 
and from waves one to four in 1995/96. The rationale for this exercise is to show if 
shorter waits were a one year anomaly for new fimd-holders that disappeared when they 
had been in the scheme a while, perhaps through losing their enthusiasm or the provider 
developing control over them. Table 4.13 details this comparison.
For this comparison, it seemed reasonable to include any fiind-holding patients who 
joined the waiting list before their practice entered the scheme. After all, they would 
have had at least twelve months on the list as a fimd-holding patient, so there is a 
diminishing likelihood that the wait before their practice entered the scheme would 
exceed the waiting period after it joined. Anyway, the practice would have had over a 
year to facilitate the patient’s admission anyway, and consequently there should be a 
relatively small number of them that started waiting before their practice joined the 
scheme.
It can be seen from table 4.13 that in eleven out of sixteen cases, patients from practices 
in at least their second year within the scheme had significantly shorter waits than did 
non fund-holding patients. Out of the five where differences were not significant, in four
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of them the fund-holding population numbered fewer than 100 (and in two they were 
under 5), and small numbers make significant results less likely. Indeed, in these four 
cases the mean waits of fund-holders were still much lower than that of the non fund­
holders, even though the results were not significant. The other instance that did not 
produce a significant result was Worthing and Southlands in 1995/96, and the 
circumstances making this a special case have already been discussed.
TABLE 4.13 - Comparison o f waiting times (in days) for operations covered by the fund-holding scheme 
on non fund-holding (health authority) patients from the elective waiting list and those registered with 
fund-holding GPs, except for the latest wave o f such practices in any single year, at four providers over 
four years
Health authority patients Fund-holding patients ANOVA
Provider and year Median Mean No. Median Mean No. F critical F obtained P value
Crawley Horsham 
1992-93 69.0 148.4 2655 64.5 123.5 550 3.84 10.58 0.0012
1993-94 167.0 214.2 2067 96.0 161.5 571 3.84 36.48 <0.0001
1994-95 132.0 193.9 1865 68.0 144.7 1052 3.84 54.07 <0.0001
1995-96 168.0 194.6 1897 121.0 172.6 1377 3.84 16.66 <0.0001
Mid Sussex
1992-93 54.0 94.6 1788 50.0 72.4 77 3.85 3.14 0.0767
1993-94 62.0 112.9 1473 46.0 78.2 469 3.85 30.06 <0.0001
1994-95 62.0 118.3 1666 48.0 86.4 759 3.85 35.96 <0.0001
1995-96 59.0 125.8 1737 48.0 88.3 1067 3.84 61.07 <0.0001
Royal West Sussex 
1992-93 176.0 262.8 1179 223.0 223.0 1 3.85 0.03 0.8592
1993-94 245.0 270.4 1037 219.0 255.0 94 3.85 0.52 0.4700
1994-95 284.0 282.0 1279 152.0 199.1 403 3.85 70.43 <0.0001
1995-96 153.0 205.8 1751 74.0 125.2 718 3.85 131.36 <0.0001
Worthing and Southlands 
1992-93 74.0 129.1 6555 32.5 56.0 4 3.84 1.06 0.3036
1993-94 83.0 134.5 6221 71.0 118.1 601 3.84 8.73 0.0031
1994-95 80.0 129.6 4942 72.0 120.7 1402 3.84 5.56 0.0184
1995-96 83.0 136.1 4228 85.0 132.7 2465 3.84 1.12 0.2893
In sum, the conclusion must be made that for non-urgent elective surgery, fund-holders 
generally had shorter waiting times than did non fiind-holding patients. Yet these shorter 
waits may not necessarily be because practices were in the fund-holding scheme. As 
discussed in the second chapter, there could be suspicions that the practices joining the 
fund-holding scheme had always been able to get quicker admissions to hospitals for 
their patients.
147
DOES FUND-HOLDING SHORTEN WAITS?
The doubt over whether it really is something to do with the scheme that shortens the 
waiting times of fund-holding patients relates closely to a comment made by the Audit 
Commission (1996b, p. 1), the sentence written in bold type in the original document to 
en^hasise the point being made. "When differences appear between fundholders and 
practices outside the scheme, it does not necessarily follow that fundholding status 
is the cause*. This statement was made in a digest of information about practices that 
joined the scheme in the first five waves, and a similar message was also put forward in 
another report on the scheme, published by the same organisation that corresponding 
year:
...GPs choose to become fundholders and they differ from those who choose not 
to in several important regards. Any success or failure could therefore be 
attributable either to fundholding as a system or to the nature o f the particular 
GPs operating it... (Audit Commission, 1996a, p. 3)
If these points have any validity in the context of this research, it would mean that the 
shorter waits of fund-holding patients in West Sussex would not be a consequence of 
their practices’ participation in the scheme. If  this really was the case, those practices 
which entered the scheme during the first five years of the internal market would surely 
have achieved shorter waiting times for their patients, relative to the waits endured by 
patients of the continuing non fund-holding practices, before they became fund-holders.
On the &ce of it, the Audit Commission’s (1996a; 1996b) argument looks a little fer- 
fetched. The spread of fimd-holding in West Sussex has surely been extensive enough to 
ensure that practices with disperse characteristics, including the working patterns and 
personalities of individual partners plus the demographic and social class profiles of their 
patients, have joined the scheme. Perhaps the clearest common denominator between 
them might be no more than a simple willingness to participate in the scheme. Yet the
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Audit Commission (1996a; 1996b) still raised their doubts and the matter thus needs 
investigating.
Hence it is necessary to establish whether the shorter waiting times of fund-holding 
patients on the elective waiting list occur once their practice joins the scheme, relative to 
the continuing non fiind-holding population, or whether it was a continuation of an 
existing trend. To do this, the patients registered with practices in their last year outside 
the scheme were separated from the rest of the non fund-holding population using the 
same provider. Differences in the waiting times that year for procedures covered by the 
scheme of these two non fund-holding populations were again tested for statistical 
significance through ANOVA computations.
The waiting times in the following year for patients of these preparatory year practices, 
their first inside the scheme, were then compared with the waits of the continuing non 
fund-holding population using the same provider over the equivalent period. As such, 
the waits of patients from the same practices prior to and after fund-holding status are 
compared to those of the continuing non fimd-holding population using the provider in 
those two years, in effect the latter being used as a control group.
The logic of the methodology rests on the principle that if it is something specifically to 
do with fund-holding status that lowers waiting times, two findings would be predicted. 
First, it would be expected that for practices in their last year outside the fund-holding 
scheme the waiting times of their patients would not normally be shorter than the waits 
of patients from other non fund-holding practices. Second, in the following year once 
these new fund-holders have joined the scheme it would be anticipated that the waiting 
times of their patients would fall below the level experienced by those of the continuing 
non fimd-holding practices. If these two phenomena were evident, it would surely be 
legitimate to conclude that it is something to do with membership of the scheme that 
reduces waiting times for patients of fimd-holding practices.
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The four-year run of data (April 1992 to March 1996) that was available meant details 
concerning the preparatory year (1991/92) of those practices that entered the scheme in 
1992/93 were not accessible. Because the approach compared the waits of practices’ 
patients over a two-year period, this part of the study was necessarily confined to those 
practices (and their comparators) which joined the scheme in 1993/94, 1994/95 and 
1995/96. Table 4.14 itemises the first stage of the approach, comparing the waits of 
patients from continuing non fund-holders with those fi’om practices in their last year 
outside the scheme.
TABLE 4.14 - Comparison o f waiting times (in days) for operations covered by the fund-holding scheme 
between patients on the elective waiting list from continuing non fund-holding practices and those from 
practices in their final year outside the scheme at four providers over three financial years
Contfandng non ftmd- Final year non ftmd-
holders’ patients holders’ patients ANOVA
Provider and year Median Mean No. Median Mean No. F critical F obtained P value
Crandey Horsham 
1992-93 74.0 149.9 2202 58.0 141.1 453 3.85 1.10 0.3042
1993-94 159.0 211.0 1646 188.0 227.0 421 3.85 2.41 0.1210
1994-95 132.0 194.0 1863 163.0 163.0 2 3.85 0.06 0.8073
Mid Sussex
1992-93 54.0 95.0 1712 53.0 85.3 76 3.85 0.57 0.4494
1993-94 62.0 114.0 1244 64.0 106.8 229 3.85 0.62 0.4306
1994-95 62.0 118.8 1630 61.5 97.8 36 3.85 0.91 0.3402
Royal West Sussex 
1992-93 181.0 266.7 997 165.0 241.5 182 3.85 1.94 0.1642
1993-94 257.0 274.8 953 138.5 220.4 84 3.85 5.74 0.0167
1994-95 282.0 282.5 938 296.0 280.6 341 3.85 0.03 0.8658
Worthing and Southlands 
1992-93 74.0 129.0 5825 74.5 129.7 730 3.84 0.01 0.9052
1993-94 84.0 134.1 4991 83.0 135.9 1230 3.84 0.19 0.6652
1994-95 78.0 128.2 4700 121.0 156.6 242 3.84 12.15 0.0005
Table 4.14 shows that in ten cases out of twelve there was not a significant difference 
between the waiting times of patients from continuing non fund-holding practices and 
those registered with practices in their final year outside the scheme. The other two 
cases went in different directions. At the Royal West Sussex provider in 1993/94 the 
patients of non fund-holders in their preparatory year had shorter waits than those 
registered with practices staying outside the scheme from April 1994. For the other 
case, 1994/95 at Worthing and Southlands, the patients fi’om practices in their last year
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outside the scheme were significantly longer than those registered with GPs who were 
continuing their non fund-holding status in 1995/96. Hence with just one exception out 
of a dozen cases future fund-holding practices were not reducing their patients’ waiting 
times prior to their entry into the scheme, relative to the other non fund-holders.
The inclination of the second stage of this investigation is obviously to discover whether 
the waiting times of these practices’ patients fell, relative to those from continuing non 
fund-holders, after they had joined the fund-holding scheme. However, when the fund- 
holding population embodies patients only from first year fund-holding practices there is 
a complication, again linked to the changing status of some patients as their practice joins 
the fund-holding scheme. The effect of either removing from or keeping within the 
population those people that started their waits prior to the practices entry into the 
scheme will have a greater influence on the outcome of the analysis than was the case 
with the previous comparisons which used practices from all waves.
If patients who started waiting before their practice became fund-holders are included, 
this could well mean that numerous long waits which may have been shortened if the 
practice had been in the scheme from the start of the wait will falsely amplify the average 
waits of fund-holders, perhaps enormously. Yet if the analysis was performed this way, 
with the waiting times endured before the practice joined the scheme counted towards 
the fund-holders’ average and they still had significantly shorter waits than non fund- 
holding patients, this would be absolutely conclusive. But otherwise if all such patients 
who started waiting prior to their practice joining the scheme were excluded from the 
analysis, this may lower the average waits of the fund-holding populations too much.
For some of the waiting period whilst registered with the practice when it was outside 
the scheme may also have been endured as a fund-holder.
Table 4.15 details the comparison after such patients have been excluded from the fund- 
holding population. It shows that patients of first year fund-holders had statistically 
significant shorter average waits at every provider in all years. This covers eleven 
comparisons as no operations on patients of first year fund-holders were performed at
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Crawley Horsham in 1995/96, which seems entirely consistent with table 4.14 showing 
that just two had been received by patients of preparatory year practices the year before. 
Yet if the results in table 4.15 are not too surprising, it is necessary to assess the position 
of all patients of first wave fund-holders whether or not they might have spent much time 
on the list before the practice joined the scheme.
TABLE 4.15 - Comparison o f waiting times (in days) for operations covered by the fund-holding scheme 
for elective waiting list non fund-holding (health authority) patients and those from practices in their 
first year inside the scheme who spent the entire duration o f the wait as a fund-holding patient at four 
providers over four financial years
Continning non ftmd- First year non ftmd
holders’ patients holders’ patients ANOVA
Provider and year Median Mean No. Median Mean No. F critical F obtained P value
Crawley Horsham
1993-94 167.0 214.2 2067 45.0 64.5 279 3.85 171.00 <0.0001
1994-95 132.0 193.9 1865 42.0 62.6 289 3.85 152.47 <0.0001
1995-96 168.0 194.6 1897 - - 0 - - -
Mid Sussex
1993-94 62.0 112.9 1473 39.0 50.5 107 3.85 25.63 <0.0001
1994-95 62.0 118.3 1666 36.0 62.2 222 3.85 40.10 <0.0001
1995-96 59.0 125.8 1737 22.0 52.2 20 3.85 6.10 0.0136
Royal West Sussex
1993-94 245.0 270.4 1037 76.0 101.0 113 3.85 79.94 <0.0001
1994-95 284.0 282.0 1279 77.5 99.0 84 3.85 87.42 <0.0001
1995-96 153.0 205.8 1751 52.5 82.3 338 3.85 175.00 <0.0001
Worthing and Southlands
1993-94 83.0 134.5 6221 52.0 78.4 418 3.84 75.55 <0.0001
1994-95 80.0 129.6 4942 53.0 80.0 768 3.84 118.28 <0.0001
1995-96 83.0 136.1 4228 72.0 95.9 147 3.84 13.76 0.0002
Table 4.16 details the comparison in this format and if anything it backs-up the deduction 
that the waiting times of patients normally fall if their practice enters the fund-holding 
scheme. In six cases out of twelve, they still had significantly shorter waits. In five the 
differences were no longer statistically significant, and in one the non fund-holders had 
significantly shorter waits. Moreover this latter case, Crawley Horsham in 1995/96, 
reveals how the inclusion of patients fi*om practices whose status changed during the 
wait can often pervert the inquiry by overstating the waits of fund-holders. There was 
only one relevant ftmd-holding patient for this comparison, and the circumstances of the 
analysis closely mirror the earlier examples.
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This patient had a waiting time of 509 days, but started it well before the practice (which 
does not come from the provider’s catchment area) joined the fund-holding scheme, 
hence the individual’s exclusion from table 4.15. The patient started waiting on 17 
February 1994, so 407 days passed until 31 March 1995, the practice’s last day outside 
the scheme. The patient had the operation on 11 July 1995, which was 102 days after 
the practice joined the scheme on 1 April. Yet it is the 407 days that accumulated prior 
to the practice gaining fund-holding status which makes the waiting time significantly 
longer than the average for continuing non fiind-holders. In brief, if ever there was a 
case where the shorter waiting times of ftmd-holding patients were going to be hidden, 
the circumstances of the analysis pertaining to table 4.16 was surely going to be it. Yet 
there still seems enough to show that there are repeatedly genuine significant differences 
between the waits of fund-holders and other patients.
TABLE 4.16 - Comparison o f waiting times fin days) for operations covered by the fund-holding scheme 
on patients from the elective waiting list registered with non fund-holding (health authority) GPs and 
those offund-holders in their first year inside the scheme at four providers over four financial years
Continuing non ftmd- First year fund­
holders’ patients holders’ patients ANOVA
Provider and year Median Mean No. Median Mean No. F critical F obtained P value
Crawley Horsham
1993-94 167.0 214.2 2067 73.0 135.3 451 3.85 69.74 <0.0001
1994-95 132.0 193.9 1865 83.0 160.5 488 3.85 13.79 0.0002
1995-96 168.0 194.6 1897 509.0 509.0 1 3.85 4.30 0.0381
Mid Sussex
1993-94 62.0 112.9 1473 49.5 70.3 136 3.85 14.73 0.0001
1994-95 62.0 118.3 1666 59.5 119.6 354 3.85 0.03 0.8653
1995-96 59.0 125.8 1737 64.0 114.6 34 3.85 0.24 0.6270
Royal West Sussex
1993-94 245.0 270.4 1037 182.0 228.1 253 3.85 9.50 0.0021
1994-95 284.0 282.0 1279 160.0 204.9 157 3.85 26.61 <0.0001
1995-96 153.0 205.8 1751 126.0 190.3 627 3.85 3.94 0.0473
Worthing and Southlands
1993-94 83.0 134.5 6221 97.0 142.2 708 3.84 2.20 0.1382
1994-95 80.0 129.6 4942 79.0 127.4 1189 3.84 0.30 0.5819
1995-96 83.0 136.1 4228 97.0 131.5 243 3.84 0.29 0.5879
Although various anomalies pertaining to this section have had to be taken into account, 
the balance of evidence strongly suggests that the shorter waiting times of fiind-holder 
patients, relative to those of other GPs, has something to do with the participation of
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their general practices in the fund-holding scheme. The doubts concerning the Audit 
Commission’s (1996a; 1996b) claim that it is difficult to establish whether something has 
changed due to fund-holding as a system or simply the nature of the GPs participating in 
the scheme have surely been overcome. As such, fimd-holding did lessen the waiting 
times of patients on the elective waiting list who are registered with practices inside the 
scheme, relative to those who have their surgery commissioned by a health authority.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has dealt with two principal inquiries. The first was to demonstrate whether 
patients of OF fund-holders enjoy shorter waiting times for the elective surgery covered 
by the scheme than their non fund-holding counterparts. For the sake of thoroughness, 
the inquiry into this question has been performed on a number of slightly different levels. 
Although providers can differ in the way they rank people into the various bands of the 
list, consistent contrasts between the waits of fund-holding and other patients only 
appear in the category largely devoted to those with a routine clinical status, the elective 
waiting list (see tables 4.9 to 4.12). Such variations were scarce for the booked and 
planned categories of the waiting list, so fund-holding does not appear to make a 
significant difference to the waiting times of clinically urgent patients nor those requiring 
regular investigative procedures.
Moreover, those patients on the elective waiting list who began their wait before their 
practice entered the fund-holding scheme but had the operation after it joined generally 
spent much longer on the list as a non fund-holding than fund-holding patient (table 4.3). 
That seems perfectly con^atible with a tendency for fund-holders to have shorter waits 
than their non fimd-holding counterparts. After all, there is no other obvious reason why 
it should happen. This particular analysis covered people who, at the extremes, joined 
the waiting list both the day before their practice entered the scheme as well as those 
having the operation the day after it joined. If fimd-holding made no difference, it could 
sensibly be expected that the percentage of the overall waiting times for all such patients
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would be divided evenly between the periods before and after the date of the relevant 
practices’ entry into the scheme.
However, this also means that when the criterion for nominating a patient as either ftmd- 
holding or not is whether their general practice was in the scheme at the time of the 
operation, this will commonly lead to the average waits of fund-holders being overstated. 
When the analysis is restricted to those patients whose practice did not alter their status 
(fimd-holding or not) during the course of their wait, flmd-holders had significantly 
shorter waiting times in all sixteen cases (table 4.4). Even when patients on the elective 
waiting list were identified as fund-holding or not in line with the status of their practice 
at the time of the operation, fund-holders still benefited from significantly shorter waits in 
twelve cases out of sixteen (tables 4.9 to 4.12).
Regarding the four cases where the differences lost significance, the influence of 
including patients in the fimd-holding population who spent part of their wait before their 
practice joined the scheme on inflating the waits of this group is emphasised by looking 
at tables 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 alongside table 4.3. At Mid Sussex in 1992/93, the Royal 
West Sussex in 1992/93 plus Worthing and Southlands in 1993/94, patients whose 
practice joined the scheme during their time on the list spent the substantial majority of 
this overall period before the date of entering the scheme. The only exception was 
Worthing and Southlands in 1995/96, where patients on the waiting list at the time their 
practice became fund-holders on 1 April 1995 generally waited longer after this date than 
before it.
Furthermore, in ten of the sixteen cases the differences for the elective waiting list were 
so wide that fund-holding patients still had statistically significant shorter waits even 
when the other two categories of the list, the planned and booked groups, were brought 
into the comparison as well. These results for the whole list as a unified amalgam are 
also given in tables 4.9 to 4.12.
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The second primary concern of the chapter was to evaluate if the shorter waiting times of 
fimd-holding patients on the elective waiting list had anything to do with the participation 
of their general practices in the scheme, to which the answer was shown to be yes. The 
waiting times of patients from practices in their last year outside the scheme were rarely 
different to the average waits of patients from general practices that would be continuing 
their non ftmd-holding status the subsequent year. In just two cases out of twelve were 
the variances significant, and in one of these it was the continuing non ftmd-holders’ 
patients that had the shorter waits (table 4.14).
Yet when the waits of patients from the same blocks of practices were conq^ared in the 
following year, it became perceptible that the waiting times of patients from the first year 
ftmd-holders often fell below the level experienced by the continuing non ftmd-holders’ 
patients (tables 4.15 and 4.16). Therefore, the balance of evidence strongly indicates 
two main conclusions. First, ftmd-holding patients on the elective waiting list commonly 
had shorter waiting times than those registered with GPs outside the scheme. Secondly, 
it was something to do with the ftmd-holding status of their general practices that 
brought this about.
To close, equality should preferably be measured by contrasting one specific variable, 
whatever it may be, between two persons or groups (Sen, 1992). When waiting times 
for the non-urgent elective surgery covered by the fund-holding scheme is the chosen 
variable, at four providers over four years they, were regularly unequal with fund-holders 
customarily having shorter waits than other patients. From this, establishing that there 
were differences in waiting times between the two groups of patients is just one issue 
being considered. Another equally important aspect is to discover the reasons why this 
happened, and it is this objective to which the thesis turns next.
C h apters
Fund-holders’ budgets via historic data: who really benefits?
The evidence from the previous chapter showed that the average waiting times of fund- 
holding patients on the elective waiting list who received operations covered by the fund- 
holding scheme were generally shorter than the waits endured by other patients. That 
says little about the effectiveness of fund-holders as commissioners, relative to the health 
authority, if they had received overgenerous budgets to purchase elective surgery. As 
such, the focus of this chapter is to investigate whether fund-holding practices in West 
Sussex were funded over generously. It covers the effect of the budget setting system, 
the division of extra funding allocated to the NHS in the county, the likely impact of 
hospital prices, and compares fund-holders’ actual budgets against the resources they 
should have received according to a capitation formula.
BUDGET SETTING IN WEST SUSSEX
The first task is to examine how the budgets of GP fund-holders in West Sussex were 
actually set for the hospital services covered by the scheme in respect of the four years 
relevant to this research project, 1992/93 through to 1995/96. This information was 
obtained from senior managers in the finance department of the county’s health 
authority. Two distinct methodologies, capitation techniques and historic activity, were 
adopted for different types of services.
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Capitation techniques
The budgets of GP fund-holders for pathology, x-rays, and physiotherapy^’ were largely 
set through a simple non-weighted capitation formula. Local NHS providers supplied 
details of the activity for all practices within its catchment area during the first half of a 
financial year. The health authority, or prior to the amalgamation of such bodies the 
family health services authority, collated this data and valued it according to the fimd- 
holding tariff of the specific provider for the following year. This total was divided by 
the number of people registered with all practices in the relevant locality, and each one 
joining the scheme in the forthcoming April received an allocation set by multiplying the 
per capita amount by the total of patients registered with it. The amount was, of course, 
doubled to annualise it.
In itself this was a fairly unsophisticated methodology. Although the practices concerned 
accepted it, the system took little account of their demographic profile. As a precaution, 
practices who felt they were special cases through having demanding patient lists were 
formally protected by having the opportunity to discuss their circumstances, with a view 
to negotiating extra funds. Yet there was seldom any real success for practices that tried 
this. Health authority staff claimed that a minimal amount of money had been added to 
budgets in this way. Also, if practices had such activity performed on patients at another 
hospital, meaning one that is not their principal acute provider, the prospective fund­
holder was welcome to record this. The data had to be agreed by the specific provider 
that supplied the service and if the hospital did not do this, the practice was not funded 
for it.
As mentioned in the second chapter, this methodology suggests it is going to be very 
unlikely that new fund-holders will be systematically over funded for these services. If 
practices preparing for fund-holding status inflated their activity deliberately, the financial 
consequences of the increase would be spread around all the practices in a provider’s
15. Prior to the scheme’s extension in April 1996, these services accounted for some 9 per cent of all 
fund-holders’ hospital and community health services budgets (Audit Commission, 1996a).
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catchment area. Essentially, the opportunity for fund-holders to gain from the system 
was therefore negligible.
Historic activity
The principal hospital services for which fimd-holders’ budgets were set on the basis of 
historic activity were elective surgery and outpatient appointments.^^ In brief, practices 
preparing for fund-holding status would record all the elective operations and outpatient 
activity provided for their patients which appeared relevant to the scheme during the first 
six months, April to September, of their last year as non fund-holders. The providers 
also catalogued the activity applicable to each of the relevant practices and on a monthly 
basis the two parties were asked to compare their records in the expectation that every 
month would be agreed as it passed. The idea was to avoid the extremely onerous task, 
and dare one say panic, that would have occurred if all six months had to be agreed 
together in the ensuing October and November. The activity was valued in line with the 
price lists of the various providers for the following year and doubled in order to 
annualise it.
Because the hospitals had details of the precise codes of the operations given to patients, 
practices were highly dependent on the provider accepting that a procedure was covered 
by the fund-holding scheme. Conversations with managers at practices and providers 
confirmed that the hospital data was the primary source of information used to agree the 
activity, meaning it was what the provider claimed to have happened that was routinely 
agreed. Nonetheless, if a practice discovered that it had received a discharge notice for a 
patient who had not appeared on the provider’s list, the hospital investigated that episode 
to establish whether it should be counted towards the budget.
16. Prior to the scheme’s extension in April 1996, these services accounted for some 69 per cent of all 
fimd-holders’ hospital and community health services budgets. Elective surgery covered 29 per cent 
of the total, and ouQratient appointments 40 per cent (Audit Commission, 1996a).
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Regardless of this safeguard, if a discharge summary was despatched, the strong odds 
were in favour of the episode being on the provider’s listing. Managers at various 
practices thought it far more likely that applicable procedures might have taken place 
where no notice had been sent out by the hospital. Practices would thus be unlikely to 
know about such treatments, which consequently may not have been recorded, leading to 
them being under funded on joining the scheme. Even so, it is possible that such 
practices might not be invoiced for an equivalent number of episodes the following year, 
which could balance out the problem. Yet it is also feasible that if the administrative 
efficiency of providers improved, practices may have been charged for a growing number 
of procedures, relative to the total that might have been missed in the year prior to 
becoming fund-holders. On balance, it seems the most likely probability was that fimd- 
holders’ budgets might have been set below the true level of historic activity.
Dixon’s (1994) inference that the poor discharge information of hospitals may result in 
practices recording too much activity therefore looks to have an inverse logic. Because 
practices were so dependent on the data supplied by providers, it looks more likely that 
their activity could be under rather than overstated if insufficient treatment summaries or 
discharge notes were sent out to cover all the care provided. If that inference is correct, 
on entering the scheme practices may have been under funded. Although reports from 
practice and hospital managers suggests the monthly agreement process was essentially a 
harmonious affair, one of the main complaints of the practices was that this was the case.
Moreover, if a practice and provider were unable to reach agreement over activity levels, 
the local policy deemed that the hospital’s records would be used to calculate the budget 
offer. For this reason too, Dixon’s (1994) claim that practices who recorded more 
activity than providers would receive overgenerous funding is simply not applicable to 
the budget setting system in West Sussex.
For treatments which occurred at hospitals other than practices’ local or main providers, 
the principles were the same but normally the agreement between the parties was left 
until the six-month period was over, due to the smaller volume of activity. For example.
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though it represents only a minority of such practices’ activity, it is not too uncommon 
for consultants based at the West Sussex providers to make tertiary referrals to London 
teaching hospitals. In such cases, practices were again dependent on providers making 
them aware of such activity, and then agreeing that it had occurred, to have it counted 
towards their budget. If these conditions were not met, the practice would not have 
received funding for the treatment.
Similarly, when treatments were newly brought into the scheme, the sums allotted to 
existing fund-holders were set in the same way. Hence with operations, for the year 
prior to their inclusion in the scheme, episodes that practices and hospitals agreed had 
occurred in the first six months were valued in line with the providers’ fund-holding price 
list in the ensuing year and annualised. The allocations for other less common services 
covered by the scheme, like domiciliary visits, were also set in accordance with the 
activity during the data collection period agreed between the practice and provider.
The final point to make in describing the methodology as it concerns historic data is the 
very strict way in which the precise dates of the first six months of the financial year 
were adhered to. Even the episodes of care counted as taking place on the last day of 
March or the first day of October, just one day either side of the data collection period, 
were not included in the treatments used to calculate the budget offers. Moreover, since 
any money allocated to fimd-holders was taken fi*om the health authority cash limit, such 
organisations had every reason to set the budget setting rules as far as possible to its own 
advantage, rather than that of the fund-holders. For all the reasons just discussed, it is 
feasible that the baseline budgets of GP fund-holders were more likely to have been set 
against an under rather than overestimate of their true historic activity.
Community extensions
Although the two methods for allocating resources in respect of hospital services have 
now been discussed, there are other elements of fund-holders’ hospital and community
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health services budgets, the community extensions covered by the scheme/^ Because the 
discharge information from the providers to practices for aspects of care like outpatient 
appointments for mental health and learning disability patients was notoriously poor, it 
was not considered worthwhile for historic data to be agreed by the parties. Instead, 
providers supplied their own record of each relevant practice’s activity levels (this was 
shared with the prospective fund-holders), and the health authority set the budgets 
according to these details produced by the provider.
For community nursing, new fund-holders in West Sussex received budgets in line with 
the number and grades of district nurses and health visitors already allocated to the 
practice, plus their on-costs. Therefore, if inequity exists between fund-holders and 
other practices, this would be a continuation of a pre-existing state of affairs unrelated to 
the scheme. It is also likely that overgenerous budgets for community nursing will be 
passed back to the employing provider in a non-attributable block contract, so would not 
extend the resources available to purchase extra acute services like elective surgery.
SOURCES OF OVER FUNDING; SEASONAL VARIATIONS
The presumption that flmd-holders will be over funded therefore seems questionable in 
principle. However, was it in practice? For example, was the six-month data collection 
period likely to bias the calculation of the annualised costs of historic activity and if so, in 
what direction? The basis for this hypothesis is that if the provision of activity covered 
by the scheme to non fund-holding patients is skewed towards the first half of the year, 
new fund-holding practices could enter the scheme with overgenerous allocations. A 
large proportion of their budgets would be set on the basis of the six months in their 
preparatory year in which most of their activity occurred.
17. Prior to the scheme’s extension in April 1996, e?q)enditure on community extensions accounted for 
some 22 per cent of fund-holders’ hospital and community health services budgets. Of this figure, 
16 per cent was taken up by the community nursing services covered by the scheme (district nursing 
and health visiting), and 6 per cent by other community services, mainly mental health outpatient 
consultations (Audit Commission, 1996a).
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For the analyses in this section^ it should also be noted that the data relates to the elective 
surgery performed on all applicable NHS patients, not just the category who were the 
main focus of the investigation performed in the fourth chapter, those from the elective 
waiting list. The justification for this is that the budgets of GP fimd-holders for elective 
surgery were set according to the number and value of operations covered by the scheme 
performed on each of their NHS patients in the data collection period. As such, patients 
from the elective waiting, planned and booked lists were all covered by the methodology, 
including those who did not have their waiting times recorded. Consequently, the totals 
from table 5.1 correlate with the overall numbers in table 4.1 from the previous chapter.
Table 5.1 gives the breakdown per half year of operations covered by the fimd-holding 
scheme provided to NHS patients from the elective waiting, planned and booked lists 
registered with practices both inside and outside the scheme at the providers and years 
relevant to this study. It is noticeable that for both the non fimd-holding and fimd- 
holding populations as a whole, there was a slight tendency for more operations to occur 
in the second half of the year. Moreover, the aggregated totals reveal only a tiny 
difference between the two groups of patients in the ratios for their activity between the 
halves of the year, and in some cases the activity trends for each group looks very 
similar. The Royal West Sussex plus Worthing and Southlands providers in 1994/95 are 
good examples of this, with more operations on both populations happening in the 
second six months than in the first.
Yet there are some cases where profound differences exist. For instance, in 1993/94 at 
Crawley Horsham, whilst the fimd-holding activity was spread quite evenly, practically 
59 per cent of non fimd-holding work occurred in the second half of the year. At the 
same provider a year later, substantially more of the operations on non fimd-holders took 
place in the last six months, while this trend was reversed for fimd-holders. As such, 
with regard to seasonal variations it appears that the balance in the activity of the two 
populations suggest there sometimes are differences in the priority given to each group at 
alternative times of the year, but by no means does this look a consistent finding.
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TABLE 5.1 -  Breakdown per half year o f operations covered by the fund-holding scheme performed on 
patients from the overall waiting list registered with non fund-holding (health authority) andfund- 
holding practices at four providers over four financial years
Provider and period
Health authority patients 
Number Per cent
Fund-holding patients 
Number Per cent
Crawley Horsham
1992-93 April September 1775 48.5 451 51.5
October March 1888 51.5 425 48.5
1993-94 April September 1187 41.1 727 49.8
October March 1701 58.9 734 50.2
1994-95 AprQ September 1229 45.0 1237 52.6
October March 1505 55.0 1115 47.4
1995-96 AprO September 1636 51.7 1304 51.3
October-Marcb 1531 48.3 1239 48.7
Mid Sussex
1992-93 April September 1289 52.5 349 44.6
October March 1168 47.5 434 55.4
1993-94 AprU September 941 50.2 392 45.4
October March 933 49.8 471 54.6
1994-95 Aprll-September 1013 49.4 608 46.4
October March 1039 50.6 703 53.6
1995-96 April September 1180 53.4 672 47.9
October March 1031 46.6 730 52.1
Royal West Sussex
1992-93 April September 2184 49.6 138 54.5
October March 2220 50.4 115 45.5
1993-94 April September 2514 51.5 626 49.6
October March 2366 48.5 635 50.4
1994-95 April September 2395 46.0 946 45.0
October March 2812 54.0 1154 55.0
1995-96 April September 2181 48.1 1827 49.6
October March 2349 51.9 1857 50.4
Worthing and Southlands
1992 93 April September 4150 48.6 414 48.2
October March 4396 51.4 445 51.8
1993-94 April September 4122 48.6 918 49.1
October March 4356 51.4 950 50.9
1994-95 April September 3435 47.6 1820 47.7
October March 3779 52.4 1995 52.3
1995-96 April September 3484 51.7 2053 49.5
October March 3258 48.3 2094 50.5
AGGREGATE
4 years April September 34715 48.9 14482 49.0
October March 36332 51.1 15096 51.0
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So what does table 5.1 say about the likely impact of differences between the first and 
second halves of the year on the budgets of GP fund-holders? Across all sixteen cases, 
four providers over four years, more operations on non fimd-holders took place between 
October and March than fi'om April to September. With all else being equal this would 
suggest most fund-holding practices in West Sussex were, if anything, somewhat under 
funded by way of seasonal variations, having been budgeted on the basis of the half year 
in which less of their patients’ surgical activity occurred.
Additionally, it is noticeable from table 5.1 that in 1995/96 more operations on non fund­
holders were performed in the first half of the year than in the second, 8,481 against 
8,169. A reason for this was the situation at Worthing and Southlands, discussed in the 
previous chapter. Non-urgent activity in the last quarter of that year on non fimd-holders 
fi"om the elective waiting list was slowed to just over 19 per cent of the annual number 
for that specific waiting list category (against an even spread of 25 per cent).
As such, for the three earlier years, 1992/93, 1993/94 and 1994/95, the tendency for 
more non fund-holding work to take place in the last six months was even more striking 
than the difference which is perceptible in the aggregated rows for four years in table 5.1. 
And this is the period relevant to the budget setting process for the practices that acted 
as fund-holders during the time-span of this study. At the four providers in these three 
years, 54,397 operations relevant to the scheme were performed on non fund-holding 
patients. Of these, 26,234, slightly more than 48 per cent, were performed in the first 
half of the year and 28,163, approaching 52 per cent, in the second. Therefore, the gap 
is widened when 1995/96 is excluded.
Whilst the point was made that with all else being equal, this might indicate that fund­
holders as a group will be somewhat under funded, other things are not always equal. It 
is therefore necessary to analyse the balance between the two halves of the year for those 
practices formally preparing for fund-holding status in 1992/93, 1993/94 and 1994/95. 
The last of the four years included in the database, 1995/96, is not included as it has no 
significance on the budgets offered to fund-holding practices during the four year time
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span of the study. The practices for which this was their preparatory year will not have 
entered the scheme until 1996/97, the sixth wave. However, it is still worth mentioning 
that most sixth wave fund-holders in West Sussex could well have had their budgets for 
elective surgery set on the basis of the half year in which the majority of their activity 
occurred. A logical interpretation from this is that if all else were equal, these practices 
would generally have been over fiinded for elective surgery.
Seasonal variations for preparatory year practices
The West Sussex practices that prepared for fimd-holding status during either 1992/93, 
1993/94 or 1994/95, and used the Crawley Horsham, Mid Sussex, Royal West Sussex, 
plus Worthing and Southlands providers in that year were identified and separated from 
the other practices outside the scheme. The elective surgery received by their patients, 
whichever category of the waiting list they were called in from, was divided into two 
blocks. Those relevant to the period running from 1 April to 30 September, which 
would have been used to calculate their budgets for the next year once they joined the 
scheme, and those from 1 October to the following 31 March. In line with the local 
budget setting methodology, every one of the procedures that were applicable to each 
half of the year were valued according to the relevant providers’ price list in the ensuing 
year.
The rationale for this venture was to compare the allocations received by practices for 
elective surgery at the four providers to what would have been received had the annual 
costs of the work been spread evenly between the two halves of the year. Tables 5.2 to 
5.5 provide this information and to clarify the investigation their format is now described 
in some detail. The number and value of operations performed on patients of practices 
preparing for fund-holding status in each half of the applicable year, with separate figures 
for inpatients and day cases as well as the total of these, are given and requires no further 
explanation. The column headed ‘actual budget effect’ is the April to September total 
doubled, and relates to the genuine funding of such practices for elective surgery at local
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hospitals. The column denoted as ‘actual activity value’ represents the sum of the values 
for April to September and October to March, and portrays the real costs of the 
practices’ surgery covered by the fimd-holding scheme at local providers that year.
The figure in the ‘(under) or over funding’ column is the difference between the actual 
budget effect and the actual activity value. If the latter, the actual activity value, exceeds 
the former, the actual budget effect, the total is bracketed and denotes an under funding. 
This is because the practices involved generally lost out, at least as far as their allocations 
for operations at local providers is concerned, by having their budgets set on the basis of 
the half year in which their surgical activity was at its lowest level.
Alternatively, if the figure in the right-hand colunm is not in brackets, meaning that the 
actual budget effect was a greater figure than the actual activity value, it signifies that the 
practices concerned were generally over funded for the elective surgery received by their 
patients at local providers. In line with the previous definition of under funding, the 
reason for this is that the costs of their activity in the data collection period tended to be 
higher than in the second six months of that year. The aggregate figures for the sum of 
the three years is also given for each provider.
TABLE 5.2 - Comparison o f the numbers and value o f elective surgical procedures covered by the fund- 
holding scheme performed on patients ofpractices in each half o f their last year outside the scheme at 
the Crawley Horsham provider over three financial years
AprO to September October to March Actual Actual (Under) or
Year Categoiy Number Value Number Value budget effect activity value overftmding
1992-93 Inpatients 136 155705 138 161970 311410 317675 (6265)
Day cases 137 43597 188 65096 87194 108693 (21499)
TOTAL 273 199302 326 227066 398604 426368 (27764)
1993-94 Inpatients 93 117739 174 219838 235478 337577 (102099)
Day cases 158 50636 208 64177 101272 114813 (13541)
TOTAL 231 168375 382 284015 336750 452390 (115640)
1994-95 Inpatients 1 720 1 652 1440 1372 68
Day cases 1 652 0 - 1304 652 652
TOTAL 2 1372 1 652 2744 2024 720
Aggregate Inpatients 230 274164 313 382460 548328 656624 (108296)
Day Cases 296 94885 396 129273 189770 224158 (34388)
TOTAL 526 369049 709 511733 738098 880782 (142684)
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TABLE 5.3 - Comparison o f the numbers and value o f elective surgical procedures covered by the fund- 
holding scheme performed on patients ofpractices in each half o f their last year outside the scheme at 
the Mid Sussex provider over three financial years
Year Category
AprO to September 
Nnmber Value
October to March 
Nnmber Value
Actual 
budget effect
Actual 
activity value
(Under) or 
over flmdlng
1992-93 Inpatients 25 37630 19 28660 75260 66290 8970
Day cases 33 17525 40 18830 35050 36355 (1305)
TOTAL 58 55155 59 47490 110310 102645 7665
1993-94 Inpatients 59 76275 52 95150 152550 171425 (18875)
Day cases 96 41475 66 28040 82950 69515 13435
TOTAL 155 117750 118 123190 235500 240940 (5440)
1994-95 Inpatients 7 9375 13 19525 18750 28900 (10150)
Day cases 11 5570 12 5520 11140 11090 50
TOTAL 18 14945 25 25045 29890 39990 (10100)
Aggregate Inpatients 91 123280 84 143335 246560 266615 (20055)
Day Cases 140 64570 118 52390 129140 116960 12180
TOTAL 231 187850 202 195725 375700 383575 (7875)
TABLE 5.4 - Comparison o f the numbers and value o f elective surgical procedures covered by the fund- 
holding scheme performed on patients ofpractices in each half o f their last year outside the scheme at 
the Royal West Sussex provider over three financial years
Year Category
April to September 
Nnmber Value
October to March 
Number Value
Actual 
budget effect
Actual 
activity value
(Under) or 
over funding
1992-93 Inpatients 179 189652 204 217805 379304 407457 (28153)
Day cases 156 43200 136 37472 86400 80672 5728
TOTAL 335 232852 340 255277 465704 488129 (22425)
1993-94 Inpatients 95 114790 67 76360 229580 191150 38430
Day cases 142 33500 133 31510 67000 65010 1990
TOTAL 237 148290 200 107870 296580 256160 40420
1994-95 Inpatients 242 305586 280 374819 611172 680405 (69233)
Day cases 413 96911 466 107826 193822 204737 (10915)
TOTAL 655 402497 746 482645 804994 885142 (80148)
Aggregate Inpatients 516 610028 551 668984 1220056 1279012 (58956)
Day Cases 711 173611 735 176808 347222 350419 (3197)
TOTAL 1227 783639 1286 845792 1567278 1629431 (62153)
Tables 5.2 to 5.5 show that the activity of preparatory year practices at the providers is 
inclined to reflect that of the wider non fund-holding group (table 5.1). Hence GP fund­
holders in West Sussex tended to lose out to an extent by having their budgets set on the 
basis of a six-month activity window. The consequences of this on practices’ budgets 
were unevenly distributed in different localities. For example, in the catchment areas for 
both the Mid Sussex plus Worthing and Southlands providers, the overall effects were
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fairly marginal. Moreover, in one year at each the costs of the activity for practices in 
their preparatory year were even higher in the data collection period than in the second 
six months.
TABLE 5.5 - Comparison o f the numbers and value o f elective surgical procedures covered by the fund- 
holding scheme performed on patients ofpractices in each half o f their last year outside the scheme at 
the Worthing and Southland^ provider over three financial years
April to September October to March Actual Actual (Under) or
Year Category Nnmber Value Number Value budget effect activity value over ftmding
1992-93 Inpatients 294 286633 286 271746 573266 558379 14887
Day cases 163 102087 169 104339 204174 206426 (2252)
TOTAL 457 388720 455 376085 777440 764805 12635
1993-94 Inpatients 467 439167 473 437812 878334 876979 1355
Day cases 387 177942 395 180657 355884 358599 (2715)
TOTAL 854 617109 868 618469 1234218 1235578 (1360)
1994-95 Inpatients 86 84632 82 97434 169264 182066 (12802)
Day cases 58 21100 79 27800 42200 48900 (6700)
TOTAL 144 105732 161 125234 211464 230966 (19502)
Aggregate Inpatients 847 810432 841 806992 1620864 1617424 3440
Day Cases 608 301129 643 312796 602258 613925 (11667)
TOTAL 1455 1111561 1484 1119788 2223122 2231349 (8227)
Yet the negative outcomes of the budget setting methodology were far more serious for 
fund-holders that are local to the Crawley Horsham and Royal West Sussex providers. 
At the former, practices lost a significant amount of money through having their budgets 
set in accordance with activity in the first half of the year, a circumstance that had quite 
severe consequences for those joining the scheme in April 1994. At the Royal West 
Sussex, practices entering the scheme that same year, its fourth wave, actually did quite 
well out of the methodology, with most of their activity falling in the data collection 
period. However, this effect was reversed in the years either side of 1993/94, with the 
practices in their preparatory year during 1994/95 losing out particularly badly.
These findings comply with answers given during interviews with the chief executives of 
both the providers and health authority, plus the public health director of the latter. The 
health authority commonly raised its financial commitment to hospitals in the second half 
of a financial year. Whilst the huge majority of this money commissioned more elective 
surgery, three of the provider chief executives maintained that modest numbers of extra
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outpatient consultations had occasionally been purchased later in the year. This could 
suggest that some fund-holders may have been budgeted for outpatient services on the 
basis of the six months during their preparatory year in which least activity was provided 
to their patients, albeit to a lesser extent than was the case with elective surgery.
In sum, as far as elective surgery at local providers is concerned. West Sussex fund­
holders were generally disadvantaged by the use of their historic activity over a six 
month period in the year prior to them joining the scheme, rather than gaining from this 
methodology. The aggregate under funding of such practices from waves three to five 
for surgical activity at four providers, using the techniques for measuring this as detailed 
in the earlier description of tables 5.2 to 5.5, totalled £220,939.
SOURCES OF OVER FUNDING: INFLATED ACTIVITY
As discussed in the second chapter, suspicions have been raised in the literature that GPs 
preparing for fimd-holding status may try to manipulate the budget setting system. The 
idea is that they could inflate the usage of hospital services by their patients during the 
year prior to their entry into the scheme to surreptitiously increase the budget they 
receive for purchasing such services. This possibility was investigated by comparing the 
rates of surgical activity for practices in the two years prior to their entry into the fund- 
holding scheme. By doing this it should be possible to assess whether the elective 
surgery performed on patients registered with practices in their last year outside the 
scheme was higher than would have been expected from the level of activity in their 
penultimate twelve months as non fund-holders.
However, this task is not quite as straightforward as simply comparing the number of 
operations performed on patients of such practices over a two-year period. Three of the 
providers underwent major rebuilding programmes during parts of the four years covered 
by the database that, when finished, increased their capacity for patient throughput. And 
even without such capital projects, events like the appointment of new consultants and
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other changes in the medical stafiF establishments at hospitals would be expected to alter 
the number of operations performed. Shifts in the priorities of purchasers could also 
make a hospital modify the overall volume of elective surgery it provides. Otherwise, 
part of a hospital’s operating theatre complex could be closed down for a lengthy period 
of refurbishment, which is liable to reduce surgical activity during that interval.
Consequently a large rise, or decrease, in the surgical activity of practices in their last 
year outside the fund-holding scheme may on its own be nothing more than a reflection 
of a change to the circumstances and capacity of their local hospital. Moreover, there 
are a number of factors that could cause this change. A control group is thus required in 
order to legitimise any such comparison and fortunately there is a suitable party equipped 
for this function: the continuing non fund-holding population over the two years. After 
all, if the activity of one non fund-holding group is going to vary because of changes in 
the capacity of a hospital during that period, then surely it will also shift for the other.
The trend in activity rates between continuing non fund-holders and prospective fund­
holders can thus be compared for the two years prior to the latter group’s entry into the 
scheme.
The four-year run of data that is available (1992/93, 1993/94, 1994/95 and 1995/96) 
means that comparisons between the two groups of non fund-holding patients can be 
performed twice. For the fourth wave practices that entered the scheme in April 1994, 
the data is available for their final two years as non fund-holders, their penultimate year 
of 1992/93 and also their preparatory year of 1993/94. Likewise, for the fifth wave 
practices that became fund-holders in April 1995, the data is available for both their 
penultimate year outside the scheme, 1993/94, as well as their last, 1994/95. Obviously 
the third wavers whose first twelve months inside the scheme was 1993/94 have to be 
excluded fi*om this exercise because their penultimate year as non fund-holders, 1991/92, 
is not included in the database.
Table 5.6 gives the number of operations that were performed in both 1992/93 and 
1993/94 at the four providers on patients registered with both continuing non fund-
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holders (those who remained outside the scheme in 1994/95) and those from practices 
that joined the scheme in April 1994. The totals include patients from all categories of 
the waiting list that received operations covered by the scheme in those years, whether or 
not their waiting time had been recorded.
TABLE 5.6 - Comparison o f the number o f elective surgical procedures covered by the fund-holding 
scheme performed on patients ofpractices that joined the scheme in its fourth wave with the number 
performed on those registered with practices continuing their non fund-holding status in 1994-95
1992-93 1993-94
4^ * wave fkiture ftmd- Continuing non ftmd- 4"* wave ftiture ftmd- Continuing non ftmd-
holders’ patients holders’ patients holders’ patients holders’ patients
Provider Number Per cent Nnmber Per cent Number Per cent Number Per cent
Crawley Horsham 599 19.5 2465 80.5 633 21.9 2255 78.1
Mid Sussex 309 13.2 2031 86.8 273 14.6 1601 85.4
Royal West Sussex 390 10.5 3339 89.5 437 9.0 4443 91.0
Worthing and Southlands 1607 21.1 6027 78.9 1722 20.3 6756 79.7
TOTAL 2905 17.3 13862 82.7 3065 16.9 15055 83.1
Table 5.6 shows that for the operations covered by the fund-holding scheme performed 
on non fund-holding patients in the 1992/93 and 1993/94 financial years, the proportions 
relevant to practices who became fourth wave fimd-holders and those who stayed 
outside the scheme during 1994/95 changed very little. To ensure the same practices 
should remain in each group for both years, the analysis pertaining to 1992/93 excluded 
those patients registered with practices that joined the scheme in April 1993, the third 
wave.
Indeed, on a proportional basis the overall activity of fourth wave fimd-holders was 
lower in their last twelve months outside the scheme than in the penultimate year, though 
individually neither Crawley Horsham nor Mid Sussex fit into this generalisation. The 
movements in the activity of either group, at the level of individual providers and on an 
aggregate basis across them all, do not look remotely sufficient to warrant a conclusion 
that practices in their preparatory year inflated the elective surgery performed on 
patients. Additionally, a chi square analysis (confidence level 95 per cent) of the changes 
in both prospective fourth wave and continuing non fund-holding practices’ activity 
between 1992/93 and 1993/94 is provided in table 5.7.
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TABLE 5.7 - Significance in the movement of elective surgery covered by the fund-holding scheme on 
patients registered with continuing non fund-holding practices and fourth wave fund-holders in the two 
financial years prior to the latter joining the scheme
1992-93 1993-94
4"' wave future fünd- Continuing non fund 4"* wave future fund Continuing non fund Chi square test
holders’ patients holders’ patients holders’ patients holders’ patients for independence
Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected A* A*
No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. critical obtained P value
2905 2869.2 13862 13897.8 3065 3100.8 15055 15019.2 3.84 1.04 0.3089
This chi square test for independence (table 5.7) has been performed to ascertain whether 
the movements in the elective surgery supplied to the patients of both groups of practices 
were statistically significant. Because the hypothesis relates to the change in activity for 
the fourth wave practices in general, the totals of the operations cover all four providers 
(even though these were separated in table 5.6). The analysis reinforces the impression 
that fourth wave fiind-holders did not inflate activity in their preparatory year. The 
changes for each group of practices over the two-year period were not significant.
FIGURE 5.1 - Two year movement in the percentage split between the number of elective surgical 
procedures covered by the fund-holding scheme performed at four providers on patients registered with 
practices who became fund-holders in April 1994 and those registered with practices that remained 
outside the scheme in 1994-95
□  Fourth wave future fiind-holders 
■  Continuing non fiind-holders
1992-93 1993-94
YEAR
This verdict is reinforced by figure 5.1 which compares the percentage movement in the 
operations performed on patients of practices who eventually became fourth wave fund­
holders with those who retained their non fund-holding status in 1994/95. No obvious
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contrast is apparent. Hence the judgement must be made that fourth wave fund-holders 
in West Sussex did not inflate the level of elective surgery that was received by their 
patients at the four featured providers prior to joining the scheme, relative to other non 
fund-holders. Even if such practices had attempted to do this, it seems they failed.
Table 5.8 presents exactly the same analysis as that performed for the production of table 
5.6, apart from everything having moved on a year (so patients from practices that joined 
the scheme in April 1994 are excluded from the analysis). The movements between the 
1993/94 and 1994/95 financial years in the percentage of activity covered by the scheme 
on patients registered with fifth wavers (who eventually became fimd-holders in April 
1995), and on patients from practices that remained as non fimd-holders during 1995/96, 
are compared. In this case, a slightly greater proportion of the overall non fimd-holding 
activity was performed on patients of fifth wave practices in their final year outside the 
scheme, 1994/95, than in the previous year, 1993/94. But the point must also be made 
that this was only a very marginal increase, just over one-quarter of a single percentage 
point.
TABLE 5.8 - Comparison o f the number o f elective surgical procedures covered by the fund-holding 
scheme performed on patients ofpractices that joined the scheme in its fifth wave with the number 
performed on those registered with practices continuing their non fund-holding status in 1995-96
1993-94 1994-95
5* wave ftature ftmd- Continuing non ftmd- S*** wave ftitnre ftmd- Continuing non ftmd-
hoiders’ patients holders’ patients holders’ patients holders’ patients
Provider Nnmber Per cent Number Per cent Number Per cent Number Per cent
Cramdey Horsham 4 0.2 2251 99.8 3 0.1 2731 99.9
Mid Snasei 31 1.9 1570 98.1 43 2.1 2009 97.9
Royal West Sussex 1157 26.0 3286 74.0 1401 26.9 3806 73.1
Worfliing and Southlands 300 4.4 6456 95.6 305 4.2 6909 95.8
TOTAL 1492 9.9 13563 90.1 1752 10.2 15455 89.8
The same analysis of the statistical significance in the activity movements for future fifth 
wave and continuing non fund-holders is performed in table 5.9, as was shown by table 
5.7 for the fourth wavers and their comparators. It confirms that the changes between 
1993/94 and 1994/95 for each group of practices were not statistically significant.
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TABLE 5.9 - Significance in the movement of elective surgery covered by the fund-holding scheme on 
patients registered with continuing non fund-holding practices and fifth wave fund-holders in the two 
financial years prior to the latter joining the scheme
1993-94 1994-95
5“* wave future fund Continuing non fund S**" wave future fund Continuing non fünd- 
holders’ patients holders' patients holders’ patients holders’ patients
Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected
No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No.
Chi square test 
for independence 
A* A*
critical obtained P value
1492 1513.8 13563 13541.2 1752 1730.2 15455 15476.8 3.84 0.65 0.4184
Moreover, the lack of movement in the activity of practices in their last year outside the 
scheme during 1994/95, relative to the continuing non fund-holders, is again clearly 
shown by the chart in figure 5.2. There is no observable difference in the relative size of 
the bars representing the activity of fifth wave practices and continuing non fund-holders 
in the two years prior to the former group’s entry in the scheme. If future fifth wavers 
had inflated surgical activity, the expectation would be that their bar for 1994/95 should 
have been visibly higher than the one for 1993/94.
FIGURE 5.2 - Two year movement in the percentage split between the number of elective surgical 
procedures covered by the fund-holding scheme performed at four providers on patients registered with 
practices who became fund-holders in April 1995 and those registered with practices that remained 
outside the scheme in 1995-96
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In fact when the two cases pertaining to tables 5.6 and 5.8 are combined, the surgical 
activity of fourth and fifth wave fund-holders in their penultimate years outside the 
scheme amounted to 13.8 per cent of the overall non fund-holding activity. Fourth and 
fifth wavers then had 13.6 per cent of the non ftmd-holding surgical activity that was
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covered by the fund-holding scheme in their final year outside the scheme. Hence on an 
aggregate basis the practices in their preparatory year during 1993/94 and 1994/95 
proportionately had slightly less surgery performed on their patients during their last year 
outside the fund-holding scheme than in the previous twelve months, relative to the 
continuing non fund-holders.
As such, from the two cases that were open to examination, the only conclusion that 
looks appropriate is that practices in their final year outside the fund-holding scheme did 
not inflate their surgical activity, relative to the other non flmd-holders, to surreptitiously 
increase their budget.
SOURCES OF OVER FUNDING: INFLATION, PRICES AND GROWTH
There are other issues related to the fairness of the budget setting methodology that were 
briefly mentioned in the second chapter. One is that fund-holders' budgets should be 
adjusted for inflation in a similar fashion, and to the same extent, to those of health 
authorities. With all else being equal, it would be unfair if one purchasers’ budget was 
increased for inflation more than that of the other. This point has strong connections to 
the prices charged by providers to separate purchaser types, and that topic will also be 
discussed.
Another issue relates to the possibility that a health authority could have a diminishing 
cash limit as the years pass, whilst fund-holders might be allowed to retain the budgets 
they had on joining the scheme. The effect of this would be to upgrade the resources 
available to fund-holding practices in the local NHS economy, relative to the health 
authority. Further to this, even if a health authority had an increasing cash limit through 
the receipt of growth funds, the additions made to fund-holders’ budgets should not by 
comparison be excessive (similar to the point just made about inflation). Each of the 
issues of inflation, prices, and the growth or decline of the health authority’s cash limit
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are discussed in turn with the last topic also being linked to the rise in the demand for 
emergency services.
Inflation
Discussions with various senior managers from the finance department of the West 
Sussex Health Authority provided a straightforward answer to the query concerning 
inflation. Whatever percentage increase for inflation was received by the health authority 
in a particular year for the purchase of health care services, the same percentage was 
passed on to the overall hospital and community health care budgets held by fund­
holders.
For example, say that in a single year the overall resources available in West Sussex for 
commissioning health care services were £250 million. If an uplift of 2.5 per cent had 
been applied that year for inflation, an addition of £6.25 million would be received. Out 
of the £250 million, if fund-holders had budgets for purchasing health care services 
totalling £50 million, then altogether they would get an addition of 2.5 per cent to this 
figure, an extra £1.25 million. The health authority would keep the other £5 million, 
which also equates to 2.5 per cent of their £200 million. Therefore, on an overall basis 
the allocations for inflation were most unlikely to change the relative funding position of 
the two purchaser types. If fund-holders started off in the scheme as under funded, they 
were likely to remain so, with the reverse also being true.
However, while the increase for fund-holders mirrored the percentage received by the 
health authority in global terms, all such practices did not necessarily receive the same 
proportional uplift to their budgets. As far as possible the rises reflected the price 
changes of local providers. For example, with all else being equal, say one hospital 
raised its prices by 3 per cent and another by 2 per cent in a year when the relevant uplift 
for inflation was 2.5 per cent. The budget increases to fund-holders in each provider’s 
catchment area would mirror the price rises of the local hospital. In this case one group
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of practices would get an addition of 3 per cent and the other 2 per cent. For the overall 
balance of resources between the health authority and fund-holders, this does not imply 
any systematic over (or under) funding for inflation for either party.
Price differentials
The arrangements for inflation link to the prices different purchasers are charged. The 
global percentage that went to existing fund-holders for inflation, whatever it was in a 
particular year, was supposed to cover rises in hospital prices. If the uplift received was 
not sufficient to do this, then fund-holders were expected to shape their non-urgent 
activity levels accordingly, or send patients to cheaper providers. In West Sussex it was 
thus only for the budgets of new ftmd-holders where resources tended to automatically 
follow in full any price increases by providers, formally to enable them to afford the same 
activity levels previously received by their patients. After that first year price rises had to 
be met out of the global uplift for inflation, despite the attempts to cover those of 
particular hospitals within the overall sum.
This might contradict the likelihood that providers will hike their fund-holding tariff to 
extract more money fi’om local practices for the same level of work. While this could 
work for those embarking on their first year inside the scheme, it may endanger business 
with existing fund-holders. This was especially likely as five providers encompassing 
seven acute hospitals are compressed into a county that also has big hospital complexes 
in Brighton, Guildford, Redhill, and Portsmouth within quite easy commuting distances 
of its boundaries. The location of the inter-county hospitals was given in figure 3.1. In 
line with this possibility, senior finance managers at the health authority claimed there 
was nothing to suggest that local providers’ had exorbitantly hiked their fund-holding 
tariffe to get more money fi’om practices. On balance, therefore, differential prices look 
anything but a safe bet as to the reason why fund-holders in the county might be over 
ftmded.
178
However, could the reverse be true in the context of which purchaser is charged the 
higher prices? This is a rather delicate issue as a hospital’s prices should be based upon 
its costs (see Bartlett et al., 1994), with no planned cross-subsidisation of contracts (see 
MacKerrell, 1993). Because there is no obvious reason why the cost of supplying the 
same treatment to fund-holding and non fund-holding patients will deviate, providers are 
not supposed to charge different prices for the same service to alternative purchasers. 
Nevertheless, Dixon (1994) was probably correct in claiming that the setting of prices by 
hospitals has been an imprecise science and there could be scope for providers to charge 
varying prices to each commissioner. So might the health authority be charged the 
higher prices?
Unfortunately, it is impossible to prove one way or the other. A direct comparison of the 
prices to different purchasers is impracticable because hospitals do not issue a price list 
for specific treatments to health authorities in the same way that they do to fund-holders. 
For surgical procedures the contracts between the health authority and its local NHS 
providers detail a single amount to be paid per specialty for all day cases, then another 
total for elective and emergency inpatients. Both figures represent an imprecise amalgam 
covering a whole range of treatments both inside and outside the fund-holding scheme.
A price per individual treatment does not exist and discussions with health authority staff 
indicates this makes it impossible for them to distinguish what is being paid for distinct 
services within the scheme, plus episodes outside it. Providers are in an advantageous 
position in any asymmetry of information (see Propper, 1993a; 1993b), and this may 
reinforce any idea that health authorities can be seen as ‘captive’ purchasers.
In such circumstances it is feasible that providers may take advantage of this and charge 
health authorities more than fund-holders for the same services. If this proposition is 
correct it raises the question as to what, if anything, should be done about it. If the 
health authority is paying higher prices, should it retain more funds at the expense of 
fund-holders’ budgets? A problem with this idea is that it is currently impossible to 
prove whether the health authority has been paying higher prices. And even if it were 
verified the same dilemma would exist as if fund-holders’ budgets had been uplifted for
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the same reason. If fund-holders should not be funded in full for providers’ extortionate 
price rises because this would unfeirly lessen the amount left for the health authority, 
then the same point can be made about districts bailing themselves out by taking more 
money from practices. It may also remove, or at least reduce, any economic incentive 
for a hospital to improve its efficiency and lower its running costs in order to cut prices.
The share of capitation growth
The point was made in the second chapter that inequitable funding between fund-holders 
and health authorities could feasibly develop from the latter having a diminishing cash 
limit, if fund-holders were able to retain their original budgets set when a district had 
more fimding. The purchasing power of the two commissioner types could gradually 
move in opposing, or at least not the same directions. Funding for the health authority 
would be squeezed, without the same disadvantages 6Hing upon the practices within the 
scheme. This hypothesis has less to do with the mainstream debate about any alleged 
under funding of the service than the change in the early 1990s to the way health 
authority cash limits were set (when RAWP was discontinued in fevour of a weighted 
capitation formula).
This would have benefited some districts but not others, according to whether the new 
capitation formula had showed a health authority to be under or over funded through 
RAWP. The custom was for the districts defined as under funded against their capitation 
target to be awarded supplementary increases to their annual cash limits. The intention 
was to move all areas towards their capitation targets and progress with this was usually 
gradual over a number of years. This actually worked in favour of West Sussex, with the 
county being appreciably short of its capitation target. As such, the county received 
significant increases for capitation growth over a number of consecutive years during the 
1990s, so NHS fimding in West Sussex was anything but shrinking during the decade.
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However, is it feasible that GP fund-holders in West Sussex might have received an 
unfairly large proportion of the extra funding for capitation growth that came in to the 
county? Perhaps the health authority could have felt obliged by the last government’s 
desire to attract practices into the scheme to hand an inappropriately large proportion 
over to the budgets of fund-holders.
For this reason, details concerning the capitation growth received by the NHS in West 
Sussex during the 1990s, and how much of this went to the budgets of GP fund-holders, 
were required. The division of funds to distinct health authorities was performed at the 
regional level (see Smee, 1996), and the information concerning the capitation growth 
received by the county in the earlier years of the decade was obtained from the South 
Thames regional office. The West Sussex Health Authority director of finance provided 
this data for the later years, plus the division of these funds between health authorities 
and GP fund-holders for the whole period. As such, the capitation growth that came to 
West Sussex, and the amount that went to fund-holders in the county, was successfully 
acquired for 1992/93 through to 1995/96, and indeed for 1996/97 plus 1997/98 as well.
Nevertheless, even with this information there is still a major query to be addressed. Of 
the growth received each year, what would have been a fair allocation to fund-holders? 
Critics of the scheme might feel that if fund-holding patients were benefiting from shorter 
waits, their practices should not receive any additional growth monies, whatever their 
funding position to start with. However, this view might be flawed for two reasons. At 
the time the decisions were being taken about how much of the growth money should go 
to fund-holders there was no evidence about waiting time differences. Alternatively, 
others may think that if fund-holders are acquiring quicker services, it might be inefficient 
to leave more money with a health authority that could be the less effective purchaser.
The Audit Commission (1996a, p. 6) provided a useful guide as to what would be a fair 
division of growth money. Without citing a year to which the remark was attributable, 
the comment was made that ‘fundholders purchase about 20 per cent of their patients’ 
hospital and community healthcare by value’. Also, the document later stated that ‘by
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1994/95, 41 per cent of the population were covered by the scheme, and about 8 per 
cent of health services’ annual revenue expenditure was channelled through fundholding 
practices’ (Audit Commission, 1996a, p. 107). The statistics in this second quote match 
neatly with the existing fund-holding practices purchasing 20 per cent of the value of 
their patients’ hospital and community health care services, so this percentage can be 
taken as relevant to 1994/95. Hence if every GP were fund-holding, that year practices 
would have controlled some 20 per cent of such expenditure.
The two years in which major extensions to the scheme, in the context of the scope of 
services within it, were enforced are 1993/94 when the community extensions became 
incorporated and 1996/97 when a great deal more elective surgery was brought into the 
remit of standard fund-holding. Therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest that for 
1993/94 through to 1995/96, the 20 per cent figure is as good as any to use as a guide to 
what fund-holders should have received out of the capitation growth in those three years. 
In 1992/93 the county received no capitation growth anyway, so there is something to 
work from in assessing if fund-holders were over or under funded for capitation growth 
in the years relevant to this project.^*
Considering that the data was available, this exercise was continued for 1996/97 and 
1997/98. However, because of the large extension to the fund-holding scheme in April 
1996, the 20 per cent share loses its relevance. A larger portion would be applicable.
The Audit Commission (1996a) stated that about half the population would be registered 
with fimd-holders in 1996/97, when their practices would manage some 15 per cent of 
expenditure on hospital and community services. Of this percentage, GP total purchasers 
controlled 4 per cent. If about 3 per cent of this quota were for the services outside the 
standard scheme post-March 1996, this leaves some 12 per cent of overall expenditure 
channelled through fund-holding practices covering around half the population. Hence if
18. If growth had been received in 1992/93, the Audit Commission (1996a) enabled the percentage due 
to fund-holders for that year to also be calculated. They identified 22 per cent of the 20 per cent (so 
4.4 per cent of the over^l total) as relevant to the community extensions. Taking this 4.4 per cent 
from the 20 per cent leaves 15.6 per cent for the services inside the scheme during 1992/93.
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the entire population was registered with standard fund-holders, such GPs might control 
24 per cent of expenditure in 1996/97 and 1997/98.
Of course, the appropriate percentages might vary in separate areas due to a number of 
factors, including the demographic profile of the local population. For example, the 
proportion of the available resources spent on services covered by the standard fund- 
holding scheme in West Sussex might be different to the ratio in Lancashire, Cumbria, 
Birmingham, East Anglia, or anywhere else. Yet this does not change the point that the 
Audit Commission’s (1996a) percentages are still the most valuable source of data there 
is to use.
Capitation growth net of emergencies
Table 5.10 compares what would be expected to go to fund-holders in the county for 
capitation growth, using the percentages calculated above, against what actually was 
assigned to them. For clarification, table 5.10 will now be explained in some detail. The 
total growth that came to West Sussex per year is detailed in the first two columns. The 
third column represents the percentage of patients registered with fund-holding practices 
in the county (see table 3.1). For 1997/98, that percentage includes the 5.3 per cent of 
patients registered with the East Grinstead GP total purchasing project because they 
purchase all the services in the standard fund-holding scheme. However, it excludes the 
1.3 per cent on the lists of community fund-holders to restrict the analysis to the 
potential over or under funding of those commissioning hospital services.
The next colunm provides the percentage of hospital and community services covered by 
the standard fund-holding scheme (methodology just explained). The ‘expected growth 
to fund-holders’ column uses the data in the previous three. For example, in 1993/94 if 
every West Sussex practice was in the scheme, it was estimated that 20 per cent of the 
£5,448,000 growth should go to fimd-holders, £1,089,600. Since 28.9 per cent of 
patients were registered with such practices that year, the total in the fifth column is 28.9
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per cent of £1,089,600, or £314,894. The next colunm details the actual growth passed 
on to fund-holders that year, and the column on the far right represents the difference 
between the expected and actual amounts to such practices.
TABLE 5.10 - Comparison o f the capitation growth received by fund-holding practices in West Sussex 
against what might have been expected to go to them i f  allocations had been in line with the published 
quota o f services covered by the standardfund-holding scheme over a six year period
Year
Total growth to 
West Sussex
% of population on 
Amd holders' lists
% of services In 
fhnd holding
Expected growth 
to Amd holders
Actual growth to 
Amd holders Difference
1992-93 16.5 15.6
1993-94 5448000 28.9 20.0 314894 - 314894
1994-95 3555000 41.1 20.0 292221 - 292221
1995-96 5985000 47.4 20.0 567378 503000 64378
1996-97 19706000 62.8 24.0 2970088 499000 2471088
1997-98 7637000 68.9 24.0 1262854 1012000 250854
TOTAL 42331000 5407435 2014000 3393435
Table 5.10 shows the fund-holders that joined the scheme during the time span of the 
research, 1992/93 to 1995/96, as being under funded for capitation growth by £671,493. 
Although not relevant to the budgets of such practices in the four years covered by this 
study, their situation deteriorated over the next couple of years with a serious shortfall 
occurring in 1996/97. Over the whole period detailed in table 5.10, West Sussex fund­
holders may have missed out on funding worth something approaching £3.4 million.
The impact of emergency admissions
However, it may be that accepting the above figures without any ‘fine-tuning’ could lead 
to a less than wholly fair conclusion. For instance, the health authority might be liable 
for expenditure on non fund-holding services that could be growing at a far quicker rate 
than the costs of treatments within the scheme. Perhaps the most prominent service for 
which this argument is likely to be used is that of emergency admissions. Despite the 
lack of specific prices for distinct emergency services, health authorities could finance the 
increase in demand for such care by reducing the resources originally earmarked for the 
elective care of non fund-holding patients. Also, Keeley (1997) felt flmd-holders may
184
admit more patients as emergencies to induce savings on their budgets, although Mays 
(1997) denied this by citing Toth et al. (1997) as finding no contrast in emergency 
admission rates for fund-holding and other patients.
Yet even if fund-holding is not implicated in any increase to the demand for emergency 
services, the impact of such a trend could be the same. It might conceivably eat into the 
resources for purchasing elective care for non fund-holding patients. A persuasive 
argument can thus be made that it would be reasonable for the health authority to make 
the increased costs of emergency services, of which the precise rise is unknown, the first 
charge on the capitation growth monies coming into the county. Therefore, it seems 
germane to consider what the impact of emergency admissions has been in West Sussex 
although, unfortunately, the available data on this subject is somewhat vague due to the 
point made in the previous section devoted to prices. The health authority has little 
insight into the prices that it pays for any specific treatments inside or outside the fund- 
holding scheme, including emergencies.
Hence there are huge and perhaps even insurmountable complications in computing 
precisely what the financial consequences of emergency admissions have been in West 
Sussex during the lifetime of the internal market. Yet the PID data held by the West 
Sussex Health Authority provides a record of the number of emergency admissions for 
residents of the county. Table 5.11 details the number of emergency admissions to the 
county’s five public providers that supply acute services, over a five-year period. While 
it covers only the activity at providers within West Sussex, including the Queen Victoria 
Hospital, the totals will represent the vast majority of the health authority’s liability for 
emergency admissions over the period. Although some West Sussex residents will get 
admitted as emergencies in other parts of the country, like those who fall ill or suffer 
accidents when on holiday, the incidence of this type of event is likely to be limited.
Table 5.11 shows that there was indeed a steady growth in the number of emergencies 
over the five years, with the overall difference between the number in 1992/93 and 
1996/97 representing an increase of more than 17 per cent. By far the largest single
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increase occurred in 1994/95 when there was a rise of some 7.5 per cent against the 
previous year, due mainly to the position at Crawley Horsham. Indeed, this rise had 
made the health authority perform some work on the costs of emergencies at the time. 
Although emergency costs are not identified separately, they estimated their expenditure 
on such admissions that year at something around £21.2 million. Although it must be 
remembered that this was an imprecise estimate, it is still the best approximation they 
could come up with. Basically, it is the nearest thing there was to information on the 
costs of emergency services.
TABLE 5.11 -  Number o f emergency admissions for West Sussex residents at five providers over five 
financial years
Provider 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97
Crawley Horsham 8186 8246 9584 9627 10101
Mid Sussex 4571 4776 5086 5355 5723
Royal West Sussex 8813 9308 10015 10755 11302
Worthing and Southlands 14172 14752 15252 15046 14863
Queen Victoria 753 547 522 813 856
AGGREGATE 36495 37629 40459 41596 42845
Source West Sussex Health Authority PID.
If this figure is adequately reliable and the uplift to the health authority’s annual cash 
limit for inflation is taken to cover any price increases (despite emergency services not 
being attributed to separate charges in the contract), increases in the expenditure on such 
services can be estimated. Expenditure of some £21.2 million in 1994/95 for 40,459 
admissions gives an average cost of nearly £524. Ignoring price changes because the 
assumption is made that the effects of these are cancelled out by uplifts to the health 
authority’s cash limit in respect of inflation, this makes the cost in 1992/93 about £19.1 
million (for 36,495 episodes). In 1993/94 emergencies may have cost a little more than 
£19.7 million (for 37,629 episodes), and in 1995/96 the charge could have risen to 
almost £21.8 million (for 41,596 admissions). While that covers the four years of this 
study, because the growth funding is available for 1996/97, the cost of 42,845 
admissions that year might have been around £22.5 million.
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As such, from the available data the best estimate of the growth in emergency costs is an 
increase of £600,000 in 1993/94 (from £19.1 million in 1992/93 to £19.7 million), £1.5 
million in 1994/95, £600,000 in 1995/96, and £700,000 in 1996/97. From this, table 
5.10 can be updated by making these rises the first charge on the extra funding year on 
year for capitation growth that was received in West Sussex. Although that table also 
included the amount for 1997/98, because the number of emergencies for the whole of 
that year was not available when the thesis was produced, it is excluded from table 5.12.
It is also worth noting that the health authority’s estimated expenditure of about £21.2 
million on emergencies in 1994/95 relates to the aggregate costs on such services, not 
just those at its local hospitals. As such, by attributing the gradual rise in admissions at 
the West Sussex providers to this overall figure, an implicit assumption is being made 
that the local trend was a fair representation of the admission rates for West Sussex 
patients as emergency cases outside the county. There is no obvious reason why this 
should not be considered a justifiable presumption.
TA BLE 5.12 - Comparison o f the capitation growth received by fund-holding practices in West Sussex 
against what might have been expected to go to them out o f the total received by the health service in 
the county, net o f the estimated increases year on year in the costs o f emergency admissions
Year
Total growth to 
West Sussex
Rise in costs of 
emergencies
Growth net of rise 
in emergencies
Expected growth 
to flmd-holders
Actual growth 
to flmd-holders Difference
1993-94 5448000 600000 4848000 280214 280214
1994-95 3553000 1500000 2055000 168921 - 168921
1995-96 5985000 600000 5385000 510498 503000 7498
1996-97 19706000 700000 19006000 2864584 499000 2365584
TOTAL 34694000 3400000 31294000 3824217 1002000 2822217
From this, whilst the lack of firm data relating to the exact spend on emergency services 
has forced a greater reliance on conjecture than would have been ideal, the assumptions 
that have been made seem reasonable. Keeping in mind such qualifications, table 5.12 
still shows that it looks exceedingly likely that fund-holders in West Sussex did not 
receive the share of capitation growth that may have legitimately been due to them. For 
the period up to 1995/96, the term relevant to the previous waiting time comparison, 
such practices appear under funded by some £457,000 (from the totals in the column on
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the far right), even though there was a very small différence for the last of these years. 
Their position appeared to get even worse in 1996/97, when a very small proportion of 
the overall growth found its way to fimd-holders’ budgets.
It thus becomes quite a challenge to understand how the rising burden of the health 
authority’s emergency costs can be blamed for the longer waits of non fund-holders. 
Could expenditure on emergencies have been underestimated, or might there have been 
other unavoidable rises in the charges applicable to non fund-holding services? To test 
such suspicions, the cost of emergencies, plus anything else that might have been beyond 
the health authority’s control, can be inflated to a level far beyond the previously used 
totals. If the £21.2 million for 1994/95 is uplifted by 300 per cent to £63.6 million, the 
figures in table 5.12 are modified to those in table 5.13. The rate of the growth in 
expenditure on such services is taken as identical to that shown in table 5.12, and over 
the whole period comes to £10 million.
TABLE 5.13 - Comparison o f the capitation growth received by fund-holding practices in West Sussex 
against what might have been expected to go to them out o f the total received by the health service in 
the county, net o f increases year on year in the generously estimated costs o f emergency admissions
Year
Total growth to 
West Sussex
Rise in costs of 
emergencies
Growth net of rise 
in emergencies
Expected growth 
to Amd holders
Actual growth 
to Amd holders Difference
1993-94 5448000 1800000 3648000 210854 210854
1994-95 3555000 4400000 (845000) (69459) - (69459)
1995-96 5985000 1800000 4185000 396738 503000 (106262)
1996-97 19706000 2000000 17706000 2668648 499000 2169648
TOTAL 34694000 10000000 24694000 3206781 1002000 2204781
Table 5.13 indicates that even when the rising costs of emergencies are increased to a 
level way beyond the health authority’s own estimates, fimd-holders are still revealed as 
‘short changed’. For the period up to 1995/96 the accumulated negative effect of this 
for fimd-holders, £35,133, was due to the situation in 1993/94 although the position of 
such practices again worsened from 1996/97. There is consequently a great deal to 
suggest that fimd-holders were under funded with regard to capitation growth. Further, 
because table 5.13 might represent a large overestimate of emergency costs, the apparent
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shortfall in the amount apportioned to them for this fector looks as though it could have 
been very significant indeed.
In retrospect there have been a few unavoidable ‘ife and buts’ in this investigation into 
the way capitation growth was distributed. Beyond those already discussed, no attention 
was paid to the demographic characteristics of the non fimd-holding and fimd-holding 
populations. However, there is no obvious reason why such fectors would make a telling 
difference to the analysis. Areas of relative social deprivation, neighbourhoods densely 
inhabited by both the elderly and young, plus the more wealthy areas of the county are all 
well served by fimd-holding and non fimd-holding practices.
Summary
Hence an examination into the impact of prices, inflation and growth does little to show 
that fund-holders in West Sussex were able to shorten the waiting times of their patients 
through receiving overgenerous budgets. This coincides with the division between the 
two halves of the year for the surgical activity of practices in their preparatory year for 
fimd-holding status, and no clear increase in the number of operations performed on their 
patients in the last year outside the scheme (relative to continuing non fimd-holders). In 
view of these findings, the evidence is beginning to mount that the hypothesis about 
practices in the scheme being over fimded may not offer a valid explanation for the 
shorter waiting times of their patients. However, there is one further line of inquiry to 
perform regarding the funding issue. What does a capitation analysis suggest about the 
budgetary position of fund-holding practices in West Sussex?
ANALYSIS BY CAPITATION FORMULA
It has already been mentioned that it was always the previous government’s intention to 
set GP fimd-holders’ and health authority budgets in the same way (see Department of
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Health, 1989a). The use of historic data in the allocation of resources to fund-holders 
was planned as a temporary measure, and the intention was to fix their budgets for 
hospital services by way of a capitation methodology. Consequently, devolving budgets 
to general practices has meant the composition of a capitation formula that is efficient for 
allocating resources in respect of small populations has been given much attention over 
the past few years. For example, the Welsh Office and former Mid-Glamorgan Family 
Health Services Authority hired a consultancy firm named London Economics to 
examine variations in practice expenditure on hospital services and derive targets to be 
used in determining allocations to fund-holders.
The priority given to the evolution of a sound capitation formula is not surprising. After 
all, the evidence revealed in this chapter suggests that the setting of budgets to practices 
partly on the basis of past activity has tended to make the process something of a lottery. 
Although West Sussex fund-holders that had their preparatory year in 1992/93, 1993/94 
and 1994/95 were usually disadvantaged through the historic activity methodology, there 
are exceptions at particular providers in specific years (see tables 5.2 to 5.5).
A number of consistent themes have been put forward about the desired properties of 
such a formula in both governmental and academic publications. It should promote 
equity between flmd-holders and other patients (Sheldon et al , 1994; NHS Executive, 
1996a). It should also take account of the genuine needs and characteristics of people, 
rather than variables which are endogenous to the system like hospital prices, the volume 
of existing supply, plus referral habits (Glennerster et al., 1994a). Sheldon et al. (1994) 
considered the breakdown of populations in the contexts of age and sex to be the most 
vital weightings for the development of an equitable capitation model.
Such issues overlap with the reasons cited for the historic variations between practices in 
an official document issued under the last government (see NHS Executive, 1996a). 
Demography and the relative morbidity of patients correspond with their sincere needs 
and attributes, whilst factors like a possible surplus of locally available facilities and 
differences in medical practice correspond with the endogenous variables. Beyond this.
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Martin et al. (1997) placed the causes of variations in health care utilisation into four 
groupings. First, those due to the features of individual patients, such as age. Second, 
those created by factors not automatically covered by a formula, like the presence of 
diabetes, but which in principle can be predicted. Third, there are those that arise from 
clinical practice. Fourth, there is a random element, specifically the chance incidence of 
illness.
Martin et at. (1997) claimed that the first of these factors could be captured comfortably 
by a capitation formula for small populations, and that in principle the second can be 
predicted. By contrast, any formula should not attempt to cover the third factor and no 
capitation methodology can adequately compensate for the fourth, because it is a random 
element. From this, the crux of their argument was that there is considerable random 
variability in the demand for health care of small populations numbering 10,000 which 
becomes less significant as the group increases, becoming very small for bodies of
100,000 and microscopic for those o f450,000. This randomness cannot be readily 
captured by any budgeting system for GP practices, making their expenditure subject to 
serious deviations from the allocation. To counter this, ideas were put forward on how 
the problem could be resolved, like setting budgets for longer than a single year.
Yet whether or not there are major obstacles in setting budgets for individual general 
practices by a capitation methodology, the factors which have just been discussed do not 
seriously undermine the forthcoming analysis. This is because it is concerned with 
demonstrating what a capitation formula suggests about the funding apportioned to GP 
fund-holders as an overall group, rather than the breakdown of resources between 
individual practices.
The capitation methodology
Personal communications with staff from the West Sussex Health Authority indicates 
that they consider themselves to have been involved in national work towards developing
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a capitation formula for allotting sums to practices for the services covered by the fimd- 
holding scheme. This complies with the development of a local capitation methodology 
that closely resembles the recently issued guidance on budget setting for fimd-holders 
and GP total purchasers (see NHS Executive, 1997a). The exception has been to count 
the population as the aggregate body of patients registered with general practices in the 
county, rather than scaling them back to account for list inflation. This is because list 
inflation does not differ between fimd-holders and non fimd-holders within the county.
Because detailed advice on the use of capitation methods for setting budgets to fimd- 
holders is provided in the official document, there is no point in rewriting it here. While 
the process is abbreviated into the single paragraph below, a fiiU description of the 
techniques can thus be traced in NHS Executive (1997a).
In brief, expenditure on fimd-holding treatments is sub-divided into the services covered 
by the scheme because each, such as community nursing and elective surgery, will have a 
diverse age-cost curve and needs weightings. Data on the spending patterns between 
practices on the various treatments are then obtained, including indicative amounts for 
non fimd-holders, and from this the total pot to be allocated for each category of fund- 
holding service is determined. The aggregate list size of general practices in the county 
is counted, then sub-divided between the distinct practices. The national ‘weighted’ 
capitation formula for health authorities incorporates need drivers to account for area 
wide characteristics. Estimation techniques are used to attribute these, most obviously 
but not exclusively adjustments for the age and sex breakdown, to specific practice 
populations. The ‘weighted’ population per practice is then attributed to the total pot 
allocated to fimd-holding services. This gives a notional budget per practice.
From this, each practice both in and outside the fund-holding scheme will have a 
capitation based indicative budget that weights crude populations to fectors connected to 
the relative need for, and cost o^ health care services covered by the fimd-holding 
scheme. If the formula is accepted as a rational method for measuring the feimess of
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allocations, it enables a judgement to be made about whether the actual budgets received 
by fimd-holders were equitable.
The position against capitation
The West Sussex Health Authority used the above methodology to compare the fimding 
position of fimd-holding and non fimd-holding practices for the 1996/97 financial year 
(see table 5.14). Whilst the table concerns the year after the period relevant to this 
study, the full range of data required to calculate the position prior to 1996/97 is not 
accessible.
Nevertheless, the results for 1996/97 should convey a valuable signpost to the position in 
prior years. It is unrealistic to imagine that the characteristics of practices that have a 
bearing on the weightings attached to a capitation methodology are going to dramatically 
alter in a short time span. If a practice has, against the norm, an elderly list size, this is 
part of its nature and may well be permanent. They will not have that characteristic one 
year and the next have a very low proportion of old patients. Patient turnover between 
general practices, particularly in a county like West Sussex, is not that extreme. Even if 
there was a shift in the characteristics of a practice’s profile, it will be gradual. Any 
change would, if it happens at all, ordinarily occur over a long period.
As such, it appears from table 5.14 that an analysis of the financial position of GP fimd- 
holders in West Sussex by way of a capitation formula also fails to suggest that such 
practices were budgeted over generously. If they are over fimded, by the health 
authority’s own calculations this comes to about ten pence per patient. For a practice of
10,000 patients this translates into £1,000, about one-quarter of the current average cost 
of a single hip replacement operation (see Warden, 1998a), and hardly a material sum. If 
non fimd-holders are under funded, the health authority reckons this came to £51,000 on 
an aggregate basis in 1996/97, some nineteen pence per patient. To put this into context, 
details supplied by a local community trust suggests that would pay for less than one and
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a half full-time health visitors plus their on-costs like travel expenses. Not a great deal to 
share between practices covering more than 270,000 patients.
TABLE 5.14 - Comparison o f1996-97 West Sussex fund-holders ’ hospital and community health care 
services budgets and the total apportioned by the health authority for the same services to non fund­
holders against the allocation each group would receive through a capitation funding methodology
Actual Capitation
Total Hat Actual allocation Capitation allocation Value of Difierencc
Category sizes allocations per patient allocation per patient Difference per patient
Fundholders 487382 56938000 116.82 56887000 116.72 51000 0.10
Non land holders 273102 32850000 120.28 32901000 120.47 (51000) (0.19)
AGGREGATE 760484 89788000 118.07 89788000 118.07
Notes 1. List sizes represent the patients registered with West Sussex practices, as cross border patients are taken to balance o u t 
2. Indicative actual allocations for non fund-holders are calculated fixnn their providers’ fimd-holding price tariff.
Source West Sussex Health Authority c^ ita tio n  modelling pqiers.
Yet the capitation analysis, indicating that funding for the two groups was quite even, 
leads to a slightly different understanding of the financial balance between the purchaser 
types to certain other issues investigated in this chapter. Some had suggested that fimd- 
holding practices might well be under funded. This warrants a further consideration of 
the groundwork on which the judgement derived fi’om the capitation analysis was based.
The capitation analysis revisited
The various kinds of analyses performed for this chapter lead to two distinct views. The 
capitation assessment shows flmd-holders to be budgeted quite fairly. Alternatively, 
examining the effects of setting flmd-holders’ budgets by historic activity and evaluating 
the division of growth monies between the purchasers indicates that practices within the 
scheme may tend to be somewhat under funded. However, there are reasons why these 
findings may not be contradictory. But before these are discussed, it is also necessary to 
recognise the unavoidable limitations on the study.
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The inquiry into the six-month balance of surgical activity for practices in their final year 
outside the scheme covers just one element of their hospital and community health care 
services allocations, elective surgery. Altogether this service accounts for just 29 per 
cent of that budget (Audit Commission, 1996a). Yet the database contained no data 
about the minority of operations that would have occurred at providers other than the 
four featured in the study. Hence the activity available for analysis will have represented 
a slightly smaller percentage of the budgets for elective surgery. The data necessary to 
fecilitate investigations into the other components of fimd-holders’ budgets was not 
accessible. Hence the evaluation that was possible had no direct relevance to something 
more than 71 per cent of fimd-holders’ hospital and community services budgets.
For this reason, the theoretical likelihood of over or under fimding for other hospital 
services such as outpatient consultations, physiotherapy appointments plus investigations 
like x-rays and pathology was discussed at some length (see also chapter two). Whilst 
the point was made that there might be good reasons for believing that over fimding in 
these areas may not occur, this conclusion is inevitably based upon theory rather than 
firm evidence, sinq)ly because the data required for hard proof is not retrievable.
However, beyond the unavoidably limited scope of the analyses, there is another reason, 
and perhaps a more convincing one, why fimd-holders look under fimded by seasonal 
variations and growth money, yet budgeted at the right level under a capitation analysis. 
To see if there can be a degree of compatibility between these positions, it is necessary to 
move the debate towards the way in which the capitation comparison was performed.
The source of concern about the reliability of the capitation analysis relates to one of the 
notes to table 5.14, how the costs of services that had been provided to non fimd-holding 
patients were valued.
The health authority used the providers’ fimd-holding price lists to determine the costs of 
services covered by the scheme that they purchased for non fimd-holding patients. The 
official line of the health authority was that this is justifiable. There is no firm evidence 
of any variation in the prices charged by the same provider to different purchasers, and
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no doubt this is absolutely correct. Yet, as inferred earlier, could the reason for this be 
that nobody is, and the way the contracts are arranged perhaps no one can be, sure of 
what is being paid by the health authority for specific treatments. In short, the budgets 
to each group by way of a capitation methodology cannot be weighted against any 
difference in the prices that might have been charged to alternative purchasers.
Hence the following hypothesis can be volunteered. If the health authority was paying 
10 per cent more than the prices GP fund-holders are charged for the same treatments, 
then table 5.14 would look rather different to the way it turned out. As it currently 
stands, using the fund-holding price lists to cost the activity of non fimd-holding patients, 
the actual allocation per non fimd-holding patient is a little higher than the spend on their 
fimd-holding counterparts, maybe because of case mix or demographic variations, but 
still broadly similar. But if the real price paid by the health authority for items of care 
was on average 10 per cent higher than the fee for equivalent treatments charged to 
practices, the allocation to non fund-holding patients would be raised fi*om £32.85 
million to £36.135 million. This new total equates to £132.31 for each non fimd-holding 
patient, £15.49 more than the per capita amount attributed to fimd-holders.
Therefore, if the health authority was paying 10 per cent more than the practices, the 
overall pot would be increased fi*om £89.788 million to £93.073 million (the fimd- 
holders’ £56.938 million plus the non fimd-holders’ new allocation of £36.135 million). 
This would also alter the appearance of the right hand side of table 5.14. Table 5.15 
shows the way the table changes.
The proportional split between the capitation allocations to fimd-holders and non fimd- 
holders calculated by the health authority and shown in table 5.14 has been transposed in 
the equivalent column in table 5.15. Hence in table 5.14, £56.877 million (some 63.4 per 
cent of the £89.788 million) was attributed to fimd-holders and £32.901 million (about 
36.6 per cent) was attributed to non fimd-holders. In the same way, around 63.4 per 
cent of the new pot of £93.073 million, nearly £59 million, becomes defined as the
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capitation allocation for fund-holders, while approximately 36.6 per cent, over £34 
million, is attributed to non fund-holders.
TABLE 5.15 -  Comparison o f1996-97 West Sussex fund-holders ’ and non fund-holders ’ hospital and
community health care services budgets i f  the health authority was charged 10 per cent more for
treatments than GP fund-holders
Actual Capitation
Total list Actual allocation Capitation Allocation Value of Difference
Category Sizes allocations per patient allocation per patient Difference per patient
Fund holders 487382 56938000 116.82 58968278 120.99 (2030278) (4.17)
Non Amd holders 273102 36135000 132.31 34104722 124.88 2030278 7.43
AGGREGATE 760484 93073000 122.39 93073000 122.39 - -
Notes 1. List sizes represent the patients registered with West Sussex practices, as cross border patients are taken to balance out
The capitation allocation to fund-holders thus becomes about £2 million more than their 
actual allotment, with the reverse being true for non fund-holders. As such, if table 5.14 
did represent a 10 per cent underestimate of the amounts paid by the health authority for 
hind-holding services, a completely different complexion is put on the capitation analysis. 
Whilst this percentage is an estimate, the same principles apply for any other judgement. 
If the price differentials were 5 per cent, then against the capitation formula fund-holders 
may be under hinded by about £1 million, by £0.5 million with a 2.5 per cent differential, 
and so on. Whichever percentage is applied, the point can still be made that it is no more 
dependent on ‘guesswork’ than the prices estimated by the health authority.
CONCLUSION
The central goal of this chapter was to assess, as far as the accessible data allowed, 
whether the shorter waiting times for elective surgery commonly enjoyed by patients of 
GP fund-holders in West Sussex corresponds with practices in the scheme being over 
funded. This question was partly approached by investigating the timing of the surgical 
activity that was used to calculate the budgets of new fund-holding practices. It was 
shown that more operations on patients from practices preparing for fund-holding status
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at local NHS providers tends to occur in the six month window that is disregarded for 
budget setting purposes. This is one of the findings that make allegations about fimd- 
holders having overgenerous budgets look rather fi-ail.
After all, what type of circumstances could compensate the practices who ‘lost out’ in 
this way? Perhaps their activity with other more distant providers, which was not 
available for examination, was heavily slanted towards the work mainly taking place in 
the period used for budget setting. It might be possible to think of a few peculiarities 
like this, but in the final analysis, they are all likely to be rather far-fetched. For even if 
this did happen, it would only have relevance to a minority of the activity for such 
practices. The large majority of the elective surgery received by patients registered with 
GPs in West Sussex will surely occur locally. Moreover, it appears that practices 
preparing for fund-holding status did not inflate their surgical activity in the last year 
outside the scheme, relative to other non fimd-holding practices.
Further to these findings, it also seems possible that fund-holding practices in West 
Sussex did not receive a fair share of the capitation growth that came into the county for 
patients of all types of GP, flmd-holders and non fimd-holders alike. This looks to be the 
case even after subtracting the increasing costs to the health authority for emergency 
admissions, which had to be estimated, from the total received. There also seems little or 
no reason to deduce that inequitable funding would arise through the techniques adopted 
for apportioning fimds in respect of inflationary pressures.
Another important approach to the fimding issue concerned the move towards capitation 
formulas for setting budgets at the level of general practices. The comparison between 
actual and capitation based allocations for GPs inside and outside the scheme, performed 
by the health authority, implies that the budgets of fimd-holders were at about the right 
level. But the accuracy of this discovery would seem dependent on a presumption that 
the health authority and fimd-holding practices were charged the same prices for the 
individual services that are covered by the scheme. Yet there are reasons to suspect that 
the ambiguous contracting arrangements between the health authority and providers.
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particularly concerning the prices for specific treatments, could make this doubtful. If 
the health authority had been paying higher prices than fund-holders, a capitation analysis 
might show such practices to be under funded.
This is not to say that providers charging hidden but higher prices to the health authority 
would have absorbed all the capitation growth. Some of it, and doubtless plenty of it, 
would have facilitated additional clinical activity in the county. A rising trend in the 
overall provision of elective surgery covered by the fimd-holding scheme in the years and 
at the providers featured in this project, reflecting a national tendency highlighted by Le 
Grand et al. (1997), supports this claim (see table 5.1). Yet this rise fails to guarantee 
that the health authority has not been paying higher charges than fimd-holders for the 
same services. And if they have, it goes some way to explaining why the health authority 
perhaps needed to retain a greater share of the capitation growth than would otherwise 
appear reasonable.
A question that arises from this possibility is whether it justifies the health authority 
dominating the partition of growth fimds between the purchasers beyond a level that 
would otherwise look even-handed. After all, fimd-holding patients benefit from shorter 
waiting times for non-urgent elective surgery, so why should they get more fimding? On 
the face of it this response has an elementary appeal. However, the point that there was 
nothing beyond anecdotal evidence about waiting time difterences at the time the growth 
was divided up, plus the risk of undermining efficiency incentives to providers, makes 
this option less attractive.
It is also worth contemplating how many critics of fund-holding would, if practices in the 
scheme were paying higher prices and achieving longer waits for their patients than the 
health authority, have argued that this should be evened up by giving fund-holders a 
disproportionately large share of any growth funding. If the answer is not very many, 
then the same response seems applicable if the reverse is true. Thus the health authority 
might not be entitled to a larger share of growth funds just because it is obtaining longer 
waits and possibly paying higher prices.
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To close, the focus of this chapter was to demonstrate whether fimd-holders in West 
Sussex were over funded, and perhaps the most salient comment about this question was 
a remark made by the health authority’s director of public health during an interview 
conducted for this research. “It is most unlikely that anyone from the health authority 
would even attempt to claim that our fimd-holders have been over funded. We are all 
quite aware that they have not been”. Considering that observation, it does not appear 
necessary to ‘sit on the fence’. If the nearest thing to making such practices look over 
funded is a capitation analysis indicating they are budgeted at an appropriate level, which 
itself may be based upon a dubious assumption that might hide their under funding, the 
following conclusion looks justified. The evidence strongly supports the rejection of the 
hypothesis that fimd-holding patients in West Sussex enjoyed shorter waiting times due 
to the overgenerous fimding of their practices.
C hapter 6
The case mix effect: critical or irrelevant?
The hypothesis that contrasts in the waiting times of fimd-holding and non fimd-holding 
patients might be a consequence of differences in case mix was recently advanced, albeit 
very briefly, in the letters pages of the British Medical Journal (see Black, 1998). It is 
therefore necessary to respond to this speculation. As such, the focus of this chapter is 
an investigation into the effect of the surgical case mix on the waiting times of both the 
fimd-holding and non fimd-holding populations. It will demonstrate whether sufficient 
discrepancies exist in the assortment of the range of operations given to each group of 
patients, and the waits applicable to them, to explain the contrasts in their waiting times.
There are three prominent reasons for suspecting case mix could have a major influence 
on average waiting times, and one seems less likely than the others. The least probable is 
the impact of randomness in the need for certain types of operations. The logic behind 
this idea is the fact that there will always be a degree of randomness in the demand for 
health care, and differences in medical practice by doctors can amplify the variability in 
the utilisation of services (see Newhouse et al., 1989). Yet even without contrasts in 
medical practice, a level of random variability must surely exist in that the precise range 
of care two groups of patients need over a year will invariably differ to some extent, 
regardless of any contrasts in the demographic profile of the populations.
Yet on its own this may be the least probable cause why case mix might have a critical 
impact because the degree of randomness in the demand for health care is not prone to 
always be skewed one way. After all, is it likely that something perhaps driven by pure
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chance will predominantly work in a one-sided manner? Why should it invariably be non 
fimd-holding patients who, on a proportional basis, need to utilise services that have the 
longest waits? If such randomness did have a significant inqjact in some instances, is it 
not just as likely that fimd-holders would proportionally require procedures for which 
waiting times are lengthy as often as non fimd-holders? Therefore, if randomness did 
consistently cause shorter waiting times for fimd-holding patients, it would seem to have 
as much to do with one-sided chance, or bad luck for non fimd-holders, than anything 
else. This somehow seems a rather fer-fetched proposition.
Yet rather than relying on randomness to provide a convincing rationale for the case mix 
hypothesis, there are two other reasons to attach validity to it, both also linking to the 
notion that certain operations at providers have longer waiting times than others. The 
first depends on fimd-holders sending their own patients who need treatments for which 
there are long waiting times at their local hospital elsewhere. This could either be to 
another NHS hospital with a shorter waiting list or, connected to the point of Harrison et 
al. (1997) that the private sector can under certain conditions relieve pressure on the 
NHS, a non-public establishment. Either way, fimd-holding GPs may pick and choose 
between hospitals to enable patients to go to providers offering short waits for the 
treatments required.
If this was a widespread response amongst fimd-holding GPs to services offering long 
waits it could feasibly make a difference to the average waits of their patients who are 
treated at local public providers, relative to other patients. They would tend to receive 
services for which waits are shorter. Of course, an idealistic view held by disciples of 
market systems would be that this should create incentives for NHS hospitals to try and 
improve the speed of access to those services which have long waiting times. However, 
even if this did happen it may still be the case that, at least in the meantime, fimd-holding 
patients would be sent elsewhere for those services with long waits locally, so the shorter 
waiting times of fimd-holding patients could still be elucidated by a case mix conq>arison.
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The other reason why case mix might have relevance to waiting times is the impact of 
demography. After all, it is true that some procedures are often applicable to certain 
types of population. For instance the provision of cataract surgery, plus hip and knee 
replacements, is usually associated with older patients. If these operations had long 
waiting times at a hospital and younger patients from the locality were concentrated onto 
the lists of fund-holding GPs, or vice versa, that may well have an effect. Alternatively, 
gynaecology services are obviously gender rather than age specific. With all else being 
equal if fimd-holders, relative to other practices, proportionally had twice as many 
middle-aged female patients on their lists it could be expected that they would have 
double the incidence of hysterectomies in their procedure case mix. If the average waits 
for hysterectomies were abnormally long or short against the par for other operations 
performed at the hospital, this might contribute to waiting time differences.
THE ANALYSIS
The possibilities discussed above lead to a fundamental question. How should a 
comparison of the case mix of fimd-holders and non fimd-holders be discharged? In very 
broad terms. Black (1998) addressed this issue. It is noteworthy that he inferred it is the 
mix of surgical procedures that can particularly determine contrasts in waiting times. 
However, he also implied that this matter could be investigated by evaluating other 
characteristics of the fimd-holding and non fimd-holding populations, specifically 
mentioning age, sex and diagnosis.
Nevertheless, if case mix does have a tangible effect it will surely be contrasts in the 
waits for specific operations, more than anything else, that will determine the differences 
in waiting times between patient groupings. Certainly if one population has, for example, 
proportionally more women or elderly than the other, the incidence of some conditions 
are likely to be more common in that band. But that should be reflected in the mix of 
operations. Yet it is also possible that the populations might have a diverse age and sex 
breakdown, but their diagnosis trends could be identical. Alternatively, diagnosis rates
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may differ even without any discernible contrast in the structure of the groups* age and 
sex profile, due to the effect of random variability. Either way, whilst age and sex can 
sway the prevalence of certain types of conditions and the diagnosis of them will drive 
the demand for particular forms of operation, it is principally the contrasts in waiting 
times for specific procedures that might shape the average waits of two groups.
As such, simply showing that differences exist in the construction of the groups in the 
context of age or sex may do nothing more than hint at the surgical case mix variances 
that could exist. It does not provide hard evidence of this because there is no firm 
guarantee that the case mix of two populations with dissimilar characteristics will vary, 
nor that it will be the same for groups with similar profiles. Consequently, it seems 
logical to focus on the actual spread of operations more than the demographic features 
and diagnosis trends of the populations. This should give the strongest clue about the 
true role of case mix in waiting times because it focuses on the final outcome in the 
assortment of procedures, rather than the potential causes of it.
There is also another reason why diagnoses may have less bearing on the difference in 
waiting times of non fund-holding and fund-holding patients on the elective waiting list 
than the actual mix of procedures. This is the partition of patients into separate 
categories of the list. It has already been reported that at the margins separate providers 
may use differing criteria for deciding which part of the list some patients are placed in 
(see figure 4.1). Yet despite this, the spread of diagnoses between people in the same 
section of the list will be far less wide than would have been the case if they had not been 
divided up into the elective waiting, booked and planned categories. This remains the 
case even though dissimilar diagnoses can lead to the same operation.
Though there will be others, an example of this are women who undergo hysterectomies, 
the surgical removal of the uterus. Some experience the event due to the diagnosis of a 
malignant disorder in that area of the body, while others have the same type of operation 
because of menorrhagia unrelated to any form of cancer. The first group will ordinarily 
go on the booked category of the list, while the second are more likely to join the
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elective waiting list. If a case mix analysis centres on a single element of the overall list, 
the diversity in the diagnoses of patients having the same operation type should be much 
restricted. As such, to reach the real crux of the case mix issue it again seems sensible to 
focus on procedures within a single category of the waiting list, rather than diagnoses.
Clustering elective surgery
Before undertaking the main analysis pertinent to the case mix hypothesis, it is necessary 
to consider how operations are grouped under various codes. These are conventionally 
termed OPCS codes because the latest edition of the manuscript which details the full 
range of all operation procedure codes, and their categories, is the Office of Population 
Censuses and Surveys (1990). For a valid contrast of the surgical case mix provided to 
the two bands of patients, it is essential to be aware of the potential complexity of the 
exercise. There was a large range and number of operations within the fund-holding 
scheme in the four years under review and one of the most common types of operation 
covered by the scheme are hip replacements. Yet there are actually nineteen distinct hip 
replacement operations in three main groupings. For instance, the OPCS code W37 
covers six different operations categorised under the heading ‘Total Prosthetic 
Replacement of Hip Joint Using Cement’, namely:
W37.0 - Conversion from previous cemented total prosthetic replacement of hip joint.
W37.1 - Primary total prosthetic replacement of hip joint using cement.
W37.2 - Conversion to total prosthetic replacement of hip joint using cement.
W37.3 - Revision of total prosthetic replacement of hip joint using cement.
W37.8 - Other unspecified.
W37.9 - Unspecified.
Similarly the code W38 includes six types o f ‘Total Prosthetic Replacement of Hip Joint 
Not Using Cement’, whilst the code W39 incorporates seven kinds o f ‘Other Total 
Prosthetic Replacement of Hip Joints’. Although some of the nineteen operations are far
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more common than other types, even for fairly large populations the number of episodes 
recorded under each of the nineteen codes can often be quite small. Hence a case mix 
study which took each of the nineteen hip replacement procedures on an individual basis 
might be so detailed that it could become both hard to understand and also less 
meaningfiil. The example given for hip replacements is repeated for all other kinds of 
operation as well, with there being various forms of the same overall procedure types.
This is illustrated by reference to just one provider in a single year, chosen at random.
At the Royal West Sussex provider in 1992/93, exactly 1,179 operations were performed 
on non hind-holding patients from the elective waiting list who had their waiting times 
recorded (table 4.4). Ignoring all the sub-codes within the overall codes, thus taking, for 
example, all the W37 episodes as one operation rather than six, these were spread out 
between ninety-seven procedures. This gives a mean of only some twelve operations per 
code. If these were then broken down according to whether they were W37.0 or W37.1 
and so on, the figures could often be so small, frequently with just one or two episodes 
per procedure, interpreting the results of a case mix comparison might become over 
complex. To bypass this obstacle some kind of compression between the operations 
must occur. The decision is, what level of convergence?
Concerning this question, there appears little point in looking at, for example, W37, W38 
and W39 procedures as three distinct groups. After all, they are all hip replacements. 
Further, what is so specific about hip replacements that they have to be considered on 
their own? It seems sensible to band them with knee replacements as well, of which 
there are also nineteen types of procedure under the W40, W41 and W42 codes. Also, 
discussions with clinicians suggest that replacements of other joints should logically be 
included in this group of procedures, thus incorporating the nineteen operations under 
the W43, W44 and W45 codes. Conveniently, all these joint replacement procedures are 
included under the same sub-heading for operations on the ‘Bones and Joints of Skull 
and Spine’, namely that o f ‘Joint’, for which the codes run from W37 to W92.
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From this, it can be argued that the most rational course for this case mix comparison 
appears to be utilising the groupings in the OPCS manuscript that merges procedures on 
specific areas of the body, such as joints. The breakdown for the groups that at some 
point, up to the end of 1995/96, included an operation covered by the fund-holding 
scheme is given in the appendix. From this, the data can be further compressed by 
amalgamating the operations pertinent to the activity of the two purchaser types in a 
particular year at a provider into the ten most common procedure categories. This again 
means those relevant to specific areas of the body (joints were mentioned as an example 
of this). Highlighting the ten most common categories, with all others combined into an 
eleventh group, results in tables that could otherwise have ended up as very ‘reader 
unfiiendly’ due to their length being presented in a more understandable format.
The fund-holding population
Another important matter to consider is which of the fund-holding populations to use for 
the comparison. After all, the waiting time comparison in the fourth chapter was 
performed in a variety of formats. Most obviously this was between health authority 
patients and all those registered with fimd-holding GPs at the time of their operations, 
plus those who spent the entire duration of their wait as a patient from a fund-holding 
practice. Because the case mix comparisons will cover every year at each provider, the 
study represents quite a plethora of information. As there was a large degree of overlap 
in the results pertaining to the elective waiting list in chapter four, whichever fund- 
holding population was used, it seems rather over-elaborate to execute the full analysis 
twice over with both models of the fund-holding population. So which fund-holding 
group should be used?
The first point is obvious. The comparisons will, of course, cover just those patients 
fi^ om the elective waiting list who had their waiting times recorded. But beyond this, 
perhaps the most attractive option would be to use the patients numbering the larger of 
the two groups, whose status as a fund-holder was determined by their registration with
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a practice participating in the scheme at the time of the operation. It can be recalled 
from chapter four that there was a clear tendency for fimd-holding patients who spent 
part of their waits while their practice was outside the scheme to increase the average 
waits of the overall fimd-holding group (table 4.3). Yet despite this, that larger group 
still had significantly shorter waits in twelve out of sixteen cases (tables 4.9 to 4.12).
Moreover, a preliminary assessment of the four cases vsdiere significant differences were 
lost by including those patients who joined the elective waiting list prior to the practice 
entering the scheme suggests that it does not actually matter which fimd-holding group is 
used. The results of the comparisons are not materially altered whichever fimd-holding 
population is used for the comparison with non fimd-holders’ activity. For this reason, 
the option previously identified as the most attractive one, the patients registered with a 
fimd-holding practice at the time of the operation, is to be used as the fimd-holding 
population. Particularly as a further benefit of this decision is that every NHS elective 
waiting list patient that had their waiting time recorded will thus be involved in the 
analysis.
The search for evidence
For the shorter average waiting times of fimd-holding patients to be explained by case 
mix differences, certain conditions would have to be met. There would have to be 
significant variation in the proportion of common procedure types provided to fimd- 
holding and non fimd-holding patients. However, finding such a contrast is on its own 
not enough. It could be that a greater ratio of fimd-holding patients were admitted for 
the procedure types which have longer waiting times than the norm for a provider in a 
year. In this event, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the case mix differences 
actually increased the waits of fund-holding patients, relative to non fimd-holders, to a 
higher level than might otherwise have been the case.
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As such, for the case mix issue to have any firm validity it appears that the following 
circumstances would be required. Tangible differences in the case mix of fimd-holders 
and non fimd-holders would have to be accompanied by a strong tendency for the 
variances to increase, and significantly so, the waiting times of non fimd-holders or 
decrease the waits for fimd-holding patients. In summary, the search is for an indication 
of the following kinds of circumstances.
Firstly, it is essential that clear case mix differences must exist. The second is derived 
fi"om the first and can be slanted two ways. One is that patients registered with fimd- 
holding practices tend to undergo a preponderance of operations, relative to those 
received by non fimd-holders, which typically have shorter waiting times. The other is 
that the surgery received by non fimd-holders is skewed towards those operations that 
customarily have long waits. The third vital piece of evidence that is required is whether 
these tendencies, if they exist, have a significant effect on increasing the waiting time 
differences between the two sets of patients. All three trends, including at least one 
although preferably both aspects of the second, is required to corroborate the case mix 
hypothesis.
CASE MIX COMPARISON: THE RESULTS
Differences in the case mix of fund-holding and non fund-holding activity, merged into 
the OPCS groupings for operations on zones of the body, for elective waiting list 
patients receiving procedures covered by the fund-holding scheme were tested for 
significance at the 95 per cent confidence level. The measurement of variances in the 
expected and observed fi-equencies of the operation groups has been performed through 
the chi square test for independence. Because the structure of the relevant tables in the 
context of their rows and columns offer ten degrees of fi^eedom, the obtained chi square 
statistic in every case is compared to a critical statistic of 18.307 (see Healey, 1996).
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Stage one: are case mix difTerences significant?
Tables 6.1 to 6.4 reveal the case mix in the surgery covered by the fund-holding scheme 
of elective waiting list patients at each provider. As the first stage of a fairly technical 
analysis, it is worth explaining the structure of the tables. For each of the four years the 
actual number of operations applicable to the ten most common procedure categories at 
the provider is detailed for both non fund-holding and fund-holding patients. Also shown 
is the aggregate number for all the procedures not falling into one of the other ten, thus 
making eleven all told. The totals for the collective actual and expected fi’equency 
columns are also given. The expected frequencies are calculated in line with the usual 
practice for the test for independence, the multiplication of the total row and column 
fi-equencies divided by the number of cases (see Fleming and Nellis, 1994; Healey, 1996).
From this data, the chi square analysis is performed for every combination of actual and 
expected fi-equencies. This provides a chi square statistic for each combination, which 
are detailed individually. The aggregate obtained chi square statistic is the sum of the 
twenty-two totals resulting from the comparison of the actual and expected values for 
each group of procedures. As a side point, because of the rounding up and down to get 
these figures to two decimal places, the sum of the individual amounts do not always 
exactly equal the aggregate total shown.
If the sum comes to over 18.307, the variance between the activity of fund-holding and 
non fund-holding patients is significant at the 95 per cent confidence level. Where the 
difference is not significant, no further action is required as it is taken that the variation in 
case mix was not adequate to have driven any meaningful contrast in the average waiting 
times of the two bands of patients. As such, tables 6.2 and 6.3 show that no further 
analysis will be performed for the Mid Sussex provider in 1992/93 and 1993/94 plus the 
Royal West Sussex for 1992/93, 1993/94 and 1995/96. In the other eleven cases where 
the contrasts are statistically significant, the search for the first of the conditions outlined 
earlier is considered satisfied. Subsequently, for these cases the investigation will move 
on to assess whether the other two trends are also evident.
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TA BLE 6.1 -  Comparison o f the case mix for elective surgery, based upon groups o f operations on 
distinct areas o f the body, covered by the fund-holding scheme performed on non fund-holding (health 
authority) and fund-holding patients -who had their waiting times recorded at the Crawley Horsham 
provider over four financial years
Procedure category
Health aufliority activity 
Actual Expected Chi sq. 
number number statistic
Fund holding activity 
Actual Expected Chi sq. 
number number statistic
Sum of
chi sq. P value
1992-93
Uterus 448 433.0 0.52 75 90.0 2.51
Mastoid and middle ear 254 259.1 0.10 59 53.9 0.49
Joint 228 221.9 0.17 40 46.1 0.81
Tonsil and other parts of mouth 176 192.1 1.34 56 39.9 6.46
Abdominal wall 135 133.3 0.02 26 27.7 O il
Bladder 129 122.5 0.34 19 25.5 1.65
Skin or subcutaneous tissue 123 123.4 0.00 26 25.6 0.00
Nose 121 125.8 0.19 31 26.2 0.89
Fallopian tube 99 87.8 1.44 7 18.2 6.93
Breast 87 94.4 0.58 27 19.6 2.77
Other 855 861.8 0.05 186 179.2 0.26
TOTAL 2655 2655.0 4.75 552 552.0 22.88 27.65 0.0021
1993-94
Uterus 292 278.6 0.65 125 138.4 1.30
Joint 214 189.7 3.10 70 94.3 6.25
Tonsil and other parts of mouth 151 155.7 0.14 82 77.3 0.28
Fallopian tube 133 130.3 0.06 62 64.7 O il
Nose 118 125.6 0.46 70 62.4 0.92
Abdominal waD 114 112.9 0.01 55 56.1 0.02
Mastoid and middle ear 108 126.3 2.64 81 62.7 5.32
Veins and other biood vessels 90 84.2 0.40 36 41.8 0.81
Breast 75 78.8 0.19 43 39.2 0.37
Skin or subcutaneous tissue 71 69.5 0.03 33 34.5 0.07
Other 701 715.5 0.29 370 355.5 0.59
TOTAL 2067 2067.0 7.97 1027 1027.0 16.04 24.03 0.0075
1994-95
Joint 233 206.6 3.37 145 171.4 4.06
Uterus 212 200.1 0.71 154 165.9 0.86
Mastoid and middle ear 135 142.7 0.41 126 118.3 0.50
Tonsil and other parts of mouth 123 124.6 0.02 105 103.4 0.03
Nose 117 120.8 0.12 104 100.2 0.14
Stomach pylorus 112 130.1 2.52 126 107.9 3.03
Abdominal waü 109 123.0 1.59 116 102.0 1.92
Veins and other blood vessels 85 70.0 3.23 43 58.0 3.90
Skin or subcutaneous tissue 69 64.0 0.40 48 53.0 0.48
Bone 65 44.8 9.08 17 37.2 10.95
Other 605 638.4 1.75 563 529.6 2.11
TOTAL 1865 1865.0 23.20 1547 1547.0 27.98 51.18 <0.0001
1995-96
Joint 232 217.6 0.95 144 158.4 1.31
Stomach pylorus 167 169.0 0.02 125 123.0 0.03
Mastoid and middle ear 152 179.4 4.18 158 130.6 5.75
Tonsil and oflier parts of month 149 162.6 1.14 132 118.4 1.57
Uterus 145 120.9 4.78 64 88.1 6.57
Nose 139 141.8 0.05 106 103.2 0.08
Abdominal wall 85 103.6 3.34 94 75.4 4.58
FaIlo|dan tube 79 67.7 1.88 38 49.3 2.59
Bone 78 63.7 3.23 32 46.3 4.44
Veins and other blood vessels 68 68.9 0.01 51 50.1 0.01
Other 603 601.9 0.00 437 438.1 0.00
TOTAL 1897 1897.0 19.58 1381 1381.0 26.93 46.53 <0.0001
211
TABLE 6.2 -  Comparison o f the case mix for elective surgery, based upon groups o f operations on 
distinct areas o f the bo(fy, covered by the fund-holding scheme performed on non fund-holding (health 
authority) and fund-holding patients who had their waiting times recorded at the Mid Sussex provider 
over four financial years
Procedure category
Health authority activity 
Actual Expected Chi sq. 
number number statistic
Fund bolding activity 
Actual Expected Chi sq. 
number number statistic
Sum of
chi sq. P value
1992-93
Stomach pyloms 342 338.4 0.04 109 112.6 0.12
Utems 227 218.3 0.34 64 72.7 1.03
Bladder 167 173.3 0.23 64 57.7 0.69
Joint 141 146.3 0.19 54 48.7 0.58
Peritoneum 109 102.0 0.47 27 34.0 1.43
Skin or subcutaneous tissue 106 96.8 0.88 23 32.2 2.63
Colon 99 111.0 1.31 49 37.0 3.93
Veins and other blood vessels 73 72.8 0.00 24 24.2 0.00
Abdominal wan 67 69.0 0.06 25 23.0 0.18
Breast 67 67.5 0.00 23 22.5 0.01
Other 390 392.4 0.01 133 130.6 0.04
TOTAL 1788 1788.0 3.53 595 595.0 10.64 14.19 0.1647
1993-94
Stomach pyloms 299 292.8 0.13 116 122.2 0.32
Joint 179 180.6 0.01 77 75.4 0.03
Utems 144 157.3 1.13 79 65.7 2.70
C(don 122 123.5 0.02 53 51.5 0.04
Abdominal waO 78 69.1 1.14 20 28.9 2.72
Bladder 71 72.7 0.04 32 30.3 0.09
Perhonenm 61 62.1 0.02 27 25.9 0.05
Breast 55 51.5 0.24 18 21.5 0.57
Veins and other blood vessels 45 45.9 0.02 20 19.1 0.04
Can bladder 39 36.7 0.15 13 15.3 0.35
Other 380 380.9 0.00 160 159.1 0.01
TOTAL 1473 1473.0 2.90 615 615.0 6.92 9.80 0.4579
1994-95
Stomach pylorus 316 331.5 0.73 237 221.5 1.09
Joint 179 208.0 4.05 168 139.0 6.06
Uterus 180 189.4 0.47 136 126.6 0.70
Colon 125 121.1 0.13 77 80.9 0.19
Bladder 95 93.5 0.02 61 62.5 0.03
Abdominal wan 86 79.7 0.49 47 53.3 0.74
Fanoplan tube 78 71.9 0.51 42 48.1 0.76
Veins and other blood vessels 59 58.2 0.01 38 38.8 0.02
Breast 56 48.6 1.14 25 32.4 1.71
Oudet of bladder and prostate 48 46.2 0.07 29 30.8 O il
Other 444 417.8 1.64 253 279.2 2.45
TOTAL 1666 1666.0 9.26 1113 1113.0 13.86 23.13 0.0103
1995-96
Stomach pylorus 303 325.0 1.49 228 206.0 2.35
Joint 263 257.7 O il 158 163.3 0.17
Utems 170 175.0 0.15 116 111.0 0.23
Colon 118 118.1 0.00 75 74.9 0.00
Bladder 87 86.9 0.00 55 55.1 0.00
Abdominal wan 80 82.0 0.05 54 52.0 0.08
Veins and oflier blood vessels 77 82.0 0.31 57 52.0 0.48
Nose 69 63.0 0.56 34 40.0 0.89
Bone 54 39.8 5.08 11 25.2 8.02
FaBoplan tube 40 39.8 0.00 25 25.2 0.00
Other 476 467.6 0.15 288 296.4 0.24
TOTAL 1737 1737.0 7.88 1101 1101.0 12.46 20.35 0.0261
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TABLE 6.3 -  Comparison o f the case mix for elective surgery, based upon groups o f operations on 
distinct areas o f the body, covered by the fund-holding scheme performed on non fund-holding (health 
authority) and fund-holding patients who had their waiting times recorded at the Royal West Sussex 
provider over four financial years
Procedure category
Health authority activity 
Actual Expected Chi sq. 
number number statistic
Fund holding activity 
Actual Expected Chi sq. 
number number statistic
Sum of
cM sq. P value
1992-93
Joint 329 329.0 0.00 19 19.0 0.00
Uterus 145 146.5 0.02 10 8.5 0.28
Abdominal wall 102 100.2 0.03 4 5.8 0.55
Veins and other blood vessels 70 68.1 0.05 2 3.9 0.95
Fallopian tube 70 70.9 0.01 5 4.1 0.20
Outlet of bladder and prostate 57 55.8 0.03 2 3.2 0.46
Bladder 55 56.7 0.05 5 3.3 0.91
Vagina 39 40.7 0.07 4 2.3 1.17
Fascia gangUon and bursa 35 35.0 0.00 2 2.0 0.00
Peripheral nerves 28 27.4 0.01 1 1.6 0.21
Other 249 248.7 0.00 14 14.3 0.01
TOTAL 1179 1179.0 0.27 68 68.0 4.74 5.02 0.8901
1993-94
Joint 300 303.5 0.04 105 101.5 0.12
Bladder 100 97.4 0.07 30 32.6 0.21
Outlet of bladder and prostate 94 92.9 0.01 30 31.1 0.04
Veins and other Mood vessels 91 83.9 0.60 21 28.1 1.79
Abdominal wall 72 74.9 0.11 28 25.1 0.34
Peripheral nerves 63 57.7 0.49 14 19.3 1.46
Uterus 56 56.9 0.02 20 19.1 0.05
Call bladder 29 28.5 0.01 9 9.5 0.03
Fascia ganglion and bursa 24 27.0 0.33 12 9.0 0.98
Skfai or subcutaneous tissue 24 20.2 0.70 3 6.8 2.10
Other 184 194.1 0.52 75 64.9 1.56
TOTAL 1037 1037.0 2.90 347 347.0 8.68 11.56 0.3155
1994-95
Joint 313 305.3 0.19 126 133.7 0.44
Bladder 118 117.5 0.00 51 51.5 0.00
Abdominal wall 114 99.5 2.13 29 43.5 4.86
Veins and other blood vessels 110 107.1 0.08 44 46.9 0.18
Outlet of bladder and prostate 108 106.4 0.02 45 46.6 0.05
Uterus 83 89.0 0.41 45 39.0 0.93
Fallopian tube 73 74.4 0.03 34 32.6 0.06
Peripheral nerves 34 48.0 4.08 35 21.0 9.31
Vagina 33 34.1 0.03 16 14.9 0.08
Skfai or subcutaneous tissue 32 27.8 0.63 8 12.2 1.43
Other 261 269.8 0.29 127 118.2 0.66
TOTAL 1279 1279.0 7.89 560 560.0 18.00 25.91 0.0039
1995-96
Joint 345 339.9 0.08 256 261.1 0.10
Stomach pylorus 204 230.8 3.10 204 177.2 4.04
Bladder 178 164.6 1.09 113 126.4 1.42
Colon 128 118.8 0.72 82 91.2 0.93
Abdominal wall 105 106.3 0.02 83 81.7 0.02
Uterus 101 113.7 1.41 100 87.3 1.84
Veins and other blood vessels 89 93.3 0.20 76 71.7 0.26
Peripheral nerves 80 72.4 0.80 48 55.6 1.04
FaBoplan tube 63 63.9 0.01 50 49.1 0.02
Outlet of bladder and prostate 61 61.1 0.00 47 46.9 0.00
Other 397 386.3 0.30 286 296.7 0.39
TOTAL 1751 1751.0 7.73 1345 1345.0 10.06 17.79 0.0586
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TABLE 6.4 -  Comparison o f the case mix for elective stirgery, based upon groups o f operations on 
distinct areas o f the body, covered by the fund-holding scheme performed on non fund-holding (health 
attthority) and fund-holding patients who had their waiting times recorded at the Worthing and 
Southlands provider over four financial years
Procedure category
Health authority activity 
Actual Expected Chi sq. 
number number statistic
Fund-holding activity 
Actual Expected Chi sq. 
number number statistic
Sum of 
chisq. P-value
1992-93
Anterior chamber of eye & lens 995 992.0 0.01 97 100.0 0.09
Utems 701 713.1 021 84 71.9 2.03
Bladder 593 591.4 0.00 58 59.6 0.04
Joint 579 569.6 0.16 48 57.4 1.55
Fallopian tube 258 250.7 021 18 25.3 2.10
Colon 254 265.3 0.48 38 26.7 4.73
Abdominal wall 252 258.9 0.18 33 26.1 1.82
Stomach pyloms 229 241.6 0.66 37 24.4 6.55
Skin or subcutaneous tissue 215 216.2 0.01 23 21.8 0.07
Breast 179 179.9 0.00 19 18.1 0.04
Other 2300 2276.4 024 206 229.6 2.42
TOTAL 6555 6555.0 2.16 661 661.0 21.44 23.61 0.0087
1993-94
Anterior chamber of eye & lens 761 800.6 1.96 214 174.4 9.00
Utems 617 601.1 0.42 115 130.9 1.94
Bladder 600 601.9 0.01 133 131.1 0.03
Joint 547 5272 0.75 95 114.8 3.42
Abdominal wall 328 3252 0.02 68 70.8 0.11
Colon 262 265.2 0.04 61 57.8 0.18
Tonsil and other parts of mouth 226 208.6 1.46 28 45.4 6.69
Veins and other Mood vessels 215 215.1 0.00 47 46.9 0.00
Outlet of bladder and prostate 205 221.7 1.26 65 48.3 5.78
Fallopian tube 203 192.1 0.61 31 41.9 2.81
Other 2257 2262.3 0.01 498 492.7 0.06
TOTAL 6221 6221.0 6.54 1355 1355.0 30.02 36.56 <0.0001
1994-95
Anterior chamber of eye & lens 711 683.8 1.08 332 359.2 2.06
Bladder 644 680.5 1.96 394 357.5 3.73
Joint 523 491.1 2.08 226 257.9 3.96
Uterus 440 464.8 1.33 269 244.2 2.52
Abdominal wall 196 192.7 0.05 98 101.3 0.10
Colon 192 192.7 0.00 102 101.3 0.01
Sldn or subcutaneous tissue 176 167.8 0.40 80 88.2 0.76
Fallopian tube 170 149.5 2.82 58 78.5 5.36
Outlet of bladder and prostate 169 168.5 0.00 88 88.5 0.00
Veins and other blood vessels 126 121.3 0.18 59 63.7 0.35
Other 1595 16292 0.72 890 855.8 1.37
TOTAL 4942 4942.0 10.62 2596 2596.0 20.22 30.84 0.0006
1995-96
Bladder 680 6742 0.05 426 431.8 0.08
Anterior chamber of eye & lens 537 564.5 1.34 389 361.5 2.09
Joint 505 462.1 3.99 253 295.9 623
Utems 340 370.6 2.53 268 237.4 3.95
Outlet of bladder and prostate 174 173.7 0.00 111 111.3 0.00
Abdominal wall 162 162.8 0.00 105 104.2 0.01
Colon 120 119.5 0.00 76 76.5 0.00
Tonsil and other parts of mouth 118 114.6 0.10 70 73.4 0.16
Fallopian tube 117 101.2 2.47 49 64.8 3.86
Sldn or subcutaneous tissue 99 94.5 022 56 60.5 0.34
Other 1376 1390.4 0.15 905 890.6 0.23
TOTAL 4228 4228.0 10.85 2708 2708.0 16.95 27.79 0.0019
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In short, tables 6.1 to 6.4 have streamlined the continuing analysis to eleven cases, due to 
the discovery of five instances where any difference in the case mix relevant to the two 
populations was not statistically significant. But even in these eleven cases, as discussed 
earlier, on its own this far fi-om proves that the variations in the average waiting times of 
the two groups of patients can be put down to case mix contrasts. It is therefore an 
opportune time to move on to the second step of the investigation. Do the disparities 
applicable to the eleven cases tend to increase the waits of non fimd-holders or shorten 
those of fimd-holders?
Stage two: the direction of case mix contrasts
In the eleven cases where the obtained statistic exceeds the critical one, 18.307, this does 
not mean critical variances exist the whole way through the tables. The null hypothesis 
can be rejected due to very large differences between the actual and expected activity for 
only a few groups of operations, whilst for the rest there might be little or no variance.
It is because of this that the advantage of recording the obtained chi square statistic for 
the comparison between each of the individual operation groups can be recognised. It 
indicates at a glance which of the contrasts for each procedure category was primarily 
responsible for the rejection of the null hypothesis and therefore which categories require 
subsequent investigation to substantiate whether the net effect of the variation was to 
increase non fimd-holders* waits or shorten those of fimd-holders. Correspondingly, 
each sample where the difference in the case mix of fimd-holding and non fund-holding 
patients was most noteworthy will now be addressed.
The results of the research into this matter is exhibited in tables 6.5 to 6.8, a separate one 
devoted to each provider. In brief, the analysis revolves around separating the procedure 
groupings for either population that contributed most to the overall rejection of the null 
hypothesis. The average waits for these categories, which had an abnormally high or low 
activity relative to the expected number, was then calculated as was the mean waiting
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time for the rest of the operation groups for which the actual and expected number of 
procedures were broadly similar. From this, it is possible to assess what the effect on the 
aggregate waiting times for the relevant population would have been if the activity for 
the abnormally high or low categories had been commensurate with the expected 
number.
For example, say for the non fund-holding population one category stood out as being 
radically different to the expected number, and for this particular group they received
100.0 more operations than the norm would have been. If the mean wait for these types 
of procedures for non fimd-holders was 50.0 days longer than the average for all the 
other categories together, then it is taken that case mix differences would have added to 
the aggregate number of days waited by this population. The analysis for Crawley 
Horsham in 1992/93 is explained in some detail so as to use a genuine example to further 
clarify how the inquiries are performed. Because the same methods of inquiry are used 
for the other cases, this detailed description will not be repeated.
In line with the above example, the first step in this investigation is to identify which of 
the procedure groupings were chiefly responsible for the case mix difference at a 
provider to be significant. Table 6.1 shows that for 1992/93 at the Crawley Horsham 
provider a couple of the twenty-two operation categories stand out as making the chi 
square obtained statistic exceed the critical statistic. Both of these were activity 
performed for fimd-holding patients, one being the episodes on tonsils and other parts of 
the mouth (predominantly tonsillectomy procedures), the other were fallopian tube 
operations (primarily female sterilisation). Together they accounted for nearly half,
13.39, of the overall obtained chi square statistic of 27.65. It is therefore the waits of 
fimd-holders for these two procedure categories that are most worth investigating.
Returning to the database used for the waiting time comparisons, fund-holding patients 
on the elective waiting list at Crawley Horsham in 1992/93 who underwent operations on 
parts of their body other than either their tonsils and mouth or fallopian tubes had a mean 
wait of 115 .7 days. Furthermore, the average waiting time for fimd-holding patients
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receiving operations on their tonsils and other parts of the mouth was 184.1 days. Table 
6.1 shows that the actual activity for this group of operations on fund-holding patients,
56.0 episodes, was 16.1 more than the expected number, 39.9. Therefore, if the actual 
activity reflected the expected activity, 16.1 fewer operations on the tonsils and mouth 
would have occurred, with the same total added to the number accounting for everything 
else except fallopian tube procedures. If the mean waits for these two procedure groups 
remained constant, this would lower the aggregate waiting times of fund-holding patients 
by 1,101.2 days (184.1 days less 115.7 equals 68.4, multiplied by 16.1).
Meanwhile, fund-holding patients who underwent operations on their fallopian tubes 
waited an average of 162.7 days, which is more than the mean wait of 115.7 days for the 
rest of the procedures, excluding tonsils and the mouth, by 47.0 days. From table 6.1 the 
actual activity for fallopian tube procedures was 11.2 operations less than the expected 
total (7.0 rather than 18.2). So by using the same methodology as with the tonsils and 
mouth group, if the actual activity for fallopian tubes had mirrored the expected numbers 
11.2 patients would have waited 47.0 days more. This raises the aggregate waits of 
fund-holding patients by 526.4 days. As such, if the actual activity for fallopian tube plus 
tonsil and mouth operations had reflected the expected numbers, the aggregate waits of 
fimd-holders would be lower by 574.8 days (1,101.2 less 526.4). Because the variation 
in the expected and actual procedures inevitably has consequences upon the activity for 
other categories, this other group is always shown in forthcoming tables.
Therefore, the nature of the actual case mix, relative to the expected case mix, appears to 
have lengthened the aggregate and consequently the average waits of fund-holding 
patients at Crawley Horsham in 1992/93. For this reason, the idea that case mix might 
explain the shorter average waits of fimd-holding patients must be rejected in this case.
In line with this judgement, Crawley Horsham in 1992/93 will not be carried forward to 
the third stage of the analysis. To close this explanation, the calculations just described 
are depicted in table 6.5, along with the inquiries pertaining to the same provider for 
1993/94, 1994/95 and 1995/96.
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TABLE 6.5 - Calculation o f the effect o f important case mix differences on the mean number o f days 
waited by fund-holding and non fund-holding (health authority) patients on the elective waiting list at 
the Crawley Horsham provider
Year and 
population Procedure category
Mean
wait
Actual
number
Actual
wait
Expected
number
Expected
wait Variance
1992-93
Fund holders Tonsil and mouth 184.1 56 10309.6 39.9 7345.6 2964.0
Fallopian tube 162.7 7 1138.9 18.2 2961.1 (1822.2)
Other
Fund-holder net effect
115.7 489 56577.3 493.8 57132.7 (566.9)
574.8
1993-94
Fund holders Joint 237.8 70 16646.0 94.3 22424.5 (5778.5)
Mastoid and middle ear 119.8 81 9703.8 62.7 7511.5 2192.3
Other
Fund-holder net effect
145.1 876 127107.6 870.0 126237.0 870.6
(2715.6)
1994-95
Health authority Bone 255.5 65 16607.5 44.8 11446.4 5161.1
Other
Health authority net effect
191.7 1800 345060.0 1820.2 348932.3 (3872.3)
1288.8
Fund holders Bone 295.6 17 5025.2 37.2 10996.3 (5161.1)
Other
Fund-holder net effect
148.3 1530 226899.0 1509.8 223903.3 2995.7
(2975.4)
1995-96
Health authority
Fund-hoiders
Mastoid and middle ear 170.1 152 25855.2 179.4 30515.9 (4660.7)
Uterus 192.1 145 27854.5 120.9 23224.9 4629.6
Other 197.2 1600 315520.0 1596.7 314869.2 650.8
Health authority net effect 619.7
Mastoid and middle ear 160.4 158 25343.2 130.6 20948.2 4395.0
Uterus 98.2 64 6284.8 88.1 8651.4 (2366.6)
Other 178.7 1159 207113.3 1162.3 207703.0 (589.7)
Fund-holder net effect 1438.7
TABLE 6.6 - Calculation o f the effect o f important case mix differences on the mean number o f days 
waited by fund-holding and non fund-holding (health authority) patients on the elective waiting list at 
the Mid Sussex provider
Year and 
population Procedure category
Mean
wait
Actual
number
Actual
wait
Expected
number
Expected
wait Variance
1994-95
Health authority Joint 194.8 179 34869.2 208.0 40518.4 (5649.2)
Other 109.1 1487 162231.7 1458.0 159067.8 3163.9
Health authority net effect (2485.3)
Fund holders Joint 145.6 168 24,460.8 139.0 20,238.4 4222.4
Other 88.3 945 83,443.5 974.0 86,004.2 (2560.7)
Fund-holder net effect 1661.7
1995-96
Health authority Bone 216.8 54 11707.2 39.8 8628.6 3078.6
Other 122.9 1683 206840.7 1697.2 208585.9 (1745.2)
Health authority net effect 1333.4
Fund-holders Bone 203.6 11 2239.0 25.2 5130.7 (2891.7)
Other 87.9 1090 95811.0 1075.8 94562.8 1248.2
Fund-holder net effect 1643.5
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TABLE 6.7 - Calculation o f the effect o f important case mix differences on the mean number o f days 
waited by fund-holding and non fund-holding (health authority) patients on the elective waiting list at 
the Royal West Sussex provider
Year and 
population Procedure category
Mean
wait
Actual
number
Actual
wait
Expected
number
Expected
wait Variance
1994-95
Health authority Peripheral nerves 277.0 34 9418.0 48.0 13296.0 (3878.0)
Other 282.1 1245 351214.5 1231.0 347265.1 3949.4
Fund holder»
Health authority net effect 
Periphaal nerves 154.6 35 5411.0 21.0 3246.6
71.4
2164.4
Other 204.1 525 107152.5 539.0 110009.9 (2857.4)
Fund-holder net effect (693.0)
TABLE 6.8 - Calculation o f the effect o f important case mix differences on the mean number o f days 
waited by fund-holding and non fund-holding (health authority) patients on the elective waiting list at 
the Worthing and Southlands provider
Yearand 
population Procedure category
Mean
wait
Actual
number
Actual
wait
Expected
number
Expected
wait Variance
1992-93
Fund holders Stomach pylorus 21.2 37 784.4 24.4 517.3 267.1
Colon 53.5 38 2033.0 26.7 1428.5 604.5
Other
Fund-holder net effect
126.5 586 74129.0 609.9 77152.4 (3023.4)
(2151.8)
1993-94
Fund4iolders Eyes and lens 151.5 214 32421.0 174.4 26421.6 5999.4
Tonsil and mouth 243.1 28 6806.9 45.4 11036.7 (4229.8)
Bladder and prostate 159.6 65 10374.0 48.3 7708.7 2665.3
Other
Fund-holder net effect
123.0 1048 128904.0 1086.9 133688.7 (4784.7)
(349.8)
1994-95
Fund holders Fallopian tube 107.5 58 6235.0 78.5 8438.8 (2203.8)
Other
Fund-holder net effect
124.2 2538 315219.6 2517.5 312673.5 2546.1
342.3
1995-96
Health authority Uterus 101.3 340 34442.0 370.6 37541.8 (3099.8)
Fallopian tube 97.4 117 11395.8 101.2 9856.9 1538.9
Joint 254.2 505 128371.0 462.1 117465.8 10905.2
Other
Health authority net effect
122.9 3266 401391.4 3294.1 404844.9 (3453.5)
5890.8
Fund-holders Uterus 97.2 268 26040.0 237.4 23075.3 2964.7
Fallopian tube 114.3 49 5600.7 64.8 7406.6 (1805.9)
Joint 225.3 253 57000.9 295.9 66666.3 (9665.4)
Other
Fund4iolder net effect
126.4 2138 270243.2 2109.9 266691.4 3551.8
(4954.8)
With regard to the data in tables 6.5 to 6.8, two brief points are worth noting. First, by 
recording the figures to a single decimal point, a certain degree of rounding up and down 
has necessarily taken place. For this reason there will be slight differences in various
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cases if the mean waits shown in the tables for the itemised procedure categories are 
compounded for comparison against the averages detailed in tables 4.9 to 4.12. Second, 
if the net effect of the case mix difference was to increase the mean waiting time for a 
population, the actual wait would be a higher number of days than the expected wait. In 
such cases the figure in the variance column on the right of the table is not placed in 
brackets. Conversely, if the case mix reduced the average waiting time of a population, 
meaning the actual wait is a lower number than the expected wait, the total in the 
variance column is bracketed. The outcome of the above investigation will now be 
summarised.
In short, the objective was to identify which cases should progress on to the third stage 
of this study, that of ascertaining whether the inq)act of case mix in shortening fimd- 
holders’ waits or lengthening those of non fimd-holders are substantial It has already 
been explained that for Crawley Horsham in 1992/93, the case mix differences increased 
the waits of fimd-holding patients, so this case does not graduate to the next stage. For 
the same provider in 1993/94, the case mix contrasts again centred just on the fimd- 
holding population. The effect here was to decrease their waits, so this case will feature 
in the next stage. In 1994/95 case mix differences at Crawley Horsham both increased 
the waits of non fimd-holders and reduced them for fund-holders, so this case will also be 
investigated further. In 1995/96 at Crawley Horsham case mix inflated the waits of both 
populations, but more for fimd-holders in both a numerical and proportional context.
This case is therefore not applicable to the third stage.
At Mid Sussex in 1994/95, case mix differences actually lowered the waits of non fund- 
holding patients but increased them for the fimd-holders. Hence this case is clearly 
ineligible to be carried forward to the next stage of the inquiry. For the same provider in 
1995/96, case mix extended the waiting times of both populations. Similar to Crawley 
Horsham in 1995/96, the increase to fimd-holders’ waits was both proportionately and 
numerically greater than for the non fimd-holding population. As such, this case is also 
disqualified fi-om the third stage of this examination. Indeed, this means the Mid Sussex 
provider will not have a role in the next step of this particular research process.
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For the Royal West Sussex provider in 1994/95, the outcome of case mix variation was a 
slight increase in the waiting times of non fund-holders, along with a decrease in waits 
for fund-holding patients. This case will therefore be admitted to the third stage.
The 1992/93 analysis for Worthing and Southlands concentrated on fund-holding 
patients and that population’s waiting times were reduced by case mix contrasts. This 
trend was repeated at the same provider the following year, when the significance of case 
mix differences were mainly driven by operations on the eye and lens (cataract surgery), 
tonsil and mouth, plus the bladder and prostate of fund-holding patients. Once again the 
impact was to lower waits, so like 1992/93 this case shall be referred to the next stage of 
the inquiry. At Worthing and Southlands in 1994/95, case mix variation slightly raised 
the waiting times of fund-holders, so this case shall not be have a role in the next stage of 
the process. For this same provider in 1995/96 the enquiry focused upon operations on 
the uterus (chiefly hysterectomies), fallopian tubes and joints of patients from both 
populations. The effect was to inflate the waits of non fimd-holders and lessen them for 
fimd-holders. This case will therefore be addressed in the third stage.
In sum, there were eleven cases where statistically significant differences emerged in the 
surgical case mix of fimd-holding and non fimd-holding patients. Six had a greater 
impact on abating the waits of fimd-holders relative to people registered with practices 
outside the scheme whilst five appeared to have the reverse effect. In other words, five 
cases have been lost to the final stage in each of the first two steps of this study.
Stage three: are contrasts merely significant or important as well?
Half a dozen out of sixteen cases have advanced to the final stage of this investigation 
into the gravity of case mix in driving the generally shorter waiting times of fimd-holding 
patients. In each of these, the differences in the surgical case mix of patients registered 
with practices inside and outside the scheme were statistically significant, and the effect
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of this was to lower the waits of fund-holders, relative to non fund-holders. The issue to 
be addressed in this stage of the inquiry is the relevance of this trend. Was it likely to 
have been a consequential factor in driving significant discrepancies in the average 
waiting times of the two populations?
The six cases under review each feature in table 6.9. For the relevant populations that 
were the basis for the analyses in tables 6.5 to 6.8, it provides the original aggregate 
waiting times upon which the comparisons in tables 4.9 to 4.12 were based. It also 
details what the impact on the original aggregate would have been if the actual activity 
had reflected the expected activity, as demonstrated in tables 6.5 to 6.8. The outcome 
from this is to display the extent to which the expected activity would have altered the 
mean waiting times of the specific population.
Regarding the Crawley Horsham provider, table 6.9 shows that 1,027 applicable fund- 
holding patients received operations in 1993/94. Their aggregate actual waiting time for 
these episodes was 153,535 to give a mean wait of 149.5 days. If their surgical case mix 
had reflected the expected case mix, calculated by the methodology explained earlier, the 
aggregate wait would be 2,715.6 days more than the actual total (see table 6.5). This 
increases the aggregate expected waiting times from 153,535 to 156,250.6 days. With 
the total number of procedures numbering 1,027, this will result in an expected mean 
wait of 152.1 days, an increase of 2.6 days to the actual average of 149.5 days.
From this, a decision needs to be made as to whether this difference can rightfully be 
considered as having a material effect in causing the contrasts in the average waiting 
times of fund-holding and non fimd-holding patients (see table 4.9). A truly objective 
estimate via a recalculation of the ANOVA tests using the higher expected aggregate 
wait is difficult. It would be prone to subjective value judgements in constructing the 
individual components of the test, namely the discrete waiting time of individual patients. 
This is because the variance computed through ANOVA reflects the pattern of variation 
within the population groups and also between them. Consequently, spreading the 
additional 2,715.6 days between the 1,027 fund-holding patients equally, just over 2.6
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days each, would give a different result to adding 2,715.6 to a single patient, or almost
13.6 days to 200 patients, plus any other possible combination.
To be fair, this is a somewhat extreme guide because the contrasts in the distinct 
categories of operations featured in table 6.5 have not been utilised, which they certainly 
should be. However, the point remains that the process of evaluating the genuine effect 
of the changes in the mean waiting times is not totally straightforward. Even so, it would 
still appear that the impact of the changes would have been very modest indeed.
TABLE 6.9 -  Effect o f significant case mix differences that would have increased the mean waits (in 
days) offund-holding patients or decreased the mean waits o f non fund-holding (health authority) 
patients on the elective waiting list at three providers
Provider, year and 
population
Number of 
operations
Actual
waits
Mean
wait
Change to 
actual wait
Expected
waits
Expected 
mean wait
Change to 
mean wait
Crawley Horsham 
1993-94 Fund-holdera 1027 153535 149.5 2715.6 156250.6 152.1 2.6
1994-95 Healtii authority 
Fund holders
1865
1547
361677
231932
193.9
149.9
(1288.8)
2975.4
360388.2
234907.4
193.2
151.8
(0.7)
1.9
Royal West Sussex 
1994-95 Health authority 
Fund holders
1279
560
360690
112413
282.0
200.7
(71.4)
693.0
360618.6
113106.0
282.0
202.0 1.3
Worthing and Southlands 
1992-93 Fund holders 661 76967 116.4 2151.8 79118.8 119.7 3.3
1993-94 Fund holders 1355 178514 131.7 349.8 178863.8 132.0 0.3
1995-96 Health authority 
Fund holders
4228
2708
575554
358953
136.1
132.6
(5890.8)
4954.8
569663.2
363907.8
134.7
134.4
(1.4)
1.8
For instance, in the case of Crawley Horsham in 1993/94, a mean wait of 152.1 days for 
fund-holders would undoubtedly still produce a statistically significant result against the 
non fund-holding average of 214.2 days (see table 4.9). The original comparison had 
produced an F critical statistic of 3.84 against an obtained statistic of 90.1. Just adding
2.6 days to the mean waits of fund-holders should lower the difference to a small degree, 
but would not stop the variance fi’om being significant. Precisely the same point can be 
made about this provider in 1994/95. Subtracting 0.7 days fi"om the actual mean wait of 
non fimd-holders, resulting in an expected average of 193.2 days, and adding 1.9 to the
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actual mean of fund-holders to give an expected average of 151.8 is clearly not going to 
make the original result in table 4.9 insignificant.
Again, the same judgement looks applicable for the Royal West Sussex in 1994/95. 
Adding 1.3 days to the actual mean of fund-holding patients (fi-om table 4.11) gives a 
new average o f202.0 days. Against a non fimd-holding mean o f282.0 days it is 
nonsensical to imagine that the wide gap between the original F critical and obtained 
statistics, 3.85 and 87.0, is going to be narrowed to the point where the result no longer 
remains significant.
Regarding Worthing and Southlands, for two of the cases featured in table 6.9,1993/94 
and 1995/96, whilst fimd-holders had shorter waits in both years the original results were 
not shown as significant in table 4.12 anyway. To be fair, for 1993/94 this was probably 
a result of 324 fimd-holding patients at the time of the procedure spending nearly 56 per 
cent of their waiting time prior to their practices joining the scheme (see table 4.3). For 
1992/93 at this provider, the actual mean wait of the fimd-holding population would 
have been changed fi-om 116.4 days (table 4.12) to 119.7 (table 6.9), against an average 
waiting time for non fimd-holders of 129.1. Again, the relative closeness of these waits 
was driven by 205 fimd-holders spending 64 per cent of their gross waits o f45,026 days 
on the list prior to their practice joining the scheme (see table 4.3). Taking this last point 
into account, it is hard to see how a change of 3.3 days to the mean waiting time of fund­
holders could possibly undermine the significance of their shorter waits.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has dealt with the idea that waiting time differences between fund-holding 
and non fimd-holding patients might have been caused by what is probably a more hidden 
factor than some of the other hypotheses investigated during this study. The inquiry 
focused on the contrasts in the surgical case mix of each population, with the relevance 
of the investigation being dependent on different sorts of operations at specific providers
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having varying waiting times. The definition of the case mix hypothesis as a more hidden 
factor can be justified on the following grounds. Firstly, if the case mix profile of fimd- 
holding patients was set by chance or other random factors, it may shorten their waits in 
an almost spurious manner. Secondly, other factors might have a more obvious potential 
impact on waiting times. For instance, it seems fair to suggest that the prospect of an 
imbalance in funding between the purchaser types probably ‘springs to mind’ as a 
possible reason for any discrepancies in waiting times before the case mix issue.
Although there may be various ways in which an investigation into case mix differences 
could be undertaken, the study concentrated on the mix of procedures rather than any 
contrasts in the age or sex profile of the fund-holding and non fund-holding populations. 
The reason for this is that if there are discrepancies in the waits for various kinds of 
surgery, it seems sensible to focus on the number of episodes received by each group of 
patients rather than some of the things that may influence the prevalence of certain types 
of operation. By doing this, the investigation converges straight away on the real crux of 
the matter instead of more peripheral side issues. A similar reasoning was behind the 
decision to concentrate on the mix of procedures rather than diagnosis rates, a judgement 
vindicated by the nature of the separate categories of the overall waiting list.
The methodology adopted for the inquiry showed that any differences in the surgical case 
mix of the fund-holding and non fund-holding populations were not significant in five out 
of the sixteen cases. In five of the remaining eleven cases, the contrasts in case mix 
tended to increase the waits of fund-holders relative to non fund-holders. In the other six 
cases where case mix had increased the waits of non fund-holding patients or decreased 
those of fund-holders, the effect looks too marginal to be accepted as a critical factor in 
explaining the disparities in the relative waiting times of each group. These cases seem 
almost perfect examples of the notion that statistically significant differences are not 
necessarily consequential.
As such, the overriding impression fi-om this analysis has been that the shorter waits of 
fund-holding patients on the elective waiting list cannot legitimately be considered as
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driven by case mix dififerences. The hypothesis that contrasts in case mix might be a 
material factor behind the shorter waiting times of fund-holding patients must therefore 
be rejected. From this, and because the previous chapter indicated that fund-holding 
patients do not appear to benefit fi'om shorter waits due to their practices receiving an 
overgenerous level of funding, the genuine reason behind the contrasts in average waits 
has yet to be established. The investigation into factors that have the potential to explain 
these differences thus continues in the next chapter.
C hapter?
Contracts, relationships, information, incentives and exit
The last two chapters have demonstrated that the funding balance and case mix contrasts 
have both been found to be wanting in their capacity to explain the trend towards shorter 
waiting times for fund-holding patients on the elective waiting list at four West Sussex 
providers. The purpose of this chapter is to continue the investigation into the various 
other hypotheses mentioned in the second chapter that may account for this tendency. In 
doing this it will focus on the impact of contracts, the relationships between purchasers 
and providers, plus the information and incentives applicable to the commissioners. The 
chapter will then move on to the significance of the exit option whereby purchasers may 
move patients between alternative hospitals, or are at least perceived as able to do so by 
the providers themselves. Each of these issues shall be addressed in turn.
CONTRACTS
There are two main strands to the contract investigation. One relates to the idea that the 
shorter waiting times of fund-holding patients were determined by specifications placed 
in contracts between the practices and providers. The other concerns the notion that the 
use of alternative contract types by purchasers could stimulate different responses by 
hospitals in admitting patients. In particular the widespread (although not universal) use 
of cost-per-case contracts by fund-holding practices might have been a vital factor in 
shortening the waits of their patients whilst health authorities persevered with block 
agreements that guaranteed local NHS providers a set income for a less specific level of
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service provision. If this were the case and contract type was the dominant factor in 
driving wmting time differences, it would seem reasonable to expect the waits of fund- 
holding patients admitted under block contracts to be longer than those from practices 
utilising cost-per-case agreements.
Contract specifications
The hypothesis that variances in waiting times result from distinct purchasers specifying 
different waiting time limits for their populations presumes a commissioner driven 
environment in probably its purest form. After negotiating a contractual agreement, 
providers would respond to whatever waiting time targets are in place. Hence if a 
provider’s contract with the health authority defined a target wait of eighteen months for 
non-urgent elective surgery whilst agreements with fund-holders were for twelve 
months, the hospital keeping to these time spans would produce clear contrasts between 
the discrete populations. From this scenario, if one fund-holder specified a goal wait of 
six months while another demanded ten months, differences would arise within the fund- 
holding population.
The idea that waiting times are a simple outcome of contractual demands represents an 
uncomplicated supposition. The question is, does it accurately reflect what tended to 
happen at four West Sussex providers between April 1992 and March 1996? The health 
authority, which holds copies of local fund-holders’ contracts with providers, facilitated 
an inspection of these documents for the relevant period. Discussions were also held 
with the managers at each trust who had direct responsibility for contractual liaison with 
such practices. Both of these sources provided a compatible response. In short, the 
answer is no, this is not the reason behind waiting time differences.
For the years under review hospitals did not tend to negotiate differential waiting times 
between distinct fund-holders and the health authority. Managers at three providers said 
contracts were absolutely consistent in this respect, although one of them had just started
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to allow individual fund-holders to specify their own targets after the four years relevant 
to this study. The manager at the other provider stated that occasionally they had, when 
a local practice insisted on setting differential waiting time targets, allowed them to do it. 
Yet this was followed with an observation that it was a purely “academic” exercise. 
“Even if we had tried, it would be a tremendous struggle to keep to different waiting 
time targets. Allowing contracts to occasionally be written this way had more to do with 
trying to keep a practice happy, and it really was just the odd one here and there, than 
anything else. In all honesty little or no attention was paid to it”.
This corresponds with answers given by consultants at the providers. Whilst they were 
aware that fund-holders had the formal authority to try and specify shorter waits for their 
own patients in contracts, all denied this had a material influence in shaping waiting 
times. Nine of the twelve consultants declared themselves to be completely unaware of 
the contents of contracts, with a typical response being made by the consultant who 
described himself as “oblivious” to such issues. Another said it would be a “nightmare” 
to attempt keeping to specific targets in different practices’ contracts. In fact the only 
consultants who admitted to even being told by hospital managers that a practice had a 
waiting time target specified in their contracts were from the provider whose manager is 
quoted in the previous paragraph. Moreover, it was also noticeable that individual fund­
holders’ contracts did not even specify precise waiting time targets for elective surgery, 
beyond making some bland reference to meeting patient’s charter standards.*^
Whilst the collection of fund-holders’ contracts held by the health authority was not 
absolutely complete, the very large majority were inspected. None were found where a 
practice had specified unique waiting times, so if it did happen at the above provider it 
must have been one of the contracts that were missing. In fact there appeared to be a
19. Although the precise patient’s charter targets were not formally mentioned in the contracts, firom 
April 1992 nobody should have been on the waiting list more than two years (see Department of 
Health, 1991). Following an experiment in which this limit was reduced by six months for cataract 
surgeiy plus hip and knee replacements, the target of eighteen months was extended to most 
operations from April 1995 (see Department of Health, 1995b). The exceptions were coronary 
arteiy bypass grafts and angioplasty procedures, both of which had a target wait of twelve months 
(see NHS Executive, 1996d).
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common policy in the county in this respect. A\ t^h minimal differences in punctuation 
and the use of upper and lower case letters, all the contracts seen contained the following 
sentence. ‘The maximum waiting time will be as per the specification of the provider’s 
district health authority and its requirements under the patient’s charter’.
As such, it seems the most sustainable conclusion that can be reached is to reject the 
hypothesis that differential waits were a product of specifications that are formally stated 
in the contract document. However, does the idea that hospitals respond dififerently to 
alternative types of contract offer more hope of finding the reason for contrasts in 
waiting times?
Contract type and waiting times
This inquiry will use the waiting times of patients registered with fund-holders that 
commission elective surgery by way of different contract types as a guide to whether the 
trend towards longer waits for non fimd-holders can be seen as a consequence of the 
health authority usmg block contracts. The logic of the analysis rests on the following 
principle concerning the way fimd-holders commission surgery. Do the waiting times of 
patients fi*om practices that utilise different sorts of agreement show similar tendencies to 
the contrasts in waits between fimd-holders (on an overall basis) and non fimd-holders? 
If they do, then the forms of contract enq)loyed by the health authority and most fund- 
holding practices could be at the root of the variances.
The type of contract used by specific fimd-holders to commission elective surgery fi*om 
the four providers featured in the research was established primarily by seeing the actual 
documents at the health authority’s offices. In the few cases where the contract was not 
traceable, the information was obtained by telephoning the practices concerned. After 
excluding the East Grinstead fimd-holders because the Queen Victoria Hospital was not 
applicable to this study, the remaining practices were separated into four groups on the 
basis of their local providers’ catchment areas. The number of West Sussex fimd-holders
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from each group that had used block, cost-per-case or cost and volume arrangements in 
each year to purchase surgery is shown in table 7.1. It is noticeable that cost-per-case 
agreements were the predominant contract type used by such practices during the four 
years under review.
TABLE 7.1 - Types o f contract held by West Sussex fund-holding practices to purchase the elective 
surgery covered by the fund-holding scheme at four providers over four financial years
Provider and year Cost-per-case Cost and volume Block Total
Crawley Horsham
1992-93 2 0 0 2
1993-94 3 0 0 3
1994-95 3 0 0 3
1995-96 3 0 0 3
Mid Sussei
1992-93 3 0 0 3
1993-94 3 0 0 3
1994-95 3 0 0 3
1995-96 3 0 0 3
Royal West Sussex
1992-93 1 0 0 1
1993-94 4 0 0 4
1994-95 6 0 0 6
1995-96 9 0 1 10
Worthing and Southlands
1992-93 2 0 0 2
1993-94 3 1 0 4
1994-95 7 1 1 9
1995-96 4 3 3 10
Every fund-holder in both the Crawley Horsham and Mid Sussex localities used cost-per- 
case contracts, so these practices and providers have no further role in this investigation. 
With regard to practices whose main provider was the Royal West Sussex, the inquiry is 
confined to 1995/96 when just one had a block contract while all the others used cost- 
per-case agreements. The greatest mix in contract type was between fund-holders 
primarily using Worthing and Southlands, particularly in 1995/96 although there was a 
degree of variety in the two previous years.
Indeed, the mix at this provider in 1995/96 might even suggest that the contract type 
hypothesis may have some real substance to it, as fund-holders should not be considered 
to have had shorter waits in this particular case (contrary to the results shown in table
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4.4). The analysis pertinent to table 4.4 had defined the fund-holding population as those 
patients whose practice had been in the fimd-holding scheme over the entire duration of 
their wait. However, table 4.3 indicates that patients receiving operations at Worthing 
and Southlands in 1995/96, whose practice joined the scheme during the course of their 
wait, spent nearly two-thirds of their waiting period after the entry date. Excluding those 
patients firom the fund-holding population can thus be seen as giving a false impression 
(too low) of the average waiting times of fund-holders in this case.
Whilst table 7.1 separates practices on the basis of their chief provider, that will not be 
the only hospital where their patients are treated. Patients do not always receive services 
fi’om the hospital that is geographically closest to their general practice. When someone 
registered with a fund-holding GP is seen at a provider that is not the nearest hospital to 
the practice’s surgery premises, payment for the service tends to made under one of two 
scenarios. If the practice is historically quite a heavy user of the less local provider, they 
may have a cost-per-case contract vydth them. Otherwise, the admission is likely to be 
made on an extra contractual referral basis, meaning the practice pays for the treatment 
on a cost-per-case basis without holding a formal contract with the provider. The data in 
table 7.1 represents the contractual arrangements between providers and their local fimd- 
holders, and covers all the cost and volume or block contracts held by such practices.
Table 7.2 provides a comparison of the waiting times of patients fi*om practices using 
alternative types of contracts to purchase elective surgery. The patients applicable to the 
cost-per-case category include those registered with practices outside the provider’s 
catchment area whose treatments were performed on an extra contractual referral basis, 
as well as people fi*om practices that held a formal cost-per-case contract. The fund- 
holding population is defined according to the status of patients’ practices at the time of 
the surgery in order to make the size of the cost and volume plus block groups as 
meaningful as possible. In this way it captures all fimd-holding patients admitted under 
each form of contract that had their waiting time recorded. The analysis is unavoidably 
restricted to three years at Worthing and Southlands, plus one at the Royal West Sussex.
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Of the four cases featured in table 7.2, only one shows a statistically significant difference 
between practices using alternative forms of contract. Patients of the practice that had a 
cost and volume contract with Worthing and Southlands in 1993/94 had significantly 
longer waits than those from fimd-holders commissioning surgery on a cost-per-case 
basis. Yet the following year patients of this same practice had somewhat shorter waits 
than their cost-per-case counterparts, though not to a significant extent. Moreover, it is 
clear that patients fi*om practices utilising block contracts at Worthing and Southlands in 
1994/95 and 1995/96 did have longer waits that those admitted on a cost-per-case basis, 
even if not to a statistically significant extent. Yet this trend at Worthing and Southlands 
was reversed at the Royal West Sussex in 1995/96. In this latter case, patients fi'om the 
practice using a block contract had shorter waits than those admitted under cost-per-case 
agreements, although again not to a significant degree.
TABLE 7.2 - Comparison o f waiting times (in days) at two providers for operations covered by the fund- 
holding scheme on patients from the elective waiting list registered with fund-holding practices that 
purchased the service through cost-per-case, cost and volume, or block contracts
Cost-per-caac Cost and volume Block ANOVA
Provider and year Median Mean No. Median Mean No. Median Mean No. F crlt F obt P value
Royal West Sussex
1995-96 92.0 156.4 1194 - - 0 88.0 149.0 151 3.85 0.31 0.5772
Worthing Southlands
1993-94 82.0 127.6 1029 91.5 144.8 326 - - 0 3.85 4.71 0.0302
1994-95 76.0 122.8 2023 72.0 118.9 341 104.0 138.8 232 3.00 1.99 0.1368
1995-96 87.0 130.4 1296 78.5 130.5 750 93.5 139.1 662 3.00 1.26 0.2828
As such, no consistent trend is apparent. A case exists where patients of fimd-holders 
using block contracts had shorter waiting times than their cost-per-case counterparts (the 
Royal West Sussex in 1995/96), with the opposite being true elsewhere (Worthing and 
Southlands in 1994/95 and 1995/96). It is also possible to find a case where patients 
admitted under cost and volume agreements had shorter waits than those called in under 
cost-per-case contracts (Worthing and Southlands in 1994/95), as well as an example 
going the other way to this (Worthing and Southlands in 1993/94). Hence the waits of 
fimd-holding patients covered by different sorts of contract do not consistently reflect the 
trend that would support the contract type hypothesis. Patients called in under block
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contracts do not have significantly longer waits than those admitted on a cost-per-case 
basis. On balance, therefore, the hypothesis that waiting time variances are a result of 
the purchaser types tending to use different forms of contract lacks support.
RELATIONSHIPS
The foundation for the relationship hypothesis is the idea that different purchasers will 
have varying levels of influence over the people at hospitals who decide which patients 
should be admitted when for their operations. In itself this raises a number of queries 
concerning, for example, the identity of whoever makes this decision at the providers, 
which in itself connects to the administration of the admission process. Evidence linked 
to such issues came mainly fi’om interviews with twelve hospital consultants and the four 
chief executives fi’om the trusts, though six department managers were also seen at the 
providers. While the responses fi’om each individual source were compatible, at the 
margins they exhibit some variance in practice. Yet on a general level, consistent policy 
trends were evident.
Admitting patients
Admission policies for elective surgery and outpatient appointments differ. Concerning 
outpatient services all of the dozen consultants confirmed that on receiving referrals they 
categorise patients according to the degree of urgency indicated by the GP’s letter. This 
classification can often determine whether they see a patient themselves or pass them to a 
less senior colleague. Patients are then called in line with this urgency, with routine cases 
admitted in the date order of referral letters. All but one (eleven out of twelve) of the 
consultants said fund-holding status has no influence at all on the speed of admission for 
outpatient consultations. The exception claimed that in cases where the letter made it 
obvious the referral was not urgent, fund-holders may be called in a little sooner.
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Once seen in an outpatient clinic, patients requiring operations are categorised according 
to their clinical urgency and entered onto the waiting list. At this point clerks mark every 
patient’s notes and waiting list record according to whether or not they come from a 
fimd-holding practice. Because of this every consultant indicated the latest they became 
fully aware of whether a patient on the waiting list is with a fimd-holding practice was 
the time of their placement on the list. One made a typical response by stating, “quite 
simply, it would be impossible not to know”. All twelve consultants remarked that fimd- 
holding status makes no difference whatsoever to the waits of clinically urgent patients 
and planned admissions, but confirmed that in routine cases fund-holders are called in 
sooner, regardless of who takes the final decision.
Once people are on the waiting list with an urgency status, nine of the twelve consultants 
said they make the final decision as to which patients are called in when. The other three 
said their departmental manager, secretary or a waiting list clerk mostly makes this 
decision for routine status cases, two of them saying they had relinquished this job since 
the internal market began. One was happy with this change, made for administrative 
convenience, and without complaint would have followed the line of admitting fund­
holders sooner. The other also gave up the role willingly, but was uncomfortable with 
the expectation that he should admit fund-holding patients earlier and thus wanted such 
decisions taken out of his hands. As such, it appears that consultants admit fund-holding 
patients sooner in order to take account of the interests of their trust. This issue will be 
explored later.
These accounts given by the consultants agree with the views of the chief executives of 
the providers, although an important qualification was strongly emphasised by them 
which particularly corresponds with the reason one consultant gave for choosing to limit 
his role in deciding the admission order of patients. All four remarked that consultants 
have the prime role in deciding which individual patients are called in when, although this 
was put into context by a set of additional comments. For example, their decisions must 
“comply with the rules of the game”, their actions should be made “within an unwritten 
policy framework”, they are “given advice about their decision making”, and “their room
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for manoeuvring is restricted”. In sum, a heavy majority of consultants feel they still 
retain the final responsibility for admitting non-urgent patients, even though some do not 
get too involved in this decision and prefer leaving it to non-clinical staff. Nevertheless, 
such specific decisions appear to be shaped by wider organisational priorities.
It therefore seems feasible that if relationships had a major impact in driving waiting 
times, it is most likely to be the links purchasers have with consultants that could be the 
fulcrum of the idea. After all, it is they who mostly decide which individual patients are 
called in when, even if they work within a policy fi-amework. Also, the relationships 
between GPs and hospital consultants, by way of the referral system let alone any 
contractual link, probably represents the closest point of contact between key purchaser 
and provider agents. Yet there is more than a single way of looking at the relationships 
between consultants and purchasers. One option is to examine their relationships with 
the agencies that are the actual commissioners of their services, the health authority and 
fund-holding GPs. Another is to evaluate the nature of the contact between consultants 
and the people who drive their business -  all GPs, including non fund-holders.
Consultants, GPs and health authority staff
All the consultants denied that their personal relationships with individual GPs was in any 
way influenced by fund-holding, although one made a sweeping generalisation when he 
called non fimd-holders “apathetic”. The overriding view was that if there is any degree 
of fiiendship or hostility, it originated independently fi'om the scheme. Also, eight of the 
twelve consultants said they had very good relationships with GPs in general, three 
making the point that it was in their interests to maintain such friendships for the sake of 
receiving referrals to their private practices. In short, the scheme does not appear to 
affect the nature of the personal relationship between GPs and consultants.
Moreover, every consultant also claimed that even in cases where the style of their 
relationship with individual GPs differed, it had no bearing on the speed or quality of
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care given to patients. In line with this, one made the following comment. “There is no 
way I would allow my relationship with specific GPs or practices to influence the way I 
look after patients. Besides, if I did get on badly with any I would be unlikely to see 
many of their patients anyway. They are going to send their referrals to one of my 
colleagues rather than me”.
Also, only one of the dozen consultants felt he had more contact with partners of fund- 
holding practices than he did with GPs outside the scheme and claimed this had no effect 
on the waiting times of patients. Indeed, one of the other eleven commented that “fund- 
holding has increased the quantity and quality of dialogue between consultants and GPs 
in general, including non fimd-holders”. This complements the opinions given by another 
consultant, who stated that “today’s non fimd-holders are tomorrow’s fimd-holders. It 
would be pretty stupid for us to ignore them before they join the scheme as this would 
make it harder for us to keep their business once they are in it”.
Therefore, as far as the relationships between consultants and GPs are concerned, the 
interviews with consultant staff at hospitals strongly indicate that personal relationships 
do not have a material effect on the relative waiting times of fimd-holding and non fimd- 
holding patients. In sum, fimd-holding status allegedly made no difference to the 
relationships between individual consultants and GPs. Only one consultant out of twelve 
admitted that he had any more contact with fimd-holding GPs than those outside the 
scheme, and like the other eleven claimed that his personal relationships with specific 
GPs made not the slightest difference to the care received by patients.
There were some discrepancies between the level of contact different consultants had 
with health authority staff. The clinical directors generally, although not always, had 
more interaction with them than did the other consultants. The dealings between health 
authority personnel and consultants usually occurred through contract discussions and 
monitoring, plus events labelled as ‘strategy meetings’. One of the non-clinical directors 
claimed his main point of contact was as the recipient of “rude letters fi’om dogmatic and 
uninformed people who haven’t got a clue how to run a health service”. In the single
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case where a consultant had no personal contact, his impressions were derived from the 
perceptions of clinical colleagues who had.
There was a substantial overlap in consultants’ opinions about their relationships with the 
health authority managers, and it was not positive. The sole exception (out of twelve) to 
this trend called them “helpful”. One defined his association with them as characterised 
by “antipathy”, another thought they were “deeply unimpressive”, while someone else 
said, “it is very them and us, I just don’t rate them”. Another claimed he would “cross 
the road to avoid them”, whilst someone else volunteered the opinion that they were 
“complete wasters”. Others suggested they “couldn’t be much worse”, and that “as 
individuals they are probably quite pleasant people, although I find them rather secretive 
and I do think the best thing might be for the health authority to go bankrupt”, adding 
this would “get them off the scene”.
The consultants were also asked to compare fund-holders and the health authority as 
advocates of patients’ interests and classify each, taking their overall impression of fimd- 
holders as a group, into ‘good’, ‘medium’ or ‘bad’ categories. Only one consultant rated 
the purchaser types equally, ranking them as ‘medium’. The other eleven considered 
fimd-holders to be better than the health authority, all placing such practices in the 
‘good’ banding. Overall, four of them thought the health authority were worthy of a 
‘medium’ classification and the other eight considered them to be ‘bad’, one reinforcing 
this view with the word “extremely”. Interestingly the consultant who ranked both 
purchaser types as ‘medium’ qualified this by saying his opinion of fimd-holding was 
untypical of his colleagues, and after the interview introduced the clinical director of his 
department. He also agreed to answer the same set of questions and felt fimd-holders 
were ‘good’ and the health authority ‘medium’.
Beyond this, the consultants were also asked about their general attitudes towards the 
fimd-holding scheme. Remarks made previously by six departmental managers at the 
trusts that consultants had come to accept the scheme over time were confirmed. Seven 
out of twelve consultants were on balance supportive of it (indeed eight out of thirteen if
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the clinical director just mentioned in the previous paragraph is included in the total, and 
nine out of fourteen if the pilot interview is taken into account). One commented that it 
is a “potent force for producing positive change” and another said, “now everybody has 
got used to it, I and many of my colleagues would favour keeping it going”. These kind 
of responses are perhaps a surprisingly positive response to the scheme, and it thus 
appears that what could have been initial bitter opposition from consultants might have 
mellowed quite drastically.
This idea may even be reinforced because out of the five consultants opposed to it, the 
stand of four was not really staunch. One said, “I would probably rather see it abolished, 
even though they are better than the health authority, simply because I am opposed to 
market mechanisms. The problem I have is not so much with fund-holding but the whole 
internal market. I would also like to see the health authority abolished, even more so”. 
Another suggested, “it would be far more defensible if all practices were in it”, an 
attitude repeated by the interviewee who said, “it geed things up a bit. I don’t like it but 
it has improved over time. It should be abolished or made compulsory”. Someone else 
said, “I honestly think fund-holding is a very good thing, though either everybody or 
nobody should be in it. It is a very close choice for me due to the good job most fund­
holders have done in looking after their patients, yet I am a strong traditionalist regarding 
the order of our profession and I would vote to get rid of it, but only just”.
In line with the above views, all the consultants saw the opportunity driven by fund- 
holding to discuss service development with other doctors as preferable to dealing with 
the health authority. As a follow on to this response, one felt that, “by giving GPs more 
influence fund-holding has made consultants try harder to achieve better services. We 
now do the type of things we should, looking back, have been doing anyway”. Yet while 
these results may be surprising considering the reputation fund-holding has for equalising 
the hierarchical status of consultants and GPs, as referenced in the second chapter, the 
relationship hypothesis still seems to fall short of oftering a valid explanation for the 
occurrence of waiting time differences. Only one consultant said the different nature of
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his relationships with the two purchaser types had any consequence at all on the relative 
waiting times of their clients, and he described the effect as “negligible”.
In sum, the interviews with consultants strongly suggested that their relationships with 
health authority managers and GPs, both inside and outside the scheme, cannot be 
considered as a significant factor in driving the waiting time difierences between fund- 
holding and non fund-holding patients. Even though consultants predominantly consider 
fimd-holders to be better representatives of patients’ interests than the health authority, 
there is no evidence that this is the reason for the shorter waits of fimd-holding patients.
INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES
The kinds of information and incentives that are likely to be held by health authority staff 
and GP fund-holders in their commissioning functions were discussed in the second 
chapter. The ensuing section deals with the prospect that the information more readily 
available to GPs may be the type that lends itself best to commissioning elective surgery. 
Representatives fi'om each purchaser type, fimd-holding GPs plus the chief executive and 
director of public health for the health authority, were asked for their views on this 
matter. The investigation then progresses by assessing if specific incentives held by both 
GPs and health authority personnel has relevance to one purchaser type securing shorter 
waiting times for patients than the other.
Information
The first matter to consider is what kind of information would be required to secure 
shorter waiting times for elective surgery. Official publications have stressed the option 
of transferring patients to alternative providers when hospitals cannot offer satisfectory 
waits (see NHS Executive, 1996b; 1996d). The basic information required to utilise this 
action might be for a purchaser to hold accurate details of the waiting times for various
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operations at the hospitals in the surrounding area, so enabling them to switch referrals 
around accordingly. Nevertheless, on asking GPs about the extent of their knowledge of 
comparative waits at different NHS hospitals, the real situation falls short of satisfying 
this condition. This may well comply with the fairly limited differences in case mix for 
fimd-holders and non fund-holders, discussed in the sixth chapter. GPs’ attention to 
such issues was concentrated on those services with severely long waits at their local 
provider, not the position at competitors.
Moreover, only one out of the twelve fimd-holders named an awareness of comparative 
waiting times as a meaningful piece of information for GP purchasers, along with the 
even more important personal knowledge of her patients. This last factor was named by 
eleven of the GPs as the most critical source of data held by fimd-holding practices, one 
saying it is “information that cannot be replicated at the health authority”. It was felt that 
seeing patients in the surgery and obtaining feedback from them on hospital services 
placed GPs in a unique position to understand their patients’ needs and the standards of 
care at hospitals, even though they did not possess detailed knowledge on comparative 
waiting times. The one who did not select this factor as the most important information 
held by GPs for commissioning thought the comparative prices of alternative providers 
was more significant.
Beyond this, what is the position of the health authority in the context of information? 
Both of the health authority representatives felt their organisation hold a crucial quality 
as a commissioner in that they are in a good position to see the broader picture of the 
health service in the area. One of them called this an “overview” which enables them to 
piece things together. The other also maintained the health authority had a vital strategic 
function and had to retain a commissioning role for the sake of GPs who simply did not 
wish to get involved in purchasing.
Yet this raises the query as to what benefits any advantageous position in the context of 
strategic direction and overview provides for commissioning what services. After all, 
one of the health authority interviewees stressed that distinct services are best purchased
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at different levels, be it by individual practices, groups of practices, by single health 
authorities or at a grouped health authority level. This is an idea that appears to have a 
conceiting logic. The inference made by a health authority representative to this was 
that “low volume high cost services for chronic conditions” were best commissioned by 
health authorities for the sake of risk sharing. But this was the only sort of care that both 
mentioned should ideally be placed firmly in the health authority’s commissioning remit, 
apart from services for patients whose general practices choose not to participate in the 
commissioning frmction.
One made this point by saying, “GPs are closer to the action. Elective surgery should 
ideally be purchased at the level of general practice, along with just about all elective 
care. GP groups should also take responsibility for accident and emergency services.
The health authority must, however, retain the authority to monitor their performance”. 
The other representative of the health authority also considered the forms of information 
available to each purchaser made GPs the most appropriate purchasers of elective 
surgery, as well as many other things. Nevertheless, whilst putting forward the view that 
GPs must be fully involved in commissioning decisions, he did not see why they should 
need to actually hold budgets for this role themselves.
On balance, GPs feel their closeness to patients gives them important impressions of the 
relative standard of care offered by alternative hospitals. However, they do not hold the 
form of information -  a firm knowledge of the expected waits for common procedures at 
individual providers, that seems most applicable to reducing waiting times (even though 
they managed to do this). This suggests that there are other factors coming into play 
which are more important for lowering waits.
Incentives
This section examines whether the incentives of the purchaser types contribute to finding 
a convincing explanation for fund-holding patients tending to have significantly shorter
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waits for non-urgent elective surgery than their non fund-holding counterparts. The 
foundation of the inquiry into this issue was once again the interviews held with a dozen 
fund-holding GPs plus the chief executive and director of public health from the health 
authority.
The fundamental impression given by the health authority representatives was that many 
of the priorities for their organisation were essentially driven from what they called the 
“centre”. The ‘national planning guidance’, issued on an annual basis by the NHS 
Executive, was seen as a critical document in shaping their purchasing decisions. As a 
broad generalisation, a strong impression was given that health authority commissioning 
is a reactive process in which “national priorities come first”, followed by local targets. 
One of the interviewees also made the point that waiting times were a chief concern for 
them due to the patient’s charter targets. “Waiting times are important to us because we 
are told to make sure nobody waits longer than eighteen months by the secretary of state 
and regional chairman. We adopt a crude unselective approach. That must be the 
maximum wait for all procedures and all patients”. In sum, therefore, incentives at the 
health authority appear driven by higher levels in the machinery of government.
This was also linked to what they felt represented the health authority’s main leverage 
over NHS hospitals. One said, “trust boards and chief executives are personally 
accountable for meeting patient’s charter standards. They can be sacked if they don’t. 
We can call for outside objective audit if this happens, and can get the regional office 
involved”. Yet beyond the patient’s charter standards, the other admitted they held 
“very little” sway over providers in respect of reducing waiting times. “It is a sellers’ 
market. We are beholden to the trusts to grant us what they want to give”. From these 
comments, it looks as though the health authority possesses considerable leverage over 
providers to meet national targets, but not a great deal beyond that level. They admit 
their power to reduce waits beyond targets imposed by the government is severely 
compromised. In short, it seems the health authority has the incentive and leverage to 
stop waits exceeding national targets, but not much else.
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However, the opinions voiced by the health authority staff contrasted sharply with 
remarks made by the twelve GP fund-holders. Seven said that the objective to reduce 
waits for their patients was the major reason behind their practice’s decision to join the 
scheme, and for three of the others it was the second most important reason. Of the two 
where waiting times had a less significant role in the decision to become fund-holders, at 
one it had since become a very important aspect of their fund-holding status. The other, 
who was the only fimd-holder to even mention the patient’s charter, tried to quantify the 
relevance of reducing waits in their decision to join the scheme. He said it accounted for 
30 per cent of the decision, calling this a “smallish” consideration against the main 
reason, supporting the local hospital. For the other four practices where waiting times 
was not the biggest influence in making them join the scheme, two of whom were first 
wavers, keeping their referral fi^eedom was the most important factor for them all.
Therefore, the clear impression is that the patient’s charter waiting time standards which 
the health authority attempted to maintain for non fund-holding patients was not good 
enough for the large majority of practices coming into the fund-holding scheme. This 
seems the case even though that was the limit mentioned in the contracts between fund­
holders and providers. When asked what the main cause of this motivation to reduce 
waiting times was, one responded that it was to achieve a greater level of equity between 
NHS and private patients. Five said it was primarily to avoid patients coming to them to 
moan about their long waits, which was described by one GP as creating “unnecessary 
work” for them. The other six made comments that are indicative of knightly behaviour 
(see Le Grand, 1997). It was chiefly because they wanted to better the lot of their 
patients. Various comments reflected an aim to reduce the time people “spend in pain”, 
lessening patients’ “fiustration”, and lowering their “hardship”.
In sum, it therefore seems that the incentive to lower waiting times is stronger in the 
fund-holding community than at the health authority. At the latter, the strong impression 
was that the patient’s charter drives their resolve to control waiting time standards. GPs 
appeared more determined to reduce the waits of their patients, the motivation for which 
complies with ideas discussed in the second chapter. There looks to be a mix of wishing
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to improve the fortunes of their patients alongside a desire to make their own work 
routine less demanding by removing, or at least reducing, the likelihood of long-waiters 
complaining to them.
Moreover, this assessment of the incentives held by each purchaser conveniently moves 
the investigation towards the next section. Although GP fund-holders may be the more 
motivated of the two commissioner types in wishing to reduce waiting times, they still 
need a tool to enable them do this. That leads to the following question in the search for 
the reasons why fimd-holding patients generally had shorter waiting times than their non 
fund-holding counterparts. What did fimd-holders do to try and shorten waits, and how 
have hospitals reacted to them?
THE EXIT OPTION
When the twelve fimd-holders were asked what they had done to try to shorten waiting 
times, the responses were very similar. The only exception was the answer given by the 
GP mentioned a little earlier whose practice were least concerned with lowering waits, 
this accounting for 30 per cent of their decision to become fimd-holders. He said their 
patients’ waiting times had fallen at the local provider “without us really doing anything 
to make it happen ourselves”. All of the other eleven said their practice had been willing 
to move some of their referrals away from their local provider and had done this. “We 
do it to shake them up a bit”, was a typical comment made by one interviewee. Three 
qualified their responses by saying this line had been taken primarily in the first couple of 
years in the scheme and had since redirected back to the local provider most of the 
workload they had initially moved away from it. Indeed, despite the tendency to move 
referrals, all the GPs stressed the loyalty of their practice to the local NHS hospital.
When asked where their practices had sent most of the referrals that had been directed 
away from their local hospital, only one said mainly to another NHS provider, and that 
was outside West Sussex. Six said that while they had sent the majority of these referrals
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to the non-NHS sector, a significant minority had gone to other public providers, though 
again the hospitals mentioned in this context were outside the county in Brighton, 
Guildford, Portsmouth and Redhill. Five stated that it had largely been to non-NHS 
hospitals. Indeed, this use of non-NHS providers may also explain why the GPs did not 
give much priority to the relative waiting times of different public providers. It is surely 
safe for them to assume that waiting times in the private sector will be shorter than at 
public providers, so why concern themselves with memorising comparative waits at NHS 
hospitals? This finding may also update an observation of Mohan (1995) that there was 
little to suggest the private sector had received much income fi’om fimd-holders.
The fimd-holding GPs interviewed for the research put forward three constraints on 
redirecting referrals between providers. Firstly, a concern not to destabilise their local 
NHS hospital. Secondly, the lack of mobility in many of their patients. Thirdly, the 
higher prices of competitors compared to the main provider. Nevertheless, because the 
interviewees had stressed that they do switch some referrals between providers, these 
factors should be seen as limiting rather than preventing such action. Indeed, three of the 
twelve believed there was little restriction on them spreading referrals between a number 
of providers, although they were all from the area that used to be covered by the Mid 
Downs District Health Authority. In addition to the local private sector, this had three 
separate NHS provider units covering four acute hospitals within its boundaries (see 
figure 3.1), along with public hospitals just to the north of the county in Redhill and not 
far to the south in Brighton.
In brief, despite a perceived lack of mobility in some patients, fimd-holders try to shorten 
waits by switching referrals to different providers, even though they do not have a firm 
knowledge of comparable waiting times and have loyalty to their nearest public provider. 
Shaking the local NHS hospital up seemed the major rationale behind this action. To 
assess whether that shortens waits for fimd-holding patients, this point has relevance to 
the responses of interviewees representing the providers, to be reported shortly.
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Were referrals switched?
So far it has been established that GPs say they have tried to reduce waiting times by 
moving some referrals away from their local provider. It is, however, possible to put a 
little more ‘flesh on the bones’ regarding this declaration and assess whether there is any 
evidence that fimd-holders did switch referrals. If fimd-holders had moved work away 
from the NHS sector within the county, it could be expected that a lower ratio of fimd- 
holding patients would receive operations at such providers than the number received by 
non fimd-holders. This may still be the case, regardless of the greater throughput of such 
patients that is implied by their shorter waits. If fimd-holding patients received a higher, 
or even a similar ratio of operations, this may cast doubts on the claims made by the GP 
interviewees.
TABLE 7.3 - Operations covered by the fund-holding scheme performed on non fund-holding (health 
authority) andfund-holding patients from the elective waiting list at the Crawley Horsham, Mid Sussex, 
Royal West Sussex, plus Worthing and Southlands providers over four financial years
Health authority patients Fmwl holding patients
Number of Number of Operations per Number of Number of Operations per 
Year operations patients 1000 patients operations patients 1000 patients
1992-93 12358 629996 19.6 1894 124662 15.2
1993-94 11214 538304 20.8 3431 218374 15.7
1994-95 10008 446429 22.4 5933 311862 19.0
1995-96 9787 399639 24.5 6648 360845 18.4
Table 7.3 details the number of operations at the providers and years relevant to this 
study performed on NHS patients from the elective waiting list who were registered with 
fimd-holding and non fimd-holding practices at the time of the surgery. Because waiting 
times were not a consideration in this analysis, patients whose waits were not recorded 
are included in the totals. In every year there were less operations per thousand fimd- 
holding patients than there were for non fimd-holders. Whilst this is purely a numerical 
comparison with no weightings applied to the demographic profile of the populations, it 
conforms with the results that would be expected if fimd-holders had moved work away 
from the featured providers towards the non-NHS sector, or other public hospitals. This
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also complies with a remark by one of the consultants interviewed. “When practices join 
the scheme, about 10 per cent of their work with us disappears”.
Nevertheless, the point must also be made that rather than reflecting a trend for fimd- 
holding practices to move patients to other hospitals, their lower rate of surgical activity 
at the four providers could signify a lower referral rate by GPs inside the scheme. The 
information required for testing that idea is not available. However, if the data is 
accepted as suggesting that referrals were switched to some extent, many of the patients 
go to either a non-NHS provider, or a public hospital other than those featured in this 
research. For instance, if a practice in Chichester referred a patient to the Mid Sussex 
provider instead of the Royal West Sussex and that person subsequently received an 
operation, this would not affect the aggregated procedures per thousand patients. 
Correspondingly, the interviews with GP fimd-holders did suggest that many such 
movements in referrals were made to the non-NHS sector and this may account for a 
finding that was reported earlier, the views of the majority of consultants towards fimd- 
holding.
The reason for this is that the lists of clinicians working at local private hospitals clearly 
indicates that consultants fi’om nearby NHS trusts very largely comprise the medical staff 
at such non-public providers. Hence a cynical albeit perhaps quite a realistic view is that 
this could go some way to explaining the generally positive attitudes of the consultants 
interviewed for this study towards fimd-holding. The scheme may well have extended 
the profitability of their private practices.
From this, the data in table 7.3 seems to support the hypothesis that a market did exist in 
West Sussex’s health service between April 1992 and March 1996, complying with a 
viewpoint put forward by Glennerster et al. (1994a) following their research in other 
areas. GP fimd-holders themselves see many patients as not referable to hospitals other 
than their local provider (although some might live nearer a private institution anyway). 
But table 7.3 does suggest that proportionately more fimd-holding patients were referred 
to a hospital other than the four featured in this study, even though it is not conclusive
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proof of this. By suggesting fimd-holders did use the exit option in their commissioning 
strategies, this tightens the framework in which the interviews with hospital consultants 
and chief executives were conducted. It affords a greater degree of confidence in the 
notion that such practices utilised the exit option. The nucleus of the issue explored 
from this was whether it actually had an effect on waiting times.
Before moving on to the next stage of the investigation into the exit hypothesis, it should 
be noted at this point that the health authority representatives did not feel the movement 
of referrals between different providers was a realistic option for them. One explained 
the reason for this with the following example. While a strategic decision could be made, 
for instance, to open a new breast cancer centre at a trust, diverting relevant work to this 
service and away from the hospital that previously received such referrals was a matter 
for GPs. Hence the exit option, “in the final analysis”, was not seen as applicable to the 
health authority. The point was made that they “cannot stand over GPs when they make 
referrals and force them to move a certain percentage of their patients to a different 
provider”.
The inquiry into the exit hypothesis was continued when consultants and chief executives 
at the four providers were asked what they considered to be their own and the hospitals’ 
key priorities. In addition to this, they were asked why they routinely admit fund-holding 
patients with a routine clinical status sooner than such patients from non fund-holding 
practices. The responses thus provide the key information regarding the thought process 
behind admission policies. In deciding to differentiate between fund-holders and other 
patients, who was striving for what?
Hospital priorities
All four chief executives identified the financial well being of their organisation as having 
the utmost importance in their working lives, one describing this as “maintaining the 
financial viability of the trust”. Other named priorities included “sustaining emergency
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services” and “building the reputation of the trust as a quality provider”, this last point 
linked by the interviewee to securing income through attracting referrals. Ten of the 
twelve consultants cited financial survival as the main priority for their trust. Many of 
those mentioning finance as the most crucial priority also followed that up with a desire 
to be seen as providing good quality services. Indeed, the other two referred to the goal 
of being perceived as providing a good service as the chief concern, although they added 
that this did have implications for attracting business and money. Four of the consultants 
also mentioned a desire to “look after” or “stick up for” their department and to develop 
its status by attracting referrals.
Additionally, eight consultants saw their own priorities as closely matching this concern 
with financial viability. One gave an example of this attitude by saying, “if we fail to 
attract referrals the hospital loses income. The conclusion of that could ultimately be the 
trust going out of business. That would put me out of a job and immediately connects 
my own priorities with the financial well being of the trust”. The other four interviewees 
believed their own priorities were, as a whole, more ‘patient centred’ than those of their 
trusts’ management. However, three of this four, making a majority of eleven out of 
twelve, felt that on balance there was a still a high level of compatibUity between their 
own and the organisation’s priorities. One of them said, “they have to be similar. I’m 
going to be working here for the next twenty years”.
The comments of three consultants that mentioned the financial well being of the trust as 
their major priority seemed orientated towards the survival of personal careers. One said 
“we all want busy departments, otherwise there is a danger of appearing dispensable”, 
while another claimed that consultants who “don’t appear busy can fall by the wayside”. 
The single consultant who did not perceive much overlap between his own and the 
provider’s priorities, whilst stating he had retained some loyalty to the hospital, admitted 
to hoping that the “trust system bums in hell”. The weight given to the finance issue has 
been passed fi'om management to clinicians at the providers by a network of meetings, 
internal memorandums and by ‘word of mouth’ through informal discussions. A concern
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for the financial health of the organisation thus seems a working priority embracing both 
the chief executives and many consultants at the providers.
Moreover, this connects to the work of Harrison and Pollitt (1994). They claimed 
attempts had been made to incorporate clinicians into the wider financial goals of the 
NHS. Through a policy known as the resource management initiative, doctors had been 
made budget holders in order to create explicit financial responsibilities for them, but 
reported this as having only a limited impact. Yet they also saw the introduction of the 
quasi-market as compatible with attempts to incorporate clinicians, and the evidence here 
suggests it has had a more substantial effect. It would appear that many consultants 
share the financial objectives of their trusts. All of this puts a fi’amework around the 
responses to the most fundamental question asked during their interviews. For the non­
urgent elective surgery covered by the fund-holding scheme, why were fund-holding 
patients generally admitted sooner than their non fund-holding counterparts?
The rationale for waiting time differences
Every consultant stressed the central impact of financial considerations in the admission 
procedures at their trust for non-urgent surgery, all citing this as the dominant reason 
why fund-holders are called in sooner. The point was unanimously made that the need to 
maintain and preferably increase fund-holding income was the driving factor behind such 
patients’ shorter waits because of their capacity to transfer referrals to competitors. One 
described this as having a “very great effect”. Another said, “fund-holding money is the 
major *at risk’ element of our income. They do not actually have to become macho and 
threaten to move work away. Despite some patients’ lack of mobility, we know they can 
move enough at the margins to concern us, even fairly small practices. The shorter waits 
of fund-holding patients are designed to both nip this danger in the bud, and where it has 
started to stop it spreading”.
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Moreover, the declaration that fund-holders do not need to explicitly threaten to move 
work, or actually refer elsewhere, to shorten their patients’ waiting times was a blanket 
point from the consultants. Even though four of the consultants said some local fund­
holders had threatened to redirect referrals away from them, with one refusing to name 
them and another forgetting their identity, they all claimed this had not made them handle 
these particular practices’ patients any differently to those registered with other fund­
holders. Administrative convenience meant all fund-holding patients were taken as a 
block. In making this point, one said “we have not called their patients in any quicker, or 
slower, than anybody else’s. We were already fest tracking their patients because they 
are in the scheme. What more did they want and what more could we have done? 
Throwing threats around has no effect at all”.
Straightforward membership of the scheme therefore appears to have automatically 
reduced the waiting times of fimd-holders’ patients, regardless of practices resorting to 
coercive threat tactics which, according to the consultants, appear to be ignored.
Indeed, the GP that claimed his fund-holding practice had not redirected referrals away 
from the local provider also said their patients’ waits had feUen. The opportunity fund­
holders have to refer elsewhere and the prospect that such a pattern could spread, an 
apprehension which may be amplified when consultants notice a decline in the referrals 
they receive, appears fer more important in shortening waiting times than formal threats, 
idle or otherwise. It is the potential that practices have to refer patients elsewhere that 
appears the critical fector, with hospitals perceiving fund-holding work as equating with 
their income. In other words, if providers are to fWfil their potential income, they must 
at least retain (or preferably increase) the volume of fund-holding work they perform.
The consultants’ answers to this issue also reflected the responses of the providers’ chief 
executives. As one remarked, “the shorter waits of fund-holders’ patients is conqjletely 
driven by the aim of stopping them referring elsewhere. Otherwise, we lose income. For 
this reason we also hold down our prices to them, especially as we know they are under 
funded. We have also paid more attention to other aspects of service quality, like the 
turnaround in pathology tests, although this has benefited all GPs”. Another commented
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that “short waiting times are our main attraction to them, although we accept they are a 
pretty loyal lot round here. We don’t want to see any fund-holding work go elsewhere, 
and in truth we cannot afford to see it go elsewhere. We need to get their money in and 
even a marginal loss of fund-holding work is a problem”.
A further comment along the same line was made by the chief executive from the same 
trust as the consultant quoted earlier that used the term ‘at risk’ when talking of fund- 
holding income. Such phraseology has apparently caught on at that provider. “We call 
fimd-holders’ patients in earlier because we have to stop them referring elsewhere. 
Fund-holding work represents our ‘at risk’ income. We cannot lose their referrals, and 
we also try to avoid this by making our fund-holding prices competitive”. The same 
point was made as well by another chief executive. “We wish to stop them referring to 
other hospitals to maintain our income. Shorter waits for their patients are one way of 
doing this, along with building up the quality of our services. Fund-holding balanced the 
power between consultants and GPs and made us sharpen up our act, though the system 
should be simplified as it is rather fragmented. Even so, by comparison the health 
authority is not strong on commissioning”.
This last view was not a unique opinion amongst the provider chief executives. One of 
the others remarked that “fimd-holding is far better than health authority commissioning. 
It is because of them we had to get our act together to attract referrals. Fund-holders 
have brought the positive changes. Consultants used to like long NHS waiting lists for 
the sake of their private practice, but that has had to change. Clinical as well as financial 
viability means we cannot stand still. While there must be some grouping together I’d 
like to see the whole budget in the hands of GPs, away fi'om the health authority. There 
is no evidence they’ve achieved anything. They had their chance and lost it”. Similarly, 
another made the following comment. “We are in a purchaser driven environment and 
fund-holding has been a good thing and driven most improvements, but allocating 
resources to individual practices is difiBcult to get right. GP commissioning is the way 
forward, but in groups of practices as fund-holding needs to be streamlined”.
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Therefore, the exit option of fund-holding GPs is the basic reason why their patients 
were admitted sooner for non-urgent elective surgery than non fund-holders. The extent 
to which specific practices use this option looks immaterial. Administrative convenience 
and the potential of any fund-holding practice to refer patients to competitors resulted in 
there being a blanket approach to the fund-holding population. They were routinely 
admitted sooner regardless of other factors. Further, the provider representatives claim 
they also try to restrain their price increases to fund-holders and improve the quality of 
services. Moreover, whilst shorter waits and price controls are specifically aimed at 
fimd-holders, each respondent that mentioned service quality maintained that this also 
benefited non fund-holding patients. As one consultant said, “after patients are admitted, 
there is no differentiation between them. Non fimd-holders have to wait longer, but once 
they are in they get exactly the same level of care as fimd-holders”.
CONCLUSION
Many findings reported in this chapter were detected through the core of the qualitative 
research applied in this study, complementing the use of a quantitative approach to 
investigate the efifect of varying contract types. For that enquiry a clear trend in the 
waits of fimd-holding patients called in under different forms of contract did not arise. 
Where fimd-holders used a mix of contract types, there were instances when patients 
admitted under each form of agreement had the shortest waits, though such a difference 
was statistically significant in only one out of four cases. This hardly looks conclusive 
proof that cost-per-case arrangements automatically drive shorter waits than the other 
forms of contract. Further, the idea that waiting times might be an outcome of formal 
demands in contracts does not appear sustainable due to both the lack of precise 
specifications in the actual agreements and also the answers given during the interviews 
with hospital consultants.
There is no evidence to suggest that contrasts in waiting times were determined by the 
relationships between representatives of the purchasers and providers. Moreover, fund-
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holding GPs do not appear to hold the most obvious piece of information for shortening 
the waits of patients, the comparative waiting times of different providers. However, the 
determination of each purchaser type to reduce waits does appear explicitly stronger in 
the fund-holding community than at the health authority. Incentives to GPs derive 
mostly from two potential benefits. First, improving the lot of their patients. Second, 
lowering the likelihood of frustrated patients complaining to them about the length of 
their waits. The motivation to shorten waits at the health authority goes as far as 
meeting national standards.
Fund-holders attempted to reduce waiting times by referring to other providers. Whilst 
they do not claim to know how public hospitals compare in this respect, at least beyond 
their knowledge of what services have very long waits at the local provider, a large 
proportion of such redirected referrals allegedly go to the non-NHS sector. Moreover, 
this links to the reasons given by the chief executives and consultants of the featured 
providers for admitting routine status fund-holding patients more quickly than their non 
fund-holding counterparts. They cannot afford to lose the income related to this work, 
so give priority to bringing fund-holding patients in earlier to avoid their GPs sending 
them elsewhere. The interviewees from providers saw this as the main way in which they 
can attract fund-holding work and income, although the control of prices and service 
quality issues were not ignored either.
From this, there may be rather paradoxical incentives influencing the behaviour of key 
agents within the quasi-market. On the one hand fund-holders have used the exit option 
to reduce their patients’ waiting times, often referring to the non-NHS sector to do this. 
Yet at the same time they frequently stressed a desire not to destabilise the local NHS 
provider. Meanwhile, consultants tend to admit such practices’ clinically routine patients 
earlier than those from non fund-holders to safeguard their NHS hospitals’ budgetary 
position. Alongside this, most of the financial benefits from fund-holders using the non­
public sector when exercising the exit option could well pass to NHS surgeons. Trust 
consultants seem to comprise much of the medical staffing establishment of many private
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providers. Consultants and GPs thus appear to perform a balancing act in which they 
weigh up the interests of hospitals, themselves and patients in their decision making.
The next chapter will draw together the evidence detailed in this and previous chapters in 
order to outline what the research says on a theoretical level about purchasing leverage 
and hospital behaviour in the quasi-market, as well as efficiency and equity. It will also 
deal with the issue described in the last paragraph in which GPs and consultants may 
have to balance not only competing pressures, but also contrasting or even conflicting 
interests. In light of the forthcoming development of Primary Care Groups, the findings 
of this study are then used to put forward a set of policy recommendations.
C h a pters
Leverage, hospital behaviour, efficiency, equity and policy
This study has moved the debate about the possibility of a two-tier service between fund­
holders and other patients beyond the former reliance on anecdotal evidence. Fund- 
holding patients on the elective waiting list at four public providers did tend to have 
shorter waiting times for the operations covered by the fund-holding scheme than non 
fund-holders. Various hypotheses were investigated that could explain this phenomenon, 
ranging from an idea that GP fund-holders systematically received overgenerous budgets, 
the case mix differences of the populations, and contrasts in the way each purchaser type 
performs their role. The reason was a component of the last of these factors. Whilst 
GPs had more desire than health authority managers did to shorten waits beyond national 
standards, motivation and incentives alone are not enough. They need to be backed up 
with a ‘tool’ to do the job and this was supplied by the exit option, their capacity to refer 
to alternative hospitals, or at least being perceived as able to do so by providers.
A key task of this chapter is to use that finding to consider the policy implications of the 
research. With regard to this objective, important characteristics of the quasi-market will 
be explained in a theoretical context, in particular covering the concepts of purchasing 
leverage, hospital behaviour, efficiency and equity. The evidence from this study in the 
light of these factors will then lead to a discussion concerning the implications of the 
research for the Primary Care Groups that are proposed in the Labour Government’s 
White Paper (Department of Health, 1997).
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PURCHASING LEVERAGE
The objective of the 1991 reforms to increase the responsiveness of NHS providers was 
discussed in the first chapter. This research indicates that fund-holders acquired shorter 
waits for their patients by increasing the responsiveness of hospitals more than the health 
authority were able to do, despite such practices being individually and collectively the 
smaller commissioner of elective surgery. Because it is tempting to associate purchasing 
leverage with resource capacity, this may not be expected. If both a large and a small 
commissioner used the same provider for the supply of a good or service to an extent 
that correlated with their relative sizes, the larger one may negotiate a 'better deal*, 
perhaps securing a quicker delivery, a cheaper price, or a higher quality product.
To take an example fi'om the commercial world, Rees (1969) implied some three decades 
ago that Marks and Spencer, a very large retailer, had developed considerable influence 
over its suppliers. If, as seems likely, the company has grown since then, this influence 
has probably also swelled. Although such relationships may be conducted on very good 
terms, they could conceivably incorporate a degree of domination. Hence if Marks and 
Spencer used the same manufacturer that supplies one of its best selling dresses as a 
number of independent single shop boutiques that sell an identical garment, it seems 
rational to presume the following. The manufacturer will be more dependent on its trade 
with Marks and Spencer for its survival or growth. In turn, the supplier would give the 
greatest priority to maintaining its custom with Marks and Spencer, who should thus be 
able to negotiate or demand gains that may not be available to the individual boutiques.
Although the NHS was a quasi-market for a completely different type of commodity to 
this example, in terms of size and financial resources it seems appropriate to think of the 
health authority as the Marks and Spencer of the two purchaser types and fund-holders 
as the single shop boutiques. Nevertheless, to use an analogy, within the West Sussex 
internal market the boutiques were often getting better delivery dates for elective surgery 
than Marks and Spencer. Holding the larger budget failed to give the health authority 
the purchasing leverage to reduce patients’ waiting times below national standards.
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regardless of how much motivation they had to try and do this. Interviewees ifrom the 
trusts also implied that attempts were made to restrain the prices charged to fund-holders 
and improve the standards of services, although benefits arising from the latter were 
carried through to non fund-holding patients as well.^ ® Indeed, the idea that trusts try to 
attract referrals by enhancing service quality was discussed by Barker et al. (1997).
Yet it is still essential to expand upon the exit hypothesis to explain the true nature of 
purchasing leverage. The greater distance between health authorities and their client 
population than the relatively limited gap between GP fund-holders and their patients 
was discussed in chapter two. The theory was that this could enable partnerships to 
decide to send patients to a range of alternative hospitals whereas health authorities may 
have to second-guess the demand for services at various providers, or persuade (perhaps 
force) non fund-holders to refer within set guidelines. But during their interviews fund- 
holding GPs revealed they send the large majority of their patients to the local hospital. 
The exit option was therefore probably utilised for a minority of fund-holding patients 
(with one consultant claiming this was about 10 per cent). It is thus only at the margins 
that such practices direct referrals between alternative providers, making it necessary to 
clarify why the exit option may work for fund-holders but not for health authorities.
For although the fund-holding GPs indicated that the maintenance of referral freedom 
was a consideration in the decision of some practices to join the scheme, the potential to 
switch referrals also rests with non fund-holders. This is because the annual Contract 
Directory of the West Sussex Health Authority shows that it has formal contractual 
agreements with numerous providers around the south east of England. Considering this 
broad spectrum of hospitals that non fund-holding GPs can use, they could have the 
opportunity to switch referrals. While they might be more restricted than fimd-holders
20. Representatives of the trusts made no claims that they try to constrain their charges to the health 
authority. This, alongside the attempts to check the prices charged to fund-holders, could support a 
hypothesis advanced in the fifth chapter that the health authority might be paying more than fimd- 
holders for specific episodes of elective care.
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through feeling constrained by health authority managers to only use the public sector 
when doing this, the chance to ‘shake up’ their local NHS hospital should still exist.
Some practices may be reluctant to do this, perhaps not being too concerned about their 
patients’ waiting times or loyal to a provider. However, the first attitude was evident in 
one of the interviews with a fund-holding GP, and he reported their patients’ waits had 
been lowered without them doing anything specific to make this happen, whilst others 
also claimed to be very loyal to their local provider. Yet hospital representatives said 
that no differentiation was made between patients of fund-holding practices on the basis 
of either referral patterns or anything else, so the same principle could apply to non fund­
holders.
A question that arises from this is why the exit option works for fund-holding practices 
but not for non fund-holders. A comprehensive understanding of purchasing leverage 
thus needs to go beyond a simple acceptance that the exit option applies only to fund- 
holding GPs, because non fund-holders are not always tied to just one hospital. Hence it 
is sensible to again consider the nature of the contractual relationships between the 
purchaser types and providers.^^ This may clarify why budget size in the NHS might not 
have the same relationship with purchasing leverage as in the private sector, assuming 
that in the latter, abundant financial resources enable a greater degree of control over 
suppliers. This was the basis for the idea that Marks and Spencer will enjoy a much 
stronger negotiating position with a clothing supplier than single shop boutiques.
Part of the explanation for this might be the fact that there is a constant cycle of firms of 
various sizes in the private sector going out of business. In many cases the only people 
who are really going to take any great notice are the creditors, staff and shareholders, 
and such news is rarely worth extensive media coverage. If Marks and Spencer decided
21. Flynn and Williams (1997) suggested that modes of contracting in the NHS internal market have 
been divided into two camps, hard and soft contracting. Hard contracts are the more prescriptive, 
embodying close surveillance and sanctions. Soft contracts function symbolically as a general 
statement of intent, so providing a framework for collaborative work. Lapsley and Llewellyn (1997) 
have discussed the use of soft contracts in social care.
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to move its custom away from a supplier, this could conceivably close it down. If this 
happened, it is feasible that there would not be enough negative publicity about such an 
event to make Marks and Spencer reconsider the decision and persevere with the existing 
arrangements. Hence in this kind of scenario companies like Marks and Spencer could 
have enormous power over their suppliers.
But this example has important differences to the NHS. If a hospital was closed down 
the media coverage and public outcry may create considerable embarrassment for 
politicians. It is thus difficult to imagine that any such decision would be taken locally 
without prior approval from higher levels in the NHS structure, at which there may also 
be a reluctance to grant permission for an action of this type. If such a decision was 
made independently at local level, it could endanger the careers of individuals involved in 
making the unpopular decision. This view was validated in managerial jargon by one of 
the health authority interviewees who said that closing a public acute hospital could be 
seen as an “unwise career move”. This can now be considered alongside the relative 
financial resources of the purchaser types.
Because most, indeed the large majority, of the resources available for commissioning 
health care services has been in the hands of health authorities, the contracts such bodies 
hold with their local providers will be of a substantial size. Probably so large that any 
decision by a health authority to take a large amount of money from a provider may well 
threaten the financial security of the trust. Yet while health authorities yield a decisive 
influence on the survival prospects of local trusts, the political sensitivity attached to the 
closure of NHS hospitals means this could weaken their purchasing leverage. As such, 
health authority purchasing strategies might be locked into safeguarding the survival of 
local NHS hospitals, regardless of whether non fund-holding GPs spread their referrals 
around alternative providers.
The role of health authority agreements, which are not attributable to definite costs for 
specific treatments like fund-holders’ block, cost-per-case, or cost and volume contracts, 
can be seen as covering most of the fixed running costs of local NHS providers. Hence
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they might have less to do with obtaining added patient benefits, like shortening waiting 
times beyond national targets. And because health authority agreements give less 
priority to equating payments with the level of service provision than fund-holders* 
contracts, if non fund-holding GPs moved patients away fi'om a hospital, this might not 
concern its management nearly as much as if fund-holding practices did this. No direct 
or immediate loss of cash will result for the provider. Health authority money was not 
‘at risk’ in the same way that fund-holding income had been.
Competition between providers in the quasi-market may thus have existed at the margins 
for a limited number of fimd-holding patients. Hospitals gave them quicker access times 
for non-urgent elective surgery to avoid their GPs sending them elsewhere. Hence the 
size of a purchaser’s budget seems less relevant to purchasing leverage than a capacity or 
willingness to execute the exit option, but only when money follows the patient. But the 
way in which the quasi-market worked in this respect does not mean the purchaser types 
operated under different regulations. There is no published rule that formally bans health 
authorities fi'om closing NHS providers, even though in reality there are factors that can 
stop this happening. Health authorities and fimd-holders tended to perform their roles as 
commissioners in dissimilar circumstances, not under different regulations.
The competition over a relatively small number of patients may also explain how fund- 
holding GPs perform a balancing act of trying to motivate the local provider to reduce 
waiting times, while at the same time wishing to support the very same hospital. To use 
the proportions of the consultant quoted earlier, if they still send the large majority, say 
90 per cent, of their patients to the local provider, this may well satisfy their longing to 
consider themselves loyal. It is the competition for the other 10 per cent that shakes the 
hospital up, shortens waits, and lowers the number of complaints received fi'om patients. 
Yet this might not be a sufficient quota to trouble the conscience of GPs in the context of 
the provider’s viability. As a small purchaser, they could realise that on their own they 
cannot close a hospital, certainly with a relatively small proportion of their list size being 
referred to a competitor. So they would find themselves in a position to use the exit 
option whilst also supporting the nearest trust.
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This led five out of the twelve GP fimd-holders interviewed for the study to say their 
purchasing leverage was raised by their smaller budgets, although opinion was divided on 
this issue. Six felt their relatively small budgets reduced their negotiating strength and 
the other was uncertain, saying it could go “either way”. The forthcoming development 
of larger Primary Care Groups will perhaps show which view has most validity, and the 
later discussion of the policy in^lications of the research will address how a degree of 
purchasing leverage might be maintained for such bodies in the future.
Allied to ideas about the enhanced leverage of fund-holders, it may also be reinforced by 
a common perception of the financial environment of the NHS. There is a tendency for 
the service to be seen as permanently under funded (see Kember and Macpherson, 1994). 
In this climate, more priority could be attached to the potential income from fund-holders 
than if the finances of providers were considered comfortable. Although individual fimd- 
holding practices may not have the budgets to close a trust down, in an environment that 
many could see as * short-changed' their money is made critical because it is not safe, and 
it follows patients to a greater extent than income from health authorities.
In brie^ the case put forward is that the key to purchasing leverage in the NHS quasi­
market might be for a single commissioner to hold a small enough budget to free them 
from a primary obligation to maintain a hospital's financial stability. Health authorities 
have this responsibility far more than fund-holders. Any such advantage for fund-holders 
could be amplified by a belief that the NHS is under fimded. This means the potential 
income from such practices, which is more attributable to the number of patients treated 
than is the case with health authority finance, cannot be written-ofif by providers as 
peripheral. Therefore, the way the internal market was structured has given support to 
the theory that smaller purchasers will be more effective in gaining benefits for patients 
than large commissioners because of their flexibility (discussed in chapter two). The 
relevance of this to the way Primary Care Groups function will be addressed later.
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HOSPITAL BEHAVIOUR
This section moves the theoretical focus of the chapter onto the evolution in models of 
hospital behaviour. McGuire et al. (1988) maintained that much of the literature on this 
subject comes from the US. They suggested that there are only a few such models, 
mainly because there is no firm idea of what a typical hospital looks like and it is difficult 
to identify the chief decision-makers within them. Nevertheless, they outlined models of 
hospital behaviour that had been formulated. For example, hospitals could attempt to 
maximise output alongside a consideration of service quality. Another model sees the 
maximisation of a hospital’s status as an important goal. Others focused on the varying 
internal structures of different hospitals, with there being a balance between the relative 
strength of doctors and managers in the decision-making process. Although there was 
often a failure to define the impact of this on conduct, the medical and ethical motives of 
doctors can still be seen as having a material impact on hospital behaviour.
Eastaugh (1992) also wrote that most of the existing literature on hospital behaviour, 
incorporating physician behaviour, originates from America and has been characterised 
by two approaches, each trying to identify the primary motives which drive conduct. 
Utility maximisation covers such issues as profit, professional status, leisure time, ethics, 
study time, the number of support staff, plus the complexity and interest of case mixes. 
Profit maximisation grants a higher status to one of these factors, the role of profit as an 
incentive, defining this as the most important motive determining behaviour patterns.
Yet both sets of theorists accept that behaviour is too complex to be explained solely by 
profit motives, and the general vagueness of such findings may endorse Donaldson and 
Gerard’s (1993) claim that the literature lacks a satisfactory theory of hospital behaviour.
The non-profit sector
It is noteworthy that Bartlett et al. (1994) referred to public providers in the NHS quasi­
market as ‘not-for-profit’ organisations. In using this term they were evidently referring
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to financial profit and, considering that a primary goal of private firms is to make one 
(see Oleck, 1956; Cyert, 1988), such hospitals were being distinguished fi’om commercial 
enterprises. Whilst NHS trusts are empowered to make operating surpluses and are also 
required to meet financial targets (Propper and Bartlett, 1997), the term ‘not-for-profit’ 
means that surpluses must be ploughed back into the corporation rather than provide 
additional monetary rewards to its managers (Bartlett, 1995). This definition matches 
the opinion of Weisbrod (1988) that ‘non-profit’ institutions are designed to prevent 
entrepreneurs reaping monetary benefits through increasing the organisation’s surplus. 
Consequently, the phrase ‘not-for-profit’ appears to overlap closely with the expression 
‘non-profit’.
Most of the literature on the non-profit sector also originates fi’om the US,^  ^leading 
Young (1993) to his judgement that the subject was discovered there. Some work on 
this topic loses relevance to the NHS by focusing on charitable and private bodies rather 
than the public domain (for example, see Dobkin Hall, 1987; Douglas, 1987; Young, 
1987). Notwithstanding this, studies of the motives underlying the sector can be found 
in the non-profit literature (see McLaughlin, 1986; Young, 1983). Indeed, Hansmann 
(1987) divided the economic theories on non-profit bodies into two groups. Some deal 
with the role of such institutions, including public goods theory and contract failure 
theory, while others focus on organisational behaviour, like the optimising models.
With regard to the optimising models, it has been alleged that non-profit organisations 
have strong incentives to accumulate financial surpluses (Tuckman, 1993; Tuckman and 
Chang, 1993). Linked to this point, Starkweather (1993) addressed the issue of non­
profit hospitals making profits and argued that the word ‘profit’ was often used loosely 
in relation to the sector, applied interchangeably with terms like ‘earnings’ and ‘net
22. For example, see Bennett and DiLorenzo (1989); Carbone (1993); Craig Jenkins (1987); Galambos 
(1993); Ctessler (1986); Hammack and Young (1993); James (1987); Jencks (1987); Knoke (1993); 
Marmor et al. (1987); Milofsky (1987); Nelson (1993); Ostrom and Davis (1993); Rudney (1987); 
Salamon (1987); Simon (1987); Skloot (1987); Timpane (1993); Useem (1987); Ylvisaker (1987).
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income’. This was seen as narrowing the distinction between for-profit and non-profit 
hospitals beyond recognition.
Hospital behaviour in the quasi-market
The idea about a narrowing distinction between for-profit and non-profit hospitals makes 
it easier to understand the behaviour patterns of public providers in the internal market. 
Regardless of staff at NHS providers not being allowed to procure their organisations’ 
surpluses for themselves (outside of factors like performance bonuses), the incentives to 
secure income might be almost as strong as in the for-profit private sector. Trusts have 
to meet financial targets (Propper and Bartlett, 1997) and if performance falls short of 
reaching them, career prospects could be undermined. The survival of careers, jobs and 
organisations is a powerful motive and in a climate where employment security in the 
public sector has been squeezed (see Kessler and Bayliss, 1992), it seems reasonable to 
infer that this will be the case in the NHS.
From this, by introducing a greater set of competitive pressures into a service that many 
may see as under funded, the internal market drove providers into unwritten admission 
policies that differentiated between fimd-holding and other patients for non-urgent 
elective surgery. The rationale for this was to safeguard the element of their potential 
income that is most ‘at risk’, the resources held by fimd-holders. The financial priorities 
of NHS hospitals was the catalyst for competition between them, and this occurred over 
what was proportionately a fairly marginal number of patients. Those considered by 
their fimd-holding GPs to be mobile, even though this did benefit a much wider group, 
the non-urgent fimd-holding population as a whole.
Also, both hospital managers and most consultants identified with the broad financial 
interests of their organisation. Hence the survival of trusts can be seen as relevant to the 
utility of non-clinicians and doctors alike. For most consultants this appears to have a 
higher standing in the hierarchy of priorities than issues that might be seen as ethical
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considerations like the equality of access to services. The importance given by clinicians 
to the broad financial security of their hospitals can be seen as verified by the remarks of 
every consultant that was interviewed for the research. While three of the twelve felt 
that attracting fund-holding work helped their departments’ prestige, they all said that 
the income derived from admitting fund-holding patients earlier went to the trust as a 
whole, not specifically to them or their individual specialties. So how does this finding 
relate to the previously mentioned balancing act that may see surgeons weigh the 
interests of their NHS provider against the profitability of their own private practices?
The answer to this question could be that whilst welcoming fund-holding referrals to 
their private practices, they might continue to arrange the work they receive at NHS 
hospitals in a way that benefits the financial status of that provider. This means calling in 
routine status fund-holding patients sooner than their non fund-holding counterparts. As 
such, the interests of both the consultants and their NHS hospital might be met, at least 
to an extent. Whilst raising their non-NHS income by accepting fund-holding referrals to 
their private practice, the work that is left for them at public hospitals is performed, or at 
least arranged, in a way that helps the financial status of that provider. Consultants also 
consider the financial well being of their NHS hospital to be in their personal interests. 
From this, the evidence as it relates to NHS providers seems to correlate with the profit 
maximising models of hospital and physician behaviour, even though this is an example 
where the word ‘profit’ has been used interchangeably with the term ‘income’.
EFFICIENCY
Three aspects of efficiency were described in the first chapter of this thesis, productive 
and allocative efficiency, plus X-efficiency. The effect of the quasi-market on allocative 
efficiency, the distribution of resources in a way that produces the closest possible match 
between what can be produced and what consumers want, is at best unclear and at worst 
unknown. If, as seems very likely, patients want shorter waiting times, fund-holding 
appears more effective at facilitating this than health authority purchasing.
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However, this may benefit just those non-urgent patients registered with fund-holding 
practices, not the whole clinically routine population. The internal market might have 
been efficient on an allocative basis for some, but not others. There is also some doubt 
as to whether or not the shorter waits of fund-holders were gained at the expense of non 
fund-holders having longer waiting times. The zero-sum effect was addressed in chapter 
four. The data fi’om figures 4.4 to 4.7 does not show the actual trends in waiting times 
were the same as would be expected if fund-holders had shorter waits due to the longer 
waits of non fund-holders. Nevertheless, it would be sensible to temper any rejection of 
the zero-sum effect with caution. The evidence falls short of being truly conclusive.
Regarding X-efficiency, no claims are made that this study has addressed the relative 
costs of health authority and GP fund-holder commissioning, though it seems reasonable 
to accept that fund-holding is the more expensive of the two systems (see Davies, 1995). 
Therefore, if the outcomes fi’om fund-holder and health authority commissioning were 
similar, the former might not score very well if A^efficiency were the sole criterion for 
measuring the success of the two systems. The higher transaction costs caused by the 
fund-holding scheme could make it more X-inefficient than health authority purchasing, 
without bringing any added benefits for patients. But as was implied when Glennerster 
(1996) reported a small cost-benefit study that suggested the advantages of fund-holding 
might outweigh the costs, reality is not so straightforward.
This is because the efficiency goals of the 1991 reforms were not just about AT-efficiency, 
and for non-urgent patients needing operations the outcomes fi’om the two systems were 
not the same. Those registered with GP fund-holders tended to benefit fi'om significantly 
shorter waiting times, and this was shown not to be derived fi’om factors that would 
make the performance of such practices spurious, like receiving overgenerous budgets or 
chance case mix contrasts. Moreover, if productive efficiency is explicitly connected to 
expanding patient throughput, this is an area where fund-holding begins to score well, 
certainly far better than health authority purchasing. And at the level of patients, where 
the preference for quick treatment is indicated by people paying for private health care
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(see Calnan et al., 1993), this higher output by hospitals seems an unambiguous gain in 
quality for the NHS. For patients may enjoy benefits like suffering less inconvenience, 
pain, or returning to work earlier (as discussed beforehand).
From this, in the context of productive efiBciency, commissioning health care services 
could be a fimction where the cheap option is not necessarily cheerful, in that you get 
what you pay for. There may well be an element of truth in that argument, but evidence 
produced for this thesis appears to indicate that fund-holding could have been made less 
expensive without losing effectiveness. For exanq)le, NHS trusts have contracts with all 
the fund-holding practices in its catchment area. These are large documents, ofl;en more 
than thirty pages. Discussions with hospital and practice managers suggest that many 
hours have been spent negotiating these over the years, outside the topic of waiting time 
standards. To an extent this might have been more necessary in the past. For instance, 
perhaps better information is now given in referral letters and discharge notices.
Yet the evidence fi'om the seventh chapter suggests that contracts have little or no 
influence on patients’ waiting times, and this does beg the question on how much notice 
is actually paid to the rest of the agreements, whatever they might say. The opinion of 
hospital and practice managers was that time and money could be saved by cutting down 
on the work attached to contract negotiation. Indeed, this must have been done in some 
areas of the country as sample provider contracts fi'om outside the county were produced 
that comprise just a very few pages.^^ As one manager at a practice said, “the only 
important page is the one itemising our financial commitment. The contracting process, 
like many aspects of the scheme, has been made unnecessarily bureaucratic by a health 
authority who say a whole host of worthless jobs must be performed to keep the auditors 
happy”.
When speaking of the bureaucratic nature of some elements of fund-holding other than 
the contracting process, the above manager expanded on the point by confirming he was
23. The best examples of this were the contracts produced by both the Guy’s and St Thomas’ Hospital 
Trust in London, plus the Southampton University Hospitals NHS Trust.
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talking about practices recording every item of care covered by the scheme on their own 
computer systems. He argued that providers’ printouts are now accurate enough to 
make this a “futile exercise”, although spot checks would still be necessary to identify 
any drop in standards relating to the correctness of the hospital data. As such, it may 
have been possible to retain the benefits of GP purchasing, if that is what shorter waiting 
times are considered to be, and limit the costs of fund-holding. Moreover, in accordance 
with the setting of combined management cost envelopes for health authorities and 
Primary Care Groups in each area (see Department of Health, 1997), the government is 
obviously intending to pin down future transaction costs. Nonetheless, this might have 
been possible under the fimd-holding scheme.
In sum, it seems that fimd-holding was successful in raising the responsiveness of NHS 
hospitals to extend the rate of patient throughput, relative to the outcomes from health 
authority commissioning. Yet it was probably quite expensive to run, even though some 
of the costs of the system might have been avoidable. As the scheme stood, therefore, 
the cost of a greater degree of productive efficiency could have been a lower level of X~ 
efficiency. This judgement falls into place with a point made in the first chapter, that the 
quasi-market reforms should be seen as concerned with enhancing productive efficiency 
as much, or perhaps even more so, than with cost containment. However, if one part of 
a dual-purchasing configuration is more effective than the other is in extending hospital 
responsiveness, only one group of patients is likely to reap the accrued benefits of this. 
Equity is therefore an important consideration in any review of the policy implications of 
this study.
EQUITY
One place from which to start a discussion about the implications for equity of any future 
NHS reforms is to address how equitable, or inequitable, the quasi-market actually was. 
On the face of it, that may seem a strange starting point. There was a two-tier service 
for patients awaiting non-urgent elective surgery, so at first glance it is understandable
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why some would write the internal market and fund-holding experiments off as a blight 
in the history of a service initiated to reduce inequity. Moreover, such attitudes connect 
to Mooney and McGuire’s (1987) observation that equity and equality are often coupled 
in the health care literature. Yet the two concepts are not the same. The argument may 
therefore rely on either a mistaken definition of equity, confusing it with equality, or 
ignore the fact that equity in the NHS can work at more than a single level, such as 
between separate purchasers and also different groups of patients.
The basis for this judgement relates to the point that inequality does not necessarily imply 
inequity. As Le Grand (1991b, p. 11) wrote, debates are often confiised by a failure to 
distinguish properly between equity and equality, and ‘the two concepts are in fact quite 
distinct’. A foundation for this idea was that equity is compatible with an equality of 
choice. For a fictitious example of this, say that under some form of enterprise start-up 
scheme the state gave a couple of its citizens in identical circumstances £5,000 each, this 
could be seen as equitable (at least between the two of them). One started a legitimate 
business with the money and through hard work made it a success, soon becoming a 
millionaire. Meanwhile, the other used the entire handout to feed a cocaine habit, and as 
a result ended up destitute. The financial outcome is that these two individuals are not 
equal, but the inequality was not caused by inequity. They each chose to use the money 
in different ways.
This notion can be applied to the West Sussex internal market as follows. For operations 
covered by the fund-holding scheme performed on people fi’om the elective waiting list, 
patients registered with GP fund-holders generally had shorter waiting times than their 
non fund-holding counterparts. In that respect the system was unequal. If this inequality 
had arisen because fund-holding practices had constantly received overgenerous budgets, 
the system would also have been inequitable. Yet the fifth chapter of this thesis showed 
that fund-holding practices in West Sussex had not been systematically over funded for 
operations. The inequality in waiting times was not a result of financial inequity between 
the commissioners. Rather, it was a consequence of differences in the way GP fimd- 
holders and the health authority perform as purchasers of elective surgery. Like the
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cocaine addict and the aspiring entrepreneur above, they used their money differently. 
Hence at the level of the purchasers, this may make the system equitable.
Nevertheless, equity theory suggests this should not be taken as the end of the matter. 
Whilst the system may have been equitable at the level of the purchasers, at the level of 
patients the inequality of waiting times cannot so easily be dismissed as equitable and 
thus tolerable. The reason for this is the previously mentioned issue, equality of choice. 
Le Grand (1991b) argued that it is inequitable if an inequality between individuals occurs 
through factors outside their control. To apply this idea to the internal market, unequal 
waiting times might be inequitable if patients have no choice over who commissions their 
health care services, even if the funding levels of the purchasers is equitable. In other 
words, equity between commissioners can coexist with inequity among patients.
A critical factor in the equity debate is thus the level of choice patients have over which 
purchaser commissions their surgery. Obviously people do have a right to change GPs, 
so as long as there is a mix of fund-holding and non fund-holding practices in a locality, 
they can in theory exert some control over who commissions their elective surgery. 
Someone who considers the health authority to be ineffective in this function can register 
with a fund-holding GP, and vice versa. Yet this opportunity for choice may be more 
theoretical than actual. It presumes a level of knowledge in the population about the 
relative effectiveness of purchasers that may not be credible, for the following reasons.
Up to the point where the preliminary results of the statistics shown in chapter four of 
this thesis were reported (see Dowling, 1997), there was a reliance in academic circles on 
anecdotal evidence for gauging the relative waiting times of non fund-holding and fimd- 
holding patients. This makes it difficult to see how the general population can have the 
chance to make informed choices on which agency may do the best job in purchasing 
elective surgery, or any other form of health care. Anyway, even if such information was 
available, choosing a GP is unlikely to be shaped just by commissioning effectiveness. 
There could be many other factors that sway a person’s choice of practice, including the 
kindness of doctors, the politeness of receptionists, the availability of car parking spaces.
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or the courtesy shown by practice nurses. Additionally, these potential influences should 
not be seen as an exhaustive list. Taken together, it does not seem very realistic to 
expect patients to react instinctively to purchasing effectiveness in their choice of GP.
One personal example can be used to emphasise that point. The author of this thesis, a 
resident of West Sussex who was surely more aware than anyone on the relative waiting 
times of fimd-holding and non fimd-holding patients in the county, remained registered 
during the entire research period with a non fimd-holding practice. In feet, firom April 
1996 they were the only non fimd-holding practice in the city of Chichester. Although 
not on a hospital waiting list during that time, there is always a chance that a condition 
could develop that necessitates this. Despite that possibility, the author’s knowledge was 
not enough to drive a decision to change practices in order to join the list of a fimd- 
holding GP.
Perhaps a legitimate response to this might be that patients who choose not to change 
GPs to seek the best commissioner should not complain if they have to wait longer for 
their operations. This idea opens up a con^lex issue about the responsibilities of 
individuals in seeking out effective welfare services, and the government in ensuring they 
are available to the wide population. Finding an answer to that debate is not an aim of 
this thesis. Yet there might still be a bottom line at which the state takes responsibility 
for making sure the services on offer are as uniformly efficient as possible. Extending the 
uniformity of waiting times is thus a consideration in the context of policy options, and if 
one system performs better than the other, perhaps the superior one should be made 
available to all? This could expand equity if it provides more of a ‘level playing field’, so 
that some patients do not remain disadvantaged by their general practices choosing to 
stay outside the commissioning process.
Moreover, the general point about inequity, and equity, at the separate levels of patients 
and purchasers overlaps with a debate covered by Bevan (1998). He put forward a case 
that there are two types of equity applicable to the NHS, equitable fimding between 
patients of all practices and common waiting times. Fund-holding has been criticised for
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undermining equity on both counts because patients registered with GPs in the scheme 
allegedly may have benefited from shorter waits because such practices were budgeted 
over generously. The abolition of the scheme comphes with the government’s wish to 
remedy both types of inequity. However, Bevan (1998) also claimed that variations in 
medical practice make the simultaneous achievement of each sort of equity across 
general practice populations impossible, and suggested a choice has to be made between 
them.
Yet the reason why Sevan’s (1998) argument overlaps with the points made earlier in 
this section has nothing directly to do with variation in medical practice. Rather, if more 
than one purchaser type exists, differences in commissioning practice can impair the 
chance of achieving both types of equity. In addition to the statistical evidence given in 
chapter five, senior staff from the West Sussex Health Authority admitted that fund­
holders in the county were not over funded. This leads to the following judgement. In 
West Sussex, differences in waiting times were not a result of an unjust, meaning an 
inequitable, funding of local fund-holding practices.
From this, if funding in West Sussex did not unfairly advantage fund-holders, equitable 
waiting times do not appear consistent with financial equity. To achieve common waits 
for patients of all practices, '^* fimd-holders would presumably have to be under funded. 
Therefore, Sevan’s (1998) case holds but not only for the reasons he gave. Differences 
in purchasing effectiveness could be just as important a factor in making the two types of 
equity incompatible as variations in medical practice. A question that arises from this 
prospect is what might be the best way to try and achieve both efficiency and equity in 
the NHS? The following discussion considers that issue, and in doing so also uses the
24. This issue is not quite so straightforward as a simple distinction between fund-holding and non 
fund-holding patients. The average waits over the entire waiting list of patients from either group 
can differ greatly at separate hospitals. One example showing this is the mean waiting time of 
104.7 days for non fund-holding patients at the Mid Sussex provider in 1993/94 (table 4.11), whilst 
non fund-holders at Crawley Horsham that same year had a mean wait of twice that length, 209.4 
days (table 4.10).
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points made earlier about purchasing leverage and hospital behaviour in the quasi­
market.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The policy implications of this research are important because what happens to the NHS 
in the future will automatically build upon what has gone before. In social policy reform 
the past inevitably shapes the Mure to some extent and it is now too late to manufacture 
the NHS from scratch. Key lessons can thus be leamt from this comparative study of 
health authorities and GP frmd-holders as purchasers with regard to the development of 
Primary Care Groups. In particular, what does the study imply about eflBciency and 
equity in the health service, both of which the Labour Government wishes to extend (see 
Department of Health, 1997), and the levels from which services are best purchased? In 
the light of this debate, it is perhaps judicious to briefly reflect on GP fund-holding in 
particular, for the reasons that will be explained next.
GP fund-holding: a post-mortem
It is conceivable that social historians of the fiiture will define GP fimd-holding as more 
than just the forerunner of Primary Care Groups. The scheme may come to be seen as 
the genesis of them. After all, the planned involvement of GPs in Primary Care Groups 
appears to make them a more obvious development of fimd-holding than health authority 
commissioning. So in the final months of its life-time, it seems an appropriate time to 
conduct a brief ‘post-mortem’ on fimd-holding, albeit using some ‘poetic licence’ for this 
terminology considering that at the time of writing the scheme has not yet expired.
This study has shown that when patients’ waiting times are used as the basic measure of 
a purchaser’s effectiveness, GP fimd-holders should be seen as better commissioners of 
elective surgery than health authorities. Yet regardless of this and any other successes or
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feilures of the scheme, fund-holding might well be more remembered as the aspect of the 
1991 reforms that produced the most controversy and confrontation (for example, see 
Keeley, 1997b; Millard, 1997). This produced an environment that had allegedly allowed 
some commentators to disguise their personal and sometimes hostile bias towards fimd- 
holding with an image of informed opinion (see Marum, 1997).
Considering this climate, here is the rub. Could the major problem for frmd-holding have 
been that it was unable to win either way? If it shortened waits or induced other benefits 
not enjoyed by patients represented by health authorities, it would be blamed for driving 
a two-tier NHS. Otherwise, if it had not made such differences, what was the point of it? 
After all, it has generally been recognised that the scheme was expensive to run (see Le 
Grand et al., 1997), so might it not be best to abolish it? Therefore, without (or short 
oQ firm proof that any advantages of fund-holding were filtering through to all patients 
(which may be difficult to verify), either success or feilure could spell fervent criticism.
As such, it is probably not too surprising that the format of the internal market was due 
for a change. Yet fund-holding possibly created a momentum that could not be ignored 
by the new government. The rapid growth of the scheme in the context of participating 
practices and patients covered made it difficult to ignore the potential of GPs to play a 
central role in any fiiture purchasing configuration, despite many people’s opposition to 
the fimd-holding experiment. The scheme may have made it very hard, if not impossible, 
to ^tum the clock back’ and relegate GPs to their pre-1991 status. This was the climate 
in which the new administration formulated its plans for the NHS. In short, establishing 
Primary Care Groups would presumably not have been part of the Labour Government’s 
White Paper if fund-holding had never been introduced.
Beyond the 1991 reforms: Primary Care Groups
Beyond these points, it is necessary to place any discussion of the policy implications of 
this study into its proper context by highlighting the forthcoming changes that the new
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Labour Government plans to make to the NHS. By doing this, recommendations can be 
made that, if adopted, would fashion the structure of the service in line with what is 
probably going to happen anyway. It seems more logical to make suggestions that shape 
current government policy, rather than completely contradict it. Hence it is important to 
briefly describe the main proposals concerning the commissioning function -  as outlined 
in the new White Paper (Department of Health, 1997).
There will be four models of Primary Care Groups formally encompassing all general 
practices and their patients. They will typically cover around 100,000 people each, but 
this can vary according to local circumstances and any new evidence on what might be 
the optimum population size for a group. At the lowest level they will be bodies acting 
in an advisory capacity to its local health authority. At the highest level, though still 
accountable to the health authority, they will be free standing groups which will not only 
commission care from providers but take responsibility for the provision of community 
services to its population.
The depth of GPs’ involvement in the commissioning function should therefore expand 
as groups move up the levels, although other interests will also be represented in the 
structure of such bodies -  including the nursing profession. Those beginning at the 
lowest stage of the Primary Care Group ladder will be expected to progress over time to 
a higher level, so that health authorities will eventually relinquish their commissioning 
frinction.
Efficiency and equity: where next for the NHS?
The first point to be considered is the type of equity that should be seen as the main goal, 
financial evenness or common waiting times. The trouble with basing equity on common 
waits is that it may compromise efficient commissioning. Purchasers that are good at 
shortening waits will see resources slip away to those who are not, because ineffective 
commissioners will presumably require additional finance. Although some may see the
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following sentence as provocative language, it forcefully puts across the point that is 
being made. Efficiency incentives could feasibly become smothered by an addiction to 
universal outcomes. To accept this view as valid means that financial equity is the base 
fi-om which policy must originate, and that would appear to support the use of formula 
funding.
Though the mechanics of setting a fair formula attracts deliberation and debate, the work 
towards effective formula funding has resulted in a capitation methodology which has 
been designed for use at the level of individual general practice populations (see NHS 
Executive, 1997a). This should presumably go some way to nullifying the objections to 
the aim that could previously have been made: that a robust capitation formula for such 
small populations was too difficult to achieve. Furthermore, for commissioners covering 
bigger communities like the average number of people that are likely to be represented 
by Primary Care Groups, the suitability of formula funding looks even more convincing 
(see Martin et a l, 1997). However, not everybody shares this optimism, as was shown 
by Baker’s (1998) claim that funding Primary Care Groups by capitation methods could 
lead to chaos.
Nevertheless, allocating funds by way of a capitation formula might provide the best 
hope of alleviating the other cause of inequity identified by Bevan (1998), variation in 
medical practice. If the expenditure limits implied by the budgets are vigorously applied, 
when GPs are purchasers and have incentives to avoid over spends against the allotted 
sum, this might have more effect than most other policy options on tempering differences 
in medical practice between GPs. Furthermore, it should still be remembered that the 
most expensive items of health care, including things like major surgery, renal dialysis 
and oncology services, will only be provided when a hospital doctor -  not a GP, define 
them as necessary. Consequently, many contrasts in the costs of secondary services for 
patients of individual general practices may have more to do with genuine need than 
differences in medical practice between GPs.
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However, regardless of differences in medical practice, it has already been discussed at 
some length how the inequitable waiting times at four West Sussex providers did not 
seem to be a consequence of fimd-holders having overgenerous budgets. Yet something 
must still be done to match the financial equity that may derive from capitation funding 
with a better chance of an equitable access for all patients requiring non-urgent elective 
surgery. One option could be to remove purchasing responsibilities from the practices 
that already have it. Yet this would mean passing it back to the purchaser who generally 
obtained longer waits for the patients of non fimd-holding GPs, the health authorities. It 
seems feasible that doing this might equalise patients’ waiting times at a higher level than 
may otherwise be possible, perhaps gaining uniformity at the expense of reducing all to 
the level of the least effective. If this was to be the case it seems a somewhat bizarre, if 
not a perverse way, of achieving greater equality in patients’ access to hospital services.
Returning to a point made earlier, perhaps the most obvious potential solution to this 
dilemma is to extend the benefits of GP purchasing (like shorter waits) to all patients, 
rather than just the population registered with fund-holding practices.^’ And considering 
the likely balance in the influence of health authorities and GPs between the four levels of 
Primary Care Groups, it would appear to be important for such groups to move up the 
four stages as quickly as is possible. From this, if the outcome of Primary Care Groups 
is to pass the commissioning function to GPs, the government could be moving the NHS 
in the right direction. Particularly as their White Paper said a national schedule of 
reference costs will itemise what individual treatments cost across the NHS, and trusts 
will publish and benchmark their charges on the same basis (see Department of Health, 
1997).
Carrying this idea forward to cover services outside the standard fund-holding scheme 
could well be vital to the eventual success of the changes. For an implication from the
25. While this may reduce differences in the services received by patients that were driven by arbitrary 
policy rules (the opportunities for practices to choose between fimd-holding and non fimd-holding 
status) it is unlikely to reduce disparities in other aspects of care. This point is reinforced by the 
way Glermerster et al. (1994a) emphasised stark contrasts in the standards of separate general 
practices even before the fund-holding era.
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fifth chapter of this thesis was the potential for money to be wasted due to the health 
authority not knowing what it was paying for which procedures. While this is not an 
argument for blanket cost-per-case arrangements, the block agreements of the future 
should be more like fimd-holders’ block contracts than the less specific type used by 
health authorities. Identifiable costs must be attributed to each identified treatment, and 
providers should be penalised if there are wide discrepancies between the contracted and 
actual volume of activity.
But in the context of shortening waits, a success of fund-holding was its ability to make 
hospitals responsive to commissioners. An idea put forward earlier in this chapter was 
that the limited budgets of fimd-holders might give them extra purchasing leverage 
because it frees them from the worries associated with the potential to close a hospital 
down. Yet Primary Care Groups, if they typically cover populations of about 100,000, 
may adopt a responsibility for keeping their local trusts open. However, if the block 
payments are attributed to individual items of service, the leverage may still be retained. 
The feature which created leverage, the capacity to transfer a relatively small proportion 
of referrals to other providers when money for the treatments follows the patient, could 
become spread around all practices rather than concentrated in the hands of fund­
holders. As such, the flexibility that gave strength to the small purchasers (GP fund­
holders) in the quasi-market could thus be carried over to larger Primary Care Groups.
Further, because the moveable patients may well be a relatively minor proportion of the 
population, much of the fixed costs of trusts should be covered by the payments for the 
services supplied to the majority of patients who are not going to be referred elsewhere. 
In general, a cautious optimism about the proposed reforms therefore seems justified, 
although there are a number of factors that seem critical. For example, GPs would need 
the freedom to refer patients to where they want and the money for all treatments should 
explicitly follow the patient to the provider supplying the service. Most episodes of care 
can be supplied under block contracts (to be called service agreements) similar to the 
types used by fimd-holders, with payments being measurable against precise levels of 
service utilisation. Yet the system should be flexible enough to allow specific payments
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for individual treatments at rarely used providers. Hence there should still be room for 
some payments to be made on a cost-per-case basis.
However, there is a danger that budgets covering populations of about 100,000 might be 
so vague and intangible to GPs that any incentives for individual practices to stay within 
the allotted sum are negated. This could undermine budget discipline at a level where 
professional self-regulation can work. If the administrative costs are not too excessive, 
budgets should thus be devolved for some services to smaller levels within Primary Care 
Groups, like individual practices. Hence the extent to which each practice was over or 
under running against its budget could be monitored. This may comply with more GPs 
being involved in the management of groups and also with an observation of a health 
authority manager, quoted in the last chapter, that distinct services are best purchased at 
varying levels. For example, if the purchase of bone marrow transplants is performed 
better for wide populations, this should occur. If elective surgery is best commissioned 
by individual practices. Primary Care Groups must be flexible enough to permit this.
From this, a key task for the future must therefore be to distinguish what should be 
commissioned at any level, and to allow purchasing decisions to be taken in line with 
such evidence, a question that was addressed by Le Grand et a l (1997). Indeed, the 
need for Primary Care Groups to do some things at devolved levels may find support 
from the evaluative work on total purchasing projects by Goodwin et a l (1998). They 
wrote that single practice and small multi-practice pilots were more likely than large 
projects to report meeting their objectives.
Moreover, the outcomes from Primary Care Groups will doubtless offer opportunities 
for future research. For instance, it may be interesting to investigate the effectiveness of 
such groups at varying levels, and their commissioning of different kinds of service. The 
success of groups in commissioning treatments where the prospect for leverage is more 
explicitly to do with the exit option, like elective surgery, could be evaluated against their 
performance in purchasing procedures less open to market mechanisms, like accident and 
emergency or maternity services. This may inform the debate on how the engagement of
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GPs in the planning process behind secondary care compares to their capacity to exercise 
the exit option.
CONCLUSION
It is noticeable that some of the ideas put forward in the previous section on policy 
implications are dependent on continuing the right of GPs to switch referrals between 
providers. If this reflects the true nature of Primary Care Groups, a degree of 
competition should be induced between hospitals. Yet although the new government’s 
White Paper does include the point that the internal market will be abolished (see 
Department of Health, 1997), such competition does not contradict any of the details in 
that document. For instance, the White Paper indicates that both the separation between 
providers and commissioners plus the right of purchasers to redirect work between 
hospitals is to be maintained.
Accordingly, it would seem that the potential success of Primary Care Groups rely on 
some of the language used in the White Paper, most obviously the point about abolishing 
the internal market, having more to do with political rhetoric than firm intentions. The 
evidence that market mechanisms gave some patients shorter waiting times can perhaps 
be seen as confirming that the quasi-market, far from being all bad, did have some very 
positive features. As a result, the argument being made is that if the internal market in its 
present guise is to be abolished, it should be replaced with another form of quasi-market.
There is no reason why this proposal should be seen as contrary to the ideology of the 
present government. If there is a baseline doctrine behind the concept that has become 
known as ‘New Labour’, it is likely to correspond in some way with the philosophy of 
market socialism. A fundamental idea behind this notion is that under certain conditions 
markets can produce virtuous outcomes (Estrin and Le Grand, 1989; Le Grand, 1989). 
Correspondingly, if ends are seen as more important than means, claims to the beneficial
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outcomes of markets should not be seen as a prerogative of the new right (see Miller, 
1989).
From this, markets do not inevitably have to contradict the principles of equity. If the 
opportunity to switch referrals encapsulates all GPs and the money for NHS treatments 
follows patients, the prospects for both equitable and shorter waiting times, plus lower 
waiting lists, should theoretically be improved. Le Grand (1991b, p. 20) wrote that it is 
‘commonly asserted that there is, or that in most situations there is likely to be, a trade­
off between equity and efficiency’, an assertion also made by Williams (1993). In the 
context of productive efficiency, perhaps this is one of the occasions where a trade-off is 
not necessary. For a government that finds itself embarrassed by growing NHS waiting 
lists (see Warden, 1998b; 1998c), as well as seeing them become the main test of its 
political virility (see Warden, 1998d), it should be a tempting proposition to follow a 
policy that could both reduce waits and extend equity.
Allied to this point, what is the alternative to GPs taking on the wide commissioning 
function within the NHS? It would appear to be the health authority doing this. Primary 
Care Groups would remain at level one. If their block contracts were changed to mirror 
those used by fimd-holders, where payments are compared to the actual activity that has 
taken place and modified to reflect it on a global basis, GPs may still have the exit option 
backed by money following the patients. Yet considering that the financial responsibility 
of GPs grow as Primary Care Groups move up the stages, at the lowest level questions 
could be asked as to whether it would be wrong for GPs not to hold the budget for the 
secondary care received by their patients. After all, it was an interviewee fi'om the health 
authority who argued that GPs should hold responsibility for elective care plus accident 
and emergency services, for they also arrange many of the admissions for the latter (see 
chapter seven).
The rationale for this argument is that the growth in the demand for emergency services 
may not necessarily be down to the same expansion in the need for such services. People 
can be admitted as emergencies for a large number of reasons and in a wide variety of
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conditions. It could be that some patients are admitted now who would not have been in 
the past. While this could mean that some patients who should have been admitted in the 
past were not, it might also be that some people are taken in now who do not need to be 
admitted as emergencies. Of course, not all such admissions are arranged by GPs. For 
example, they have no control over self-referrals by patients. But GPs do arrange many 
emergency admissions themselves, and in such cases this is a service where the costs of 
hospital services are directly driven by practices.
As such, if GPs are the gatekeepers to such services, it seems logical that they should 
hold the funding as well. Considering the alleged rise in the costs of emergency services, 
as discussed in chapter five, perhaps a major fault of the standard fund-holding scheme 
was that it excluded GPs fi*om any financial responsibility for too many services? It left 
the agents with influence on the rate of such admissions with little incentive to check any 
unnecessary costs, outside a moral obligation to curb NHS spending. That is not a claim 
that fimd-holders were more likely than other GPs to show little interest in controlling 
the costs for services outside the scheme. The results of research into the emergency 
services fails to support this idea, despite the fact that such expenditure falls outside the 
remit of fimd-holders (see Toth et al., 1997). But fimd-holders still had little personal 
reason to try and check unnecessary emergency admissions, apart from being taxpayers, 
and neither did non fimd-holders. Perhaps it is small wonder that the costs have grown.
It may therefore be a good thing that Primary Care Groups should extend the purchasing 
responsibility of GPs beyond the remit of the current standard fimd-holding scheme. 
Linked to this, it would seem sensible for Primary Care Groups to be encouraged to 
move up the four levels, or join at the highest feasible level to start with, as soon as 
possible. Perhaps hesitancy over this could result fi*om the financial skills required to 
manage the budgets for services outside the fimd-holding scheme. Yet Primary Care 
Groups will have staffing structures, and accountants can be part of this. Anyway, the 
financial performance of GPs within the fimd-holding scheme does not seem to give 
cause for concern. A senior finance manager from the local health authority confirmed 
that West Sussex fimd-holders had a net under spend against their aggregate hospital and
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community health services budgets, similar to a national trend identified by Le Grand et 
a l (1997).
In that review of the literature on NHS purchasers. Le Grand et a l (1997) made the 
point that although health authorities had initially under spent by less than fimd-holders 
and on an aggregate basis had then moved into deficit, the reasons for this were unclear. 
However, with regard to the prospect that fimd-holders may have been over fimded, this 
thesis has shown that does not appear to have been the case in West Sussex. Although 
managing the budget for care covered by the standard fimd-holding scheme will be easier 
than the fimds for all services, the situation in West Sussex suggests there is little reason 
to immediately write-off Primary Care Groups as being unable to carry out this fimction 
to acceptable standards.
In sum, the evidence fi-om this study suggests elective surgery (and fi-om this perhaps 
most health care services) should be purchased by general practices. So that purchasing 
leverage and hospital behaviour can contribute to efficiency and equity in the context of 
waiting times, the following format for the new NHS is implied. Trusts give priority to 
income maximisation. This can be made to work for patients by giving all GPs, through 
their Primary Care Groups, the freedom to switch referrals between different providers. 
This is likely to happen with a minority of a hospital’s caseload, so that much of its fixed 
costs should remain covered. But as long as money follows the patients through making 
payments attributable to the number treated, trusts should be responsive and try to cut 
waiting times to attract referrals. Hence the efficiency of providers might be advanced, 
with purchasing leverage spread around all GPs. With Primary Care Groups fimded by a 
capitation methodology, this could create equal access for patients.
Moreover, incentives for GPs to act as efficient commissioners, beyond improving the lot 
of their patients, should be maintained. Devolving budgets within Primary Care Groups 
for some services may open up the potential for under spends to be used by practices in 
similar ways to fimd-holding savings. There should also be room to cut the transaction 
costs incurred with fimd-holding by decreasing the volume of data recorded at general
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practices. Cutting the detail in contracts and making the contracting process less time 
consuming could reduce transaction costs as well -  a change that might result from the 
intended move towards three-year and in some cases five-year service agreements (see 
Department of Health, 1997). Taking these points into account, it seems equity can be 
achieved at the levels of purchasers and patients, alongside hospital efficiency and lower 
transaction costs. While this seems a realistic proposition in theory, further research will 
be required in the future to ascertain whether events actually turn out that way.
Appendix
Listed below are the groups of procedures used for the case mix comparison in the sixth 
chapter. The groups are characterised by having procedures within them that at some 
point have been covered by the standard fund-holding scheme up to and including the 
1995/96 financial year. This does not mean every separate operation code in a group 
was always covered by the scheme, and some may never have been. For example, in 
1995/96, of the cranial nerve procedures running fi*om A24 to A3 6, only operations 
within the A27 code were included in the standard fund-holding scheme. The codes not 
covered by the scheme in a particular year will not be included in the applicable tables of 
chapter six. Moreover, to appear as a distinct group in those tables, the number of 
operations that were relevant to it would have made it one of the ten most common of all 
the procedure groups below at a provider in a specific year.
Nervous system 
A24-A36 Cranial nerves
A44-A57 Spinal cord and other contents of spinal canal
A59-A73 Peripheral nerves
Endocrine system and breast
B08-B16 Thyroid and parathyroid glands
B27-B37 Breast
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Eye
C10-C22 Eyebrow and eyelid
C24-C29 Lacrimal apparatus
C31 -C3 7 Muscles of eye
C39-C51 Conjunctiva and cornea
C53-C64 Sclera and iris
C66-C77 Anterior chamber of eye and lens
C79-C86 Retina and other parts of eye
Ear
D10-D20 Mastoid and middle ear
D22-D28 Inner ear and eustachian canal
Respiratory tract
EOl-ElO Nose
El 2-El 7 Nasal sinuses
E19-E27 Pharynx
E29-E38 Larynx
E39-E52 Trachea and bronchus
E53-E63 Lung and mediastinum
Mouth
F34-F42 Tonsil and other parts of mouth
F44-F58 Salivary apparatus
Upper digestive tract
G01-G25 Oesophagus including hiatus hernia
G27-G48 Stomach pylorus and general upper gastrointestinal tract endoscopy
G49-G57 Duodenum
G58-G67 Jejunum
G69-G82 Ileum
Lower digestive tract
H04-H30 Colon
H33-H46 Rectum
H47-H62 Anus and perianal region
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Other abdominal organs -  principally digestive
J18-J26 Gall bladder
J27-J52 Bile duct
Heart
K25-K38 Valves of heart and adjacent structures
K40-K51 Coronary artery
Arteries and veins
L74-L97 Veins and other blood vessels
Urinaiy
M01-M16 Kidney
M18-M32 Ureter
M34-M49 Bladder
M51-M70 Outlet of bladder and prostate
M72-M83 Urethra and other part of urinary tract
Male genital organs
NOl-N13 Scrotum and testes
N 15-N24 Spermatic cord and male perineum
N26-N34 Penis and other male genital organs
Lower female genital tract
PO1 -P13 Vulva and female perineum
P14-P31 Vagina
Upper female genital tract
Q01-Q20 Uterus
Q22-Q41 Fallopian tube
Q43-Q56 Ovary and broad ligament
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Skin
SO 1-S62 Skin or subcutaneous tissue
S64-S70 Nail
Soft tissue
T19-T31 Abdominal wall
T33-T48 Peritoneum
T50-T62 Fascia ganglion and bursa
T64-T74 Tendon
T85-T96 Lymphatic tissue
Bones and joints of skull and spine
V22-V54 Bones and joints of spine
Other bones and joints
W05-W36 Bone 
W37-W92 Joint
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